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Abstract
This thesis is an intellectual history o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ from the works of 
Hugo Grotius to the contemporary writings o f the ‘English School’. Its central 
argument contends that, contrary to its contemporary conceptualisation, the Grotian 
tradition has not, historically speaking, been a tradition o f thought about 
international society. Rather, it is a moral tradition, derived in essence, if not always 
in substance, from Grotius’ most famous work De Jure Belli ac Pads, and 
perpetuated in the international legal writings of a range of scholars including 
Samuel Pufendorf, James Kent, Henry Wheaton, Cornelius van Vollenhoven and 
Hersch Lauterpacht before being transformed into its current form in the works of 
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. In explicating this argument, this thesis pursues two 
inter-related lines of inquiry. The first is concerned with the meaning of the term 
‘Grotian’, both in relation to Hugo Grotius and as it has been employed in 
subsequent scholarship. In doing so, it introduces a three-tiered moral scheme that 
is central to Grotius’ thought and highlights its perpetuation in international legal 
and political thought. The second line o f inquiry considers what it means, both in 
theoretical and practical terms, to designate a set of thinkers and ideas a ‘tradition’ 
and considers the epistemological ramifications of doing so. As such, it is 
concerned not only with the manner in which the term ‘tradition’ has been 
employed by proponents of the ‘Grotian tradition’ but seeks to highlight some of 
the broader implications associated with the construction o f traditions for the 
discipline o f International Relations.
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Preface
This is a thesis about Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and the invention o f the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ in International Relations scholarship. It is, at heart, an intellectual history 
of the ‘Grotian tradition’ from the works of Grotius to its most prominent 
articulation in the twentieth century scholarship of the so-called ‘English School’. 
In large part, it is driven by the recognition that as the proliferation of ‘Grotian’ 
traditions evident in twentieth century scholarship continues to grow in new and 
divergent directions and, as an increasing number of scholars are identifying 
themselves as ‘Grotians’, an extended study of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and, by 
extension, what it means to be ‘Grotian’, has never been more pertinent. Thus, 
although it does not claim to constitute a comprehensive account of Grotius’ works 
and their impact on subsequent scholarship, this thesis aims to begin the process of 
piecing together almost four hundred years o f ‘Grotian’ scholarship.
Alongside this central impetus, this thesis pursues a secondary aim, namely, the 
provision of a substantive engagement with the available works of Grotius that are 
of relevance to International Relations. In large part, this is driven by the 
recognition that although Grotius stands as a relatively prominent figure in 
contemporary International Relations scholarship, no such work exists. Although a 
number of intellectual biographies are available, the most notable of which is
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Charles Edwards’ Hugo Grotius The Miracle o f  Holland/ there is a need for a more 
comprehensive work that takes Grotius’ early writings into consideration. Indeed, 
since the publication o f Edwards’ work, a number of Grotius’ early works have 
been published, both in vernacular languages and as English translations, thereby 
facilitating a more comprehensive account of the development of Grotius’ thought. 
In addition, although a painstakingly researched exposition of De Jure Belli ac 
P ads  has appeared in the form of Onuma Yasuaki’s edited collection, A Normative 
Approach to War: Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius/ the works from which 
Grotius’ masterpiece was derived remain largely unexplored in International 
Relations scholarship. Indeed, perhaps closest to incorporating a comprehensive 
account of Grotius’ intellectual development are Richard Tuck’s Natural rights 
theories, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 and The Rights o f War and 
Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant 
although, as will be seen as this thesis progresses, considerable problems are 
associated with the portrayal of Grotius in all o f these works.^
Thus, although most contemporary scholarship focuses exclusively on Grotius’ 
most famous work De Jure Belli ac P ads (The Rights o f  War and Peace), this
 ^ Charles Edwards, Hugo Grotius The Miracle o f Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought, 
(Chicago; Nelson-Hall, 1981).
- Onuma Yasuaki (ed.), A Normative Approach to IVar: Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
 ^ Richard Tuck, Natural rights theories: their origin and development, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979); Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); The Rights o f War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order from. Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
thesis draws on a range of his early and less prominent works often classified as 
‘historical’ or ‘theological’ in orientation. In doing so, however, due to the limited 
accessibility of many o f these works, the choice of editions and translations used 
has very often been dictated by availability. As the most commonly referred to 
English translation, I have primarily relied on Francis W. Kelsey’s 1964 edition of 
De Jure Belli ac Pads  whilst also referring, on occasions, to A C. Campbell’s 1901 
edition, entitled The Rights o f  War and Peace, and, in light of its influence on 
subsequent scholarship, Thomas Manley’s 1738 English translation of Jean 
Barbeyrac’s edition o f the work."  ^For similar reasons, I have also used editions of 
the works of Samuel Pufendorf', Emerich de Vattel, Chiistian von Wolff, Samuel 
Rachel, Cornelius van Bykershoek, and Henry Wheaton published as part of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s series on the “Classics Of 
International Law”.
 ^Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads Lfbri Tres (The Law of War and Peace), trans. Francis W. 
Kelsey, (New York; Oceana Publications, 1964); The Rights o f War and Peace Including the Law of  
Nature and o f Nations, bans. AC. Campbell, (Wasliington: M. Walter Duime, 1901); The Rights o f  
War and Peace in Three Books Wherein are Explained, the Law o f Nature and Nations, and the 
Principal Points relating to Government, to which are Added, All the large Notes o f Mr J. 
Barbeyrac, bans. Tliomas Manley, (London: bays & Manley, 1738).
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Works by Hugo Grotius
DJB De Jure Belli ac P ads Libri Tres (The Law of War and Peace in Three
Books)
DJP De Jure Praedae Commentarius (Commentary on the Law of Prize and
Booty)
DA De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae (The Antiquity o f the Batavian
Republic)
RE De Repiiblica Emendanda (An Emendation of the Republic)
CiT Commentarius in Theses X I  (Commentary on Eleven Theses)
Works by Other Authors
EJU Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo (Elements of
Universal Jurisprudence in Two Books) by Samuel Pufendorf
DJN De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (The Law of Nature and Nations
in Eight Books) by Samuel Pufendorf
OHC De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta Legem naturalem (On the Duty o f Man
and Citizen) by Samuel Pufendorf
JGM  Jus Gentium Methodo Sdentifica Pertractatum (The Law of Nations
Treated According to a Scientific Method) by Christian von Wolff
LDG Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle appliqués à la
Conduit et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains (The Law of
XI
Nations or the Principles o f the Law o f Nature Applied to the Conduct and 
to the Affairs o f Nations and o f Sovereigns) by Emerich de Vattel 
TGS Transactions o f  the Grotius Society
Xll
Traditions of Thought and the ^Grotius Problem’ in 
International Relations
Not only is there no consensus over the nature of the man, his work, and 
how it is to be used, these divisions have often obscured the fact that there is 
no agreement over what it actually means to be ‘Grotian’. Self-confessed 
members see themselves, and their tradition, in markedly distinct ways 
whilst claiming their often contradictory values to be quintessentially 
‘Grotian’. These contradictions were perhaps a consequence of the Grotian 
predilection for inconclusiveness. ^
In the discipline o f International Relations,^ Hugo Grotius is a name more 
synonymous with a tradition than with a man. It is a name evoked with relative 
frequency in contemporary scholarship, and yet, little consensus exists as to 
precisely what it means to be ‘Grotian’, what the ‘Grotian tradition’ entails or, 
indeed, whether or not Grotius can be considered a ‘Grotian’ himself. Echoing these 
sentiments, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts note in their introduction to 
Hugo Grotius and International Relations, “[t]he claim that there is a ‘Grotian 
tradition’ of thought about international relations has often been made rather 
loosely, with little discussion of what is meant by a ‘tradition’ or why a particular
’ Karma Nabiilsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law, (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 134.
 ^ In accordance witli convention, tlie capitalised International Relations designates tlie study of the 
lower case international relations.
tradition is held to be ‘Grotian’.”  ^ Thus, in its most common incarnation, the 
‘Grotian tradition’ simply exists as an amorphous set of ideas vaguely centered 
around “a commitment to the idea of international society .C onvenient though it 
is, this vague conceptualisation belies the fact that a range o f ‘Grotian’ traditions 
operate in the discipline, each founded, whether consciously or otherwise, on a 
particular understanding o f what is meant by the term ‘tradition’, and each 
conceiving the value o f Grotius’ works relative to this. Thus, as increasing numbers 
of International Relations theorists have come to describe themselves as ‘Grotians’ 
in recent scholarship, albeit in distinctly divergent ways, an extended engagement 
with the range of problems inherent in the construction of the ‘Grotian tradition’ has 
never been more timely or pertinent.^
In light of these observations, and the recognition that although the importance of 
Grotius’ most famous work. De Jure Belli ac Pads (The Law o f  War and Peace)/ 
has been ‘vast’ in subsequent scholarship, “a comprehensive study of its intellectual
 ^Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, “Introduction: Grotian Tliouglit in International Relations” 
in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.51. 
ibid.
 ^ For example, despite entertaining vastly different notions of what it is to be ‘Grotians’, Robert 
Jackson and Tim Dunne have botii been recenlJy attracted to die label. Robert H. Jackson, 
“International Community Beyond the Cold War”, in Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and 
International Intervention, ed. Michael Mastandmio and Gene M. Lyons, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.60; Tim Duime, Inventing International Society: A History o f the 
English School, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p.xi.
 ^Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres (hereafter DJB), trans. Francis W. Kelsey, (New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1964).
impact has not yet appeared,”  ^ this thesis constitutes an intellectual history of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ in its various forms, from the works of Hugo Grotius to its most 
prominent articulation in the twentieth century scholai'ship of the ‘English School’.^  
In doing so, it seeks to address two inter-related sets of questions. Drawing on the 
development of ‘Grotian’ scholarship in international legal and political thought, 
the first seeks to ascertain precisely what the term ‘Grotian’ has meant both 
historically and as it is employed in contemporary scholarship. It asks why 
particular sets o f thinkers and ideas have been classified as ‘Grotian’ and, by 
extension, whether or not the term ‘Grotian’ retains any necessary connection to the 
historical figure of flugo Grotius himself. The second set of questions is concerned 
with the concept of tradition and asks, in the first place, what it means to designate 
a set of thinkers or ideas as a tradition. Extending this line of inquiry flirther, it also 
seeks to investigate the implications o f employing traditions as taxonomic devices 
according to which the conceptual boundaries and cognitive relationships between 
ideas are understood. In this endeavour, it seeks to draw a set of conclusions that are 
not only specific to the construction o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ but that may be more 
broadly applicable to the discipline o f International Relations. Considered together, 
these two sets of questions not only seek to elucidate both the construction and 
content of the ‘Grotian tradition’, but investigate the extent to which its 
epistemological parameters, membership and ultimate relationship to the figure of
 ^Benedict Kingsbui) ,^ “Grotius, Law and Moral Scepticism; Theory and Practice in tlie Thought of 
Hedley Bull” in Classical Theories o f International Relations, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumami, 
(London: Macmillan, 1996), p.43.
 ^That group of scholars known as the ‘English School’ and whetlier or not they constitute a ‘school’ 
of thought are discussed in Chapter VII.
Hugo Grotius is determined by the manner in which what is ‘Grotian’ is conceived 
to be a ‘tradition’.
Tradition in International Relations
Since its formal inception as a distinct scholarly discipline in the early twentieth 
century, International Relations has relied on the concept of ‘tradition’ as one of the 
central sources of its self-image.^ Although the reasons for this are probably wide 
and varied and, I suspect, more accidental than consciously planned, the attraction 
of tradition is easy to see. Traditions are a “practical convenience.” ®^ Drawing 
together a range of at times disparate concepts, they constitute “a way o f imposing 
order upon” what often appears to be “a complex and protean reality.”  ^^  As James 
Der Derian writes;
The power o f tradition lies in its ability to condense and
simplify... complexity into uniform, comprehensive and teachable
 ^The establisliment of International Relations as a distinct discipline is conventionally held to have 
occurred with the founding of tlie first Chair of International Relations at the University College of 
Wales at Aberystwytli in 1919.
R.B.J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.27.
” Tim Dmme, “Mythology or methodology? Traditions in international theory”. Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 19, (1993), p.308.
expressions, like idealism and realism, classicalism and behaviouralism, or 
neorealism and international political economy, landmark traditions all.
Although the concept of ‘tradition’ is itself the focus of the following chapter, it 
suffices here to say that, in this sense at least, ‘tradition’ is employed as a 
taxonomic device according to which ideas and their relations to one another are 
classified.
In this vein, the history of International Relations in the twentieth century is 
conventionally told as a chronological series o f ‘great debates’ waged between the 
contending theoretical traditions and paradigms into which the discipline is alleged 
to be divided. Indeed, this propensity, both for dividing the discipline into ‘often 
conflicting traditions’ and for the subsequent taxonomic classification of its 
component theories, has become one of the ‘hallmarks’ of contemporary 
International Relations scholarship.^^ Although it has been both questioned and 
subsumed by a wide range of classification schemes in contemporaiy scholarship, 
for much of the twentieth century. International Relations was characterised in 
terms of the so-called ‘first great debate’ waged between realism and idealism, the 
two dominant traditions o f the inter-war period identified in E.H. Carr’s seminal
James Der Derian, “Introducing Pliilosophical Traditions in International Relations”, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No.2, (1988), p. 190.
Ian Clark, “Traditions of Thought and Classical Tlieories of International Relations”, in Classical 
Theories o f International Relations, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, (London: Macmillan, 
1996), p.l.
work. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939/'^ In the work of Martin Wight, 
International Relations is divided into ‘at least three’ traditions; realism, rationalism 
and revolutionism,^^ while Michael Donelan, citing ‘inflation’, lists five; natural 
law, realism, fideism, rationalism and historicism/® Greater still, Nardin and 
Mapel’s Traditions o f  International Ethics lists tw e lv e ,w h ile  David Boucher 
divides political theories of international relations into three traditions; empirical 
realism, universal moral order and historical reason.'^ Finally, in the field of regime 
theory Stephen Krasner identifies three traditions; the structuralist or realist, 
modified structuralist or modified realist, and the Grotian/^
E.H. Cair, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, ed. Michael Cox, (London: Palgrave, 2001); For objections to this see Peter Wilson, “The 
mytli of the ‘First Great Debate’”, Review o f International Studies, Vol.24, Special Issue, (December 
1998), pp.49-58; Lucian Ashwortli, Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal 
Tradition, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1991). Despite argiunents to the contrary, a range of contemporary 
dieorists, including Enuiianuel Navon, still maintain tliat this initial division continues to infonn tlie 
categorisation of International Relations scholarship. Emmanuel Navon, “The ‘Third Debate’ 
revisited”. Review o f International Studies, Vol.27, (2001), p.6Il. For a critique of Navon’s piece 
see Duncan S.A. Bell, “Political Tlieory and tlie functions of intellectual liistory: a response to 
Emmanuel Navon”, of International Studies, Vol.29, (2003), pp. 151-160.
Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, 
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991),
Michael Donelan, Elements o f International Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.2.
Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds ). Traditions o f International Ethics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
David Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Stephen Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables”, 
International Organization, Vol.36, No.2, (Spring 1982), pp. 185-206.
Following the infusion and general misappropriation of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal 
work on the role of paradigms in scientific research, the ‘traditions’ have, in some 
quarters, become ‘paradigms’.^ ® Thus, following the second, methodologically 
inspired debate waged between the behaviouralists, inspired by the methods of the 
natural sciences, and proponents of the ‘traditional’ approach to international 
relations, came the third or ‘inter-paradigm’ d e b a t e . I n  this vein, both Banks, and 
Olsen and Groom divide International Relations into three contending paradigms; 
realism, pluralism and structuralism.^^ With respect to Kuhn’s original notion of 
paradigms as successive phases in the development of knowledge, each to be 
discarded as new and more effective sets o f ideas are developed, Vazquez describes 
a progression in International Relations, through the idealist and realist phases.
^ Thomas Kulm, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, (Cliicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962).
Steve Smitli, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theoiy”, 
in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995), pp. 1-37. Emanating from this tliird debate is, in Yosef Lapid’s view, a more fundamental 
conflict between the positivist and post-positivist approaches to international relations, Smiilarly, 
Ole Wæver contends tliat we are “probably after the fourth debate” waged between Robert 
Keohane’s division of international organization into rationalism and reflectivism. Yosef Lapid, 
“The Tliird Debate: On the Prospects of International Tlieoiy in a Post-Positivist Era”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol.33, (1989), pp.235-25I; Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm 
debate”, in International theory: positivism and beyond, ed. Steve Smitli,, Ken Booth and Marysia 
Zalewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 149-185; Robert O. Keohane, 
“International Institutions: Two Approaches”, in International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. 
Janies Der Derian, (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995), pp.279-307.
Michael Banks, “The Inter-Paradigm Debate”, in International Relations: A Handbook o f Current 
Theory, ed. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); William C. Olsen and 
A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then & Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation, (London: 
Routledge, 1991).
followed by the behavioural revolt, and ultimately ending with the ‘world society’ 
approach.
On a separate front. International Relations scholarship has also been somewhat 
obsessed with the construction o f what is perceived to be The tradition of 
International Relations theory’ in the form of a canon o f great or ‘classic’ works. 
Indeed, the lack of a self-evident set o f works indicative of the intellectual history 
of the discipline was most famously addressed in Martin Wight’s controversial 
1966 article, “Why Is There No International Theory?”^^  In responding to this 
question, Wight does not infer that there is no such thing as international theory but 
rather maintains that a tradition o f international theory comparable to that of 
political theory does not exist. Thus, whereas political theory has been traditionally 
organised into a canon o f classic works, stretching from Plato to the present, 
international relations does not have a corresponding set o f ‘classics’. Rather, it is 
“scattered, unsystematic and...largely repellant and intractable in form” and is to be 
found in the works of a range o f political philosophers, international lawyers, 
statesmen and diplomats.^^
In response to this realisation. International Relations has dedicated a great deal of 
energy to the construction of its own canon of ‘classic’ works largely poached from
Jolm A. Vazquez, The Power o f Power Politics: A Critique, (London; Frances Pinter, 1983). 
Martin Wight, “Wliy Is There No International Tlieory?”, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on 
the Theory of World Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1966), pp. 17-34. 
ibid., p.20.
the field of political theory. Thus, orthodox volumes, such as Howard Williams’ 
International Relations in Political Theory include Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Clausewitz and Marx.^® 
Similarly, Michael Donelan’s ‘1®‘ XI’ includes Aristotle, Augustine, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, with Kant 
as the team captain.^^ However, precisely who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ is entirely a 
matter of opinion determined in large part by what are perceived to be the specific 
aims of constructing such a tradition in the first place. Recognising this and a range 
of other problems inherent in the canonisation o f the discipline - though conceding 
its value as an ‘educational device’ - Brown, Nardin and Rengger’s volume. 
International Relations in Political Thought, provides a far more broadly based set 
of thinkers that includes, in addition to Grotius, a number o f less well-known 
figures.^^ Indeed, it is interesting to note that despite his stature in both seventeenth 
and twentieth century international thought, Hugo Grotius has very often been 
excluded from collections such as these.
However, this ‘traditions tradition’, as it might be instructively titled, has recently 
attracted a significant amount o f critical attention. In particular, Ian Clark has 
identified thiee specific sets o f criticisms leveled at the employment of traditions.
^ Howard Williams, International Relations in Political Theory, (Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 1992).
Michael Donelan, “The Political Theorists and International Theoiy”, in The Reason of States, ed. 
Michael Donelan, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978), p.75.
^ Clnis Brown, Teriy Nardin and Nicholas Rengger (eds.). International Relations in Political 
Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 2-3.
both as categorical devices and in a canonical sense, in International Relations. The 
first set focuses on the sense in which “the quest for traditions inculcates a fetish for 
categorisation for its own sake.”^^  As such, it is particularly critical of the manner in 
which the “history of thought becomes subordinate to discovering the pigeon-hole 
in which any particular writer most appropriately belongs.” ®^ Indeed, it is a problem 
which one of the most prominent proponents of the ‘traditions approach’, Martin 
Wight, recognised, arguing that;
In all political and historical studies the purpose of building pigeon-holes is 
to reassure oneself that the raw material does not fit into them. Classification 
becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks 
down.^ ^
In a similar vein to Wight, R.J. Vincent warns of what he characterises as the 
dangers inherent in the “whole enterprise o f treating great thinkers like parcels at 
the post office” that seems to have afflicted the discipline.
The second set of criticisms, to be discussed in some detail in the following chapter, 
fundamentally claims that the very “construction of traditions of thought is itself an 
essentially illegitimate scholarly procedure because it makes untenable assumptions
Clark, p.7.
^  /6/d.
Wight, International Theory, p.259.
R.J. Vincent, “The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentietli Centmy International Thought”, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 10, (1981), p.96.
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about the nature of political language.”^^  In particular, historians o f ideas such as 
Quentin Skinner argue that the construction o f traditions is based on the false 
assumption that a set of perennial problems can be identified in political philosophy 
and create a false sense o f coherence both within and between the works of their 
m e m b e r s . A m o n g s t  post-structuralist theorists such as Rob Walker, the 
designation o f a set of writers and/or ideas as a tradition is necessarily accompanied 
by assumptions pertaining to its origins. Thus, although Walker accepts that all 
‘stories’ in the history of ideas must begins somewhere, he argues that “the point of 
origin depends on where we think we are now,” thereby rendering the construction 
of traditions particularly susceptible to the charge of anachronism.^^ In addition, 
Walker also criticises the manner in which the “crudely anachronistic interpretive 
procedures” of the traditions approach have characterised figures such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau “in disguises that make them quite 
unrecognizable to anyone who examines the textual evidence we have o f them.”^^  
Indeed, Edward Keene makes a similar argument with regard to the peculiar 
(dis)guise worn by Hugo Grotius in many works of international relations.^^ 
However, as Walker continues:
Clark, p.8.
Quentin Skinner, “Meaning mid Understanding in tlie Hisloiy of Ideas”, History and Theory: 
Studies in the Philosophy o f History, Vol. VIII, (1969), pp.3-53.
Walker, Inside/outside, p.27. 
ibid., p.92.
Edward Keene, “The reception of Hugo Grotius in international relations theory”, Grotiana, 
Vol.20/21, (1999/2000), pp. 135-158.
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That each o f these figures is open to sharply differing interpretations has 
mattered little. The history o f political thought turns into an ahistorical 
repetition in which the stmggles of these thinkers to make sense of the 
historical transformations in which they were caught are erased in favour of 
assertions about how they all articulate essential truths about the same 
unchanging and usually tragic reality: the eternal game o f relations between 
states.^^
Finally, the division o f International Relations into theoretical traditions has also 
been “condemned for encouraging intellectual conservatism and for closing down 
the a g e n d a . A s  Walker argues, in response to Robert Keohane’s division of 
approaches to international institutions into two traditions of rationalism and 
reflectivism, terms such as this and their predecessors, realism and idealism, “have 
served primarily to close off serious discussion in a manner that has helped to 
insulate the discipline of international debate ever since.”'’® Such categories, he 
argues, “should be understood as the primary forms in which the basic assumptions 
governing the study of world politics have been left to congeal, requiring little 
further explanation.”'” Furthermore, returning once more to the treatment of the 
‘great thinkers’ of international relations he writes that;
Walker, Inside/outside, p.92. 
Clark, p.8.
■10 R.B.J. Walker, “History and Structure in die Tlieoiy of International Relations”, in International 
Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian, (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.315; Robert O. 
Keoliane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, in International Theory: Critical 
Investigations, ed. James Der Derian, (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.279-307.
Walker, ibid.
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Within their stylized horizons it is possible to honor all those who, for some 
reason, are revered as contributors to the distilled wisdom of tradition. 
Thucydides, Marchiavelli [sic], Hobbes, Rousseau and the rest may then 
commune with more common masters like E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau 
and their even more modern disciples.'’^
As will be seen shortly, when transposed to the realm of the ‘Grotian tradition’, the 
‘common masters’ of Hersch Lauterpacht, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, amongst 
others, are seen to ‘commune’ with the honoured and revered figure o f Hugo 
Grotius, despite bearing little relation to him in reality.
Despite this range o f well-founded criticisms, perhaps the most fundamental 
problem with the ‘traditions tradition’ of International Relations is the 
indiscriminate use o f the term ‘tradition’ itself. In particular, in very many 
instances sets of thinkers and ideas are designated as ‘traditions’ without any 
consideration whatsoever of what a tradition actually constitutes. Of those theorists 
named above only two, Nardin and Wight discuss the concept of tradition in an 
explicit fashion before applying it to International Relations. On the other hand, 
David Boucher begins his discussion of the three traditions of political theory in 
international relations with the correct, though ultimately insufficient assertion that 
traditions are ‘ideal characterisations’, while Donelan and Krasner do not consider 
the term at all.'’^
Boucher, p.29.
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What is more, in those instances in which ‘tradition’ is conceptualised in an explicit 
fashion, little consensus exists as to precisely what is meant by the term. Thus, for 
Nardin and Mapel, tradition is stringently defined as both “the process of handing 
down” from generation to generation, and “the thing handed down, the belief or 
custom transmitted from one generation to another.”'’'’ Alternatively, Wight 
entertains a vague notion of tradition somewhat akin to a paradigm, according to 
which sets of ideas are defined by “logical inter-relation” whereby the “acceptance 
of one unit-idea is likely to entail logically most of the others.”'’^  Although a range 
of contending conceptualisations o f tradition are discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, it is important to note at the outset that ‘tradition’ is a loaded term. Whether 
employed to indicate a pattern of historical transmission, a vaguely coherent set of 
ideas or something akin to a Kuhnian paradigm, the term ‘tradition’ has a certain set 
of historical connotations attached to it. Thus, as Conal Condren has pointed out, 
whether intentionally or otherwise, “[t]o designate something a tradition...is to 
make a putatively historical claim about socialised processes of transmission or 
communal activity.”'’^  Thus, as discussed further in Chapter Two, whether 
intentionally or otherwise the term ‘tradition’ is underpinned by a particular 
understanding of the philosophy o f history.
Terry Nardin, “Ethical Traditions in International Affairs”, in Traditions o f International Ethics, 
ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.6.
Martin Wight, “An tmatomy of international tliouglit”. Review o f International Studies, Vol. 13, 
(1987), p.226.
Conal Condren, “Political Theory and die Problem of Anachronism”, in Political Theory: 
Tradition and Diversity, ed. Andrew Vincent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 48.
14
As will be seen as this thesis progresses, many of the problems inherent in the 
construction of the ‘Grotian tradition’ o f International Relations are identical to 
those that continue to afflict the discipline more generally. On one level, the 
‘Grotian tradition’ may thus be viewed as just another tradition o f International 
Relations, born of the discipline’s on-going fetish for categorisation. In this, many 
of those criticisms leveled at the construction of traditions in general are 
particularly applicable to the ‘Grotian tradition’. At the same time however, a range 
of problems also derived from the conceptualisation of the term ‘tradition’, but 
specifically associated with the historical figure of Hugo Grotius, have algo 
contributed to contemporary confusion surrounding precisely what the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ entails.
The ‘Grotius Problem ' in International Relations
The ‘Grotius problem’, as it may be instructively titled, is a multifaceted one. On a 
fairly superficial, though ultimately central level, it is precipitated by the fact that in 
International Relations scholarship Hugo Grotius is undoubtedly a writer more cited 
than read.'’^  As Edward Keene quite rightly points out, echoing this sentiment, 
“[t]here seems to be a suspicion among Grotius scholars, and not necessarily an ill- 
founded one, that international relations theorists often invoke his name without 
actually having read his work, apart perhaps from a quick glance at the
Philip Bobbin, The Shield ofAchilles: War, Peace and the Course o f  History, (London: Penguin 
Books, 2002), p.512.
15
prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac PacisJ^^^ As will become particularly apparent in 
Chapter Six o f this thesis, this phenomenon has certainly exacerbated many o f the 
problems inherent in contemporary characterisations of both Grotius and the 
‘Grotian tradition’.
To a great extent however, the ‘Grotius problem’ in International Relations is the 
problem of the ‘traditions tradition’ outlined above. As mentioned previously, in 
contemporary scholarship Hugo Grotius is a name increasingly associated, not with 
the seventeenth century Dutch author of De Jure Belli ac Pads, but with a tradition 
of thought. What is particularly problematic about this scenario is the extent to 
which the historical figure of Grotius himself has become obscured both by his 
categorisation within a number of convergent intellectual traditions and the 
invention of a range o f contending traditions constructed in his name. However, the 
range of problems associated with both the categorisation o f Grotius and his 
traditions is not confined to International Relations scholarship, but form part o f the 
discipline’s inheritance from the cognate fields o f political theory and international 
law.
In the history of political thought, Grotius is most commonly characterised as a 
member o f the natural law tradition.'’^  Wedged between the arguably more
Keene, “The reception of Hugo Grotius”, p. 135.
Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.30; see also, Knud Haalconssen, 
“Hugo Grotius and tlie Histoiy of Political Thought”, in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural 
Law, ed. Knud Haalconssen, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Maiy Clare Segers, Hugo Grotius and
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innovative and coherent works of Francisco de Suarez and Samuel Pufendorf 
respectively, De Jure Belli ac P ads  is often erroneously viewed as having ushered 
forth the modern era of secular natural law scholarship/® Simultaneously, Grotius 
has also been characterised as a member of the just war tradition incorporating the 
works of Cicero, Grotius’ “favourite classical author,”^’ along with Saint Augustine 
of Hippo, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria, all o f whom Grotius 
holds in high esteem/^ For theorists such as Richard Tuck and Anthony Pagden, 
Grotius is a member o f the humanist tradition. Tuck referring to him as “the good 
humanist he was.”^^  By pursuing this characterisation however, Tuck sets Grotius’ 
humanism against the more popular, though incorrect, notion that he was a member 
of the scholastic tradition/'’ In this sense, Grotius is perceived as being “merely a
secular natural law, (Ann Arbor; University Microfilms, 1977); Richaid Tuck, Natural rights 
theories: Their origin and development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
The variety of claims pertaining to Grotius’ role in the ‘secularisation’ of the law of nature are 
discussed in Charles Edwards, Httgo Grotius The Miracle o f Holland: A Study in Political and Legal 
Thought, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p.13-14.
David J. Bederman, “Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De Jure 
Belli ac P ads”, Grotiana, Vol. 16/17, (1995/1996), p.7.
Peter Haggemnacher “On Assessing the Grotian Heritage”, in International Law and the Grotian 
Heritage, A commemorative colloquium held at The Hague ou 8 April 1983 on the occasion of the 
fourtli centenaiy of the birtli of Hugo Grotius, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser histituut, 1985), p. 152ft; 
Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius, (London: S.P.C.K., 1965); James Turner 
Jolmsoii, “Grotius’ Use of History and Charity in tlie modem Transformation of tlie Just War Idea”, 
Grotiana, Vol.lV, (1983), p.23.
Richard Tuck, The Rights o f  War and Peace: Political 'Thought and International Order from 
Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.78; see also Richard Tuck, Natural 
rights theories, p.58; Antliony Pagden, “Introduction”, in The Languages o f Political Theory in 
Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden, (Qimbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.5.
J. Marthi Littlejohn, The Political Theory o f the Schoolmen and Grotius, (College Springs: 
Current Press, 1894, p.5. However, Littlejohn does not even attempt to demonstrate Grotius’ position
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link in the chain of the history o f ideas in international law that begins with Vitoria 
and Suarez” although, as Nicholas Rengger argues, “understandings of the work 
of Grotius which emphasise that Grotius is following on from the ‘tradition’ of 
Vitoria, underrate the extent to which Grotius is distancing himself from the 
positions of Vitoria by echoing the work of writers opposed to the latter in 
important respects, such as Suarez, Sepulveda and Luis Molina.” ®^ In addition to 
indicating the extent of Grotius’ well documented eclecticism,^^ this multifarious 
characterisation illustrates the limitations of attempting to ‘pigeon-hole’ a writer 
such as this.
As will be seen in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, in international legal 
scholarship, Grotius is, implicitly at least, associated with a ‘Grotian tradition’ that 
simply exists as a taxonomic device according to which the history of international 
law is schematised. In this vein, the ‘Grotian tradition’, as it appears in the works of
within tlie scholastic tradition. Ratlier, the assertion is simply coupled with an immensely detailed 
exposition of tlie development of scholasticism prior to Grotius. As such, the supposed scholasticism 
of liis work is never actually established.
Alfred Verdross quoted in Tanaka Tadaslii, “Grotius’s Method; Witli Special Reference to 
Prolegomena” in A Normative Approach to War: Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius, ed. 
Oniuna Yasuaki, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.30.
Nicholas Rengger, “A City Which Sustains All Things? Communitarianism md International 
Society”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol.21, No.3, (Winter 1992), p.362-3; 
Indeed, Tuck claims that “fragments of Grotius’ working papers for De Indis survive, which show 
tliat he was interested in contrasting his own views witli tliose of Vitoria.” Tuck, The Rights o f War 
and Peace, p.81.
Ulrich Johannes Scluieider, “Eclecticism Rediscovered”, Journal o f the History o f Ideas, Vol. 59, 
No.l, (January 1998), p. 175; J.C.M Willems, “How to Handle Grotian Ambivalence? A guidance 
towards some recent guides” Grotiana, Vol.6, (1985), p. 110.
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Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht, is simply an intermediary category of 
international thought standing between the dominant positive and natural law 
traditions/^ What is particularly curious about this pattern of categorisation is that 
although he is heralded the ‘father of international law’ who inspired it, Grotius is 
not considered a member o f the tradition bearing his name/® As with the majority 
of Grotian paternity claims however, this is both highly questionable and equally 
disputed/®
In many ways, Grotius’ position in the history o f international political thought 
represents the conglomeration of the views o f him promulgated in political theory 
and international legal scholarship. In large part, this can be attributed to the lack of 
strictly defined disciplinary demarcations that has marked International Relations 
scholarship both prior to and since its formal inception in 1919. Indeed, endorsing 
its porous boundaries, one o f the foremost proponents of the ‘Grotian tradition’ of 
the twentieth century, Hersch Lauterpacht maintains that;
^ Hersch Lauterpacht, “Hie Grotian Tradition in hitemational Law”, British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol.23, No.l, (1946), pp. 1-53; Lassa Oppenlieim, International Law: A Treatise, 
Vol.l -  Peace, 3"‘*ed. Ronald Roxbuigli, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. 106-7.
Lauterpacht, ibid., p.5.
For examples of Grotius’ status as die ‘fatlier of international law’ see Arthur Nussbaum, A 
Concise History o f  the Law o f  Nations, (New York; Macmillan, 1954), p. 113; Edward Duinbauld, 
The life and legal writings o f Hugo Grotius, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p.vii. 
Amongst the most fierce critics of this view is James Brown Scott who favours Francisco de Vitoria 
for the title. James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin o f International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and 
his Law o f Nations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934).
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...the relation between political theory and international law is of a more 
pervading character than is commonly assumed. It is the ultimate results of 
the theory o f the state which are resorted to by international lawyers as the 
foundation of their systems.^’
Similarly, when the equally prominent figure in the development of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’, Martin Wight, identified a “partition...between philosophically minded 
international lawyers and internationally minded political philosophers” he 
described it as an ‘unhappy one’ .^  ^Thus, it comes as no surprise that the majority of 
contemporary ‘Giotian’ scholarship resides in areas in which the disciplinary 
boundaries demarcating international law, international relations and political 
theory are only vaguely conceived.’’^
As mentioned above however, a number o f different ‘Grotian’ traditions can be 
identified in International Relations scholarship. Continuing the discipline’s 
schematic trend, in the area o f regime theory, Stephen Krasner identifies a ‘Grotian 
tradition’, which maintains that “regimes are an unavoidable feature of international 
life”, standing between the structuralist or realist, and modified structuralist or
Hersch Lauterpacht, “Spmoza and International Law”, British Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol. VIII, (1927), p.91.
^ Martin Wiglit, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, 
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p.3.
See Kennetli Abbott, “International Relations Tlieory, International Law, and the Regime: 
Governing Atrocities in International Conflicts”, American Journal o f International Law, Vol.93, 
No.2, (April 1999), pp.361-379; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stephan 
Wood, “International Law and International Relations Tlieory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciphnary Scholarship”, American Journal o f International Law, Vol.92, No.3, (July 1998), 
pp.205-239.
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modified realist traditions.^ Krasner’s Grotian tradition exhibits no explicit 
connection to Hugo Grotius nor does it seek to explain either why that particular 
category o f regime theories is labeled ‘Grotian’ or in what sense it ought to be 
considered a ‘tradition’. Similarly, Shah M. Tarzi’s “The Role of Norms and 
Regimes in World Affairs; A Grotian Perspective” fails to even mention Grotius’ 
name or discuss what the ‘Grotian tradition’ to which he refers entails beyond being 
an intermediary position between realism and universalism.^^ Alternatively, in the 
work of Richard Falk, the ‘Grotian tradition’ is termed the ‘Grotian Quest’ and is 
explicitly associated with the works of Grotius himself.®^ In addition, Falk also 
identifies what he terms a number o f ‘Grotian moments’ throughout the history of 
political thought, an idea subsequently adopted by B.V.A. Roling. As Roling 
explains, ‘Grotian moments’ are times “in which a fundamental change of 
circumstances created the need for a different world structure and a different 
international law” and include both Grotius’ times and the present.*’^  Alternatively, 
Cornelius F. Murphy’s “Grotian vision o f world order” is concerned with the works 
of Grotius and their explicit expression in subsequent writings, particularly those of
^ Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, “Regime Tlieoiy and tlie English School of International Relations; 
A Comparison”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol.21, No.2, (Winter 1992), p.331.
Shall M. Tarzi, “The Role of Norms and Regimes in World Affairs: A Grotian Perspective” 
International Relations, Vol.XIV, No.3, (December 1998), p.73.
^  Richard Falk, The End o f World Orders: Essays on Normative International Relations, (New 
York; Holmes & Meier, 1983).
B.V.A. Roling, “Are Grotius’ Ideas Obsolete?”, 'mHugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. 
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbuiy and Adam Roberts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.297. See 
also Dorotliy V. Jones, Toward a Just World: The Critical Years in the Search for International 
Justice, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p.2I3.
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries/^ Finally, Karma Nabulsi has recently 
identified a ‘Grotian tradition of war’ that is defined by a distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants in conflict situations/® Foremost amongst those 
‘Grotians’ Nabulsi discusses is Francis Leiber whose self-confessed ‘deep love of 
war’ demonstrated by his declaration that “Blood is occasionally the rich dew of 
History”, is antithetical to Grotius’ own position.^®
Despite the existence o f a range o f ‘Grotian’ traditions in twentieth century 
scholarship, the ‘Grotian tradition’ o f international relations is most commonly 
associated with the works o f the so-called ‘English School’, in particular those of its 
two most prominent members, Martin Wight and Hedley B u ll/’ Indeed, the 
‘English School’ may be considered “the chief champions of the ‘Grotian’ approach 
in the modern academy” and for this reason this thesis focuses on its particular 
variants of the ‘Grotian tradition’. The ‘Grotian tradition’ of Wight’s construction is 
schematic in nature and constitutes the replication of the international legal tradition 
introduced above. Thus, the Grotian tradition is conceived as an intermediary 
between the natural and positive legal traditions and is itself classified under the
^ Cornelius F. Murphy, “The Grotian Vision of World Order”, American Journal o f International 
Law, Vol.76, No.3, (July 1982), pp.477-498.
^  Nabulsi, p. 128. 
ibid., p. 160.
Various accounts of the ‘English School’, its membership and claims to constitute a ‘school’ of 
tlioughl are discussed in Chapter Six.
N.J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem o f Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory? (London: Routledge, 2000), p.71.
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broader banner of rationalist international thought/^ In the work of Hedley Bull 
however, the ‘Grotian tradition’ is explicitly associated with the concept of 
‘international society’, one of the constituent components of Wight’s rationalist 
approach.^'’ In subsequent scholarship, this association has manifested itself in a 
proliferation of claims that the ‘Grotian tradition’ is simply another name for the 
‘international society approach’ to international relations/^ Thus, although this 
affiliation has contributed to Grotius’ elevated status in contemporaiy scholarship, it 
has also brought with it a great deal o f confusion as to precisely what it means to be 
‘Grotian’ and whether or not Grotius was himself a ‘Grotian’.
The need to ascertain precisely what is meant by the term ‘Grotian’ has also been 
highlighted in more recent scholarship by the increasing number o f theorists who, 
following the re-launch o f the ‘English School’ in 1999/^ have begun to call 
themselves ‘Grotians’. Indeed, despite entertaining vastly different notions of what 
it is to be ‘Grotian’, Robert Jackson has confessed to a ‘Grotian bent’^  ^while Tim 
Dunne’s intellectual history of the English school explicitly aims “to reveal the 
radical potentiality of the Grotian or rationalist tradition.”®^ This trend has also been
Wight, International Theory, p. 14.
Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society”, in Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays on the Theory o f World Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp.51-73.
Jackson, “International Community Beyond tlie Cold War”, p.60.
Bany Buzan, “The English school as a research progiam: an overview and proposal for 
reconvening”, hltps:/Avww.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/buzan.htm.
Jackson, “International Commimity Beyond the Cold War”, p.60.
Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.xi.
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particularly apparent within scholarship concerned with the normative justification 
of humanitarian intervention, for example Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving Strangers: 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, and has witnessed the re- 
emergence and widespread acceptance o f the eiToneous claim that Grotius was the 
father of humanitarian intervention despite the existence o f overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary.
The various incarnations of the ‘Grotian tradition’ represented in the works 
mentioned above consequently represent distinctly different sets of ideas that 
nonetheless share the same name. It is little wonder that Cornelius Roelofsen was 
driven to write that since its inception, the “cult of Grotius” has, in many spheres, 
become marked by the “indiscriminate use o f the epithet ‘Grotian’ with terms like 
‘heritage’, ‘tradition’, or ‘concept’.” ®^ Indeed, in the area of regime theory, the 
‘Grotian tradition’ simply appears as one tradition amongst a great crowd of 
traditions according to which the discipline is divided and redivided in accordance 
with present concerns. In particular, by retaining no implicit or explicit connection 
to Grotius, it stands as a pertinent example of the spiraling propensity o f 
International Relations scholarship to constantly schematise and reconstruct its past. 
Similarly, what the assertion that Grotius ought to be considered the ‘father of
Nicholas Wlieeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.45. Evidence against tliis claim is discussed in Chapter 
Tliree.
^  C.G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century”, in Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 96-7.
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humanitarian intervention’ reveals is the extent to which the historical figure of 
Hugo Grotius has been obscured in International Relations scholarship, thereby 
giving rise to a set of questions pertaining to the efficacy o f term ‘Grotian’ itself. 
Indeed, given the wide range o f uses to which it is put, does the term ‘Grotian’ 
mean anything at all?
Approaching the ‘Grotian tradition ’
The failure o f many International Relations scholars to adequately distinguish 
between the ideas of Grotius and the contents of the ‘Grotian tradition’, however 
conceived, has been addressed by a number of contemporary theorists. Critically 
however, almost all such attempts have focused exclusively upon providing a 
comparison between Grotius’ ideas and those of the twentieth century traditions, 
thereby emphasising the ‘Grotian’ element of the title. Recognising its rather 
haphazard conceptualisation, A. Claire Cutler explicitly addresses the relationship 
between Hugo Grotius and the ‘Grotian tradition’ in “The ‘Grotian tradition’ in 
international relations.” Preferring the terms ‘Grotian’ and ‘neo-Grotian’, she 
argues that;
there is a need to distinguish between the Grotian tradition, evident in the 
works of Grotius, and the neo-Grotian tradition, evident in the works of 
Wight, Bull and certain regime analysts. The Grotian tradition posits the 
existence o f a natural law based society, admitting to norms, standards and 
values of universal application. The neo-Grotian tradition, in contrast has 
largely rid itself o f natural law origins for society or regimes and has
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adopted a positivist stance, more in keeping with realism and the classical 
tradition/’
Thus, in essence, Cutler is proposing a two-fold definition of what is ordinarily 
understood to be collectively ‘Grotian’. However, Cutler’s presentation of Grotius’ 
ideas is marred by her reliance on early members o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ (whom 
she would call neo-Giotians), in particular Hersch Lauterpacht. Thus, rather than 
providing a direct interpretation of Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac P ads  as the standard 
against which to compare later Grotian thought, the conceptualisation of Grotius’ 
work is already imbued with Grotian scholarship.
C.G. Roelofsen also points explicitly to the distinction between Grotius and the 
Grotian tradition with the following revealing passage;
When we speak of ‘Grotius’ do we for instance mean Grotius, the author of 
De iure belli ac pads, Grotius the politician and diplomat, Grotius the 
propounder o f the ‘B atavian’/ari stocratic interpretation o f the constitution o f 
Holland, Grotius the seventeenth-century figure to whom a certain 
characteristic ‘Grotian’ train o f thought is to be attributed, or even; Grotius, 
the intellectual ancestor of a certain ‘Grotian’ approach to international 
relations?^^
A. Claire Cutler, “Hie ‘Grotian tradition’ in international relations”. Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 7, (1991), p.62.
Cornelius G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and tlie Development of International Relations Theory: The 
‘Long Seventeenth Century’ and the Elaboration of a European States System”, Grotiana, Vol. 18, 
(1997), p.97.
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Rather than divide Grotius up into his ‘political’, ‘historical’ and ‘intellectual’ 
forms however, Roelofsen simply distinguishes the multifaceted character of 
Grotius from a particular notion of what it is to be ‘Grotian’.
Almost entirely absent from contemporary literature discussing the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ is a detailed analysis o f the term ‘tradition’, both in its generality and as 
particularly employed by proponents o f the ‘Grotian tradition’. However, this 
pattern of scholarship is not limited to the analysis of the ‘Grotian tradition’ but 
appears to be more broadly applicable to a range of studies that seek to dissect the 
original ideas o f ‘classical’ writers from contemporary patterns of thought derived 
from them. For example, Onora O’Neill has identified a pattern of scholarship 
associated with the works of Immanuel Kant that is not dissimilar to that pertaining 
to Grotius and the ‘Grotian tradition’ described above. Thus, in a similar manner to 
the ‘Grotian’ association with ‘international society’, she writes that;
Much contemporary work on justice is seen, both by protagonists and by 
critics, as Kantian. Evidently not all its conclusions accord with Kant’s 
views on obligations, rights or justice; but this in itself is not surprising 
since its aim is to develop Kant’s basic insights, even to improve on his 
conclusions.^^
Thus, O’Neill aims to “distinguish Kant’s from Kantian work on justice”, thereby 
attempting a similar project to Cutler’s attempt to dissect Grotius’ ideas from those
Onora O’Neill, Bounds o f Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.65.
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of the ‘neo-Grotians’/ ' ’ Similarly, although Andrew Hurrell’s article, “Kant and the 
Kantian paradigm in international relations” shows promise o f considering its 
designation as a ‘tradition’ or ‘paradigm’ with its claim that “the use and 
widespread acceptance o f the term ‘Kantian’ makes it legitimate to examine the 
relationship between Kant and the tradition or paradigm that he is...held to 
embody,” his analysis focuses on reconciling the contending ‘statist’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’ interpretations o f Kant’s work within the Kantian tradition.
What the works of Cutler, O’Neill and Hurrell have in common is that none 
considers the sense in which the ‘Grotian’ and ‘Kantian’ traditions have been 
conceived as ‘traditions’, but simply compare their contents with the original ideas 
of Grotius and Kant. Indeed, it is proposed that the apparent failure o f International 
Relations scholars to adequately distinguish between the works of Gr otius and the 
ideas of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and, following the identification of their conflation, 
rectify previous anomalies, can in part be attributed to this oversight.
Perhaps the most prominent treatment o f the supposed existence and ‘traditional’ 
status of the ‘Grotian tradition’ is that of Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts 
who include a section entitled ‘A Grotian Tradition in International Relations?’ in 
their introduction to Hugo Grotius and International Relations.^^ In attempting to
ibid.
85 Andrew Hunell, “Kant and tlie Kantian paradigm in international relations”. Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 18, (1990), p. 184-5.
Kingsbuiy and Roberts, p.51.
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confront its convoluted conceptualisation, Kingsbury and Roberts identify four 
types of ‘Grotian tradition’. In addition to the loosely defined tradition simply 
indicating support for the concept of ‘international society’ most commonly utilised 
in the discipline, they also identify ‘textual’ and ‘contextual’ approaches, and a 
‘Grotian tradition’ that employs elements of all three types. The derogation of the 
wider ‘Grotian tradition’ into its constituent types is however, counterproductive 
and conceptually problematic for a number o f reasons. Most prominently, by 
categorising a range of disparate traditions according to four ideal types, this 
schématisation is unable to distinguish between the ‘Grotian’ traditions within each 
type. As such, the problem of imprecision evident in the characterisation of a 
singular ‘Grotian tradition’ is simply replicated here on a smaller scale. As a 
consequence, rather than achieving greater conceptual clarity, the means of 
achieving such visibility are actually foreclosed. More critically however, 
Kingsbury and Roberts’ chapter provides only a brief discussion of the concept of 
‘tradition’ itself and does not consider the manner in which the proponents of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ have employed the term.
One such writer who has applied the theoretical notion o f tradition to the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ as conceived in the works o f Martin Wight and Hedley Bull is Jens 
Bartelson.^^ Indeed, in his insightful essay addressing the relationship between the 
‘Hobbesian’ and ‘Grotian’ traditions, Bartelson comes closest to pin-pointing the 
source of current confusion regarding the relationship between Grotius and the
Jens Bartelson, “Short circuits: society and tradition in international relations theory”. Review of 
International Studies, Vol.22, (1996), pp.339-360.
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Grotian tradition/^ Indeed, although Bartelson’s project leads him down an 
alternative line o f inquiry to that being pursued here, his assessment is referred to 
briefly in Chapter Six.
An outline o f the argument
As it stands, the ‘Grotian tradition’ o f International Relations exists as a 
multifariously conceived entity within which so many contending 
conceptualisations o f what it means to be ‘Grotian’ reside that the term has been 
rendered positively obfuscating. What is more, aided by the overwhelming 
proclivity for the construction of traditions in International Relations scholarship, 
the historical figure o f Hugo Grotius has become both over-categorised and 
smothered by a range of traditions bearing his name. In light of the abundant 
confusion surrounding precisely what it means to be ‘Grotian’ and whether or not 
Hugo Grotius was one himself, it is not surprising that contemporary theorists have 
settled for a vague conceptualisation o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ that is associated 
with the concept of international society.
However, the central argument o f this thesis contends that contrary to its 
contemporary conceptualisation, the ‘Grotian tradition’ has not, historically 
speaking, been a tradition o f thought about international society. Rather, it has been
Altliough Tim Dunne provides a discussion of the term ‘tradition’ itself and its application to 
Wight’s international tlieory in Inventing International Society, p.54-58, he does not consider its 
reception in tlie work of Hedley Bull.
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concerned with the application of a specific moral scheme, known variously as 
‘Grotian morality’ or ‘Grotian ethics’ to the general conduct of international 
relations and, in particular, the regulation of war. As such, this thesis demonstrates 
that periods of resurgent interest in Grotius’ works that have contributed to his 
longevity in International Relations and ultimately directed the construction of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ can be attributed to the popularity of the moral system presented 
in his works. Thus the ontological association of the ‘Grotian tradition’ with the 
concept of ‘international society’ in twentieth century scholarship has been, at least 
in part, facilitated by a range o f epistemological problems surrounding the 
employment o f the term ‘tradition’ in disciplinary histories of International 
Relations.
In light of these and other issues raised above, the following chapter is consequently 
concerned with the concept of tradition itself. It seeks to resolve the fundamental 
question of precisely what it means to designate a set o f ideas, thinkers or actions a 
tradition and, in light of this, how one goes about analysing traditions o f thought. In 
comparing the relative merits o f a range of approaches to the concept of tradition, 
the first part of the chapter relies heavily on Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy of 
history and, in particular, the notion that all forms o f history are inventions of 
present thought. In light of this, it is the manner in which a tradition is actually 
constructed -  that is, the extent to which it constitutes an ‘historical’ reading of the 
past as opposed to a ‘practical’ one devised for ‘presentist’ purposes -  that is its 
distinguishing feature. Having considered a range of objections to Oakeshott’s
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approach, the chapter outlines a methodological approach to the analysis of 
traditions in the form of a modified version of Brian C. Schmidt’s ‘critical internal 
discursive history’. Chapter Three is concerned with the works of Hugo Grotius and 
introduces the three-tiered moral system that has influenced the subsequent 
development of both Grotian scholarship in general and the ‘Grotian tradition’ in 
particular. Chapter Four focuses on the development of ‘Grotian’ scholarship 
between the works of Hugo Grotius and the emergence of the most prominent 
incarnations of the ‘Grotian tradition’ in the twentieth century. It examines a 
number of patterns o f ‘Grotian’ thought that can be identified extending from 
Grotius to Samuel Pufendorf and Jean Barbeyrac, and from Grotius to Christian von 
Wolff and Emerich de Vattel, noting the most significant developments undertaken 
by each o f these theorists. Following the decline o f Grotian scholarship that 
accompanied the rise to prominence o f Vattel’s work, the chapter also documents 
the modest revival o f ‘Grotian morality’ in the works of the American lawyers, 
James Kent and Henry Wheaton.
In Chapter Five, the full revival o f Grotius’ works in early twentieth century 
international legal and political scholarship is discussed. The chapter begins by 
outlining the ‘Grotian’ revival that was evident in the works o f Cornelius van 
Vollenhoven and accompanied the establishment of the Grotius Society in 1915. In 
the second section it outlines the two central debates within which contending 
approaches to the relationship between law and morality have been conventionally 
framed, in international relations the so-called ‘first great debate’ between realism
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and idealism, and in international law, that between proponents of legal positivism 
and natural law. The chapter then concludes by introducing Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
two-fold conceptualisation of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and the central position of 
morality within its more developed version. Finally, Chapter Six is concerned with 
the development of the ‘Grotian tradition’ in the works of the ‘English School’ 
theorists, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. It outlines the central position of law and 
morality in Wight’s conceptualisation of rationalism and the application of Grotius’ 
upper and lower moralities to the theorisation o f international society. However, it 
is only with the works of Hedley Bull that the final firm association o f Grotius with 
the analytically conceived ‘Grotian tradition’, rationalism and, by extension, 
international society occurs. It is also here that a notion o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ 
divorced from what has previously been understood as the central principles of 
‘Grotian morality’ is achieved, thus completely reconfiguring the fundamental 
elements of what it means to be ‘Grotian’. The thesis then concludes by returning to 
the sets of questions surrounding the terms ‘Grotian’ and ‘tradition’ outlined above 
and considers what the implications of their conceptualisation might be for both the 
‘Grotian tradition’ in particular and, more generally, for the discipline of 
International Relations.
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II
Tradition
References to a tradition o f international relations theory are by no means 
innocent. This is not to say they are entirely misleading. They offer us a 
number of important clues about the historically constituted nature of both 
the theory and practice o f international politics. But -  particularly as they 
are inserted into textbooks, into passing references and obligatory footnotes 
-  accounts of tradition serve to legitimise what counts as proper 
scholarship.’
As a tradition, or set of traditions o f international political thought, the construction 
of the ‘Grotian tradition’ is, at least in part, determined by the sense in which the 
term ‘tradition’ has itself been employed. Indeed, that the ‘Grotian tradition’ is 
considered a tradition, as opposed to a paradigm or some other form of 
classification device, is o f particular significance to both the manner of its 
construction and, more importantly, the interpretation of its contents. Although, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the mere designation of a set of ideas or thinkers 
as a tradition imparts upon them a particular set of historical connotations, the 
precise nature and types of historical claims a given tradition both deliberately and
 ^R.B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p.29.
inadvertently makes depends first and foremost on what that particular tradition is, 
in a definitional sense, thought to entail
This chapter therefore seeks to explore the theoretical notion of tradition itself. In 
doing so, it also aims to formulate a methodological approach to the analysis of 
traditions o f thought according to which the construction o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ 
will be approached in subsequent chapters. It begins by discussing a range of 
definitions o f the term ‘tradition’ and seeks to resolve the question of whether or 
not traditions can be justifiably characterised as ‘invented’ phenomena. It argues 
that the extent to which traditions are perceived as invented, and the degree to 
which ‘invented’ traditions are considered legitimate devices of historical 
expression, is determined by varying perspectives on the relationship between past 
and present knowledge. In doing so, the chapter relies heavily on the philosophy of 
history presented in the works of Michael Oakeshott as he provides not only a 
theoretical understanding of the relationship between past and present knowledge 
that is particularly amenable to the analysis o f traditions, but one from which the 
methodological approach to their examination is derived in later in the chapter. 
Having established that, as instruments of present thought, traditions are inherently 
invented phenomena, the chapter then seeks to defend Oakeshott’s philosophy of 
history against opposition from the philosophical works of R.G. Collingwood and a 
range of contextualist methodologies derived from it. In addition, the relative merits 
of three of the most comprehensive critique o f tradition to date, Quentin Skinner’s 
variant o f the ‘contextualist’ approach, Jens Bartelson’s ‘Foucauldian geneaological
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approach’, and Brian C. Schmidt’s ‘critical internal discursive history’ are all 
afforded attention. In doing so, the final section of the chapter demonstrates that 
Schmidt’s approach accords well with Oakeshott’s understanding o f the relationship 
between past and present knowledge and concludes that although Schmidt’s 
superficial dismissal o f contextual influences in the writing o f disciplinary history 
constitutes a significant flaw, his contribution remains, with corresponding 
modifications drawn from the works o f Skinner, Bartelson and MacIntyre, the most 
appropriate methodological approach to writing an intellectual history of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ of International Relations.
Tradition as Invention
In a conventional sense, the term ‘tradition’ simply refers to “an indefinite series of 
repetitions of an action, which on each occasion is performed on the assumption 
that it has been performed before.”  ^ Traditions are consequently both “the process 
of handing down” from generation to generation, and “the thing handed down, the 
belief or custom transmitted from one generation to another.”  ^Despite a degree of 
consensus as to what is generally meant by the term ‘tradition’ however, its 
substantive constitution remains a matter of some contention. According to Martin
 ^ J.G. A. Pocock, “Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and their Understanding”, 
in Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakeshott on the Occasion o f his 
Retirement, ed. Preston King and B.C. Parekli, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968),
p.212.
 ^ Terry Nardin, “Etliical Traditions in International Affairs”, in Traditions of International Ethics, 
ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.6.
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Krygier, a tradition, defined in terms o f inheritance, is comprised o f three central 
elements:
pastness: the contents of every tradition have or are believed by its 
participants to have originated some considerable time in the past. Second is 
authoritative presence: though derived from a real or believed-to-be-real 
past, a traditional practice, doctrine or belief has not, as it were, stayed there. 
Its traditionality consists in its present authority and significance for the 
lives, thoughts or activities o f participants in the tradition. Third, a tradition 
is not merely the past made present. It must have been, or be thought to have 
been, passed down over intervening generations, deliberately or otherwise; 
not merely unearthed from a past discontinuous with the present."^
Significantly then, according to this conceptualisation, a tradition need only be 
believed to be “an ancient and continuously practiced inheritance,” rather than 
actually having been practised for some substantial period o f time.^ Indeed, in an 
earlier article, “Law as Tradition”, Krygier writes that “[ejvery tradition is 
composed of elements drawn from the real or imagined past.”  ^ Similarly, he also 
argues that, by definition, “[tjraditions depend on real or imagined continuities 
between past and present.”  ^However, these elements of imagination and invention 
are particularly contentious.
Martin Krygier, “The Traditionality of Statutes”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 1, No. 1, (March 1988), p.21. 
 ^Nardin, p.7.
® Martin Krygier, “Law as Tradition”, Law and Philosophy, Vol.5, (1986), p.240.
’ ibid., p.250.
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In Eric Hobsbawm’s eyes, for instance, the fact that “‘[tjraditions’ which appear or 
claim to be old are quite recent in origin and sometimes invented” is not an 
impediment to their classification as such.^ On the contrary, Hobsbawm defines 
‘invented traditions’ as sets of “practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and 
norms o f behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.”  ^ However, as he continues, “insofar as there is such reference to a historic 
past, the peculiarity o f ‘invented’ traditions is that the continuity with it is largely 
factitious.” Critically then, in characterising ‘invented’ traditions as such, 
Hobsbawm is not suggesting that all traditions are ‘invented’ but merely that those 
that are remain defined as ‘traditions’ despite their invented status. This is 
particularly apparent with his continual references to traditions and ‘invented 
traditions’ as separate entities. Furthermore, also of importance here is the sense 
in which Hobsbawm uses the term ‘invented’ to mean ‘fabricated’. As will be seen 
shortly, this understanding o f what it is to be ‘invented’ stands in marked contrast to 
Michael Oakeshott’s contention that as the past is nothing more than “a 
construction we make for ourselves out of the events which take place before our 
eyes,” all tradition is necessarily ‘invented’.
 ^ Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in The Iiwention of Tradition, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 1.
 ^ibid. 
ibid., p.2. 
ibid.
Michael Oakeshott, “The Activity of Being an Historian”, in The History of Ideas: An 
Introduction to Method, ed. Preston King, (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 80.
In opposition to the ‘invented tradition’ however, Alasdair MacIntyre defines a 
‘tradition of enquiry’ as being:
... more than a coherent movement of thought. It is such a movement in the 
course of which those engaging in that movement become aware of it and of 
its direction and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and to 
carry its enquiries foiivard.^^
According to this perspective, traditions are not retrospectively constructed 
‘inventions’ but self-conscious patterns o f thought. As MacIntyre writes, a tradition 
necessarily has a “contingent historical starting point in some situation in which 
some set of established beliefs and belief-presupposing practices, perhaps relatively 
recently established, perhaps o f long-standing, were put into question” and from its 
establishment, moves through a series o f stages of formal institution.^"^ As with 
Krygier’s definition, MacIntyre contends that traditions are marked, not only by a 
pattern of “reference from the present to the past”, but are also necessarily 
constituted by “a certain continuity o f directness.” Thus, belief in the tradition as a 
whole, is understood in terms o f the “superiority of the formulations o f [each 
stage’s] predecessor, and that predecessor in turn is justified by a further reference 
backwards.” However, unlike in Krygier’s definition in which traditions are 
granted authority in accordance with their present status, for MacIntyre the
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (London: Duckwortli, 1988), p.326. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions o f Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and 
Tradition, (London: Duckwortli, 1990), p. 116. 
ibid. 
ibid.
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authority o f tradition is derived from the past. At heart, this discrepancy is 
fundamentally derived from the pivotal question of whether or not traditions are 
invented. For, if, as will be demonstrated shortly, traditions are in fact invented, 
then they necessarily derive their authority from the present in which they are 
invented. Conversely, if traditions are self-conscious patterns of thought, then their 
authority must be derived from the past in which they exist. With this it becomes 
clear that while the conceptualisation of ‘tradition’ pivots about the question of 
whether or not they can be justifiably described as ‘invented’, this is dictated by a 
set of more fundamental questions pertaining to the relationship between the past 
and the present.
Past and Present in the History o f Ideas
As instruments linking the past and the present in the history of ideas, questions 
regarding the invented nature of traditions and the status they are afforded centre 
around the more fundamental question o f whether we can be said to ‘know’ the 
past, or whether all knowledge is present knowledge. At one extreme is the claim 
that all knowledge is past knowledge. Proponents of this perspective, of which Leo 
Strauss is perhaps the most prominent, argue that “given that very few of our ideas 
are our ideas, and that even the novelties we devise are pieced together from the 
readymade components of communal life it becomes difficult to conclude that there
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can be a present which is not past.” ^^  Indeed, Strauss goes so far as to suppose that 
“[m]ost of our ideas are abbreviations or residues of the thought of other people, of 
our teachers and of our teachers’ teachers; they are abbreviations and residues of the 
thought of the past.” ^^  Thus, thinking in the present is constituted by elements of the 
past, and tradition, if accurately constituted, may represent the legitimate 
accumulation of past knowledge in the present. At the other extreme is the claim, 
ascribed to by Michael Oakeshott, that all knowledge is present knowledge. 
According to this understanding, “if the ideas which we hypothesize to belong to the 
past, are now actually being thought in the present, then the hypothesis must appear 
baseless, since all we have demonstrable evidence for, is present thinking.” ^^  
According to this perspective traditions, like all forms o f thinking, are constructions 
of the present.
Intimately linked to these contending conceptualisations of past and present 
knowledge is the very nature of the historical enterprise itself. Although the nuances 
of its characterisation are wide and varied, in common usage, ‘history’ is simply 
understood as constituting both ‘the past’ and an approach to understanding ‘the 
past’. Understanding the past is generally inferred via pieces of evidence, that is, 
items that have survived from the past and continue to exist in the present. 
However, the catalogue of evidence that historians have available to them is
Preston King, “Introduction”, in The History o f Ideas: An Introduction to Method, (London & 
Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p.3.
Leo Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History”, in What is Political Philosophy? And Other 
Studies, (CMcago: University of Cliicago Press, 1959), p.73.
King, “Introduction”, in The History o f Ideas, p.3.
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necessarily incomplete. Pieces of evidence, artifacts and other records of existence 
have been lost, destroyed or overlooked, leaving us with only a partial, incomplete 
understanding of the past. The ultimate recovery of past existence is henceforth 
impossible and, as a result;
[t]here can be no complete or finished or definitive history. Such history as
is written can only be partial, even tentative.^®
Debates surrounding the question o f whether knowledge o f the past is possible 
emanate from this starting point. King writes that “[o]n the one hand, to understand 
past ideas, we are enjoined to think them through for ourselves, to bring them to 
life, perhaps to ‘enact’ or to re-enact them.”^^  That is, in attempting to understand 
past ideas, all we are able to do is construct or re-construct them in the present, 
using whatever components of the past have survived into the present. Conversely, 
opponents o f this perspective argue that historical understanding, that is, 
understanding past ideas, “may only be achieved by ceasing to think as we do 
now.”^^  Hence, the historian is implored to locate their thinking within the thought 
of the period or situation they are investigating. However, proponents of the ‘all 
knowledge is present knowledge’ perspective retort that just as time travel, and 
hence thinking anywhere other than the present, is not possible, it is also not 
possible to cease thinking in the present and replace present thinking with the
^ Preston King, “Tliinking Past a Problem”, in The History o f Ideas, p.53. 
King, “Introduction”, in The History o f Ideas, p.4.
22 ibid.
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thinking of the past. As such, the history of ideas is presented with an apparent 
paradox, as enunciated by King;
The problem is, that if history is only to do with the past, and we can only 
comprehend it in the present, indeed only by making it a part of the present, 
how can we ever really know it as past -  as it was (or ‘is’)? It would seem 
that, if we genuinely know history in the present, then it can no longer be 
past; that if we only apprehend it as present thinking, we cannot seize it as 
genuine history; that if  we know it only by present excogitation, then 
perhaps it is not really the past that we are excogitating at all.^^
Despite the pervasiveness o f this paradox within the ‘history of ideas’, a number of 
writers, including King, attempt to overcome its limitations by either denying the 
existence of a distinction between past and present, or by blurring its dividing line.
Michael Oakeshott
Regarded by many as “one o f the most influential students of the history of ideas in 
the English-speaking world,” "^^ Michael Oakeshott’s understanding of history rests 
on what he also sees as the paradoxical relationship between past and present. This 
paradox, in Oakeshott’s terms, “is not merely that the past must survive into the 
present in order to become the historical past; [but that] the past must be the present
^ Preston King, “Thinking Past a Problem”, in Thinking Past a Problem: Essays on the History of 
Ideas, (London; Frank Cass, 2000), p.25-6.
King, “Introduction”, in The History o f Ideas, p.4.
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before it is h is to r ic a l.M o re  simply, in order to be constructed or reconstructed as 
the historical past, the past must exist in the present and therefore be present and not 
past. Hence, “the historical past is not past at all...[but] nothing other, nothing more 
and nothing less, than what the evidence obliges us to believe -  a present world of 
ideas.”^^  According to Oakeshott’s conceptualisation then, “[w]hat we call ‘past 
events’ are...the product of understanding present occurrences as evidence for 
happenings that have already taken place.”^^  These present occurrences may take 
the general form of survivals, that is, as mentioned earlier, things that have survived 
from the past to exist in the present. ‘The past’, therefore, “is a construction we 
make for ourselves out of the events which take place before our eyes”, and as such, 
the past and the present are ‘logical counterparts’, ‘the past’ merely constituting “a 
certain way of reading ‘the present’ Thus history, according to Oakeshott’s 
understanding, is “the continuous assertion of a past which is not past and of a 
present which is not p r e s e n t . W i t h  this it is therefore established that the only 
possible way of conceiving the past within the past/present paradox is as an 
invented phenomenon o f the present. However, the term ‘invented’ is not used here 
to indicate a past that is ‘fabricated’, as it would be according Hobsbawm’s use of 
the term, but rather implies that the historian looking at the past from the vantage 
point of the present has a hand in how that past is presented.
Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1933/1966), p. 109.
/6/d.
Oakeshott, “The Activity of Being an Historian”, p. 80, 
ibid., p.77.
^  Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, p. 111.
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By extension, it therefore also stands to reason that the most critical characteristic 
of the past is the manner in which it is invented in present thinking. Recognising 
this, Oakeshott conceives o f three different notions o f ‘past’ as ‘remembered’, 
‘practical’ or ‘historical’. As will become apparent shortly, it is the latter two, the 
‘practical’ and ‘historical’ pasts that are of greatest relevance to the concept of 
tradition. The ‘remembered past’, Oakeshott argues, does not reside within the 
domain of the central concerns o f history as it can simply be equated with personal 
exper ience.This  form of the past, although similarly existing in the present, is 
simply a function of personal memory, and is consequently o f little use in the 
practice of historical inquiry. The ‘practical past’ however, is “composed of 
artifacts and utterances, alleged to have survived from the past and recognised in 
terms of their worth to us in our current practical engagement.”^^  Further 
elucidating what is meant by the ‘practical past’, Oakeshott writes;
Wherever the past is merely that which preceded the present, that from 
which the present has grown, wherever the significance o f the past lies in 
the fact that it has been influential in deciding the present and friture 
fortunes o f man, whenever the present is sought in the past, and whenever 
the past is regarded as merely a refuge from the present -  the past involved 
is a practical, and not an historical past.^^
ibid., p. 102.
Michael Oakeshott, “Present, Future and Past”, in On History and Other Essays, (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1999), p.35.
Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, p. 103.
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The ‘practical past’ is therefore instmmentally located in the present; that is, it is a 
tool whose value is determined entirely in terms of its present worth. According to 
Oakeshott therefore, the role of the historian in addressing the practical past is that 
of “re-calling, or of re-enacting the past” in order to extrapolate elements of use to 
the present.^^
In contrast to the ‘practical past’ however, the ‘historical past’ “is a past which has 
not survived.” "^^ As mentioned above, due to the incomplete nature of the ‘historical 
record’, history can only ever amount to “what the evidence obliges us to believe,” 
rather than “what actually happened.”^^  As a result, the ‘historical past’ is a past 
that can only be inferred by piecing together fragments of evidence. However, as 
inference, “is the product of judgement”, even ‘historical history’, “belongs to the 
historian’s present world of experience.”^^  The role of the historian in endeavouring 
to understand the historical past is therefore not “that of recalling, or of re-enacting 
the past,” as this is, due to the reasons explained above, categorically impossible, 
but of creating it “by a process of translation.”^^  Thus, like the ‘practical past’ the 
‘historical past’ is an invention of the present. What distinguishes the ‘historical 
past’ from the ‘practical past’ however, is that it is a “dead past; a past unlike the 
present”, the history of which is concerned with “the past for the sake of the past.”^^
Oakesliott, “The Activity of Being an Historian”, p. 92. 
Oakeshott, “Present, Future and Past”, p.33.
Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, p. 108.
Oakeshott, “Tlie Activity of Being an Historian”, p.92. 
^ Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, p. 106.
46
History that is concerned exclusively with the ‘past for the sake of the past’ then, is 
similarly an invention o f the present that constitutes a form of mediation between 
the past and the present.
As instruments linking the past and the present then, traditions are also inherently 
invented phenomena that are likewise subject to the practical/historical distinction. 
However, Oakeshott’s substantial discussions of ‘tradition’ are not fundamentally 
concerned with traditions o f thought, as is the central focus o f this thesis, but with 
traditions of behaviour. As Andrew Vincent writes, for Oakeshott, a tradition is “a 
‘multi-voiced’ entity which does not constitute a creed, set of maxims, mles or 
propositions.”^^  Rather, traditions are more complex means of explaining behaviour 
in which practical knowledge o f a tradition does not exist in isolation but is 
assimilated into the practices which adherence to a tradition entails."^ ® Thus, political 
education, for example, “is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition” 
of politically motivated behaviour in a detached abstract sense, but entails “learning 
how to participate in a conversation.”"*^ For Oakeshott then, political education 
“begins in the enjoyment o f a tradition, in the observation and intimation o f the 
behaviour o f our elders.”"*^ Significantly, traditions o f political activity are 
‘temporary’ and it is here that a glimpse o f Oakeshott’s theoretical understanding o f
Andrew Vincent, “Introduction”, in Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity, ed. Andrew 
Vincent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.4. 
ibid.
Michael Oakeshott, “Political Education”, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1962), p. 129.
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tradition can be caught. As ‘temporary’ phenomena, traditions are always changing 
and yet, due to their very nature, simultaneously retain an inherent connection to the 
past from which they are derived. As Oakeshott explains;
Nothing that ever belonged to it is completely lost; we are always swerving 
back to recover and make something topical out o f even its remotest 
moments: and nothing for long remains unmodified. Everything is 
temporary, but nothing is arbitrary. Everything figures by comparison, not 
with what stands next to it, but with the whole."*^
In this sense therefore, the central principle of a tradition is ‘continuity ' whereby 
“authority is diffused between past, present and future; between the old, the new 
and what is to come.”"*"*
In a similar manner to the discussion of tradition included in Oakeshott’s essay on 
political education, ‘tradition’ also features in his consideration of ‘moral activity’. 
Here, as with political activity, traditions o f moral activity are similarly conceived 
as embedded patterns of behaviour. However, whereas the principle of continuity is 
emphasised with regard to traditions of political behaviour, in the case of moral 
activity, ‘tradition’ is marked more heavily by the principle of coherence. In fact, 
Oakeshott goes so far as to argue that “moral activity begins with coherence.”"*^ In
ibid., p. 128.
Michael Oakeshott, “Rational Conduct”, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1962), p. 106.
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this instance, knowledge o f how to behave is therefore constituted by the coherence 
of the moral tradition;
That moral activity should play upon the margins of current moral 
achievement, appealing from contemporary incoherence to the coherence of 
a whole moral tradition, is as normal as the activity which merely gyrates 
around the pivot of contemporary coherence; they are alike exhibitions of a 
knowledge of how to behave."*^
What this reveals is that although both continuity and coherence are essential 
constitutive elements of traditions, the extent of their dominance is largely 
determined by the specific tradition o f behaviour itself Thus, although Oakeshott 
provides a sense of how traditions o f behaviour function, the theoretical discussion 
of tradition in his work is limited to an ‘applied’, rather than abstract theoretical 
fbrm/^ For this reason, despite helping to further elucidate elements o f their 
construction, this particular aspect o f Oakeshott’s work is of limited value in the 
analysis of traditions of thought.
Two elements of Oakeshott’s philosophy o f history are however, of particular 
importance to this endeavour. First, in accordance with the assumption that ail 
thinking is necessarily present thinking, Oakeshott’s notion o f history as an 
‘invented’ phenomenon provides a useful means of approaching the set of logical
47 See also Michael Oakeshott, “The Importance of the Historical Element in Christianity”, in 
Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, ed. Timothy Fuller, (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1993).
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problems raised by the existence o f the ‘past/present paradox’ in the history of 
ideas. As mentioned above, the term ‘invented’ here does not equate to 
Hobsbawm’s designation o f ‘invented traditions’ as fabricated patterns o f thought 
and behaviour. Rather, it refers to an action somewhat akin to creation, not in the 
sense o f a deceitftil or fictitious act, but in the very real sense that everything that 
exists must in some way have been created. Secondly, Oakeshott’s 
conceptualisation o f the past in terms o f its ‘practical’ and ‘historical’ variants 
constitutes a particularly useful framework according to which the construction of 
historical traditions might be analysed. As will be demonstrated in the final section 
of this chapter, this distinction accords well with the specific approach to traditions 
of International Relations provided by Brian Schmidt and helps to overcome the 
methodological problems raised by the various manners in which different 
incarnations of the Grotian tradition have been constructed. However, both 
Oakeshott’s understanding o f history and its contingent conceptualisation o f the 
relationship between past and present have been subject to both a barrage of 
criticisms and radical reformulation by subsequent ‘historians of ideas’. The 
following sections consequently address the objections to Oakeshott’s philosophy 
of history presented, respectively, by proponents of both contextual and post­
structuralist approaches to the history o f ideas.
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RG. Collingwood
Despite recognising that Oakeshott’s work “represents the high-water mark of 
English thought upon history” with his “brilliant and penetrating account of the 
aims of historical thought and the character of its object,”"*^ Collingwood ultimately 
sets out “to destroy [Oakeshott’s] distinction between past and present.”"*^ In 
particular, he argues that it is a ‘delusion’ to suppose, as Oakeshott has done, that 
the past “is dead and gone, and in no sense at all living on into the present.” ®^ This, 
he explains, is due to the fact that “[t]he historian cannot answer questions about the 
past unless he has evidence about it” and this “evidence, if he ‘has’ it, must be 
something existing here and now in his present world.” *^ What this reveals at the 
outset is Collingwood’s fundamental opposition to Oakeshott’s notion of history as 
an ‘invented’ phenomenon. For, as will be explored further in this section, 
Collingwood appears to conceive history as something existing ‘out there’, an 
understanding of which is provided by evidence existing in the present. However, 
while Collingwood’s argument against Oakeshott’s understanding o f the past as 
‘dead and gone’ does not, in and o f itself, preclude the possibility of a distinction 
between past and present, the dividing line is breached by coupling this notion with 
his understanding of the purpose of history and the practice of historical inquiry.
R.G. Collingwood, The Idea o f History, ed. Jan Van Der Dussen, (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1946/1993), p. 158-9, 153.
King, “Introduction”, in The History» o f  Ideas, p.7.
RG. Collingwood, “The Historical Logic of Question and Answer”, in The History o f Ideas: An 
Introduction to Method, ed. Preston King, (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 149. 
ibid., p. 147.
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As hinted at above, Collingwood and Oakeshott’s contending visions o f the purpose 
of history are ultimately derived from their divergent understandings of the 
relationship between past and present, a distinction Collingwood aims to eradicate. 
In addressing Oakeshott’s fundamental distinction between past and present that, 
when considered together, constitutes the past/present paradox, Collingwood argues 
that “[s]o long as the past and present are outside one another, knowledge of the 
past is not of much use in the problems of the present.”^^  Thus, contrary to 
Oakeshott’s argument that “[h]istory is the past for the sake of the past,”^^  
Collingwood blurs the distinction between past and present in order to conceive 
history as having a primary function in the present. He writes;
If the function of history was to inform people about the past, where the past 
was understood as a dead past, it could do very little towards helping them 
to act; but if its function was to inform them about the present, in so far as 
the past, its ostensible subject-matter, was incapsulated in the present and 
constituted a part of it not at once obvious to the untrained eye, then history 
stood in the closest possible relation to practical life.^ "*
Thus, like Oakeshott, Collingwood contends that “all historical thought is the 
historical interpretation of the present.”^^  However, parting ways with Oakeshott, he 
derives from this the further claim that “for this reason the past concerns the
Collingwood, “The Historical Logic”, p. 149.
Oakeshott, Modes o f Experience, p. 106.
Collingwood, “The Historical Logic”, p. 151-152.
R.G. Collingwood, “The Limits of Historical Knowledge”, in Essays in the Philosophy o f History, 
ed. William Debbins, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 102.
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historian only so far as it has led to the present On the contrary, according to 
Oakeshott’s reasoning, the reason that ‘all historical thought is the historical 
interpretation of the present’ is simply because thinking in the present is all that is 
categorically possible,
Collingwood’s reasoning is however, fiirther directed by what he understands to be 
the purpose of historical inquiry. As indicated above, for Collingwood, history is 
fundamentally the search for solutions to present problems in past thinking, 
characterised by the merging o f past and present thought. Thus, unlike Oakeshott, 
who “contended that history is an autonomous activity disengaged from the 
considerations of practical life,”^^  Collingwood maintains that history serves a 
practical purpose. This notion of history as standing “in closest possible relation to 
practical life”^^  directly contradicts Oakeshott’s claim that history “is a form of 
theorising and is therefore “released from considerations of conduct”.”^^
Thus, according to Collingwood, the role of the historian is the re-enactment of 
what is being studied, rather than its ‘invention’ in Oakeshott’s sense. “Historical 
knowledge,” is therefore the “re-enactment o f a past thought encapsulated in a 
context of present thought,”^^  thus blurring the line between what is past and what
David Boucher, “Human Conduct, History and Social Science in tlie Works of R.G. Collingwood 
and Michael Oakeshott”, New Literary History, Vol.24, No.3, (Summer 1993), p.697.
^ R G. CoWmgwooA, An Autobiography, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 114.
Michael Oakeshott quoted in Boucher, p.703.
Co\Sm^QiQÛ, An Autobiography, p. 114.
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is present. Again this raises the question o f how past and present thought are to be 
discerned, given that the only thinking that we have demonstrable evidence for is 
that which occurs in the present. Nonetheless, Collingwood further exacerbates this 
logical anomaly evident in his thinking with the further claim that history does not 
entail “knowing what events followed what”, but is rather concerned with “getting 
inside other people’s heads, looking at their situation through their eyes.” *^ 
Although it does not seem logically possible to cease looking through one’s own 
eyes, the manner in which ‘getting inside other people’s heads’ is achieved is via 
what Collingwood terms the ‘logic of question and answer’.
The ‘logic o f question and answer’ fundamentally contends that any proposition 
made in the past may be considered the answer to a particular question 
characteristic o f the time or situation. Thus Collingwood wiites:
Now, the question ‘To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition 
for an answer?’ is an historical question, and therefore cannot be settled 
except by historical methods. When So-and-so wrote in a distant past, it is 
generally a very difficult one, because writers (at any rate good writers) 
always write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are 
‘likely to be interested’, which means those who are already asking the 
question to which the answer is being offered; and consequently a writer 
very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to answer. Later 
on, when he has become a ‘classic’ and his contemporaries are all long dead, 
the question has been forgotten; especially if the answer he gave was
61 ibid., p.58.
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generally acknowledged to be the right answer; for in that case people 
stopped asking the question, and began asking the question that next arose.
However, considering the central precepts o f the ‘logic o f question and answer’ 
together with Collingwood’s fusion of past and present, whereby history is the “re­
enactment of a past thought encapsulated in a context of present thought,” the 
question o f how the historian is to discern their own thoughts from those they are 
apparently investigating in someone else’s head, remains unanswered. Put 
differently, if  it is not possible to discern past and present, then surely all the 
historian is able to do is suggest a question the writer may have been answering and 
not the question. What is more, the question which the historian suggests is 
embedded in the context of the present and therefore cannot be the logical 
consequence o f ‘getting inside’ someone else’s head.
However, Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’ has provided the basis for 
an on-going philosophy of history. Inspired by Collingwood, Quentin Skinner, 
whose work will be discussed in shortly, points out that the “vital implication here 
is not merely that the classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and 
answers, but only with their own”, and that “there simply are no perennial problems 
in philosophy.”^^  Rather, “there are only individual answers to individual questions, 
with as many different answers as there are questions, and as many different
63 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in tlie History of Ideas”, History and Theory: 
Studies in the Philosophy o f History, Vol. VIII, (1969), p.50.
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questions as there are questioners.” "^* However, it is one thing to suggest that 
‘classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers’, and another 
thing entirely to suppose that ‘our questions and answers’ can be divorced from the 
practice of historical inquiry. Indeed, Collingwood and, by extension Skinner’s, 
logic seems to discount that many different questions will be posed by many 
different questioners, some of whom operate under the guise of the historian.
O f particular pertinence to this discussion however, Collingwood is quite rightly 
critical of proponents of ‘universal history’, writing that “[t]heir common 
characteristic was that they fitted facts together so as to make a pattern in which the 
same forms tended to recur again and again.”^^  Thus, contrary to claims that history 
may be constituted by elements o f universality, he argues that “[a]ll history is the 
history of something, something definite and particular” and consequently, that “the 
history of everything is the history of nothing.
Finally, and o f particular importance to the notion of ‘tradition’ developed in 
Collingwood’s work is his understanding of history and the role o f the historian as 
embedded in a notion of progress in the social and intellectual evolution of 
humankind. “Man,” he argues, “has been defined as an animal capable of profiting 
by the experience of others.”^^  For example, the mathematics of the ancient Greeks
ibid.
R.G. Collingwood, “The Philosophy of Histoiy”, in Essays in the Philosophy o f History, ed. 
William Debbins, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 130.
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is not “the dead past of a mathematical thought once entertained by persons whose 
names and dates we can give,” but is mathematics that we can understand in the 
present as the foundations o f contemporary mathematics.^*^ The historical process, 
according to Collingwood, is therefore the means according to which progress is 
achieved “by the retention in the mind, at one phase, of what was achieved in the 
preceding phase.”^^  In this manner then, ‘scientific history’, as Collingwood terms 
it, represents the accumulation o f past ideas now encapsulated in the present and 
implies that interpretations of the present are always superior to those of the past.
Thus, to recap the findings o f the preceding discussion, traditions exist as devices 
that both invent and communicate the history of ideas. In doing so, they constitute a 
means o f connecting the past and the present, although the nature o f this connection 
and the motivations for-pursuing it vary. Fundamentally, the question of whether we 
can be said to ‘know’ the past, is central to the contending conceptualisations o f 
both past and present, and the notion o f ‘tradition’ itself. Assuming with Oakeshott 
however, that the past is an invention o f the present, traditions simply constitute a 
means of constructing the past. Furthermore, despite the efforts of those opposed to 
the very notion of the ‘invented tradition’, the concept of tradition remains trapped 
in the past/present paradox and is consequently best viewed as an invented 
phenomenon. Thus, although MacIntyre’s definition o f tradition as a self-conscious 
pattern of thought appears on the surface to exist in the past, it too is a function of 
present thinking and is, as a result, similarly ‘invented’. In light of this, what is
^  fW , p.333.
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critical to the analysis o f traditions is the precise manner in which they are invented 
for, as John G. Gunnell makes clear, “it is one thing to engage in a conversation 
with the past and quite another thing to stage a conversation with the past.”^^  With 
these issues in mind, the remaining sections of this chapter are concerned with a 
range o f methodological approaches to the analysis of traditions, namely that 
‘contextualist’, ‘genealogical’ and ‘critical internal discursive’ approaches.
Contextualism
Perhaps the most interesting criticisms of the broadly conceived ‘traditions 
approach’ have resonated from a number o f contemporary historians of ideas such 
as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, James Tully and Richard Tuck. Although none 
of these writers are explicitly concerned with the traditions of International 
Relations per se. Tuck coming closest with his account of traditions of war and 
p e a c e ,th e ir  critique of traditions as instruments of historical inquiry remain 
applicable to the discipline. In this vein, Duncan Bell has recently advocated the 
application of contextualist methodologies to the disciplinary history of 
International Relations.^^ In more general terms however, contextualist approaches 
“stand as both a powerftil critique o f the invention of traditions and an argument for
Jolm G. Gunnell, “The Mytli of tlie Tradition”, in The History of Ideas, p.252.
Richard Tuck, The Rights o f War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Duncan S. A. Bell, “International relations: tlie dawn of an historiographical turn?”, British 
Journal o f  Politics and International Relations, Vol.3, No.l, (April 2001), pp. 115-126; “Political 
Theory and the hmctions of intellectual liistory: a response to Emmanuel Navon” Review of 
International Studies, Vol.29, (2003), pp. 151-160
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tlie reconstruction of more genuinely historical traditions.”^^  As such, Skinner’s 
work in particular points to a range of methodological implications both for the 
construction and analysis of traditions of thought. However, as will be discussed in 
this section, Skinner’s approach to achieving ‘more genuinely historical traditions’ 
is susceptible to a range o f criticisms both from proponents of the opposing 
‘textualist’ tradition, and more fundamentally, from those who question the very 
conceptual foundations upon which it is built. In particular, in accordance with 
Oakeshott’s conceptualisation o f history, the ability of the historian to escape the 
present by reconstructing the past context in which a text was composed, proposed 
by Skinner, is brought into serious question.
Textualism, the traditional opponent of contextualist approaches, fundamentally 
contends that all that is required to understand a text is the reading and re-reading of 
the text itself. Contextualism, on the other hand, “is a contemporary methodological 
claim that valid history is only secured via the approximately complete 
reconstruction of ‘the context’” in which it was written.^"* Like textualism, 
contextualism is not a methodology in and o f itself, but rather a pedagogic device 
used to classify a set o f approaches to historical inquiry that privilege, to varying 
extents, the place of context in the interpretation of historical texts. As John Patrick 
Diggins states, clarifying the contextualist position, “[t]he ultimate aim o f the 
contextualist is to establish what the author of a work had in mind by its production, 
and in this exercise the text itself is not a self-sufficient resource for understanding
Duime, “Mytlioiogy or metliodology?”, p.310.
King, “Introduction”, in Thinking Past a Problem, p.5.
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its author’s întentions.”^^  Thus, the contextualist approach, “insists that it is the 
context “of religious, political and economic factors” which determine the meaning 
of any given text, and so must provide “the ultimate framework” for any attempt to 
understand it.”^^  Despite holding this fundamental idea in common however, a 
range of different methodological approaches exist within the broad remit of 
‘contextualism’.
At a frindamental level, textualism and contextualism are derived from differing 
notions o f the relationship between past and present knowledge and its implications 
for the practice of historical inquiry. As John Dunn writes, textualism “views the 
historical character of the texts with massive indifference, treating them, with 
varying degrees of attention and patience, simply as repositories o f potential 
intellectual stimulation for a contemporary reader, and permitting themselves to 
respond, accordingly, just as the fancy takes them.” ’^ Thus, the ‘meaning’ of the 
text is defined entirely in terms o f its present interpretation. Contextualism, on the 
other hand, is inspired by claims that “we can make no assumptions that are valid 
for the past, that the past is marked by clironic alterity, [and] that our chief 
obligation, in the pursuit o f what Oakeshott called ‘the historical past’, is to escape 
the present.”^^  As established earlier in this chapter however, it is categorically
John Patrick Diggins, “The Oyster and tlie Pearl: Hie Problem of Contextualism in Intellectual 
History”, History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy o f History, Vol.XXIII, (1984), p. 152. 
Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding hi tlie Histoiy of Ideas” p.3.
John Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, in The History o f Political Theory and other 
essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 19.
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impossible to think anywhere other than the present and, as such, this reasoning 
amounts to the perversion o f Oakeshott’s philosophy o f history. Indeed, as King 
explains, “attempts to remove ourselves from the present to enter the past [are] self- 
defeating,” and hence, the only place in which the past can be understood is in the 
present.^^ Thus, the philosophical underpinnings of contextualism pose a serious 
methodological dilemma.
Although he argues that contextualism is not “a sufficient or even appropriate 
means of achieving a proper understanding o f any given literary or philosophical 
work,”^  Quentin Skinner stands as perhaps the most prominent contextualist 
theorist of contemporary scholarship. Derived explicitly from the speech-act 
theories o f Austin, Searle and Grice, Skinner’s ‘linguistic contextualism’, as it is 
sometimes la b e le d ,is  founded on the claim that “every serious utterance has some 
particular illocutionary force co-ordinate with its ordinary meaning as a locution.
As Tully explains, in addition to “putting forward words, sentences, arguments, 
theories and so on with a certain ‘locutionary’ or ‘propositional’ meaning...the 
author will be doing something in speaking or writing the words, sentences,
ibid., p.5.
Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding”, p.3-4.
Mark Bevir even goes fnrtlier tlian simply identifying a ‘linguistic’ variant of the contextualist 
approach, distinguishing between the ‘hard linguistic contextualism’ of J.G.A. Pocock, and tire ‘soft 
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^ Quentin Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts” in The History o f Ideas: 
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arguments and so on: he or she will be doing so with a point or an intended force. 
This act of ‘doing something in speaking or writing’ is what is referred to as the 
illocutionary force o f a speech act. According to this reasoning therefore, 
understanding a text requires understanding both its locutionary and illocutionary 
forces.
The illocutionary force is henceforth determined by examining the linguistic 
context in which a text was written. By employing a contextualist approach that 
takes both locutionary and illocutionary forces into consideration, Skinner argues 
that “[w]e can begin to see not merely what arguments [authors] were presenting, 
but also what questions they were addressing and trying to answer, and how far they 
were accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or perhaps even 
polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions o f political 
debate.” "^^ These are all elements of understanding that cannot be obtained by 
merely reading a text in isolation from its context.
Skinner’s appropriation of speech-act theory in this manner consequently attempts 
to “resurrect hermeneutical claims that are rooted in the work of individuals such as 
R.G. Collingwood.”^^  Thus, Collingwood’s aim of “getting inside other people’s
James Tully, “The pen is a mighty sword; Quentin Skinner’s analysis of politics”, in Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully, (Cambridge; Polity Press, 1988), p. 8.
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heads, looking at their situation through their eyes,"^ as proposed by the ‘logic of 
question and answer,’ is facilitated in Skinner’s work by speech act theory. In this 
vein, speech act theory is the means according to which Skinner attempts to 
ascertain what questions the answers provided by historical texts were addressing.
In conceiving historical understanding as constituted by locutionary and 
illocutionary forces, understood in terms of prevailing linguistic conventions, 
Skinner both criticises and endorses the notion of tradition. As such, he presents 
three explicit arguments against tradition. First, and as mentioned previously, citing 
the work of R.G. Collingwood, he argues that “there simply are no perennial 
problems in philosophy: there are only individual answers to individual questions, 
and as many different questions as they are questioners.”^^  Thus, the notion of 
continuity within the concept of tradition is, in Skinner’s view, prone to 
anachronism, that is, “falsely asserting an identity or continuity with the past.”^^  
Deriving this argument from the central precepts of speech-act theory, Skinner 
asserts that political language is embedded in the context of its time, hence 
eliminating the possibility o f the transhistorical languages and timeless ideas that 
constitute the continuity o f traditions. Skinner’s second and related complaint about 
the use of traditions in the history of ideas is what he terms the ‘mythology of 
coherence’. He argues that “[t]his procedure gives the thought of various classic 
writers a coherence and an air generally of a closed system, which they may never
QoWmgwood, An Autobiography, p.58. 
Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding”, p.50.
King, “Introduction”, in Thinking Past a Problem, p.5.
63
have attained or even been meant to attain.”^^  Finally, Skinner also attacks the 
‘myth of doctrines’, precipitated by “the danger of converting some scattered or 
quite incidental remarks by a classic theorist into his “doctrine” on one of the 
mandatory themes.” "^ Considered together, these three problems invite the 
possibility o f “crediting a writer with a meaning he could not have intended to 
convey, since that meaning was not available to him.”^^
However, Skinner’s approach has been subject to stringent criticism from both 
within and outside the broadly conceived realm of contextualist scholarship. 
Attacking his denial o f the existence of ‘perennial problems’, for example, Joseph 
Femia argues that “[sjurely some problems are perennial, in the sense of always 
underlying thought about certain ranges o f concrete particulars,” maintaining that 
“such problems do tend to recur as explicit focuses of concern.”^^  Peter Janssen 
however, defends Skinner’s position against Femia’s criticisms, arguing that his 
argument is based on one controversial passage of Skinner’s work. According to 
Janssen’s interpretation, Skinner’s concern is simply to “expose the absurdities o f a 
perennial-issues approach,” rather than to deny the possibility o f any similarity 
between the ideas of different peoples and ages.^^ However, it is one thing to argue
^ Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding”, p. 17. 
p.7. 
ibid., p.9.
^ Joseph V. Femia, “An liistoricist critique of ‘revisionist’ metliods for studying tlie liistoiy of 
ideas”, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully, (Cambridge; 
Polity Press, 1988), p. 164.
Peter L. Janssen, “Political Thought as Traditionary Action; Tlie Critical Response to Skimier and 
Pocock”, History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy o f History, Vol.XXIV, (1985), p. 120.
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against the assumption that all problems are perennial in nature, and another 
entirely to argue that “there simply are no perennial problems in philosophy”, as 
Skinner has done.
Alternatively, writers such as Gad Prudovsky argue that “historical figures need not 
be reconstructed solely in terms of the social and linguistic conventions o f their 
time and place.” "^^ Similarly, Femia criticises Skinner’s understanding of the history 
o f political thought as a “series o f disconnected intellectual events,” contending that 
“[i]f all historical events are sui generis, then we cannot write history; only pile up 
documents.”^^  However, the danger inherent in attempting to assert some sort of 
false coherence or continuity of ideas remains. In light of such arguments therefore, 
Prudovsky makes the sensible point that “[t]he interpreter should learn when it is 
appropriate to search for coherence and when it is not.”^^  Unfortunately however, 
he does not provide any suggestion o f what these appropriate circumstances might 
entail.
More seriously, John Gunnell maintains that by pursuing this line of argument, 
Skinner risks undermining “the kind o f integrity that was provided by the idea of 
the tradition” promulgated in this context by proponents of the grand tradition of 
political thought and “the sense o f relevance gained by the belief that it was
Gad Prudovsky, “Can We Ascribe to Past Thinkers Concepts They Had No Linguistic Means to 
Express?”, History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy o f History, Vol.36, (1997), p. 15.
Femia, p. 168.
^  Prudovsky, p.23.
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explaining our modern political condition Skinner however, retorts that his 
methodology actually amounts to a reformulation of the notion o f tradition. Indeed, 
far from arguing for the eradication o f traditions altogether, Skinner merely argues 
for a more historical approach to their interpretation and the interpretation o f those 
texts and actions contained within them;
I am suggesting that what is needed, in order to be able to carry the 
argument beyond this rather iinsatisfactoiy point, is not merely to indicate 
the traditions of discourse to which a given writer may be appealing, but 
also to ask what he may be doing when he appeals to the language of those 
particular traditions. Since many different things can always be done by 
different writers with a given ‘language’, the focus ought not, I think, to be 
on the language or the traditions in themselves, but rather on the range of
things which can in principle be done with them (and to them) at any given
time.^ ^
By situating historical interpretation within the linguistic conventions of the time 
therefore, Skinner is appealing to an historically constituted notion o f tradition. 
Mark Bevir, amongst others however, contends that by deriving a notion of
intentions from the conventions of the time, Skinner’s methodology is unable to
cope with unconventional or highly creative expressions o f intention.^^ Thus, it is 
susceptible to its own criticisms of traditions enforcing the myths o f doctrine and 
coherence. A number of writers have also questioned Skinner’s assumption that the
Giuinell, “Interpretation and tlie History of Political Theory”, p.326.
^ Quentin Skinner, “Some problems in the analysis of political thouglit and action”, iw. Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 107.
^  Bevir, “The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism”, p.289.
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intentions o f an author in composing a text are recoverable. Following Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, such critics argue that Skinner “presents the historian with a hopeless task 
o f identifying secret authorial intentions.” According to Rogers however, this 
type o f criticism “disregards the distinction between motives, often secret, and 
intentions, which are in the case of speech acts always public.”
Perhaps the most significant criticism o f Skinner’s work is encapsulated in the 
further contention that he does not seem to apply his methodology to himself as an 
interpreter. More specifically, Skinner’s instrumental endorsement of hermeneutic 
principles o f interpretation is highly inconsistent and, by extension, contradictory. 
His understanding of the relationship between text and context, or between the 
author and the situation in which the author wrote, utilises the notion o f the 
hermeneutic circle. In accordance with philosophical hermeneutics therefore, it is 
maintained that the part, constituted by the text, cannot be understood in isolation 
from the whole, the context. However, Skinner does not extend this hermeneutic 
circle to include the interpreter of the text. Indeed, as Keane argues, it is “[n]ot only 
those whose utterances are to be interpreted, but interpreters themselves [who] are 
always situated within a field o f historically bound conventions and practices 
mediated by ordinary language.” By ignoring the context of the interpreter from 
the process of interpretation therefore, Skinner assumes that the interpreter is
Ben Rogers, “Review Article: Philosophy for Historians: The Metliodological Writings of 
Quentin Skinner”, History, Vol.75, No.2, (1990), p.269.
John Keane, “More theses on tlie philosophy of histoiy”, in Meaning and Context: Quentin 
Skinner and his Criiics, (Onibridge: Polity Press, 1998), p.209.
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somehow a detached observer of the past. However, Skinner has recently addressed 
this criticism of his work, writing that;
We are of course embedded in practices and constrained by them. But those 
practices owe their dominance in part to the power of our normative 
language to hold them in place, and it is always open to us to employ the 
resources of our language to undermine as well as to undeipin those 
practices. We may be freer than we sometimes suppose.
However, if historical texts are thought to exist exclusively in the present, then 
Skinner’s archangels o f historical purity are nothing more than a fantasy. By 
extension, attempts to overcome the problem of anachronism in historical 
interpretation is also impossible and, as King has argued, may even result in an 
equally alarming prospect, particularism.
In light of these and other criticisms, a number of historians originally associated 
with Skinner’s approach have moved to distance themselves from his work in more 
recent scholarship. In particular, John Dunn, once sympathetic to a broadly 
understood Skinnerian methodology, admits to a significant shift in his own 
approach, writing that “[a]fter more than thirty years of reftect[ion]” some o f the 
‘weightiest judgements’ he had previously made about the nature of historical
Quentin Skimier, “Introduction: Seeing tilings tlieir way”, in Visions of Politics, Vol.I: Regarding 
Method, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.7.
King, “Introduction”, in Thinking Past a Problem, p.5.
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enquiry “seem...less often clear and negative than I used intuitively to believe.
As such, he now adheres to a more tempered contextualist approach that recognises 
both that the “idea o f a context o f authorship has proved, on closer consideration, 
remarkably elusive” and that “not all historical studies will tell us something.”^^  ^ In 
doing so, Dunn reverts to a more commonsense approach explained by the assertion 
that “[i]t is not a necessary truth that a lengthy text can be best understood by 
reading it the right way up. But it remains an eminently sound judgement.”
Similarly, Richard Tuck, whilst also remaining broadly contextualist in orientation, 
focuses on the historical and intellectual contexts in which texts were composed, 
interpreting Grotius’ De Jure Praedae in terms of the case o f the Dutch East India 
Company for which it was written and the intellectual tradition of humanist 
scholarship in which Grotius was e d u c a t e d . I n  doing so, in a typically 
contextualist manner. Tuck explicitly aims to “depict as far as possible the character 
of the actual life which these theorists were leading, and the specific political 
questions which engaged their attention.” However, like Dunn, Tuck also directly 
refutes Skinner’s approach on a number o f critical points. In particular, he writes 
that historical scholarship “should also be a contribution to our understanding of
John Dunn, “Introduction”, in The Hisloty o f Political Theory and other essays, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.
Jolm Dimn, “The History of Political Tlieory”, in The History o f Political Theory and other 
essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.23. 
ibid., p.26.
Tuck, The Rights o f War and Peace, pp.78-108.
Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitj  ^
Press, 1993), p.xi.
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how people might cope with broadly similar issues in our own time,” adding that 
the “point of studying the seventeenth century... is that many o f the conflicts which 
marked its politics are also found in some form in the late twentieth century; and, 
indeed, the better our historical sense o f what those conflicts were, the more often 
they seem to resemble modern ones.””  ^ With this. Tuck seems to suggest, contra 
Skinner that some problems may, in fact, be perennial.
Despite the range of criticisms launched at Skinner’s work and the derivative 
methodologies they have precipitated, alternative forms o f contextualism exist, the 
most prominent of which is evident in the work of J.G.A. Pocock. Central to 
Pocock’s philosophy of histoiy is the notion of the linguistic paradigm derived from 
Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of the manner in which paradigms operate in 
scientific research. Although Kuhn offers more than twenty different definitions of 
the term ‘paradigm’ in his seminal work. The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, it 
has largely been applied in the dualistic sense that follows;
On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given [research] 
community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, 
the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can 
replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of 
normal science.
no ibid., p.xi-xii.
Thomas Kulin, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, (Oiicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 175.
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Paradigms are, more simply, “accepted concrete examples o f scientific 
achievement, actual problem-solutions which scientists study with care and upon 
which they model their own work.”^^  ^As such, they constitute the epistemological 
parameters that demarcate any given field o f inquiry, determining, for example, the 
appropriate experimental techniques to be followed in certain standard scientific 
procedures.
Significantly, Pocock maintains that Kuhn’s notion o f the paradigm can be applied 
to “any field o f intellectual histoiy” and thereby sets about applying it to the history 
of political thought. In this sense, as with the notion of context discussed above, 
the paradigms within which the theorist writes are assumed to be both linguistic and 
political. However, recognising that the “political community is not like the 
scientific community” and, as a form of rhetoric, political language is not, like 
scientific language, the “language of a single disciplined mode of intellectual 
inquiry”, Pocock modifies Kuhn’s paradigm by redefining its central authority 
structure. He explains that within a Kuhnian scientific paradigm, particular 
solutions are provided for particular problems in accordance with an accepted 
understanding of “authority within the scientific community.” For example, it is 
accepted that certain problems in the physical sciences can be solved by reference
Thomas Kuhn quoted in J.G.A. Pocock, “Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation 
of the Study of Political Thought” 'm Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and 
History, (Chicago: Univensity of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 14, n.6.
Pocock, ibid., p. 15.
" U 6 K  P .17& 18. 
ibid., p. 18.
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to a set of currently uncontested laws of physics. However, as speech paradigms 
operate in “several simultaneous contexts, performing several simultaneous 
functions” they do not provide particular answers to particular problems but rather 
exist as ‘multivalent’ entities with varying elements of authority."^ Thus, in order 
to conceive paradigms of political thought, Pocock removes the single rigid 
authority structure of the scientific paradigm that dictates, for example, that all 
physical inquiry must proceed according to the fondamental laws of physics. What 
this modification fundamentally allows then, is the possibility that multiple 
meanings may be derived from the interpretation of a single utterance or text within 
a single paradigm.
In part, what Pocock has achieved by replacing the concept o f context with the 
notion of the paradigm, is a far more complex and nuanced understanding of what 
‘context’ itself entails. He writes that “[ojnce history is seen in linguistic depth such 
as this, the paradigms with which the author operates take precedence over 
questions of his “intention” or the “illocutionary force” of his utterance, for only 
after we have understood what means he had of saying anything can we understand 
what he meant to say, what he succeeded in saying, what he was taken to have said, 
or what effects his utterance had in modifying or transforming the existing 
paradigm structures.”^ I n  particular, he recognises that “any text or simpler 
utterance in a sophisticated political discourse is by its nature polyvalent; it consists 
in the employment of a texture o f languages capable of saying different things and
117 . . .ibid, p.25.
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of favouring different ways of saying things.” What is more, not only are “[e]ach 
of the distinguishable idioms o f which a text may be compounded... a context in its 
own right... [but] each language context betokens a political, social or historical 
context within which it is itself situated.”^
In so arguing, Pocock addresses in part King’s criticism of the distinction made 
between text and context, although, like Skinner, he is similarly unable to resolve 
its central point of contention. As King argues;
The trouble is that it is logically and physically impossible for any 
individual endlessly to contextualize the context of the context...of the 
context. The problem here is that of Fido’s tail: to chase and never to catch. 
The construction of a context is never conclusive, nor logically sounder, 
merely by virtue of it being a context. A ‘context’ is nothing more than a 
text which, by virtue of being last in place, has not yet been and cannot itself 
yet be contextualized.^^^
Contextualism is consequently faced with a logical dilemma. Either it takes context 
seriously and incorporates the context of the interpreter and the problematic context 
of the context, or it employs an instrumental notion of hermeneutic interpretation as 
evident in both the contextualist approaches of Skinner and Pocock. These
J.G.A. Pocock, “Introduction; The state of the art”, in Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on 
Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p.9.
p. 12.
Preston King, “Historical Contextualism: The New Historicism?” in Thinldng Past a Problem, 
p. 187.
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criticisms are particularly drawn upon by a range of poststructuralist theorists, 
including Jens Bartelson whose work is discussed in the following section. Such 
criticisms aside however, the contextualist approaches offered by Skinner, Pocock 
and others do provide a number o f useflil ideas that will be returned to shortly. 
Although when taken to its logical extreme the assertion that texts ought to be 
interpreted in light of their historical, political and linguistic contexts is highly 
problematic, in a more tempered form whereby ‘context’ does not prevail over 
‘text’ and the interpreter is conceived as an interested participant in this process of 
interpretation, seems a relatively sensible one.
Foucauldian Genealogy 
At first sight, it might seem that dedicating a section to the work of Jens Bartelson, 
a Foucauldian theorist, and not Michel Foucault himself, is slightly absurd; a case 
of overlooking the master in favour of the apprentice. However, there are tliree 
good reasons for doing so. First is the fact that by focusing on Bartelson we get 
‘two for the price of one’. Not only do we get an explication o f Foucault’s most 
important ideas but they are presented as read through a particular lens of 
International Relations scholarship. Secondly, as Bartelson’s work directly 
addresses Skinner’s contextualist approach to the history o f ideas, it contributes to 
the ongoing debate regarding the interpretation of historical texts with which this 
chapter is in part concerned. Finally, and less obviously at this stage, the 
introduction o f Bartelson’s work here foregrounds his return in Chapter Six in
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which his analysis of the conceptualisation of tradition employed in the works of 
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull with regard to the Grotian tradition is considered.
Employing a Foucauldian genealogical approach, Jens Bartelson’s A Genealogy o f  
Sovereignty raises a further set of questions to be leveled at both ‘presentist’ and 
‘finalist’ h is tor ies .Expla in ing  the differences between finalist and presentist 
histories, he writes that “a finalist history is a history o f the past in terms o f an 
imagined future,” whereas “a presentist history is a history of the past in terms of 
the present.” Thus, while a “finalist history treats the present as a projection of 
the past, by projecting a version of that past onto the present... a presentist history 
regards the past as a projection of the present, by projecting a version of the present 
onto the past.”^^ In a broad sense, ‘finalist’ and ‘presentist’ histories consequently 
represent an extreme interpretation o f the opposition ‘all knowledge is present 
knowledge’ and ‘all knowledge is past knowledge’ positions introduced earlier. 
Bartelson’s stated aim is therefore to overcome the “twin pitfalls o f finalism and 
presentism,” and in doing so, provide a critical appraisal o f Quentin Skinner’s 
contextualist approach outlined in the previous section.
Rather than endorse Skinner’s attempt to overcome the limitations o f ‘presentist’ 
history however, Bartelson also attacks the hermeneutic logic o f his approach. In
Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p.54.
ibid., p.55.
iW ., p.58.
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particular, he is especially concerned with Skinner’s claims to suprahistoricity as 
also discussed in the previous section. Bartelson especially seizes upon Skinner’s 
claim that:
I have merely observed that the question o f what it may be rational to hold 
true can vary with the totality o f one’s beliefs. I have never put forward the 
reckless and completely different thesis that truth itself can vary in the same 
way.^^^
As Bartelson reasons however, claims that the history Skinner is writing is true can 
only be ascertained ‘rationally’ in the present rather than the past where Skinner 
claims to be thinking. Thus, in claiming a suprahistorical vantage point, Skinner 
runs into the same circular trouble as Fido and the ‘context of the contextualiser’ 
within the hermeneutic circle discussed above. Highlighting the fundamental 
inconsistency of his approach then, Bartelson writes that “at the same time as 
Skinner wants to suspend the concept of truth in favour of historicised rationality in 
the accounts of past beliefs, he clings to much less mutable a standard when it 
comes to justifying his own beliefs, and consequently, to side-stepping the 
hermeneutic circle in order to comment on beliefs which strike him as absurd.”^^*^ 
Skinner’s history is consequently not, according to Bartelson, a ‘true’ history, but is 
rather a “doxographical one, a history o f  opinions which moves forward as a result 
of the ceaseless battle between them.” *^  ^He consequently concludes that “the very
Quentin Skinner quoted in Bartelson, ibid., p.65. 
ibid., p.66.
127 ;ibid., p.68.
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premise o f suprahistoricity is a misguided one, and that,” as a result, “it would be 
better to write a conceptual history of sovereignty [as he is doing, for example] 
from within history, and then as a history o f  the present in terms o f  its pastf^^^ This 
history, according to Bartelson, is best achieved in accordance with a ‘Foucauldian 
genealogical’ approach.
Again criticising Skinner’s application o f speech-act theory to historical enquiry, 
Bartelson begins by following Foucault’s assertion that statements ought to be 
distinguished from utterances and propositions, something which he claims Skinner 
does not do:^^^
Statements are not like propositions; they are not logical entities with a fixed 
and intrinsic meaning and reference; the same proposition with the same 
meaning can figure as different statements depending on the epistemic 
conditions under which it occurs. Statements are not utterances: whereas 
Skinner tends to equate statements with utterances, different utterances can 
be repetitions of one identical statement.
Thus, rather than interpreting statements in isolation, Bartelson, again following 
Foucault, places them within the bounds o f discourse. Discourse is, however, “a 
difficult concept”, made complicated by the number of “conflicting and overlapping 
definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints.”^^ ^
;W ., p.58.
ibid., p.69. 
ibid., p.69-70.
Norman Fairclougli, Discourse and Social Change, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p.3.
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Indeed, as Sara Mill’s notes, perhaps the most prominent proponent of discourse 
analysis, Michel Foucault, employs at least three different definitions of the term. 
Thus, in the first two instances, a discourse is both “the general domain of all 
statements” and “an individualisable group of s t a t e m e n t s . W i t h  regard to the 
second definition, Mills explains that discourses are “groups of utterances which 
seem to be regulated in some way and which seem to have a coherence and a force 
to them in common.”^^  ^ However, according to Foucault’s third definition, a 
discourse is also “a regulated practice which accounts for a number of 
statements.” It is this definition that best accords with that employed by 
Bartelson, who writes that discourses “are held together by regularities exhibited by 
the relations between different statements; a discourse is a system for the formation 
of statements.”
Contrary to the contextualist approach, the meaning of a text is consequently the 
function of the text and, “the necessity o f a suprahistorical vantage point is 
abandoned, since being and truth are now objects of inquiry rather than points of 
departure.” ^^*^ Discourse analysis is consequently;
...based on ‘a pure description o f discursive events’, and the analysis of 
statements then, is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretation: 
it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were
Sara Mills, Discourse, (London: Routledge, 1997), p.7.
ibid.
ibid.
Bartelson,^ Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p.70.
/W , p.70.
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‘really’ saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken element they contain, 
the proliferation of thoughts, images and fantasies that inhabit them; but, on 
the contraiy, it questions them as to their mode of existence, what it means 
to them to have come into existence, to have left traces, and perhaps to 
remain there, awaiting the moment when they might be o f use once more; 
what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did.
Context, in the sense employed by Skinner, is consequently irrelevant to explaining 
the meaning o f statements within discourses. Rather, in a circular fashion, “[w]hat 
counts as the relevant context is.. the particular discourse or family of statements in 
which a specific statement is being used.” ^^  ^Thus, rather than constituting a context 
in the usual sense, the “notion o f context is replaced by the concept of logical 
spaces in which the unfolding and transformation of discourse occurs.”^^  ^However, 
precisely why this cannot be simply classified as an alternative version of linguistic 
contextualism remains somewhat o f a mystery. For, although this approach 
contends that the meaning of a text is the function of the text itself, the meaning of 
statements within texts is determined by the context of the text, and the meaning of 
the text is further determined by the context of the discourse. As such, it appears 
that the ftmdamental problem here is not that of context per se, but rather of 
drawing a hard and fast distinction between texts and contexts. Indeed, this point 
was made by Preston King in the previous section with regard to poor dizzy Fido.
fW.
ibid., p.70-71. 
/W ., p.71.
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Nonetheless, the means according to which the ‘unfolding and transformation of 
discourse’ is best achieved is, according to Foucault, and by extension Bartelson, 
the genealogical approach. O f particular relevance to the study of traditions, 
Foucault writes;
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken 
continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is 
not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it 
continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined 
form to all its vicissitudes.
Thus, Bartelson writes that “genealogy is strategically aimed at that which looks 
unproblematic and is held to be timeless; its task is to explain how these present 
traits, in all their vigor and truth, were formed out of the past.” '^^  ^ Furthermore, 
unlike the Straussian enterprise, the genealogical approach “does not aim to supply 
a history of the past as it actually was,” but rather to deal with “those episodes 
which are involved in the effective formation of that which was identified as 
problematic.” "^^  ^ It is consequently, the “history of the present in terms of the past” 
and thereby escapes the past-present paradox discussed above. However, this does 
not eliminate the distinction between past and present but simply asserts that “there
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History”, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F, Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry 
Simon, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), p. 146.
Bartelson, yl Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 73.
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must be a connection between past and present, lest the writing o f history be an 
impossible or entirely meaningless enterprise.”
Genealogy is consequently, in Foucault’s words, “a form of history which can 
account for the constitution o f knowledges, discourses and domains o f objects etc., 
without having to make references to a subject which is either transcendental in 
relation to the field o f events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of 
history.” Rather than concerning itself with the origins of ideas, it aims to 
“cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning” in order to 
ascertain its point of emergence. In constructing the history of an idea, 
“[gjenealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the 
destiny of a people.” Rather, it follows “the complex course of descent” from the 
point of emergence, paying attention to “the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that”, along the way, have given “birth to those things that 
continue to exist and have value for us.” "^^  ^In doing so, it highlights the “formation 
of discourse.” The Foucauldian genealogical approach therefore constitutes a 
means according to which the emergence and evolution of ideas can be understood. 
It is neither ‘textualist’ nor ‘contextualist’, but rather seeks to analyse ideas in terms
ibid., p.74.
Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power”, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault, ed. C. Gordon, (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 117.
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy and Histoiy”, p. 144.
^^ i^bid., p. 146.
Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language”, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M 
Sheridan, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p.234.
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of the discourses in which they are situated, and in turn, discourses in terms of the 
‘logical spaces’ in which they occur.
However, the genealogical approach’s ability to facilitate the aims of this thesis is 
limited in two main ways. First, as “history o f the present in terms of the past” it 
cannot incorporate a notion o f the ‘historical past’. Rather, all history, in this sense, 
is instrumentally, as opposed to cognitively, located in the present. As a result, 
although this approach has many useful ideas to contribute to the discursive 
analysis o f traditions o f thought, its singular notion of history limits its ability to 
evaluate the construction of such traditions. Secondly, and as will be discussed in 
more detail with regard to Brian Schmidt’s ‘critical internal discursive history’, is 
the problem of what to do with context. For, as will be argued in the following 
section, although a vast number of epistemological and methodological problems 
are associated with explicitly ‘contextual’ approaches, this does not mean that 
context does not have a viable, and indeed critical, place in historical analysis.
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* Critical internal discursive history^
Methodological and epistemological claims about historicity and the 
recovery o f textual meaning, about whether meaning is a function o f an 
author’s intention or a function of the autonomy of a text, are little more 
than parasitic accretions on, or justifications for, types of interpretive
149practice.
As made particularly apparent in the preceding sections, John G. Gunnell has also 
emerged as one of Quentin Skinner’s most stringent critics. Thus, despite 
recognising that Skinner’s work has “contributed significantly to inspiring a new 
wave of substantive research in intellectual history”, he also argues that “it has 
manifested, and perpetuated, a number of problems relating to the relationship 
between philosophy and the practice o f inquiry”, many o f which have been 
discussed in previous sections o f this chapter. In particular, Gunnell is especially 
critical o f Skinner’s view of intentionality, as discussed in the previous section. 
According to Gunnell, interpretation is “a matter of recovering intentional meaning” 
however, contrary to Skinner’s understanding, intentional meaning “is not a residue 
of, or evidence for, an author’s thoughts, but theoretically identical with them.”^^  ^
Thus, criticising both the ‘textual’ and ‘contextual’ approaches outlined in previous 
sections, Gunnell writes;
Jolm G. Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins o f Political Vision, 
(Chicago: University of Cliicago Press, 1968/1987), p.xii.
Jolm G. Gmmell, The Orders o f Discourse: Philosophy, Social Science and Politics, (Lanliam: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 160.
Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time, p.xii.
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The recovery o f meaning is not simply the result of an encounter with an 
autonomous text, but neither is it primarily the consequence of successfully 
closing a historical and linguistic context. Rather, it is a matter of advancing 
and defending theoretically informed and evidentially supported arguments 
about the form and content of a text and about the external evidence for its 
meaning.
Interpretation then, “is the negotiation of meaning” according to the process of 
presenting such theoretically informed and evidentially supported arguments.
However, Gunnell’s criticisms of Skinner do not stand alone but rather exist as part 
of his wider interest in the historiography o f political science. Indeed, although his 
article “The Historiography of American Political Science” critiques elements of 
Skinner’s approach, it is more broadly concerned with the ‘historical self-image’ of 
the d isc ip l ine .Thus ,  Gunnell writes that “[w]hile attention to general historical 
contexts is important, it is necessary to avoid positing contexts that are little more 
than reified sociological constructs and/or rapidly extrapolated and unexamined 
images from secondary literature that are no more knowable or given than what 
they purport to explain.” More critically however, he also argues that;
ibid.
Gunnell, The Orders of Discourse, p. 156.
Jolm G. Gunnell, “The Historiography of American Political Science”, in The Development of 
Political Science: A Comparative Sur\>ey, ed. David Easton, Jolm G. Giumell and Luigi Gmziano, 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p. 14. 
ibid.
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The history of political science is, at least in one important sense, the history 
of the internal evolution of arguments within the discipline. It is the details 
of this dialectical process that demand more attention. Although it is 
important to be sensitive to ‘ecological’ influences, not even in modern 
theories of biological evolution do investigators attempt to read off 
development against a determinative environment, it is the genetic 
capacities of past forms that are traced, and contexts play an important but 
ultimately random role.
Having accorded contexts a limited role in the determination of meaning, Gunnell 
specifically attacks what he terms the ‘myth of the tradition’. His self-consciously 
defined purpose is to “signify the manner in which the so-called tradition was an 
image conjured up in academic discourse and projected backward to create a virtual 
history.”^^  ^At heart, the ‘tradition’ is conceived in the same manner as the context 
as “[t]he overall meaning ascribed to the tradition is advanced as the primary 
context for understanding particular texts which are, in turn, viewed as addressing a 
set of perennial issues.” ^^  ^ By doing so, the meaning of texts incorporated within 
the supposed ‘tradition’ is prefigured according to their position in this constructed 
history. Thus, “[a]t the core of the myth is the assumption or claim that the texts, 
from Plato to Marx, that have been awarded classic status by historians of political 
theory represent an actual (or self-constituted) historical tradition or inherited 
pattern of thought that in some significant respect explains contemporary
156 .ibid.
Gunnell, Orders o f Discourse, p. 155. 
Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time, p.ix.
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politics.” Explaining precisely what is entailed by the ‘myth of the tradition’ 
Gunnell writes;
The ‘tradition’ is a retrospective analytical construction which produces a 
rationalized version of the past. It is virtual tradition calculated to evoke a 
particular image of our collective public psyche and the political condition 
of our age, if not the human condition itself. It professes to tell us who we 
are and how we have arrived at our present situation.
Gunnell’s criticisms of the ‘myth of the tradition’ in political science are explicitly 
applied to the discipline of International Relations in the work of Brian C. Schmidt.
Schmidt’s disciplinary history of International Relations begins from the premise 
that “most conventional accounts of the development of the field of international 
relations contain two historiographical assumptions that have led to a serious 
misrepresentation of the actual history of the field.” First, it is generally assumed 
that the history o f International Relations can be “explained in terms of a classical 
tradition of which modern academic practitioners are the heirs.” Thus, both the 
discipline of International Relations and its constituent theoretical traditions are 
assumed to be ‘epic’ in proportions, beginning with the ‘classic’ works of the 
ancient Greeks and extending in a more or less unbroken pattern of thought to the
ibid.
Gunnell, “Tlie Myth of tlie Tradition”, p.249.
Brian C. Sdimidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 15.
/W.
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present. Secondly, Schmidt argues that the history of International Relations has 
also proceeded from the assumption that “events in the realm of international 
politics have fundamentally structured the development of international relations as 
an academic field of s t u d y . I n  particular, he adopts Gunnell’s pertinent argument 
that “[s]uch external history often fails to establish concrete connections between 
such putative contexts and the object of investigation.” As such, Schmidt’s work 
is constituted by two inter-related sets of arguments, one pertaining to the use of 
traditions as instruments of historical inquiry, and the other refuting the supposed 
epistemological viability o f the ‘contextualist’ approach to history. In doing so, it 
prepares the way for an alternative approach, ‘critical internal discursive’ history.
Just as Oakeshott conceives o f the past as either ‘remembered’, ‘practical’ or 
‘historical’, Schmidt classifies traditions as either ‘analytical’ or ‘historical’. What 
Schmidt terms an ‘historical tradition’ may exist as “a pre-constituted and self­
constituted pattern of conventional practice through which ideas are conveyed 
within a recognizably established and specified discursive framework.”^^  ^ In a 
similar manner to the ‘historical past’ then, ‘historical traditions’, despite also being 
constructed in the present, utilise the past for the sake of the past, rather than for the 
purposes of the present. Conversely, ‘analytical traditions’ are “retrospectively 
created construct[s] determined by present criteria and concerns.” In a similar
Gunnell, “The historiography of American political science”, p.29. 
Schmidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy, p.25.
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manner to Hobsbawm’s understanding of an ‘invented tradition’, ‘analytical 
traditions’ may be either deliberately, or inadvertently constructed for “presentist 
purposes rather than with the intention o f actually reconstructing the past”^^  ^
although, as mentioned earlier, Hobsbawm’s use of the term ‘invented’ is somewhat 
problematic.
In criticising the use of traditions in the disciplinary history of International 
Relations, Schmidt argues that the ‘distinguishing feature’ of the ‘traditions 
approach’ has been the “tendency to view an analytical tradition as an actual 
historical one.” ^^  ^Quoting Gunnell, Schmidt argues that;
...at its core is the reification of an analytical construct. It is the 
representation of what is in fact a retrospectively and externally demarcated 
tradition as an actual or self-constituted tradition.
Traditions have been used instrumentally to explain the present in International 
Relations without the explicit acknowledgement that they are simply analytical 
constructs and not representations o f an ‘historical’ past. For example, Robert 
Gilpin’s history o f the ‘realist tradition’ in International Relations, according to 
Schmidt, makes “no attempt to elucidate the actual historical basis of this tradition 
or the manner in which writers in different centuries and intellectual contexts can be
ibid., p.31.. 
fW ., p.25.
Giiimell quoted in Brian C. Sclunidt, ibid.
regarded as participants in an inherited pattern of thought.” Schmidt continues 
that “[t]his is because Gilpin is more concerned with validating contemporary 
neorealism than he is with understanding the history o f the field o f international 
relations.” Indeed, Gilpin, in his response to Richard K. Ashley’s critical essay, 
“The Poverty o f Neorealism,” attempts to establish the dual 
traditionalist/scientific methodology of the contemporary realist tradition simply by 
invoking the names of “three great realist writers”, Thucydides, Machiavelli and 
Carr.^^^ While it is one thing to suggest that these three writers were, in fact, ‘great’, 
to suggest that, by extension, the realist tradition is itself great, is an entirely 
different and more questionable proposition. Indeed, this fate seems to have beset 
realism on a number of levels. As Steven Forde points out, ‘classical realism’;
is a tradition that begins with Thucydides and extends through Machiavelli 
to the early social contract theorists Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau. Though 
this tradition has been immensely powerful, it is to some extent an artificial 
construct -  these thinkers did not by and large think of themselves as 
adherents to a tradition, but as innovators.
Brian C. Schmidt, /bid, p.29. 
ibid
172 Richard K. Asliley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. 
Keohaiie, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.255-300.
Robert Gilpin, “Tlie Richness of tlie Tradition of Political Realism”, in Neorealism and Its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keoliane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.306.
Steven Forde, ““Classical Realism”, in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and 
David R. Mapel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.62.
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Similarly, Schmidt also points out that Holsti argues that the realist tradition can be 
traced back to Hobbes and Rousseau without actually explaining the supposed 
continuity between their works and the works of contemporary realists. In the 
case of Holsti, as well as Olsen and Groom, the notion of ‘tradition’ is simply a 
convenient way o f schematising the development of International Relations in the 
twentieth century.
Gunnell and Schmidt’s second criticism of the conventional disciplinary history of 
International Relations, although less related to the subject of traditions, is its 
propensity for ‘contextual’ methods of interpretation. “Proponents of 
contextualism,” Gunnell writes, “have argued that their approach to disciplinary 
history, and intellectual history in general, avoids the vices o f presentism by 
locating authors and texts in their proper historical context.”*^  ^In demonstrating the 
propensity o f International Relations theorists for employing a ‘contextualist’ 
approach to disciplinary history, Schmidt mentions works by Stanley Hoffman, 
Steve Smith, William C. Olsen and A.J.R. Groom, although curiously never 
discusses the fact that a Skinnerian contextualist history o f International Relations 
has not been written. Instead, his argument rests on the claim that “proponents of
Schmidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy, p.30-31; K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: 
Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 1.
Gunnell quoted in Sclunidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy, p. 32.
Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, Daedalus, Vol. 106. 
(1977), pp.41-60; Steve Smith, “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: Tlie Development 
of International Relations as a Social Science”, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
Vol. 16, No.2, (1987), pp. 189-206. The absence of a ‘truly contextualist’ account of the development
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the contextual approach,” presumably such as these prime suspects, “frequently 
misconstrue the relationship between external events and the internal disciplinary 
response manifested in conceptual, methodological, or theoretical change.” 
Although Schmidt’s argument that the impact of context upon theory has not 
always been demonstrated, but rather assumed is well justified, it seems that his 
dismissal of context in its entirety has been somewhat hasty.
Schmidt’s ‘critical internal discursive history’ consequently attempts to overcome 
the apparent limitations of the conventional and contextual approaches to the 
history o f International Relations. The stated aim of his approach “is to reconstruct 
as accurately as possible the history o f the conversation that has been constitutive of 
academic international relations.” In doing so, he intends to “provide an account 
of the conversations pursued by scholars who self-consciously understood 
themselves as participating in the formal study o f international relations.”^^  ^
Contingent to this, is the reconstmction o f ‘tradition’ as constituted by a “lineage of 
scholars who self-consciously and institutionally understood themselves” as being 
part of a particular recurring pattern of thought. Although this notion of tradition, 
emerging from Schmidt’s distinction between ‘analytical’ and ‘historical’ traditions 
is useful in the identification and construction o f ‘historically accurate’ traditions, it
of International Relations may be due to the fact that it would be an immensely time consuming and 
complicated task.
Sclunidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy, p.36-7. 
ibid., p.37.
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/W , p.32.
91
is o f little use in explaining how the current version o f the Grotian tradition, a 
tradition that is largely ‘analytical’ but also contains ‘historical’ elements, came into 
being. However, the distinction is a useful one, in distinguishing between those 
elements of the Grotian tradition that are self-constituted and those that were 
entirely fabricated.
Similarly, Schmidt’s rejection o f the contextual approach presents both general and 
methodological problems specific to the analysis of the ‘Grotian tradition’ of 
International Relations. As Gerard Holden points out, despite Schmidt’s stringent 
set of arguments against the contextualist approach it is still not clear “why [he] is 
so opposed to contextual explanations, or why he believes a degree of 
contextualism is incompatible with some version of his preferred ‘internal 
discursive’ method.”^^  ^In particular, Holden argues that much of Schmidt’s history 
o f the development of International Relations, in particular the role o f German 
scholars, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, emigrating to the United States, the 
American Civil War, and the colonial movement, “looks suspiciously 
contextual.” In a similar vein, Duncan Bell also argues that “it seems overly 
simplistic to present the history o f the field without serious reference to actual 
events, or the major role that they can and do play in the generation of ideas, and in 
the bolstering of one position as opposed to another.”^^ '^
Gerard Holden, “Who contextualizes the contextualizers? Disciplinary history and the discourse 
about IR discourse”. Review o f International Studies, Vol.28, (2002), p.257. 
p.257-8.
Bell, “International Relations: the dawn of an liistoriographical turn?”, p. 121.
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Such criticisms are particularly pertinent to the study of the Grotian tradition in 
International Relations. In particular, Schmidt’s ‘critical internal discursive’ 
approach is, in its current form, unable to account for the specific impact of external 
events on both Grotius’ original works and period of resurgent interest in his works 
during the development of the ‘Grotian tradition’, for example, the explicit 
formation o f the Grotius Society in response to the outbreak of World War One. 
Thus, while Schmidt is correct to advise against the citing of contexts without 
providing demonstrable evidence for their impact upon subsequent discourse, his 
own discursive history demonstrates that this does not have to equate to the absolute 
omission of contexts from the writing o f intellectual histoiy. Rather, as his ‘critical 
internal discursive’ approach suggests, the aim of this form of intellectual history is 
“to reconstruct as accurately as possible the history of the conversation that has 
been constitutive of academic international relations.” As such, where this 
conversation has included explicit responses to ‘external events’, for example 
Grotius’ composition of De Jure Praedae as the legal defence for the Dutch East 
India Company, or his commissioning by the Dutch government to write a history 
defending the independence of Holland against Spanish rule, as evident in n e  
Antiquity o f the Batavian Republic, context ought to be taken into consideration.
185 Sclunidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy, p.37.
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Conclusion
In light of the critical limitations inherent in previous attempts to analyse its 
construction and substantive content, the remainder of this thesis begins from the 
premise that, according to Oakeshott’s understanding of the term, the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ is, in all its varied forms, an invented tradition. Like all traditions, it is a 
tradition constructed by the retrospective association of antecedent ideas and, like 
many traditions, incorporates both historical and analytical components. For this 
reason, the manner in which the various incarnations of the Grotian tradition have 
been constructed remains critical to their analysis and, as such, Schmidt’s 
distinction between historical and analytical traditions is particularly informative. 
Indeed, the remainder of this thesis broadly proceeds according to the central 
precepts entailed in Schmidt’s ‘internal discursive history’, taking into account 
those modifications discussed above.
Thus, while Schmidt aims to “provide an account of the conversations pursued by 
scholars who self-consciously understood themselves as participating in the formal 
study of international relations” the remainder of this thesis seeks to provide an 
account of the corresponding conversations that have been constitutive o f the 
development of the Grotian tradition. However, two caveats apply here. First, as the 
Grotian tradition incorporates both historical and analytical elements, it is necessary 
to include not only those who ‘self-consciously understood themselves as 
participating’ in its development, but those who have retrospectively been
ibid, p.38.
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associated with the tradition. By doing so, it will be possible to ascertain precisely 
what those figures who have retrospectively been associated with the Grotian 
tradition thought they were doing in composing their works of relevance to the 
tradition, what discourses and conversations they self-consciously thought they 
were engaging in and, as a result, to assess the extent to which they ought to be 
considered historical or analytical members o f the ‘Grotian tradition’. Secondly, as 
a largely analytical tradition formulated by constructing retrospective associations 
between, at times scarcely related thinkers, it stands to reason that the discourses in 
which they themselves were involved may stand outside the realm o f what is 
ordinarily incorporated within the bounds o f the ‘Grotian tradition’. Thus, without 
getting into the circular problems associated with contextualising the context of the 
context of the context..., it does discuss the relevance o f those discourses that, 
despite standing outside what is conventionally understood as ‘Grotian’ scholarship, 
nonetheless exerted an explicitly identifiable influence on the Grotian tradition’s 
central thinkers. Thus, both in this sense, and as applied to the incorporation of 
political and historical contexts, problems associated with constructing a false 
relationship between texts and contexts are avoided by limiting the use of context in 
this way.
Despite reaching the conclusion that contexts may inform the interpretation of 
Grotius’ works however, precisely which contexts ought to be considered remains a 
considerable point of contention. C.G. Roelofsen, for example, is particularly 
concerned with the political context of the seventeenth century and argues that
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Grotius’ ‘political ambitions’ and ‘experience o f public affairs’ informed his major 
works, Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli ac Pads. As such, he contends that the 
analysis of these works ought to start with the study of Grotius’ career. Martin van 
Gelderen however, along with Edward Keene and Peter Borschberg, emphasise the 
importance of the great colonial aspirations o f the Dutch and the specific case of the 
Dutch East India Company for which Grotius was retained as legal defence. 
However, in his analysis of Grotius’ early work Commentarius in Theses XI, 
Borschberg also cites the justification of the Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule as 
one of Grotius’ primary motivations. Indeed, Grotius’ defence of the Dutch Revolt 
is apparent in a number of his works including De Antiquitate Reipublicae 
Batavicae, Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgids, De Jure Praedae and 
Commentarius in Theses XI: An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, the Just War and 
the Legitimacy o f the Dutch Revolt. Similarly, Grotius’ desire to defend the 
sovereignty of Holland and the politico-theological position to which he, as a 
Remonstrant, ascribed, is evident in many works including Commentarius in 
Theses, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas (The Religiousness o f  the States 
o f Holland and Westfriesland), De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra (The 
Magistrates Authority in Matters o f  Religion Asserted, The right o f  the state in the 
church), De Veritate Religionis Christianae (The truth o f the Christian religion), 
and Verantwoordingh van de Wettelijcke Regieringh. Most famously however,
C.G. Roelofsen. “Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeentli Century”, in Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.97. see also Cornelius G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and tlie 
Development of International Relations Theoiy: The ‘Long Seventeentli Century’ and tlie 
Elaboration of a European States System”, Grotiana, Vol. 18, (1997), pp.97-120.
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Grotius’ motivation in writing De Jure Belli ac P ads  is generally ascribed to the 
tumultuous times in which he lived.
As such, the historical ‘context’ in which Grotius composed his works is a complex 
and variously defined phenomenon. Indeed, Tanaka Tadashi simply incorporates a 
range of contexts evident in Grotius’ work, listing the Netherlands’ war for 
independence, Grotius’ exile, the Thirty Years’ War, denominational differences 
between the Protestant churches in the Netherlands, his appointment as the Swedish 
ambassador in Paris and his social status as a member o f the Dutch commercial 
class, as amongst his foremost influences. Like Charles Wilson, who warns against 
viewing Grotius as “a cork bobbing in the waters of economic an [sic] social 
change” however, Tadashi also exercises a great deal of caution in proportioning 
interpretive significance to these contexts and writes that “we risk distorting our 
understanding of Grotius’ method or approach...if we overestimate these external 
elements” . I n d e e d ,  in light of this warning, and in accordance with the 
methodological principles outlined in this chapter, only those historical contexts 
that Grotius explicitly and self-consciously sought to address are discussed. In 
particular, by doing so, the following chapters demonstrate the extent to which the 
assumption that De Jure Belli ac P ads  was written solely to address the horrors of
Charles Wilson, “Hugo Grotius and his world”, in The World o f Hugo Grotius \1583-1645), 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium Organized by the Grotius Coimnittee of the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Rotterdam, 6-9 April 1983, (Amsterdam: Holland 
University Press, 1984), p.2.
Tanaka Tadashi, “Grotius’s Method: Witli Special Reference to Prolegomena” 'mA Normative 
Approach to War: Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius, ed. Onuma Yasuald, (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 11.
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the Thirty Years’ War has resulted in the inaccurate interpretation o f this work. 
Rather, it is argued that when considered in light of the contexts in which his early 
works were composed and from which the substantive contents of De Jure Belli ac 
P ads  have been drawn, its central concepts appear illuminated by an altogether 
different light.
In terms of Schmidt’s distinction between ‘historical’ and ‘analytical’ traditions, 
two distinct types of ‘Grotian’ tradition can be identified. The first, discussed in 
Chapter Four is historical in nature and extends in two explicitly identifiable lines 
of transmission. The first is that most commonly associated with the broadly 
understood ‘Grotian tradition’ and extends from Grotius to Christian von Wolff and 
Emerich de Vattel. It is, in large part, a tradition of natural law scholarship but also 
draws upon those elements of positive law that emanated from the writings of 
Grotius and his intellectual predecessors. The second, is less often recognised as a 
‘Grotian’ tradition, but nonetheless similarly exists in an explicitly identifiable line 
of transmission from Grotius to Samuel Pufendorf and Jean Barbeyrac. What is 
critical in the designation of these two traditions as ‘historical’ is the explicit sense 
in which its proponents self-consciously understood themselves to be following in a 
line of scholarship that, despite the evolution of its ideas, sought to retain a critical 
link to Grotius’ works. Thus, although none of these theorists understood 
themselves to be members of a ‘Grotian tradition’, so titled, what they understood 
themselves to be doing amounts to the same thing.
98
The ‘analytical’ variants o f the Grotian tradition are those that emerged in a variety 
of forms in twentieth century scholarship and include the traditions of Lauterpacht, 
Wight and Bull, amongst others. Unlike the ‘historical’ Grotian traditions however, 
the construction of which is regulated by the very definition of an ‘historical 
tradition’ itself, analytical traditions are constructed for presentist purposes and 
therefore employ a range o f different notions of tradition itself. Therefore, the 
remaining chapters devoted to the analysis o f the ‘analytical’ Grotian traditions, 
must take two factors into account; first, in accordance with the notion o f ‘context’ 
discussed above, the ‘presentist purposes’ for which the specific tradition was 
constructed; and, following from this, the specific notion of ‘tradition’ employed in 
its construction. As will be seen, when considered together, these two factors prove 
invaluable in elucidating both the relationship between Hugo Grotius and the 
various incarnations of the tradition bearing his name, and the manner in which its 
definitive concepts have been conceived.
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Ill
Hugo Grotius on Law, War and Love
Grotius is legendary for his inexhaustible gift for mystification and 
obscurity... The greatest enigma in the study of Grotius is the man himself.^
Although Grotius is most commonly associated with the concept of international 
society in contemporary scholarship, periods of resurgent interest in his work that 
have contributed to his longevity in International Relations can be more consistently 
attributed to the popularity o f the moral system presented in his works. As Terry 
Nardin writes, morality may be defined as the “principles and rules o f conduct 
based on, though not necessarily identical with, the “manners” and “morals” (in 
Latin, mores, French moeurs) o f a people, that is, with the generally acknowledged 
standards of conduct by which the acts and character of the members of a particular 
community are judged.”  ^Although they have often been seen as synonymous and, 
as will be seen in Chapter Four, were certainly used interchangeably in association 
with Grotian scholarship in the nineteenth century, morality and ethics remain 
distinct entities. As Nardin explains, while morality is “defined by rules of proper 
conduct”, the term ‘ethics’ refers to “a wide range of considerations affecting
 ^ Karina Nabulsi, Traditions o f War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law, (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p.29.
“ Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations o f States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983).
choice and action.”  ^ As such, morality is narrower in scope than ethics and 
consequently does not afford the consideration of consequences or outcomes a great 
deal of attention. However, as will be seen, although they use the terms 
interchangeably, in a substantive sense, Grotian scholars have consistently 
discussed Grotius’ moral scheme.
‘Grotian morality’ can be characterised as a three-tiered moral scheme. It is, in its 
most basic form, a ‘minimal’ morality, derived from the central precepts of the ju s  
naturae (law o f nature). When transposed to the international level and applied to 
the specific conduct o f war, this minimal set o f moral principles forms a second 
layer of morality expressed in Grotius’ work in terms of the just war tradition. 
However, standing over and above the central precepts o f the law of nature and the 
just war is an explicitly Christian morality that is adapted to apply to all o f 
humankind regardless o f faith. This overarching morality is dominated by the 
concepts of caritas (love) and temperamenta (moderation) and is manifested in the 
appeals to brotherhood, humanity, clemency, forgiveness and mercy that permeate 
his work.
In light of this, this chapter seeks to elucidate the central components of Grotius’ 
moral scheme as the foundation of the ‘Grotian morality’ that has shaped 
subsequent Grotian scholarship. Before doing so however, it completes two 
preliminary and complimentary tasks. First, the chapter begins by providing a brief
 ^Terry Nardin, “Etliical Traditions in International Affairs” in Traditions o f International Ethics, ed, 
Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.3.
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biographical overview o f Grotius’ life and w orks/ In doing so, and in accordance 
with the methodological principles discussed in the previous chapter, it introduces a 
number of specific historical problems that Grotius explicitly and self-consciously 
sought to address. The second section is concerned with Grotius’ early works and 
focuses on the conceptualisation of sovereignty that was so attractive to subsequent 
writers interested in the subject of colonialism. Although in many ways this mirrors 
the discussions o f Edward Keene and Peter Borschberg, upon whom Keene openly 
relies,^ it elaborates upon and deviates from the central purposes of both their 
works. In particular, by highlighting the level of congruence apparent in Grotius’ 
early works and De Jure Belli ac Pads, this section demonstrates that a range of 
prior historical events contributed to the historical and intellectual context in which 
much of De Jure Belli ac P ads  was written.^ In doing so, it also helps to
For a more complete biogi apliical treatment of Grotius see; M. De Biuigny, The life o f the truly 
eminent and learned Hugo Grotius, (London: no publisher cited, 1754); Edward Dumbauld, The life 
and legal writings o f  Hugo Grotius, (Norman: University of Oklalioma Press, 1969): Charles 
Edwards, Hugo Grotius The Miracle o f  Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought, 
Introduction by Richard A. Falk, (Cliicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981); W.S.M. Kniglit, The Life and Legal 
Works o f Hugo Grotius, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1925); R.W. Lee, Hugo Grotius. Amiual 
Lecture on a Mastermind, Henriette Hertz Trust of the British Academy 1930, from the Proceedings 
of the British Academy, VoLXVI, (London: Humphrey Milford, 1930); Hamilton Vreeland, Hugo 
Grotius, (New York; Oxford University Press, 1917).
 ^Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.45. Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius' 
Commentarius in Theses XL. An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, Just War and the Legitimacy o f the 
Dutch Revolt, (herein C/7), ed. & tians. Peter Borschberg, (Berne: Peter Lang, 1994).
 ^Onuma Yasuald has criticised a similar argmnent in Peter Haggenmacher’s Grotius et la Doctrine 
de la Guerre Juste, writing tlrat he “tends to exaggerate tlie continuity between De Jure Praedae 
Commentarius and [De Jure Belli ac Pacis\f However, 1 go beyond Haggenmacher by highlighting 
continuities between works composed prior to De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pads. Onimia
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foreground the argument presented in Keene’s work that, contrary to much 
nineteenth century scholarship, Grotius did not precipitate, foretell or personally 
direct the Westphalian Peace Treaties. Grotius’ moral system is then discussed in 
the following three sections focusing, respectively, on the conceptualisation o f law, 
war and love in his works. In doing so, these sections also address a number of 
debates that have dominated recent Grotius scholarship pertaining to the extent to 
which De Jure Belli ac P ads  ought to be interpreted as a response to the challenge 
of moral scepticism or a deviation from Aiistotelian notions of justice, and whether 
or not it constitutes the ‘secularisation’ o f the law of nature.
Life and Works
Better known by his Latin eponym, Huig de Groot was born in Delft on Easter 
Sunday in 1583, a fact with which he was so impressed that for much of his life he 
insisted on celebrating his birthday on Easter Sunday rather than the actual 
anniversary of his birth, April 10.^ By all accounts a precocious child,^ he began his 
studies at the University of Leiden in 1594 at the age of eleven, “there to become 
the protégé of the leading Dutch intellectuals o f his day.”  ^ As Charles Edwards
Yasuaki, “Introduction”, in^ Normative Approach to War: Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 1,
’ C. Jolm Colombos, “Tercentenary of Grotius”, Transactions o f the Grotius Society: Problems of 
Public and Private International Law (hereafter TGS), Vol.31, (1945), p.xxxix.
 ^R.W. Lee writes that “[a]t tlie age of eight he consoles his father in Latin verse on the death of a 
brother. At twelve he converts liis motlier to Protestantism, insisting tiiat she is too intelligent to 
remain a papist.” Lee, Hugo Grotius, p. 5.
 ^Edwards, p.2.
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notes, the university records “show that he did not devote himself to any one 
discipline: rather, he saturated his mind with a broad choice o f courses 
representative o f the scholarly offerings of the university.” In particular, contrary 
to the popular assumption, there is no evidence to suggest that he studied law. 
Rather, following his graduation from the University of Leiden, Grotius was 
awarded an honorary doctorate of law by the University o f Orleans. Grotius 
completed his university education in 1597 and between then and his death in 1645 
pursued a number o f contending career paths.
Grotius the historiographer
In 1604 Grotius was appointed the official historiographer of Holland and, during 
his period of employment, is thought to have composed a number of historical 
works that sought to address the legitimacy o f the Dutch Revolt from Spanish 
rule.^^ In 1610, he published De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae, a work 
commissioned by the States o f Holland and West-Friesland for which he was paid 
300 pounds. The dedication reads:
ibid.
For further details on the Dutch Revolt see J.L. Price, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth 
Century, (Houndinills: Macmillan, 1998); Pieter Geyl, The Revolt o f the Netherlands (1555-1609), 
(London: Ernest Bemi, 1932); Cliarles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 
(London; Macmillan, 1970); Martin van Gelderen, The Dutch Revolt, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
Jan Waszink, “Introduction” to Hugo Grotius, The Antiquity o f the Bataxnan Republic, hereafter 
(DA) ed. & trans. Jan Waszink, (Assen: van Gorcum, 2000), p.6.
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A small booklet I offer you, most noble and illustrious Lords; or rather it 
offers itself, small in size but great in substance, and all yours; it defends 
your power, your rights and your sovereignty. Its purpose is to show, by 
discussing briefly the intermediate centuries from the origins of this people 
until the present day, that the Batavian State has always been ruled by the 
most prominent members of both estates, which rule has now come to you 
through unbroken succession.
In doing so, he sought to establish that sovereignty rested, as it had done since the 
time of the Batavians, with Holland, thereby justifying their Revolt.
However, this was not Grotius’ first work to address the question of sovereignty in 
the Dutch Republic. Thought to have been composed sometime between 1598 and 
1600, De Repiiblica Emendanda explicitly sets out to compare the early form of the 
Dutch republic with the Hebrew republican model of government and, in doing so, 
addresses questions pertaining to the internal sovereignty of Holland. Similarly, 
in Parallelon Renmpublicarum, a text which was in circulation in 1602 but of 
which only one book has survived, compares the republics of the United Provinces, 
Rome and Athens. Following this, Commentarius in Theses XI, composed sometime 
between 1603 and 1608 was composed with the explicit aim o f justifying the Revolt 
o f the Netherlands, as made evident by its subtitle. An Early Treatise on
Grotius, DA, p.49.
Hugo Grotius, “De Republica Emendanda: A juvenile tract by Hugo Grotius on the emendation of 
the Dutch polity”, (hereafter RE) ed. Artlim Eyffinger, in collaboration witli P.A.H. de Boer, J. Th. 
De Smidt and L.E. van Hoik, Grotiana, Vol.V, (1984), 4, p.69.
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Sovereignty, Just War and the Legitimacy o f  the Dutch Revolt}^ The specific means 
according to which Grotius attempts to achieve this justification was by utilising his 
own version o f the just war tradition, the fundamental principles o f which are also 
presented in De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pads  and will be discussed 
further in this chapter/^ However, in order to argue that the States of Holland were 
authorised to pursue a war against Spain and that, in doing so they were, according 
to the principles of the just war, defending their sovereignty, seeking recompense 
for Spain’s failure to adhere to the Blijde Inkomst (Joyous Entry) and the Great 
Privilege o f Mary of Burgundy, and punishing Spain for injuries inflicted on its 
people by Phillip IFs representative, the Duke of Alva, Grotius needed first to 
establish its sovereignty. In doing so, he specifically engages the republican debates 
surrounding the question of sovereignty that were prevalent at the time.^^ Finally,
Hugo Grotius, Commentarius in Theses XI: An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, Just War and the 
Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolt, (herein C/T), ed. & trans. Peter Borschberg, (Berne: Peter Lang, 
1994).
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Praedae Commentarius, trans. Gwladys L. Williams, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1950), p.67-8; Hugo Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, trans. Francis F. Kelsey, (New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1964), n.I,p.l69ff.
The Blijde Inkomst (Joyous Entry) was a Brabantist pledge of 1356 which stated that tlie dukes 
were required to “obtain consent for all taxes and impositions (clause 5), for the striking and 
devaluation of the coinage (clause 7) and for die waging of wai' (clause 10).” H.G. Koenigsberger, 
Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments: The Netherlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Centuries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.24. The Great Privilege of Mary of 
Buigundy gave die state “die right to gadier at dieir own initiative, the condition tiiat die States must 
give then consent to declarations of war, and the condition that decisions or decrees from die prince 
which are in conflict widi earlier privileges are void.” Waszink, p. 15.
For example, see the debate between Thomas Wilkes and English member of the Eail of 
Leicester’s Council of State and François Vranck, the pensionary of Gouda. Thomas Wilkes, 
“Remonstrance to the States General and die States of Holland, March 1587, in E.H. Kossman and
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also composed at around the same time although not published until 1657, De 
Rebus Belgids also constitutes a history o f the Dutch struggle against Spanish rule. 
Its opening lines read;
I intend to Discourse the most famous Warre of our Times, and which may 
not improperly be called Sodall, or a Warr o f Confederates, while the 
Spaniard and Dutch People accustomed to live under one Government, and 
who had as well been Victors, as Companions in Arms, differ between 
themselves...
Indeed, although addressing the Spanish with a significantly less critical sentiment 
here, Grotius nonetheless once again seeks to establish the sovereignty and 
independence of Holland from Spanish rule.
Grotius the lawyer
By 1604 Grotius was twenty-one years old, had established his own legal practice 
and could boast the Dutch East India Company amongst his clients. The particular 
case for which he was retained by the Dutch East India Company involved the 
seizure of a Portuguese carrack in the Malacca Straits.^® Captured by Admiral Jacob
A.F. Melliiilc (eds.), Texts Concerning the Re\>olt o f the Netherlands, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), p.271; François Vranck, “A short exposition of the rights exercised by 
kings, nobles and towns of Holland and West Friesland from time immemorial for the maintenance 
of the freedoms, rights, privileges and laudable customs of the country”, 16 October 1587, in 
Kossman and Mellink, p.280-1.
Hugo Grotius, De Rebus Belgids: Or, the Annals, and History of the Low-Countrey Warrs, trans. 
Thomas Manley, (London: Middle-Temple, 1665), 1, p.l.
See Peter Borschberg, “Hugo Grotius, East India Trade and the King of Johore”, Journal o f  
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.30, No.2, (September 1999), pp.225-247; “The seizure of the Sta.
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van Heemskerk in 1602, the ‘Catherina’ was laden with a considerable cargo of 
copper, silk, porcelain and bullion from Japan, China, Peru and Mexico. In the legal 
case that followed to resolve the question of who could rightfully claim possession 
of the prize and booty seized, Grotius was employed by the Dutch East India 
Company to defend its claim. The result o f the case was De Jure Praedae, which, 
although not finished in time for the hearing, outlined Grotius’ legal defence of the 
Dutch East India Company’s actions. However, for reasons that remain unknown, 
Grotius did not publish De Jure Praedae during his lifetime. Rather, the manuscript 
of this work was discovered in 1864 at an auction o f manuscripts held by 
descendents of Grotius, the Comets de Groot family, organised by Martinus 
Nijhoff. The text was acquired by the Law Faculty at the University of Leiden, 
edited by H.G. Hamaker and published under the title of De Jure Praedae in 1868, 
and again, with minor revisions in 1869.^^ Since its discovery it has become widely 
accepted that this text formed the basis for the later ‘masterpiece’, De Jure Belli ac 
Pads.
Catlieriiia revisited: Tlie Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC politics and tlie origins of tlie Dutcli- 
Joliore alliance (1602-C.1616)”, Jowrna/ o f Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.33, No.l, (February 2002), 
pp.31-62.
A number of contemporary Grotius scholars, of whom Richard Tuck is tlie most prominent, insist 
tliat tlie correct name of this work is De Indis. The first English translation of the work by Gwladys 
L. Williams was published in 1950 under tlie title De lure Praedae Commentarius: Commentary on 
the Law o f Prize and Booty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press and London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1950). As 
such, 1 too will refer to tlie text as De Jure Praedae. Tuck, Rights o f War and Peace, p.81. See also 
X: An Unpublished Work o f Hugo Grotius’s: Translated from an essay in Dutch (1868) written by 
the late Robert Fruin, No place of Publication Given: LVGDVNI BATAORVM APVD E.J. Brill, 
1925.
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In 1608, negotiations that would ultimately result in the Twelve Years Truce 
between Spain and the Netherlands were underway. As Martin van Gelderen writes, 
“[w]ithin years the unexpected boom of Dutch overseas trade posed a serious threat 
to Spain and Portugal, whose kingdoms had been personally united since 1580.”^^  
Thus, in the ensuing peace negotiations, Philip II offered the Netherlands “the full 
recognition of Dutch liberty in the sense of independence and self-government in 
exchange for a complete Dutch withdrawal from the east and west Indies, from Asia 
and America.”^^  Fearful that their trading rights would be rescinded, the Zeeland 
Chamber of the Dutch East India Company asked Grotius to “publish something on 
the right of the Dutch to sail freely to the Indies and engage in trade t h e r e . A s  
Margreet Ahsmann writes, “[o]ne o f the Directors knew that Grotius had already 
written something of the kind, and indeed all the latter had to do was to rework 
parts of De jure Praedae to be able to accede to this request: the manuscript of De 
jure Praedae shows traces of this r e v i s i o n . T h u s ,  the twelfth chapter of De Jure 
Praedae appeared anonymously, although it was well known who the author was, 
under the title Mare Liberum sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana
^ van Gelderen, The Dutch Revolt, p.21. See also Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 
1585-1740, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
^ ibid., p.21.
Margreet Alismann, “Grotius as a Jmist”, in Hugo Grotius A Great European 1583-1645, National 
Committee for the Commemoration of liie Hugo Grotius’ Quartercentenaiy, (Delft: Meinema, 1983), 
p.39. 
ibid., p.38-39.
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commercial dissertatio (henceforth known as Mare Liberum) in 1609/^ Grotius’ 
stated intention in composing Mare Liberum is expressed as follows;
My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the Dutch -  that is to 
say, the subjects of the United Netherlands -  have the right to sail to the 
East Indies, as they are now doing, and to engage in trade with the people 
there. I shall base my argument on the following most specific and 
unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first 
principle, the spirit o f which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every 
nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.^^
Similarly explaining his position in De Jure Praedae and Mare Liberum in a letter
to a friend some years later Grotius wrote;
Some years ago, when I saw how important the East India trade was to the 
security o f my state, and how everyone agreed that the trade could not be 
carried on without force o f arms, because of the power and 
untrustworthiness of the Portuguese, I set to work to persuade us to hang on 
bravely to the commerce we had so auspiciously begun. . . So l  outlined the 
rights of war and booty, the histoiy o f the cruel and savage dealings of the 
Portuguese with ourselves, and many other relevant matters, in a fairly
26 Ahsmami also mentions tlial Mare Liberum was probably published too late to have any impact 
upon the negotiations that resulted in the truce of 9 April 1609 and that “later in life Grotius more or 
less disowned Mare Liberum." Ibid., p.39-40. Nonetheless, a defence of Mare Liberum, Defensio 
capitis quinti Maris libri oppugnati a Gvilelmo Welwode iuris civilis professore capite XXVII eiits 
libri cui titulum fecit Compendium legume martirnarum, was published some time later.
Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas) (1609), trans. Ralph van Deman Magoffin, 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 7.
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comprehensive treatise which I have so far refrained from publishing... [I 
published Mare Liberum at the time of the Peace Treaty] with the intention 
both of dissuading our side from renouncing any of our obvious rights, and 
of seeing whether the Spaniards would modify their claims somewhat in the 
light not only o f compelling arguments but also of the opinion of their own 
authorities.^^
As will be seen shortly however, it was with this set of arguments that Grotius 
established the relationship between the ju s  naturae (law of nature) and ju s  gentium 
(law of nations) that is central to his subsequent writings.
Grotius the politician
In 1607 Grotius was appointed advocate fiscal to the Court of Holland, a position 
that, despite his initial attempts to remain neutral, would see him embroiled in the 
politico-religious controversies o f the following decade. Indeed, in the decade 
following the publication o f Mare Liberum Grotius’ writings were confined to the 
political and religious issues in which he was involved. Although it is not possible 
to elaborate upon the complexities o f this period in Grotius’ life here, it suffices to 
mention a number of texts composed during this time.^^ In 1613, Grotius published
^ Hugo Grotius quoted in Richard Tuck, “Review: Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la Doctrine de 
la Guerre Juste (1983), ” Grotiana, Vol.7, (1986), p.91.
^  For discussions of tlie theological controversies of the time see; Carl Bangs, Arminitis: A Study in 
the Dutch Reformation, (Grand Rapids: Francis Ashbury Press, 1971); Artliur Cushman McGiffert, 
Protestant Thought Before Kant, (London: Duckwortli, 1911); H. John McLachlan, Socinianism in
111
Ordimim Hollcmdiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas (The Religiousness o f  the States o f  
Holland and West Freisland), a work defending the States of Holland against the 
charge of 'participes criminis ' relating to the appointment of a heretic professor at 
the University o f Leiden. Although the first part of this work is dedicated to the 
specific charge, the second and third parts address wider controversies of the time, 
including the relationship between the church and state, the nature of sovereignty, 
and the need for religious toleration and the end of sectarian hostilities. He writes:
‘He disagrees with me on predestination, I cannot tolerate him, he is 
heterodox, he is a heretic, he is Pelagian, he is a Socinian’ should be given 
up as quickly as possible; today it is all too popular with many, but it is in 
itself harmful both to the Church and to the State, and a much more serious 
danger ensues from it..
A degree of consensus has been reached between the various biographical accounts 
of Grotius’ life and character that his foremost passion was for Christian 
(re)unifîcation. As G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes notes, “[h]e was in touch with 
members of nearly all the denominations o f his day, but felt at ease with none of 
them.”^^  For this reason he had tried to remain outside the sectarian controversies of 
the time, only becoming involved when his position as advocate fiscal necessitated
Seventeenth Century England, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951); Jan Den Tex, 
Oldenharnevelt, 2 volumes, trans. R.B. Powell, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973),
^ Hugo Grotius, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas. ed. & trans. Edwin Rabbie, (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 171.
G.H.M, Postlmmus Meyjes, “Grotius as an irenicist” in The World o f Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium Organized by the Grotius Committee of the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Rotterdam 6-9 April 1983, (Amsterdam: APA -  
Holland University Press, 1984), p.43.
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it. As will be seen with regard to De Jure Belli ac Pads, this desire for Christian 
unity permeates his later theological and political writings.
In 1617 Grotius published Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi. 
Ad\fersus Faustum Socinimn Senensem (A Defence o f the Catholic Faith 
Concerning the Satisfaction o f Christ, Against Faustus Socinius), thus further 
engaging him in the religious controversies o f the time. Furthermore, although it 
was only published in 1647, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra was 
completed in 1618 immediately prior to Grotius’ arrest and trial. Grotius himself 
summarises the central argument of this work by arguing that, “the authorities 
should scrutinize God’s Word so thoroughly as to be certain to impose nothing 
which is against it; if they act in this way, they shall in good conscience have 
control of the public churches and public worship -  but without persecuting those 
who err from the right This tract particularly reveals the increasing position
of prominence afforded religious toleration in Grotius’ works.
Grotius and his associate Johan van Oldenharnevelt were arrested by 
representatives of their political opponents on August 29, 1618. Both were found 
guilty of an unspecified crime, Oldenharnevelt facing execution and Grotius life 
imprisonment in Loevestein castle. Whilst in Loevestein, Grotius took advantage of 
“the leisure providentially accorded” and composed a number of works.^^ The first
Grotius quoted in ibid., p.22. Italics mine.
R.W. Lee, “Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Ideiding tot de Hollansche Rechts- 
Geleertheyd) of Hugo Grotius”, TGS, Vol. 16, (1930), p.3L
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was a pamphlet in his own defence, which aimed to “demonstrate the illegality of 
his conviction.”^^  Verantwoordingh van de Wettelijcke Regieringh van Hollandt 
ende West-Vrieslandt provided a justification of Oldenharnevelt’s policies and 
rejected “the coup of 1618 as a violation o f provincial sovereignty.”^^  Published in 
1621, the Verantwoordingh was banned as “seditious and libelous by the States 
General on November 24, 1622. During his imprisonment, Grotius also began work 
on Bewys van den waren Godsdienst which was published in Latin prose under the 
title of Sensiis Librorum Sex in 1627 and subsequently as De Veritate Religionis 
Christianiae (The Truth o f  the Christian Religion). Grotius also composed 
Inleidinghe tot de Hollandsche Rechtgeleerdheid (The Jurisprudence o f  Holland) 
whilst imprisoned in Loevestein. As Lee notes in the Preface to the English 
translation of the work, “[t]he book was not intended for publication, but for the 
instruction of his sons in the laws o f their country.” ®^ In a note composed by 
Grotius’ brother William, included at the beginning of the work, it is revealed that 
although Grotius had intended to “bequeath it to his children for their 
instruction.. .without his knowledge various copies were in circulation, all imperfect 
and fiill o f mistakes,” thus compelling him to publish an authorised version.^^ The 
Jurisprudence o f  Holland has exerted a surprisingly significant influence on
H.J.M. Nellen. “Grotius’ Exile” in Hugo Grotius A Great European 1583-1645, National 
Committee for tlie Commemoration of the Hugo Grotius Quartercentenary, (Delft: Meinema, 1983), 
p.25.
R.W. Lee, Preface to Hugo Grotius, The Jurisprudence o f Holland, p.vii.
William de Groot, Address to tlie Reader in Hugo Grotius, The Jurisprudence o f Holland, p..\iii.
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subsequent jurisprudential theory, standing as a foundational text in the 
establishment of the Dutch and South African legal systems.38
Grotius the exile
With the help of his ever-resourceful wife, Maria von Reigersberg, Grotius 
managed to escape Loevestein hidden in a book chest and fled to Paris. After taking 
up residency there, he was received at the Court of King Louis XIII and granted an 
annuity of 3000 livres, a sum he was never to receive. As such, Grotius’ time in 
Paris with a wife and children to support was one of abject poverty.Accordingly, 
Grotius’ time was consumed by two inter-related projects. The first was the writing 
of his masterpiece. De Jure Belli ac P ads  which he began in 1622 and published in 
1625. De Jure Belli ac P ads  marked the culmination o f Grotius’ works to date and 
incorporates the central elements of De Jure Praedae and Mare Liberum. However, 
as will be seen shortly, this latest work is explicitly concerned with a far broader 
subject matter than his previous works, namely, the regulation o f war in 
international relations.
According to Ricliaid Tuck, die fundamental significance of this text is tliat it represents the 
beginning of a shift in Grotius’ tliinking away from liis Aristotelian roots. In particular, what is 
significant about this apparent ‘shift’, he contends, is tliat it represents the precursor of what lias 
become known as tlie ‘impious liypotliesis’ of De Jure Belli ac Pads to be discussed further in Üiis 
chapter. As will be seen however, although Tuck’s argument seems, at first sight, to provide a 
plausible explanation for tliis apparent sliift in Grotius’ tliinking away from a voluntarist, 
theologically derived notion of natural law, Tuck’s interpretation perceives far greater movement in 
Grotius’ thought than is warranted here. Richard Tuck, Natural rights theories: Their origin and 
development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.67.
See for example, a letter sent by Maria to her brother, dated March 11, 1622 in R.W. Lee, “The 
Family Life of Grotius”, TGS, Vol.20, (1934), p. 15.
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Most tamously, Grotius’ motivation in writing De Jure Belli ac P ads  is generally 
ascribed to the tumultuous times in which he lived and, in particular, the ravages of 
the Thirty Years’ War. As David Hill writes, for example, “[h]e saw his own 
country rising from a baptism of blood and all Europe rent and tom by the awful 
struggle of the Thirty Years’ War.”"^  ^ Similarly, Onuma Yasuaki also views as 
significant the fact that “Grotius lived during the era o f the Thirty Years’ War when 
pillaging and massacres were rampant,” arguing that “[i]n order to overcome the 
tragedies caused by endless religious wars, he sought by all available means to 
bring within the domain o f justice the relations of those independent powers, 
including states, which were capable of employing f o r c e . I n d e e d ,  the desire of 
such writers to attribute Grotius’ work to the Thirty Years’ War is derived from the 
most often quoted tract of his work;
I have had many weighty reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject. 
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to 
war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that 
men msh to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms 
have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or 
human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly 
been let loose for the committing o f all crimes."^^
40 David J, Hill, “Introduction”, in Hugo Grotius, The Rights o f War and Peace, trans. A.C. 
Campbell, (Wasliington and London: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), p.2.
Onmna Yasuaki, “Introduction”, to A Normative Approach to War, p.8.
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 28, p. 20.
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Interestingly however, Grotius’ further claims regarding the impact of such events 
on his writing later in the Prolegomena are conspicuously ignored;
If anyone thinks that I have had in view any controversies of our own times, 
either those that have arisen or those which can be foreseen as likely to 
arise, he will do me an injustice. With all tmthfulness I aver that, just as 
mathematicians treat their figures as abstracted from bodies, so in treating 
law I have withdrawn my mind from every particular fact.'*^
Thus, although it is apparent that Grotius sought to address the general climate of 
conflict evident in early seventeenth century Europe, there is little sense in which he 
can be said to be referring directly to the Thirty Years’ War. This is also made 
especially apparent by the level o f congruence evident between its contents and 
those of his earlier works, most o f which were composed prior to the outbreak of 
the Thirty Years’ War and for the specific purposes addressed above. Thus, on an 
intellectual level. De Jure Belli ac P ads  claims to be more concerned with finding a 
viable position between those who think nothing is lawful in war and those who 
think that everything is lawful in war. Grotius continues to write;
Confronted with such utter ruthlessness many men, who are the very 
furthest from being bad men, have come to the point o f forbidding all use of 
arms to the Chi istian, whose rule o f conduct above anything else comprises 
the duty of loving all men. To this opinion sometimes John Ferns and my 
fellow-countryman Erasmus seem to incline, men who have the utmost 
devotion to peace in both Church and State; but their purpose, as I take it, is, 
when things have gone in one direction, to force them in the opposite
ibid., Prolegomena 58, p.29-30.
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direction is often so far fi*om being helpfiil that it does harm, because in such 
arguments the detection o f what is extreme is easy, and results in weakening 
the influence o f other statements which are well within the bounds of truth. 
For both extremes therefore a remedy must be found, that men may not 
believe either that nothing is allowable, or that eveiything is.'^
This remedy is to be found in the production o f a systematic treatise on “[t]hat body 
of law...which is concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of 
state” and which has hitherto not been accomplished.'^^ Indeed, two points are of 
importance here. The first is Grotius’ claim that none before him have provided a 
systematic treatise on the law o f nations, whilst the second pertains to the 
‘systematic’ nature of his enterprise. In particular, Grotius names Franscisco de 
Vitoria, Henry o f Gorkum, William Matthaei, John Lupus, Franciscus Arias, 
Giovanni de Legnano and Martinus Laudensis amongst those who have “said next 
to nothing upon a most fertile subject.”'^  ^Meanwhile Balthasar Ayala and Alberico 
Gentili are mentioned in slightly more favourable light, Grotius writing of the latter; 
“Knowing that others can derive profit from Gentili’s painstaking, as I acknowledge 
that I have, I leave it to his readers to pass judgement on the shortcomings of his 
work as regards method o f exposition, arrangement of matter, delimitation of 
inquiries, and distinctions between various kinds of law.”'^  ^ The second important 
point is that Grotius explicitly claims that his treatise is based on mathematical 
principles. Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to elucidate this point
ibid. Prolegomena 29, p.20. 
f6/(7,Prolegomena 1, p.9. 
ibid., Prolegomena 37, p.22. 
ibid., Prolegomena 38, p.22.
1 1 8
in any great detail, it appears that Grotius was particularly influenced by the Dutch 
mathematician Simon Stevin who was a close friend of his father/^
In addition to further advancing his previously documented political, theological 
and economic goals, the second edition of De Jure Belli ac P ads  was also written 
with the aim o f convincing the Dutch government that he should be allowed to 
return to Holland. As will be frirther elucidated in this chapter, this is revealed by 
comparing the original version of the work published in 1625 with the second 
edition which appeared in 1631.'*  ^ Indeed, in 1625, around the time of the first 
publication of De Jure Belli ac Pads, Prince Maurice died and was succeeded as 
Stadtholder by Frederick Henry, with whom Grotius had always been friendly. 
Grotius had always assumed that following Maurice’s death he would be permitted 
to return to his homeland, however, this never eventuated. According to Nellen, 
“Grotius’ tragedy was that he never realised, or realised to late, that complete 
rehabilitation” with Holland was impossible.^^ On numerous occasions Grotius 
returned to Holland incognito, but on each occasion was uncovered by his enemies 
who threatened him with incarceration and execution.
For furtlier discussions of Grotius’ matliematical method see B.P. Vermeulen, “Grotius’ 
Metliodology and System of International Law”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol.XXX 
(1983), pp.374-382; Hendrick van Eikema Hoimnes, “Grotius’ Matliematical Metliod”, Netherlands 
International Law Review, Vol.XXXI, (1984), pp.98-106.
Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, p. 99.
Lee, Hugo Grotius, p. 3 8.
Nellen, “Grotius’ Exile”, p.27.
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In 1634, following a “chance meeting with one Salvius, vice-chancellor of 
Sweden”, Grotius entered employment as Queen Christina of Sweden’s ambassador 
in Paris.^^ However, diplomacy was never Grotius’ forte and hence the position was 
not one he approached with overwhelming enthusiasm/^ In November 1641, in a 
letter to his brother William he writes:
The loss of my embassy, if I am threatened with it, leaves me undisturbed. It 
is not [a] source o f wealth, and, as to honours, I have had enough o f them. 
Old age steals on, and, sooner or later, will entitle me to rest. I shall not seek 
to withdraw them from affairs, while I am equal-to them, nor run-afrer them, 
if they go away from me. '^^
During this period, Grotius continued to publish a number o f works, most of which 
were broadly theological in nature and reflected his “earnest desire to promote 
peace and union amongst the Christian Churches.”^^
In 1645, Grotius requested to be recalled from his position as ambassador. His wish 
was granted and he was released from service shortly before his death. At 
approximately midnight on August 28, 1645, Grotius died of exhaustion near
Edwards, p.7.
Archbishop Abbot to Sir Ralph Winwood, Lambetli, June 1613, in Memorials o f Affairs of 
State in the Reigns o f Q. Elizabeth and K. James 1. Collected (chiefly) from the Original Papers o f 
the Right Honourable Sir Ralph Winwood, Kt. 3 Volumes, (London: W.B. for T. Ward, 1725), Vol. 
Ill, p.459-60.
Hugo Grotius to William de Groot, November 1641, quoted in R.W. Lee, “Grotius -  The Last 
Phase, 1635-45”, TGS, Vol.31, (1946), p.208.
Wilhmn Rattigan, “The Character of Hugo Grotius”, in Hugo Grotius: Essays on his Life and 
Worlcs, ed. A. Lysen, (Leyden; A.W. Sythoff, 1925), p. 101.
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Rostock having been shipwrecked on the Pomeranian coast. He was sixty-two and 
had published more than sixty volumes, texts and pamphlets during his lifetime.
Republicanism
As indicated above, much of Grotius’ early work explicitly sought to defend the 
Dutch Revolt from Spanish rule and, in doing so, contributed to an on-going debate 
surrounding the relative merits o f various republican forms of government. 
However, precisely what republicanism entails itself has not always been exactly 
clear. For Aristotle, republicanism centers around the notion o f the polis as both the 
rational means to attaining the good life and the means according to which, in a 
hierarchical sense, citizens ‘rule and are ruled in turn’. Although the term ‘republic’ 
simply refers to any form o f political association here, it can also be conceived in a 
far narrower sense as the “particular rules and practices that would enable an 
association for the common good to achieve this purpose.”^^  In the context of the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, it was with this latter form of 
republicanism that writers were primarily concerned.
Foremost amongst those ‘rules and practices’ central to republican notions of 
government is the concept of sovereignty. Writing in the context of the French Civil 
Wars o f the late sixteenth century, the term soiiveraineté first appeared in Jean 
Bodin’s Six Livres de la Republique in 1576. Defined as “that absolute and
Nicholas Greenwood Oiiuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.6-7.
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perpetual power vested in a commonwealth which in Latin is termed majestasf^^ 
Bodin’s conceptualisation o f sovereignty was central to what became known as the 
thèse royale or endorsement of the ideal of absolute sovereignty. However, 
standing in direct opposition to Bodin and the thèse royale were the 
monarchomachs whose thèse parlementaire argued in “favour of representative 
institutions against absolutist monarchical tendencies”, and endorsed the peoples’ 
‘right of resistance’. Foremost amongst proponents o f the thèse parlementaire was 
the Huguenot propagandist François Hotman whose Francogallia argued both that 
the king “does not have unlimited authority within his kingdom but is 
circumscribed by well-defined right and special laws” and, further to this, that “it is 
not lawful for the king to determine anything that affects the condition o f the 
commonwealth as a whole without the authority of the public council.”^^
As the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac P ads  makes clear, Grotius was familiar 
with both these theorists, writing that “Bodin and Hotman have gained a great 
name, the former by an extensive treatise, the latter by separate questions; their 
statements and reasoning will frequently supply us with material in searching out 
the t r u t h . R a t h e r  than endorse either theorist’s position however, it is apparent 
that Grotius sought to refute both extremes. Thus, refening to the Hebrew republic
Jean Bodin, Six Boolcs o f the Commonwealth, trans. M.J. Tooley, (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, no 
year), I.VTII, p.25.
^ Willem Maas, “Grotius on Citizensliip and Political Community”, Grotiana, Vol.20/21, 
(1999/2000), p. 168.
François Hotman, Francogallia, ed. Ralph E. Glesey, trans. J.H.M. Salmon, (London; Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), XXV, p.459.
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 55, p.29.
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in De Repiiblica Emendanda, Grotius writes, contrary to Hotman, that democracy is 
a form of government “believed to have been disapproved by God.”^^  Similarly, 
arguing against Bodin’s position however, he also writes that “God makes it clear 
that he did not approve o f the supreme and uncontrolled power of a king.”^^  Rather, 
he seeks a middle ground, usually described as ‘aristocratic republicanism’, that 
first emerged in De Republica Emendanda and is apparent throughout his 
subsequent works;
We agree with the Hebrews in that we, too, show a distinct preference and 
the greatest respect for the aristocratic form of government, on the 
understanding, that is, that both the freedom of the people be guaranteed and 
the nations’ eminent men maintain a sort of bond and reflect, as it were, the 
majesty o f our state/^
Similarly, Grotius’ notion of aristocratic republicanism is further advanced in 
Parallelon Rerumpublicarum composed at around the same time as De Republica 
Emendanda. Here Grotius compares the Dutch republic with those of Rome and 
Athens, again arguing in favour of “government based on a small number of 
virtuous men -  a true aristocracy.” '^^
Grotius, 7% 18, p. 83. 
ibid., 19, p.83.
^ ibid., 45, p. 107. Curiously however, Grotius’ support for centralised government here directly 
contradicts his later conviction, evident in De Antiquitate, tliat sovereignty ought to rest witli tlie 
individual provinces of the Netlierlands, thereby guaranteeing Holland’s power and independence.
Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 161.
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However, what is particularly significant about Grotius’ contribution to republican 
debate is not only the extent to which he deviates from both these dominant modes 
of thought, but his use, in Commentarius in Theses and subsequent works, of the 
just war tradition in defending the Dutch Revolt. Thus, rather than adopt the 
argument, favoured by the monarchomachs, that the Dutch were simply exercising a 
right of resistance, Grotius seeks to demonstrate that they were engaged in a just 
war.^^ However, in order to argue that Holland had entered a just public war against 
Spain, Grotius needed to demonstrate two logically antecedent points; first that 
Holland was, in fact, a sovereign entity, and secondly, that its sovereignty had been 
impugned by the Spanish, thereby permitting Holland to pursue a defensive war. In 
doing so Grotius expounds a theory of divisible sovereignty, thereby refuting the 
central element o f Bodin’s conceptualisation o f the term.
Although Grotius ultimately aims to distinguish himself from Bodin, the definition 
of sovereignty presented at the beginning of Commentarius in Theses is derived 
from Bodin’s contention that;
... it is the distinguishing mark o f the sovereign that he cannot in any way be 
subject to the commands o f another, for it is he who makes law for the 
subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law. No one who 
is subject either to the law or to some other person can do this.^^
Thus, in Commentarius in Tl'ieses Grotius defines sovereignty as follows;
Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p.46. 
Bodin, I. VIII, p.28.
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When we speak o f ‘sovereignty’, however, we take it to mean that supreme 
right to govern the state which recognizes no superior authority among 
humans, such that no person(s) may, through any rights of his (their) own, 
rescind what has been enacted thereby/^
A similar definition of sovereignty is also evident in De Jure Belli ac Pads;
The power is called sovereign whose actions are not subject to the legal 
control of another, so that they cannot be rendered void by the operation of 
another human will/^
In addressing the question o f how the sovereign is identified, Grotius similarly 
relies on Bodin’s definition. Bodin argues that a sovereign can be identified 
according to the marques de la souveraineté, also known in Latin editions of his 
work as iura maiestatis. As suggested by notes found with the manuscript to 
Commentarius in Theses, and as made evident by its content, Grotius is following 
Bodin when he further defines sovereignty as follows;
The 'actus summae potestatis ' (marks o f sovereignty) are those that no-one 
may receive by virtue of any higher right, for example, the supreme right to 
introduce legislation and to withdraw it, the right to pass judgement and to 
grant pardon, the right to appoint magistrates and to relieve them of their 
office, the right to impose taxes upon the people etc.^^
Grotius, CiT, 16, p.214-215. 
Grotius, DJB, I.m.VH.1, p. 102. 
Grotius, CiT, 23, p.224,225.
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Again, a similar passage is found in De Jure Belli ac Pads;
Now the acts of the sovereign executive power of a directly public kind are 
the making of peace and war and treaties, and the imposition o f taxes, and 
other similar exercises of authority over the person and property of its 
subjects, which constitute the sovereignty o f the state.^^
Despite their apparent similarities however, a number of critical differences are 
apparent in the conceptualisations o f sovereignty presented by Grotius and Bodin. 
The first is evident in the omission of Bodin’s second mark in Grotius’ exposition 
of the marks of sovereignty; the right to make war and peace.^* Interestingly 
however, this mark is included in the later work De Jure Belli ac P ads  as cited 
above. A possible explanation for its omission in Commentarius in Theses is the 
extent to which it accords with the right of private companies to make war, 
espoused in defence of the Dutch East India Company in De Jure Praedae 
composed at approximately the same time and to be discussed in a later section of 
this chapter.
Secondly, central to both Bodin and Grotius’ understandings o f sovereignty is the 
right of the sovereign to raise taxes. As Bodin writes; “[t]he right of levying taxes 
and imposing duties, or of exempting persons from the payment of such, is also part 
o f the power of making law and granting privileges.”^^  As Borschberg notes 
however, “Grotius carefully reinterprets Bodin’s ninth mark of sovereignty...[and]
Grotius, DJB, p.61.
Bodin, 1.10, p.44.
ibid, I.10,p.47-8.
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recognizes two such marks: one which entitles the imposition o f taxes, and the other 
to block or impede their collection.”^^  This division is of particular relevance to 
Grotius’ defence of the Dutch Revolt as it confers upon the States of Holland “a 
certain mark of sovereignty before the [outbreak] of the war.” '^^  Thus Grotius argues 
“that there was one mark of sovereignty that belonged legitimately to our estates; 
i.e. the right to raise taxes.”^^
However, anticipating the objection that “the estates were not entitled to raise taxes 
on their own account,” Grotius continues:
I reply that this is not a [valid] objection at all. For it remains the case that 
there was a mark of sovereignty that did not belong to the prince, and hence, 
that he did not possess full sovereignty. If, then, we take the mark [of 
sovereignty which entitles] to raise taxes, this rested with the prince and the 
estates together; [however] if we take the right of blocking the taxes, that 
rested with the estates alone.
Herein lies the fundamental point of divergence between Bodin and Grotius’ 
respective understandings o f sovereignty. Thus, while Bodin pursues a royal 
absolutist line, contending that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, Grotius 
asserts both that “estates can have sovereign power,” and that “[t]he marks of 
sovereignty may be divided among several parties.”^^  Thus, directly addressing
Borschberg, p. 120.
Grotius, CiT, 9, p.269.
9 ,67,p.269.
9,69, p.271.
4,22, p.223 & 225.
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Bodin’s idea that sovereignty is indivisible and hence must lie with one person, the 
monarch, Grotius writes that “it is possible for some marks to reside with those 
persons or assemblies, while others do not.”^^
The apparent divisibility o f Grotius’ conception of sovereignty is an issue of some 
confusion and contention as he simultaneously argues against both Bodin’s notion 
of absolute sovereignty and Hotman’s claim that sovereignty cannot be held 
absolutely. Thus, in De Jure Belli ac P ads  Grotius directly addresses Hotman and 
argues that “in some cases the sovereign power is held absolutely, that is with right 
o f t r ans fe r . However ,  in the following section he seeks to demonstrate that “in 
some cases the sovereign authority is not held absolutely,” hence further confusing 
the issue.^^ The confusion is however, resolved with the further claim that 
“sovereignty must in itself be distinguished from the absolute possession of it.”^^  
Thus, “while sovereignty is a unity, in itself indivisible,” it can be divided into two 
pdiXis, partes potentiales and partes subjectivas, ‘potential’ and ‘subjective’ parts.^^ 
Using the following example in both Commentarius in Theses and De Jure Belli ac 
P ads he explains that “[w]hen, as sometimes happened, there were two Roman 
Emperors who divided the administration of the Empire, one taking the Eastern 
half, the other the Western, it cannot be denied that the Empire remained one, and 
that each Emperor could exercise without regard for the other those marks [of
4,24,p.227.
Grotius, DJB, I.III.XII.1, p. 115.
i.m.xm, p. 119. 
ibid., I.m.XIV, p. 120. 
I.m.xvn,p.l23.
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sovereignty] that pertained to his half alone.”^^  Thus, potential sovereignty can be, 
but usually is not, held absolutely,whi le  subjective sovereignty may, and often is, 
divided among several parties. The situation is further clarified with the explanation 
that “just as there cannot be two persons [each] with absolute ownership of the 
same thing, so full sovereignty cannot rest with several parties [simultaneously], 
that is to say, with [each of] these parties s epa ra t e ly . Thus ,  while sovereignty 
itself, and its constituent marks are, by nature, absolute when considered 
individually, the possession of sovereignty as a whole, is generally divided.
With regard to the Dutch situation then, Grotius writes;
The people or the senate, or [in fact] any other assembly that possesses full 
sovereignty, may transfer some of its marks (for example, the rights of 
supreme judgement and pardon) to the prince, to the extent of retaining none 
for itself. But the people or the senate can also transfer these marks with the 
proviso that it retains for itself the right of legislation, or to appoint (all or 
some of) the magistrates, or that the prince may only exercise these powers 
with its consent. No one will deny that the prince has no right to break such 
a contract or basic law of the empire and interfere with the other marks [of 
sovereignty].^^
Grotius, CiT, 4, 29, p.233. In De Jure Belli ac Pads he writes tliat “tlie sovereignty of Rome was a 
unity, yet it often happened tliat one emperor administered the East, anotlier tlie West, or even three 
emperors governed tlie whole empire in tluee divisions.” 1.111.XVH, p. 123.
Grotius, DJB, 1.1I1.X1V, p. 120.
Grotius, CiT, 4,26, p.229. 
ibid., 4, 25, p.227.
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This argument raises two points that are crucial to Grotius’ defence of the Dutch 
Revolt against Spanish rule. First, in accordance with Thesis 3, “[t]he estates can 
have sovereign power,”^^  Grotius establishes the mark o f sovereignty held by the 
estates of the States of Holland in raising taxes. Furthermore, he then argues that 
“[h]e who holds some mark of sovereignty has the right to wage war in defence o f 
that mark [of sovereignty], even [if this be conducted] against a party which holds 
another mark,”^^  justifying the Dutch action. As discussed above and in De Jure 
Praedae, Grotius writes that the Duke of Alva “proceeded to alter the laws, judicial 
provisions, and system of taxation.”^^  As such, he maintains that the Dutch had the 
right to defend their mark o f sovereignty, namely jurisdiction over taxation. 
However, he continues his argument raising the second crucial point in his defence 
of the Dutch Revolt:
He [Alva] took these measures in contravention of the statutes which the 
various princes have sworn to observe and which, by striking a rare balance 
between princely power and liberty, were preserving both the due measure 
of imperial sovereignty and the foundations of the local state.
In so arguing, Grotius refers to both the notion of limited sovereignty apparent in 
the above mentioned claim that “[n]o one will deny that the prince has no right to 
break such a contract or basic law o f the empire and interfere with the other marks
3, p.223.
^  5, p.237.
Grotius, DJR XI I, p. 169. 
^  ibid.
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[of sovereignty],”^^  and a specific set of statutes, the Blijde Inkomst and the Great 
Privilege of Mary o f Burgundy/^ As will be seen as the central precepts of Grotius’ 
understanding of the just war tradition are further elaborated upon in this chapter, in 
doing so, he provides a further just cause for the Dutch action.
Grotius concludes Commentarius in Tl'ieses by arguing that;
It is evident, then, that the war against Philip was at its inception a just war 
both in respect of its cause and with regard to [the States of Holland’s] 
defence of their mark [of sovereignty]. Likewise, it was just to continue 
against Philip this war which had originally been undertaken against Alba. 
We have now demonstrated briefly that it was legitimate for the States of 
Holland to convene against Philip; that the war was both just on the basis of 
a majority decision; and that all the marks o f sovereignty that once rested 
with Philip were [subsequently] acquired by the States of Holland.
As such, contrary to the arguments o f his contemporaries, Grotius utilises a 
particular conception o f divisible sovereignty, also apparent in De Jure Belli ac 
Pads, to demonstrate the legitimacy o f the Dutch Revolt, both to the leaders of 
Holland themselves, and to their foreign allies, in terms of the just war. However, 
although it is central to the purposes of Commentarius in Theses, this work does not 
include a complete theorisation of precisely what adherence to the fundamental 
precepts of the just war tradition entails. For this reason, the just war and its natural
Grotius, CiT, 4, 25, p.227.
^  Waszink, p. 15.
”  Grotius, CiT, Conclusion, p.283.
131
law underpinnings are discussed in some detail in the following sections with 
regard to Grotius’ larger works. De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pads. Thus, 
Grotius’ defence of the Dutch Revolt is revisited in the context of his theorisation of 
the just causes of war.
Law
Like Francisco de Suarez before him, Grotius offers multiple definitions of what is 
meant by the term jus. However, whereas Suarez divided ju s  into two forms, 
facultas moralis and lex, Grotius identifies three types of law. The first definition of 
law Grotius offers is minimalist in nature and “means nothing else than what is 
just.” '^^  Phrased alternatively, that which is lawful is that which is not unjust, that 
which is unjust being that “which is in conflict with the society of beings endowed 
with reason.”^^  As will be seen shortly, the perfect rights ordained by Grotius’ 
understanding of the law of nations, those which are innate and therefore universal, 
correspond to this minimal understanding of law.
However, corresponding with Suarez’s facidtas moralis, law may also be 
understood as constituting “a body o f rights” whereby a right is “a moral quality” 
and is necessarily attached to a person.^^ As he continues, “[w]hen the moral quality
Grotius, DJB, I.I.EI.l, p.34.
ibid.
96 .-Iibid., I.I.IV, p.35.
132
is perfect we call it facultas, ‘faculty’; when it is not perfect, aptitudo, ‘ aptitude’. 
Facultas is similarly divided into potestas (power) - which is internally divided into 
libertas (power over oneself or freedom), potestas pattia  (power over others) and 
potestas dominica (power over slaves) -  dominium (ownership) and crédita 
(contractual rights). However, can also be divided into vtdgaris (common)
and eminens (superior) law, the latter designation being appropriate when power is 
“exercise by the community over its members and their property for the common 
good.”""
Finally, the third meaning of the term Grotius offers states that law “has the same 
force as statute whenever this word is taken in the broadest sense as a rule of moral 
actions imposing obligation to do what is right.”"" This form of law is also divided 
into two main types, natural and volitional law. As will be seen shortly, natural law 
is subdivided into the ju s  naturae primarhim and ju s  naturae secundarium, the 
primary and secondary laws o f nature, while volitional law has human and divine 
variants. Divine volitional law is derived directly from the will o f God,^^® and has 
been communicated to humankind on three occasions, “immediately after the 
creation of man...in the renewal of human kind after the Flood, [and] lastly in the 
more exalted renewal through Christ.” Unlike Hebraic law which is applicable 
only to those of Jewish birth, “[t]hese three bodies of divine law are beyond doubt
^ Tanaka Tadaslii, “Grotius’s Concept of Law”, p.34. 
Grotius, DJ5,1.I.IX.1, p.38. 
p.39.
ibid., I.I.XV.2, p.45.
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binding upon all men, so far as they have become adequately known to men.” "^^  
Finally, human volitional law also exists in three forms, municipal law (jus civile), 
law narrower than municipal law, and the law o f nations (jus gentium). In all this 
however, it is the law of nature that stands as the centerpiece o f Grotius’ work.
The law o f  nature
At heart, the law of nature, in its various forms, contends that a universal and 
immutable order exists “governing everything in the universe, including human 
conduct.”^^  ^Within this order, humans are assumed to be inherently rational, and as 
such, the set of innate ideas that constitute natural law, are understood to be evident 
to all rational beings. For Christian natural law theorists, including Grotius, the law 
of nature is derived from eternal law bestowed upon existence by God via the act of 
creation. Although secular variants o f the natural law tradition exist and, as will be 
seen shortly, many writers view De Jure Belli ac Pads  as marking the move from 
an ecclesiastically derived natural law to a secular law o f nature, it is explicitly 
upon this Christian tradition that Grotius relies in constructing his own version of 
the law of nature.
The first explicit expression o f Grotius’ natural law theory is to be found in De Jure 
Praedae and provides the underpinnings for his defence of the Dutch East India
ibid;, I.I.XVI, p.45.
Cliris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger (eds.). International Relations in Political 
Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 312.
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Company and the Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule. It is also here that the 
fundamental principles o f ‘Grotian morality’ are to be found. In the Prolegomena to 
De Jure Praedae Grotius begins his defence of the Dutch East India Company by 
outlining ‘nine rules and thirteen laws’ which together form the basis of his early 
natural law theory. The first mle and primary principle states that ''What God has 
shown to be His Will, that is lawP^^^ In a fundamental sense then, natural law is 
derived from divine creation. What is more, every part of this creation “has received 
from Him certain natural properties whereby that existence may be preserved and 
each part may be guided for its own good, in conformity, one might say, with the 
fundamental law inherent in its origin.” As such, the purpose of the law of nature 
is the maintenance o f this divinely inspired order whereby God’s creation may be 
preserved.
The first principle of this natural order is love, the ‘primary force’ of which is 
“directed to self-interest.” "^^  From this, the first two precepts of the law of nature 
emerge;
First, that It shall be permissible to defend [one's own] life and to shun that 
which threatens to prove injurious; and secondly, that It shall he permissible 
to acquire fo r  oneself and to retain, those things which are useful fo r  lifeJ^^
Grotius, DJP, p.8.
105 ,ibid., p.9.
106 ,•
107
ibid.
ibid., p. 10.
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However, in addition to the innate desire for self-preservation indicated by self- 
love, Grotius also bestows upon the individual the characteristic o f innate 
sociability. He explains that “God judged that there would be insufficient provision 
for the preservation of His works, if He commended to each individual’s care only 
the safety of that particular individual, without also willing that one created being 
should have regard for the welfare o f his fellow beings, in such a way that all might 
be linked in mutual harmony as if by an everlasting covenant.”^^  ^ Thus love must 
actually be conceived as two-fold, incorporating both “love for oneself and love for 
o t h e r s . W i t h  this, the two fundamental premises of Grotius’ natural law theory 
are introduced; humankind’s instinctual desire for self-preservation and the innate 
sociability of individuals in God’s creation.
Deriving a minimal form o f morality from these foundational precepts of the law of 
nature, Grotius introduces the two most fundamental laws of his moral code;
Let no one inflict injury upon his fellow ... [and] Let no one seize possession
o f  that which has been taken into the possession o f  another
These laws of ‘inoffensiveness’ and ‘abstinence’ are distinctly minimal in nature, 
not requiring individuals to actively do something, but rather imploring them to 
avoid certain behaviour. Considered together, these two laws form the basis of 
human society by relying on what Grotius terms humankind’s ‘social impulse’; “the
los
109
ibid., p. 11. 
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intermingling of one’s own goods and sentiments with the goods and ills of 
others.”^ I n  order to maintain this society however a further two common or 
minimal laws are required; first, that “Ew/ deeds must be corrected” and secondly 
that, ""Good deeds must be recompensed”/^^  Considered together, these laws and 
rules constitute the most minimal form of morality evident in Gi*otius’ work. What 
is more, in Grotius’ view, because they are derived from the innate qualities of 
human existence, they are universal. As will be seen shortly, this is of particular 
importance to the aims o f his later work, De Jure Belli ac Pads.
However, Grotius recognises that in civil society these laws are not sufficient for 
the maintenance of order and therefore adds two additional laws;
Individual citizens shoiddnot only refrain from injuring other citizens, hut 
should furthermore protect them, both as a whole and as individuals; 
secondly. Citizens should not only refrain from  seizing one another's 
possessions, whether these be held privately or in common, but should 
furthermore contribute individually both that which is necessary to other 
individuals and that which is necessary to the whole.
Although similarly derived from the law of nature, as they require action on the part 
of individuals, these laws are o f a slightly higher morality than the previous four 
above. Grotius explains that although according to a minimal common morality it is 
reasonable to suppose that “one’s own good takes precedence over the good of
ibid., p. 14. 
ibid., p. 15. 
ibid., p.21.
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another person”, the more ‘general’ laws pertaining to the common good, ought to 
“take precedence on the ground that it includes the good of individuals as well.” ^^"^  
Herein lies one of the most important distinguishing features of Grotius’ concept of 
morality. In this regard, Lon Fuller makes a useful distinction between what he 
terms the “morality of duty” and the “morality of aspiration”. Although all the 
moral laws introduced thus far fall within the bounds of the morality of duty, that is 
they impose a particular obligation on individuals, the last two laws reside further 
along in the duty-aspiration continuum. However, as will be seen shortly, they are 
themselves superseded by a range of moral principles introduced in De Jure Belli ac 
P ads -  for example, caritas and temperamenta - that fall well within the bounds of 
the morality of aspiration.
Taking the maintenance of order to an international level, a secondary law of 
nature, known in other contexts as the ju s  gentium or ‘primary law of nations’ is 
required. This law is derived from Grotius’ second rule which states that ""What the 
common consent o f  mankind has shown to be the will o f  all, that is law. 
Critically, Grotius is referring here to an antecedent notion o f the jtts gentium that 
had been derived from the Roman understanding of the term as the “customary law 
governing relations between members of different gentes or peoples.”^^  ^Following 
this, [i]n late medieval and early modern Europe, ms gentium meant customary law
ibid.
' Lon L. Fuller, The Morality o f Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.5. 
Grotius, DÆ  p. 12.
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common to all or most civil societies.”  ^ In this sense, the ju s  gentium was simply 
the law o f nature applied to states or other political associations and thus, due to the 
universal rationality of humankind, was common to all states. Critically however, in 
these states it was manifested as a form o f civil law. However, simultaneously, a 
second type ofju s gentium, also known as ju s  inter gentes was identified as existing 
between states.^Recognising the problems inherent in this dual conceptualisation, 
Francisco de Suarez not only distinguishes between the two but argues that only ju s  
gentium defined as “the law which all the various peoples and nations ought to 
observe in their relations with one another” is ju s  gentium p ro p e r /H o w e v e r ,  
Suarez’s De Legibus, ac Deo legislatore was only published in 1612 and, as such, it 
was only by the time he composed De Jure Belli ac P ads  that Grotius could 
possibly have read the work.^^*
As indicated by the second and sixth laws introduced above, a notion of dominium 
is central to Grotian natural law and hence Grotian morality. In particular, it plays a 
critical role in Grotius’ defence of the actions o f the Dutch East India Company. As 
Yanagihara Masaharu writes, while the term dominium “is usually equated with the
ibid.118
Jtis inter gentes was coined by Richard Zouche in Inris et ludicii Fecialis, sive, luris Inter 
Gentes. et Quaestionum de Eodimi Explicatio. (An Exposition o f Fecial Law and Procedure, of or 
Law between Nations, and Questions concerning the Same), trans. J.L. Brierly, (Washington: 
Carnegie Institution, 1911).
Francisco de Suarez, “On Laws and God tlie Lawgiver”, in Selections From Three Works, trans. 
Gwladys L. Williams, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), p.447.
For furtlier discussion of tlie relationsliip between tlie laws of natuie and nations see Hendrilc van 
Eikema Hommes, “Grotius on Natural and International Law”, Netherlands International Law 
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right over things”, imperium is commonly designated with “right over persons.”
In particular, he points out that Grotius provides two different explanations for the 
concept of dominium, a legal and an historical one. However, the starting point of 
both is the contention that;
He who bestowed upon living creatures their very existence, bestowed also 
the things necessary for existence...However, since God bestowed these 
gifts upon the human race, not upon individual men, and since such gifts 
could be turned to use only through acquisition of possession by individuals, 
it necessarily followed that...‘what had been seized as his own’ by each 
person should become the property o f that person. Such seizure is called 
possessio (the act o f taking possession), the forerunner o f usus [use], and 
subsequently o f dominmm [ownership],
In accordance with this claim, the historical explanation for the emergence of 
dominium maintains that “[tjhere was no private property under the primary law of 
nations.” However, as Anthony Pagden writes, “[b]y the terms of the social 
contract, men...renounced their primitive freedom in exchange for security and the 
possibility of moral understanding which only civil society could provide.” In 
order to maintain order in such civil society, private ownership {dominium^ came to 
be distinguished from common possession \communio\ In large part, dominium
Yanagihara Masaliaru, “Dominium and Imperium”, 'mA Normative Approach to War: Peace, 
War and Justice in Hugo Grotius, ed. Onuma Yasuaki, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 147. 
Grotius, DJP, p. 11.
16,W., p.226-7.
Anthony Pagden, “Dispossessing die barbarian: die language of Spanish Tliomism and die debate 
over the property rights of the American Indians”, in Languages o f Political Theory in Early- 
Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.81.
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was differentiated from communio by the fact of occupation [occupatid\. Thus, by 
instituting a right of dominium, which was, incidentally, only granted to individuals 
in possession of the faculty o f reason, the means according to which individuals 
could continue to attain the things necessary for self-preservation are established. 
Thus Grotius writes that;
...we find that those things which were wrested from the original domain o f 
common ownership have been divided into two categories. For some are 
now public property, or in other words, they are owned by the people, which 
is the true meaning o f the expression ‘public property’; and others are 
strictly private property, that is to say, they belong to individuals.
As such, dominium, in Grotius’ view, must be conceived as ‘private’:
From the foregoing discussion, two inferences may be drawn. The first runs 
as follows: those things which are incapable of being occupied, or which 
never have been occupied, cannot be the private property of any owner, 
since all property has its origin as such in occupancy. The second inference 
may be stated thus: all those things which have been so constituted by 
nature that, even when used by a specific individual, they nevertheless 
suffice for general use by other persons without discriminations, retain to­
day and should retain for all time that status which characterised them when 
first they sprang from nature.
Grotius, DJP, p.230. 
ibid., p.231.
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In legal terms, “[t]he recognition of the existence of private property led to the 
establishment of law on the matter, and this law was patterned after nature’s 
plan.” ^^ ^
Three conclusions fundamental to Grotius’ defence o f the Dutch East India 
Company’s actions can be derived from this understanding o f dominmm as private 
property. The first concerns the further concept of dominium mundL Originating in 
the ninth century, the concept o f dominium miindi fundamentally asserted that the 
Pope is the ‘Vicar o f Christ’ on earth. Further, as its early proponents reasoned, 
as “imperial power had been conferred on the Christian emperors by the Pope, it 
simply followed...that the emperors must [also] possess dominium mundif^^^ In 
accordance with the assumption that the Pope possessed sovereignty over the entire 
world, in 1493 Alexander VI divided the “then recognised world into two parts by 
the “Papal line of demarcation” and giving all discovered and explored lands west 
of it to the Spanish, all east of it to the Portuguese.”^^  ^ As Anthony Pagden writes, 
the main objective o f Alexander V i’s action was to “limit future rivalry between 
Castile and Portugal.” As neither sovereign granted this concession by the Pope 
could lay reasonable claim to being ‘universal rulers’ however, the Bulls came 
under sustained attack from a number of quarters. As such. Chapter III of Mare
See James Muldoon, Popes, lawyers and infidels: the Church and the non-Christian World, 1250- 
1550, (Liverpool: LiverpoolUniversityPress, 1979).
Tuck, Rights o f War and Peace, p. 59-60.
Vreeland, p.45.
Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World: Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain and France 
C.1500-C.1800, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p.47.
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Liberum is dedicated to defending the claim that “The Portuguese have no right of 
sovereignty over the East Indies by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation.”^^  ^
In doing so, Grotius argues that the Pope merely desired “to settle the disputes 
between the Portuguese and the Spaniards” and hence, that “the decision of the 
Pope will not of course affect the other peoples of the world.”
The second conclusion Grotius draws from his theory of the law of nature is that 
“infidels cannot be divested o f public or private rights of ownership.” Referring 
to the case at hand, he writes;
Therefore, since the Portuguese lack both possession and title to possession, 
since the property and sovereign powers of the East Indians ought not to be 
regarded as things that had no owner prior to the advent of the Portuguese, 
and since that property and those powers -  belonging as they did to the 
peoples o f the Indies -  could not rightly be acquired by other persons, it 
follows that the said people are not Portuguese chattels, but free men 
possessed of frill social and civil rights.
“On this point,” he writes, adding insult to injury, “there is little doubt, even among 
Spanish authorities.” Thus, the King of Johore, the East Indian nation to which 
Grotius is referring, is conceived as a sovereign fi-om whom sovereign rights cannot 
be divested. Furthermore, neither his public lands nor the privately owned lands of
133 Grotius, ML, p. 15; see also DJP, p.216ff.
134 ibid.
135 Grotius, DJP, p.216.
ibid., p.226.
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his people can be justifiably acquired on the grounds that they are the possession of 
infidels. However, this point brought into serious question how the colonial 
movement was to be justified. Addressing this concern, Grotius writes that “even 
discovery imparts no legal right save in the case of those things which were 
ownerless prior to the act of discovery,” thereby reconciling his theory with the 
needs of the Dutch colonial movement by adding that unoccupied and uncultivated 
lands may be freely acquired by colonial forces.
Thirdly, in defending the right o f the Dutch to trade in the East Indies, Grotius 
utilises the further notion that “[i]t is, then, quite impossible for the sea to be made 
the private property of any individual; for nature does not merely permit, but rather 
commands, that the sea shall be held in common.” Grotius’ contingent thesis that 
“[njeither the sea itself nor the right of navigation thereon can become the exclusive 
possession of a particular party” is explicitly appropriated from the esteemed work 
of Fernando Vazquez de Menchacha.^'*^ Although dominium could not be claimed 
over the sea, humans are granted the natural right to use it and its resources. In so 
arguing, Grotius establishes the natural right of both the state of Holland and the 
privately owned Dutch East India Company to use the sea and its resources. By 
extension then, both private individuals and states are also permitted to defend such 
rights and punish those who impugn them. However, in arguing this, Grotius also 
draws upon his own derivation of the just causes of war to be discussed later in this
’^ S-6/J.,p.221.
Î6/W. p.232.
p.216.
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chapter. Indeed, it suffices here to say that although natural law and just war 
elements of Grotius’ defence o f the Dutch East India Company cannot be 
reasonably divorced from one another, the foundational position of his theory of the 
law of nature is evident from the outset.
The sceptical challenge
Although the central precepts of the law of nature introduced in De Jure Praedae 
also form the foundation o f De Jure Belli ac Pads, a number of critical differences 
can be discerned. In particular, in attempting to identify a universal moral order 
according to which a set of laws regulating the incidence and conduct of war could 
be devised, Grotius necessarily had to answer the moral sceptics’ claim that 
universal morality cannot possibly exist. In recent years Richard Tuck has offered a 
particular interpretation o f De Jure Belli ac P ads  that maintains that Grotius’ ‘main 
intention’ in the Prolegomena o f this work is to answer the sceptical challenge, 
made by figures such as Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron that “there are no 
laws of nature.”^^  ^ In large part, this claim ought to be seen as part of Tuck’s 
broader attempt to demonstrate that Grotius was a ‘Hobbist before Hobbes’. As will 
be demonstrated in the following discussion however, Tuck’s interpretation rests 
not only on a misinterpretation of Grotius’ works, but a similarly flawed reading of 
Hobbes.
Robert Shaver, “Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest”, in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern 
Natural Low, ed. Knud Haakonssen, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p.63; Richard Tuck, “Grotius, 
Carneades and Hobbes”, Grotiana, Vol.IV, (1983), pp.43-62.
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Nonetheless, the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac P ads  is, at least in part, 
concerned with refuting the sceptical claim that there is no law of nature and, by 
extension, that justice is folly. To retreat a few steps in Grotius’ reasoning here, it is 
recalled that foremost amongst his aims in composing De Jure Belli ac Pads  was to 
devise a universal set of moral standards according to which war could be 
regulated. The form which this set of moral standards was to take was that of a set 
of laws o f war and peace derived from the common morality o f the law o f nature. 
With this in mind, Grotius quite sensibly recognises that his “discussion concerning 
law will have been undertaken in vain if there is no law.” "^^  ^ As such, he seeks to 
‘fortify’ his work against “this very serious error,” selecting Carneades as the 
‘pleader’ he is to refute:
Carneades, then, having undertaken to hold a brief against justice, in particular 
against that phase o f justice with which we are concerned, was able to muster no 
argument stronger than this, that, for reasons of expediency, men imposed upon 
themselves laws, which vary according to customs, and among the same peoples 
often undergo changes as times change; moreover that there is no law of nature, 
because all creatures, men as well as animals, are impelled by nature towards ends 
advantageous to themselves; that, consequently, there is no justice, or, if such there 
by, it is supreme folly, since one does violence to his own interests if he consults 
the advantage of others.
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 5, p. 10.
p. 10-11.
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In sum, as Fetter Korkman explains, “Carneades claims that prudential wisdom 
sometimes conflicts with the demands of justice and that a person must therefore 
choose to be either wicked (unjust) or foolish (unwise).” By extension, it stands 
to reason that “justice either does not exist...or that, if it exists, it is ‘the greatest 
folly’, because it injures itself ‘by promoting the interests of others’.
According to Tuck, Grotius’ intention to refute Carneades cannot be simply viewed 
as an attack on “a long-dead classical philosopher.” Rather, he interprets it as an 
attack on the modem sceptics, Montaigne and Charron. However, as a range of 
writers, including Perez Zagorin, Andrew Lister and Robert Shaver argue, there is 
“no real evidence that [Grotius] ever perceived scepticism as a serious challenge or 
made it, as has been erroneously claimed, the target of his moral philosophy. 
However, this is, in large part, part of Tuck’s larger attempt to present Grotius as a 
‘Hobbist before Hobbes’ by emphasising the position of self-preservation in 
Grotius’ works whilst simultaneously ignoring the primacy o f sociability to his 
theory of natural law. In particular, Tuck’s argument that “Hobbes need not be seen 
as differing from Grotius over ethical matters, strictly understood, at is
Fetter Korkinaii. “Barbeyrac on Scepticism and on Grotian Modernity”, Grotiana, Vol.20/21, 
(1999/2000), p.78.
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based on a ftindamentally misleading reading of the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli 
ac Pads.
Grotius responds to Carneades’ argument by asserting that although humans are 
animals, they are “much farther removed from all other animals than the different 
kinds of animals are from one another.” This is, in large pait, due to the 
‘impelling desire’ o f humans for peaceful society. Thus, Grotius argues that, 
“[s]tated as a universal truth.. the assertion that every animal is impelled by nature 
to seek only its good cannot be conceded.” Following from this, Grotius 
continues that the “maintenance of social order...is the source of law properly so- 
called”, thereby refuting the sceptical claim that law is purely promulgated for the 
purposes of self-interest. “To this sphere o f law”, he writes, belongs;
the abstaining o f that which is another’s, the restoration to another of 
anything o f his which we may have, together with any gain which we may 
have received from it; the obligation to fulfil promises, the making good of a 
loss incuired through our fault, and the inflicting o f penalties upon men 
according to their deserts.
Thus, Grotius combines a notion o f the inherent sociability o f individuals with an 
emphasis on natural rights that began to emerge in The Jurisprudence o f Holland to
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena, 6, p.l 1,
ibid.. Prolegomena 8, p. 12.
^^ i^bid., p. 12-13.
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argue that the ‘essence’ o f law, ‘properly defined’, “lies in leaving to another that 
which belongs to him, or in fulfilling our obligations to him.” ^^ ^
However, Grotius does not wholly discount the position of self-interest in the law of 
nature, writing that;
The law of nature nevertheless has the reinforcement o f expediency; for the 
Author of nature willed that as individuals we should be weak, and should 
lack many things needed in order to live properly, to the end that we might 
be the more constrained to cultivate the social life. But expediency afforded 
an opportunity also for municipal law, since that kind of association of 
which we have spoken, and subjection to authority, have their roots in 
expediency. From this it follows that those who prescribe laws for others in 
so doing are accustomed to have, or ought to have, some advantage in 
view.
However, from this. Tuck has extrapolated a theory of the law of nature in which 
self-preservation is the central principle, thereby aligning Grotius with Hobbes. 
This interpretation is misleading and has come under sustained attack in recent 
years. Even on a fairly superficial level, a simple reading of Grotius’ works reveals 
that he was not interested in self-interest first and foremost, but rather saw it as one 
of a number of principles comprising the law of nature. Referring to the first law of 
nature, Grotius writes in De Jure Praedae that “the order of presentation of the first 
set o f laws and of those following immediately thereafter has indicated that one’s
153 ;ibid., Prolegomena 10, p. 13. 
ibid.. Prolegomena 16, p. 15.
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own good takes precedence over the good o f another person -  or, let us say, it 
indicates that by nature’s ordinance each individual should be desirous of his own 
good fortune in preference to that of another.”*^  ^When considered in isolation, this 
statement seems to afford self-preservation a position of prominence in the natural 
law theory. However, as this passage continues, “in questions involving a 
comparison between the good of single individuals and the good of all (both of 
which can be correctly described as ‘one’s own,’ since the term ‘all’ does in fact 
refer to a species of unit), the more general concept should take precedence on the 
ground that it includes the good of individuals as well.” ^^*^ At heart, this claim can 
be derived back to Grotius’ understanding o f human nature as innately sociable. In 
a similar manner, in De Jure Belli ac P ads  Grotius argues that “it is not contrary to 
the nature of society to look out for oneself and advance one’s own interests, 
provided the rights of others are not infringed.” As Vermeulen and Van Der Wal 
explain, “when Grotius calls the laws of self-preservation the first principles o f 
nature he does not imply that these laws have priority over those regarding the well­
being of other persons; he merely means to say that these principles are ‘first 
according to nature’ because they impel every animal (man included) instinctively 
from the moment of its birth to have regard for itself and preserve itself.” Thus, 
Grotius concludes “[w]rongly...does Carneades ridicule justice as folly”, for 
“[ejven if no advantage were to be contemplated from the keeping of the law, it
Grotius, DJP, p.21. 
ibid.
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would be a mark of wisdom, not of folly, to allow ourselves to be drawn towards 
that to which we feel that our nature leads.”
Transposed to the international level, Grotius maintains that “law is not founded on 
expediency alone [as] there is no state so powerfiil that it may not some time need 
the help of others outside it.”^^® On this point, Grotius criticises Carneades for 
‘passing over’ the law o f nations, and writes;
But just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage o f that state, so 
by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws should originate 
as between all states, or a gi*eat many states; and it is apparent that the laws 
thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular states, but of the 
great society of states. And this is what is called the law of nations, 
whenever we distinguish it from the law of nature.
Although this tract has often been cited as ‘evidence’ that Grotius’ works contain 
the origins of the modern concept of ‘international society’, for Grotius, this 
vaguely conceived notion of ‘international society’ or a ‘society o f nations’ is 
characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth century idea that the force of the ju s  
gentium (law of nations) is located in the societas gentium (society of nations). In 
particular, the final line -  usually omitted in contemporary scholarship -  makes it 
clear that he is referring to ju s  inter gentes notion of ju s  gentium functioning in
ibid.. Prolegomena 18, p. 15-16. 
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 22, p. 17. 
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relation to the societas gentium, as opposed to the ju s  gentium derived from the ju s  
naturae.
Aristotelian justice
The concept of justice is itself, in a fashion typical of Grotius’ method, divided into 
two forms, expletive and attributive justice. “Legal rights”, he writes, “are the 
concerns of expletive justice (iustitia expletrix), which is entitled to the name of 
justice properly or strictly so called.” This form of justice is also known as 
‘contractual’ justice in an Aristotelian sense. On the other hand, attributive justice, 
(iustitia attributrix) is concerned with ‘aptitude’, that is ‘worthiness’ or 
‘fairness’. T h i s  form of justice broadly accords with Aristotle’s ‘distributive 
justice’, and “is associated with those virtues which have as their purpose to do 
good to others, as generosity, compassion, and foresight in matters of 
governm ent .A t t r ibu t ive  justice is consequently part of a morality that is higher 
than the common basic morality o f expletive justice.
As Tanaka Tadashi notes however, “[ojpinions are divided on whether Grotius is to 
be considered an Aristotelian.”^^  ^ As Richard Tuck explains, “Aristotelian ethics 
assumed that there are real moral properties to be perceived and an intersubjectivity 
o f morals, despite the fact that there can be no a priori and demonstrative
ibid., LI.VIII. 1, p.36. 
I.I.Vin.2, p.37.
Tanaka Tadashi, “Grotius’s Method: Witli Special Reference to Prolegomena”, in A Normative 
Approach to War, p.21.
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arguments about ethical matters.”*^  ^ In contemporary literature, the case has been 
made, most prominently by Tuck, that Grotius moves away from the Aristotelian 
roots evident in De Jure Praedae in De Jure Belli ac Pads. In particular, Tuck 
argues, the distinction between distributive and commutative justice in De Jure 
Praedae is “avowedly Aristotelian.” As Tuck points out. The Jurisprudence o f  
Holland “constitutes a decisive move away from an Aristotelian theory of justice” 
by discussing justice in terms of rights. Indeed, in Tlie Jurisprudence o f Holland 
Grotius writes that justice is “a virtuous disposition of the will to do that which is 
just.” ^^  ^ ‘Just’ is defined as “what corresponds with right” and right itself can be 
understood in either a narrow or a wide sense. Thus, Grotius explains that “[rjight 
widely understood is the correspondence o f the act of a reasonable being with 
reason” while understood narrowly, is “the relation which exists between a 
reasonable being and something appropriate to him by merit or property.” As 
such, justice is certainly discussed in terms o f rights and, in turn, rights are entirely 
conceived in a purely rational sense.
However, Tuck’s argument misses the fundamental point of Giotius’ complaint 
with Aristotle in De Jure Belli ac Pads. Indeed, despite claiming that “[ajmong the
Tiiclc, “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes”, p.44. 
Tuck, Natural rights theories, p.59. 
ibid., p.66-67.
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Philosophers Aristotle deservedly holds the foremost place,” the Prolegomena to 
De Jure Belli ac P ads  is particularly critical of Aristotle’s notion of justice. Thus 
Grotius writes;
For, being unable to find in passions and acts resulting therefore the too 
much as the too little opposed to that virtue, Aristotle sought each extreme 
in the things themselves with which justice is concerned. Now in the first 
place this is simply to leap from one class of things into another class, a 
fault which he rightly censures in others; then, for a person to accept less 
than belongs to him may in fact under unusual conditions constitute a fault, 
in view of that which, according to the circumstances, he owes to himself 
and to those dependent on him; but in any case the act cannot be at variance 
with justice, the essence of which lies in abstaining from that which belongs 
to another.
Furthermore, Grotius continues to argue that “[b]y equally faulty reasoning 
Aristotle tries to make out that adultery committed in a burst of passion, or a murder 
due to anger, is not properly an injustice.” Rather, injustice “has no other 
essential quality than the unlawful seizure of that which belongs to another” 
regardless o f whether it “arises from avarice, from lust, from anger, or from ill- 
advised compassion.” What Grotius is getting at here is that Aristotle’s notion of 
justice is too broad and consequently includes things that ought to be considered 
forms of a higher morality.
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 42, p.24. 
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Secularisation o f  natural law
Although the fundamental precepts of Grotius’ law of nature are quite clearly 
derived from an understanding o f God as the divine creator of all existence in De 
Jure Praedae, in De Jure Belli ac P ads  natural law is defined not as “what ever 
God has shown to be His will” but as “a dictate of right reason, which points out 
that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a 
quality o f moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act 
is either forbidden or enjoined by the author o f nature, God.”^^  ^ As such, Grotius 
here seems to be “insisting strongly that such true principles o f natural law possess 
an intrinsic validity” and can perhaps be understood as an attempt to devise a 
truly universal moral order in a time o f religious division. Indeed, Grotius continues 
to write in De Jure Belli ac P ads  that “[w]hat we have been saying would have a 
degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded 
without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs o f men are of 
no concern to Him.”^^  ^This passage o f Grotius’ work has been particularly seized 
upon in Grotius scholarship and, in many spheres, has become definitive of the 
manner in which his works are portrayed. Known as the etiamsi daremus, or 
impious hypothesis, a vast array of scholars have interpreted this sentence as
Grotius, DJP, p.8; DJB, I.I.X.1, p.38-9.
E.B.F. Midgley, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory o f International Relations, (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 141.
Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 11, p. 13.
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constituting the secularisation o f natural law/^^ However, two particular points of 
contention are associated with this claim. Indeed, not only are Grotius scholars 
divided over whether or not Grotius did, in fact, intend his hypothesis to be 
‘impious’ but, amongst those who answer in the affirmative, precisely where the 
idea originated remains a point of contention.
Some degree of consensus exists that it did not originate with Grotius himself 
however, theorists have attributed it to a range of writers including Gregory of 
Rimini, Francisco de Suarez and Gabriel Vazquez. However, as Javier Hervada 
writes, “[t]he medieval origin of the hypothesis...appears to be situated in the 
Augustinian Gregorius Novelli o f Rimini [Gregoiy of Rimini], who died in 
1358.”^^ According to Gregory, “what indicates that a thing is good or bad is right 
reason.” Thus, sin, “that which is morally evil” is, in actual fact, nothing more 
than “that which is in opposition to right reason.”^^ Contrary to impiety however, 
the reasoning behind this contention suggests that “sin consists of behaviour which 
is in opposition to divine reason, not insofar as it is divine, but rather inasmuch as it 
is right.” ®^^ Thus, “if by some impossible means divine reason or God Himself did
Leonard Besselink, “Hie Impious Hypotliesis Revisited”, Grotiana, Vol.9, (1988), pp.3-63; M.B. 
Crowe, “The Impious Hypothesis: A Paradox in Grotius?”, in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern 
Natural Law, ed. Knud Haakonssen, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp.3-34; Javier Heivada, “Hie Old 
and tlie New in tlie Hypothesis ‘Etiamsi daremus’ of Grotius”, Grotiana, Vol.IV, (1983), pp.3-20. 
ibid., pp.45-57.
Hervada, p. 14.
fAfW.
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not exist, or if divine reason were not right, there would be sin if  the action was 
committed were contrary to the right reason of men or of angels.” As Hervada 
notes, a similar version o f the impious hypothesis also appears in the works of 
Vitoria, Molina, de Soto, Medina and Suarez, although is extended in the works of 
Gabriel Vazquez. Thus, according to Vazquez the moral order is determined not by 
divine reason but by the very nature o f God himself By extension, “the contents of 
Natural Law, rather than in divine reason, are found in man’s nature” thereby 
facilitating the hypothesis that its central precepts would remain even in the 
impossible situation where God could be shown not to exist.
On the first point of contention debate is dominated by two main perspectives. As 
Mary Clare Segers writes, the “standard or “orthodox” interpretation of Grotius’ 
natural law stresses his emancipation of jurisprudence, and especially international 
law, from theology and from the denominational interpretations o f churchmen and 
theologians.” Conversely, the “‘revisionist’ argument is that Grotian natural law 
theory is not secular because Grotius retains theological premises in his 
doctrine.” Segers’ thesis presents two arguments centering around Grotius’ 
supposed ‘secularisation’ o f natural law. The first contends that “Grotius’ natural 
law theory does not depend on theological presuppositions regarding a Divine 
Lawgiver, and that he bases natural law upon psychological propositions regarding
ibid., p. 17
188 Mary Clare Segers. Hugo Grotius and secular natural law, (PliD Thesis) (Ann Arbor: University 
Microfilms, 1977), p.7.
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the nature of man as rational and social.” *^® As such, his natural law theory is 
viewed, in this regard, as being cognisant with that of Vazquez discussed above. 
Seger’s second argument maintains that Grotius incorporated two distinct 
conceptualisations o f natural law in his works; natural law ‘strictly speaking’, “the 
minimum level o f morality without which no society could survive” and natural law 
‘broadly speaking’. T h i s  broadly based natural law incorporates a range o f moral 
principles that are distinctly Christian in orientation and will be discussed in the 
following section.
Thus, far from constituting its ‘secularisation’, by presenting a two-tier model of 
natural law, Grotius clearly retains the position of God in the establishment of 
natural law. In particular, he continues to write that “it follows that we must without 
exception render obedience to God as our Creator, to Whom we owe all that we are 
and have; especially since, in manifold ways, He has shown Himself supremely 
good and supremely powerful, so that to those who obey Him He is ale to give 
supremely great regards, even rewards that are eternal, since He Himself is 
eternal.” Indeed, it appears that Grotius’ apparent ‘impious’ hypothesis serves 
another purpose. By establishing that these fundamental principles of nature would 
hold true even in the absence of God, here understood in the Christian sense, 
Grotius ensures that those of different denominations as well as those who are not 
of the Christian faith can, nonetheless, adhere to the laws of war and peace he is
ibid., p.8. 
ibid., p.8-9.
192 Grotius, DJB, Prolegomena 11, p. 13.
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advocating. As Vermeulen and Van Der Wal argue, the impious hypothesis 
therefore has “nothing to do with a secularisation of natural law...[but] expresses 
that the content o f this law is not contingent, that it does not depend on an arbitrary 
will -  not even on the Divine Will -  but consists of an immutable system of rules 
with autonomous validity.” Indeed, this point is confirmed with Grotius’ 
argument that “[t]he law o f nature, is unchangeable -  even in the sense that it 
cannot be changed by God.” ^^"* However, that God is central to Grotius’ 
understanding of law is made clear with his citation of Marcus Aurelius’ claim that 
“He who commits injustice is guilty o f impiety”, thus confirming that law is, 
according to his reasoning, ultimately derived from God.”^^  ^As will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter, claims that Grotius was responsible for the 
‘secularisation’ o f natural law can be most convincingly attributed to Samuel 
Pufendorf and Jean Barbeyrac.
As will be seen in the following section, it is on this theoretical foundation o f the 
law of nature that Grotius bases his discussion of the just causes of war and, in 
doing so, completes his defence o f both the Dutch East India Company and the 
Dutch Revolt.
Vermeulen and Van Der Wal, p.71.
Grotius, DJB, I.I.X.5, p.40. j
ibid.. Prolegomena 12, p. 14. I
I ^^  Barbeyrac quoted in James St Leger, p.38. i
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War
Following Cicero, Grotius defines war as a “contending by force.” As such, it is 
“not a contest but a condition”, giving rise to claims in the early twentieth century 
that Grotius was the “originator of the doctrine of war as status.”^^  ^ However, 
Grotius is less concerned with the nature of war in general than with its regulation 
according to the principles o f the just war. Despite its seemingly singular character, 
the just war tradition, like the ‘Grotian tradition’, is not a single tradition of thought 
but a set of interweaving traditions sharing both points of convergence and 
divergence throughout the extensive period of its evolution. As Paul Ramsey argues 
therefore, the just war tradition “cannot be dealt with all in one lump, as if it were a 
simple system of the moral rules for the classification of cases” and, as such, 
must be considered in the explicit terms specified by its individual proponents. 
However, common to all such traditions is the concept of just war itself, understood 
to be a device simply used to indicate both the just causes o f war Qus ad bellum) 
and the just conduct of parties in war (jus in hello).
The just war
Grotius’ conceptualisation of the just causes of war appears in three works spread 
chronologically throughout his life; Commentarius in Theses, De Jure Praedae and 
De Jure Belli ac Pads. However, as with much of De Jure Belli ac P ads ’ content.
Grotius, DJB, I.I.II, p.33.
ibid.; Oiiuma Yasuaki, “Wax”, mA Normative Approach to War, p.62; A.D. McNair, “The Legal 
Meaning of War and Relations of War to Reprisals”, TGS, Vol. 11, (1925), p.31-33.
Paul Ramsey, “The Just War According to St Augustine”, in Just War Theory, ed. Jean Betlike 
Elshtain, (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1992), p.8.
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the substantive principles outlined in this discussion appeared in an almost identical 
format in the earlier work De Jure Praedae. In fact, it is in this earlier work that 
Grotius folly explains his own derivation of the just war and its inherent connection 
to natural law.
Grotius’ treatment o f the just war is confined exclusively to the just causes of war in 
De Jure Praedae and begins from the premise that war is not necessarily “in 
conflict with the law o f n a t u r e . T h u s ,  he writes in De Jure Praedae that:
God wills that we should protect ourselves, retain our hold on the necessities 
o f life, obtain that which is our due, punish transgressors, and at the same 
time defend the state, executing its orders as well as the commands of its 
magistrates... .Thus it is God’s Will that certain wars should be waged; that 
is to say (in the phraseology of the theologians), certain wars are waged in 
accordance with God’s good pleasure. Yet no one will deny that whatsoever 
God wills, is just. Therefore, some wars are just; or, in other words, it is 
permissible to wage war.^ ®^
Grotius’ defence of war itself is consequently derived from his theory of natural law 
as outlined above. In particular, in accordance with the claim that “He who 
bestowed upon living creatures their very existence, bestowed also the things 5
necessary for existence”, Grotius argues that defence of those things necessary for 
existence is a legitimate cause for war as ordained by God.^^^ What follows is that if ?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  I
Grotius, a/B, U U p .5 1 . |
Grotius, TUP, p.31-32. |
^ f W . , p T l .  I
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just cause be found, all action necessary to achieve the ends that deemed the action 
legitimate in the first place is also permitted. As will be seen shortly however, in De 
Jure Belli ac Pads, Grotius tempers this licence with calls for moderation 
(temperamenta) in the conduct of war.
Having established that, in accordance with the law of nature, some wars are lawful, 
Grotius then sets about specifying who has the authority to declare war and herein 
lies a significant point of divergence in the arguments presented in De Jure Praedae 
and De Jure Belli ac Pads. In the earlier work, Grotius argues against Aquinas’ 
claim that a just war requires “the authority of the ruler, by whose commands the 
war is to be waged; it is not the business o f a private individual to declare war, 
because he can seek redress of his rights from the tribunal o f his superiors.” ®^^ He 
writes, defending the actions of the Dutch East India Company that ""private wars 
are justly waged by any persons whatsoever, including cases in which they are 
waged in conjunction with allies or through the agency o f  subjects. However, in 
De Jure Belli ac Pads, the right to make war and peace is specified as a mark of 
sovereignty.
De Jure Praedae then continues to specify the four just causes o f war as derived 
from the nine rules and thirteen laws of nature introduced in the Prolegomena. “The
^  Saint Thomas Aquinas, Stimma Theologiae 1Î-1Î, in On Law, Morality and Politics, ed. William P. 
Baumgartli and Richard J. Reagan, (Indianapolis: Hackelt Publishing Company, 1988), p.221.
^  Grotius, DJP, p.62.
Grotius, DJB, p.61.
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first o f these,” he writes, is based on the first law of nature and “is self-defence.”^^*’ 
In accordance with the second law o f nature, that “[i]t shall be permissible to 
acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useflil for life,” the second 
just cause o f war is “defence of one’s property.”^^  ^The third cause, Grotius argues, 
“one that a great many authorities neglect to mention -  turns upon debts arising 
from a contract or from some similar source.” "^^  This cause of war is amalgamated 
with the second in De Jure Belli ac P ads  to constitute the “obtaining o f that which 
belongs to us or is our due.”^^  ^Finally, “[t]he fourth cause arises from wrongdoing, 
and from every injury -  whether word or deed -  inflicted with unjust intent” and is 
derived from the individual’s right to inflict punishment established above.
Both De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pads  focus heavily on punishment as a 
just cause of war, the latter work devoting an entire lengthy chapter to its 
elaboration, much o f which is derived from the works of Augustine, “that supreme 
authority on piety and morals.”^^  ^As Grotius writes;
When, however, Augustine said, ‘Those wars are wont to be defined as just 
which avenge wrongs,’ he used the word ‘avenge’ in a rather general way to 
mean ‘exact requital for’. This is shown by what follows, for therein we find 
not a logical subdivision but a citation of examples: ‘War, then, ought to be
Grotius, a/P ,p.67.
^  Grotius, DJB, II.I.II, p. 171. 
Grotius, LXJP, p.67. 
ibid., p.4.
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undertaken against that people and state which has either neglected to exact 
punishment for wrongs done by its members, or to return what has been 
wrongfully taken away.’^^ ^
According to Grotius, punishment holds a three-fold advantage; admonition or 
correction, the protection o f others, and deterrence.^^^ Controversially, the first form 
of punishment “may be exacted by any one at all according to the law of nature” but 
cannot include the death penalty.
Having elaborated upon the four just causes of war, Grotius is then left in De Jure 
Praedae to establish that both the Dutch East India Company and the state of 
Holland were in fact entitled to engage in the wars they did. Relying on the earlier 
claim that private individuals can justifiably enter into a war, he first demonstrates 
“the justness o f the case if the war were private” before moving on to arguments 
demonstrating “the justness o f the case if  the war were public.”^^  ^ With regard to 
the first just cause of war, self-defence, he argues that the Dutch were simply 
defending themselves against attacks made on their vessels by the Portuguese and 
as such, this argument can also be placed within the bounds o f the second just cause 
of war, defence of property. However, Grotius also argues, in the first category, that 
the Dutch were also acting in defence o f their allies, the East Indian Kingdom of 
Johore that had suffered under Portuguese rule. Also, in terms o f defence, and of
ibid. p. 172. 
ibid., p.469f.
p.470. 
/W., p.63 & 85.
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great pertinence to the justification of the Dutch Revolt, is the claim that the Dutch 
were defending their mark o f sovereignty against Portuguese and Spanish attempts 
to usurp it. On the third just cause of war, failure to honour contracts, as mentioned 
above, Grotius cites the Great Privilege o f Mary of Burgundy and Philip IPs actions 
in changing the laws o f the Netherlands against the statutes. Finally, under the 
banner o f punishment stand a range of arguments justifying the Dutch East India 
Company’s actions and the Dutch Revolt. Thus, Grotius argues at one time or 
another that the Dutch were inflicting punishment on the Portuguese/Spanish for 
injuries inflicted on them during the reign of the Duke of Alva, for injuries inflicted 
upon the East Indian peoples o f the Kingdom of Johore, for not punishing the Duke 
of Alva themselves for the injuries he inflicted on the Dutch, for Philip’s failure to 
defend the peoples commended to his care as per the statutes, and for breaching the 
law of nature and nations in attempting to restrict the freedom of the seas.
JVar on behalf o f others
De Jure Belli ac P ads  concludes its discussion of the just causes of war by 
elaborating upon whether or not war on behalf o f others can be considered just. At 
heart, this discussion is derived from Grotius’ assertion that the ‘right of resistance’ 
is not a just cause of war. He writes;
By nature all men have the right of resisting in order to ward off injury, as 
we have said above. But as civil society was instituted in order to maintain 
public tranquility, the state forthwith acquires over us and our possessions a 
greater right, to the extent necessary to accomplish this end. The state.
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therefore, in the interest of public peace and order, can limit that common 
right of resistance.^^^
Indeed, Grotius further solidifies this argument by demonstrating that rebellion and 
resistance were not permitted in Hebraic law. Holy Writ or in the practices o f the 
early Christians.
In order to justify this point of view, Grotius includes a critical caveat, that permits 
war to be conducted on behalf of others. Similarly, the passage pertaining to the 
question of whether and under what circumstances it is permissible to undertake 
war on behalf of others, from which contemporary theorists have drawn a doctrine 
o f ‘humanitarian intervention’ is similarly scarcely discussed. The particular 
passage o f De Jure Belli ac P ads  reads;
If, however, the wrong is obvious, in case some Busiris, Phalaris or 
Thracian Diomede should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as no one 
is wananted in inflicting, the exercise o f the right vested in human society is 
not precluded...If, further, it should be granted that even in extreme need 
subjects cannot justifiably take up arms (on this point we have seen that 
those very persons whose purpose was to defend the royal power are in 
doubt), nevertheless it will not follow that others may not take up arms on 
their behalf.
However, although it is usually omitted from discussions o f this passage, Grotius is 
here concerned with justifying his previous and more central claim that subjects are
Grotius, DJB, I.IV.ÏÏ.1, p. 139. 
ibid., II.XXV.VIII,2-3, p.584.
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not entitled to resist the commands o f their rulers. Furthermore, citing Seneca, 
Grotius reasons that “making war upon one who is not one of my people but 
oppresses his own,” for the “protection of innocent persons,” is not primarily 
concerned with justifying ‘humanitarian’ action, but is simply a fonction of the right 
of states to inflict punishment upon others according to the precepts of natural 
law.^^^ However, Grotius tempers this with the further caveat that “wars which are 
undertaken to inflict punishment are under suspicion of being unjust, unless the 
crimes are very atrocious and very evident.”^^  ^ Critically then, although Grotius 
recognises instances in which it may be permissible to intervene in the affairs of 
another sovereign state, the central subject of both the action and his writing is the 
state or ruler to be punished, and not the peoples who will, as a result, be protected.
The other passage of Grotius’ work often held to illustrate his understanding of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention is found in De Jure Praedae. The passage 
which seems to indicate that Grotius was in favour of humanitarian intervention 
argues that;
...not only is it universally admitted that the protection of infidels from 
injury (even from injury by Christians) is never unjust, but it is furthermore 
maintained, by authorities who have examined this particular point, that 
alliances and treaties with infidels may in many cases be justly contracted 
for the purpose o f defending one’s own rights.^^^
218 ibid., II.XXV.XIII.4, p.584. 
^  Grotius, DJP, p.315.
ibid., II.XX.XLIII.3, p.508.
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Considered in isolation it is certainly possible to infer from this a notion of 
intervention that has at least some degree o f humanitarian concern as its driving 
force. However, when considered in light of the following passage, Grotius’ true 
intentions become clear;
In any case, it is certain that the cause o f the King o f Johore was 
exceedingly just. For what could be more inequitable than a prohibition 
imposed by a mercantile people upon a free king to prevent him from 
carrying on trade with another people?^^^
Thus, Grotius justifies the actions of the Dutch East India Company in seizing the 
Portuguese ship by inferring that, in doing so, they were both punishing the 
Portuguese for preventing the King of Johore from trading with the Dutch -  a right 
Grotius considers inalienable according to the law of nations^^^ - and defending the 
East Indian king’s rights. Claims that this passage constitutes a defence of the right 
of humanitarian intervention also appear to be derived from Grotius’ further claim 
that;
Both the King of Johore and the [East Indian] nations elsewhere mentioned 
by us, are being ravaged by the Portuguese with slaughter and rapine on no 
other pretext than this, that the said mler and nations granted admittance to 
the Dutch.^^^
^  ibid XII, p. 216. See also ML. 
^  iW ., XII, p.314-5.
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However, although Grotius turns to a humanitarian pretext here, the actions he is 
describing are not an instance o f humanitarian intervention but the workings o f an 
alliance between Holland and the Kingdom of Johore. Indeed, at no point in the 
ensuing discussion is there mention o f humanitarian atrocities committed by the 
King of Johore against his own people. With this in mind, Grotius’ argument must 
be seen purely as looking to ensure both the continued right of the Dutch East India 
Company to trade with the Kingdom of Johore, and its right to retain the booty 
seized from the Portuguese vessel in question, in accordance with the right of 
punishment specified by the just war tradition. Indeed, it is to the final overarching 
tier of Grotius’ moral scheme that contemporary theorists will find evidence of his 
humanitarian sentiments.
Love
Despite expending a significant amount o f time and energy constructing a moral 
code based on a minimal morality specified by the law of nature and presented in 
the form of the just war tradition, the law o f love often trumps more conventionally 
conceived notions of justice and morality in Grotius’ work.^^"  ^ As Tanaka Tadashi 
points out, throughout De Jure Belli ac Pads, Grotius refers to love, the law of love 
and the rules of love, using the terms caritas and delectio interchangeably.^^^
Shaver, p.63.
^  Tadashi, “Grotius’s Concept of Law”, p.48. For example, caritas is referred to in tlie following 
passages; ni.II.VI, p.447; III.XI.II, p. 153; III.XIII.IV, p.542; delectio in these; II.XXIV.II.3, p.402; 
II.I.IV.2, p. 173.
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Although he “does not provide a general explanation of their sources or contents” a 
number of instructive facets of Grotius’ understanding of the law of love can be 
gleaned from a number o f passages of his work.^^^ In particular, his most lucid 
exposition of the subject states that “the rules of love are broader than the rules of 
law” and equates the failure to adhere to the law of love with ‘heartlessness’.
The law of love is fundamentally dictated by the law o f the Gospel, the ju s  
evangelicum, and enjoins individuals to put “consideration for others on a level with 
consideration for [ t h e m s e l v e s ] . A s  such, it is an expression of the well known 
teaching to ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’. Taking the 
evangelical foundations of the law of love one step fiirther, Grotius continues by 
arguing that “[t]he teachings of Christ in regard to loving and helping men ought, 
therefore, to be carried into effect unless a greater and more just love stand in the 
way.”^^  ^By this, Grotius means that the laws of love enjoined by Christ ought to be 
applied to all areas o f conduct and, given his earlier contention that states and 
individuals are morally equivalent, it stands to reason that he is also referring to 
states in this sense. Indeed, that states are included in the law of love is made clear 
with the argument that warring parties ought to love their enemies, on the grounds 
that the “reasons for refraining from war have their origin in the love which we 
either owe to our enemies or rightly manifest toward them.”^^®
Grotius, DJB, III.XIlI.IV.l, p759.
II.I.IV.2, p .m . 
fW., i.n.vm.io, p.75-6. 
ibid., II.XXIV.II.3, p.569-570.
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However, the logical extension of Grotius’ reliance on the law of the Gospel as the 
basis for the law of love presents him with two serious problems. First, by applying 
Christ’s teachings to the conduct of war, he is faced with the problem of how to 
reconcile notions of Christian pacificism with the reality that Christians engage in 
wars. Indeed, Grotius does concede that the “law of the Gospel has made such 
action in self-defence altogether unpermissible; for Christ bids us submit to a blow 
rather than do harm to an a gg re s s o r . A l t h o ug h  a Christian should ‘turn the other 
cheek’, he maintains that “it is in the love o f the innocent man”, also derived from 
the Gospel, “that both capital punishment and just wars have their origin”, thereby 
providing grounds on which Christians can go to war.^^ However, this still leaves 
the question o f how to reconcile Grotius’ earlier claim that, according to the just 
war’s natural law underpinnings, all force necessary to achieve a just cause is 
permitted. Still more problematic for the central aim of his work, the realisation of a 
universal morality, is the question o f how to make the law of love applicable to all 
of humanity. For, although Grotius certainly believes that the law o f the Gospel is 
applicable to all mankind, he must surely have recognised that those outside the 
Christian faith would not concur with his view.
Rather than face these problems head on, Grotius simply fudges the issue. In 
particular, as Tadashi points out, the ‘law o f love’, as conceived above, is used 
interchangeably with the ‘mles of humanity’ {regulae humanitatis), ‘natural equity’
ibid., II.I.X.1, p. 178.
iW., I.II.VIII.10, p.75.
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{aequitas naturalis), the ‘duty of Chiistians’ {officinm Christiani hominis) and a 
notion o f ‘internal justice’ {interna justitid), in an attempt to appeal to a higher 
notion of humanity (humanitas). He writes that “these concepts in part overlap with 
law, but they are more extensive; by appealing to them, Grotius extends the scope 
of law to vast peripheral domains.”^^  ^ Indeed, as Grotius writes, “I do not doubt that 
to human law also there can be applied what love under other circumstances would 
c o m m e n d . C r i t i c a l  to this attempt to infuse strict human law with the law o f love 
however, is the further notion of ‘ internal justice’ mentioned above.
Although it appears on numerous occasions in his work, particularly Book III of De 
Jure Belli ac Pads, Grotius does not clearly or consistently define precisely what 
‘internal justice’ e n t a i l s . A s  one of the only writers to address this aspect o f his 
Grotius’ work explains, “[t]he things which are permissible according to internal 
justice in a just war” are identical to the three just causes of war discussed above.^^*’ 
Conversely, as Grotius himself explains, “[wjhat is done by reason of an unjust war 
is unjust from the point of view o f moral injustice (interna injustitia)P^^^ What is 
certain is that internal justice is, in once instance at least, derived directly from a 
notion of conscience and is also used interchangeably with a notion of moral 
justice. Thus, although his prior theorisation of the just war authorises the use of
Tadashi. “Grotius’s Concept of Law”, p.49.
Grotius, DJB. I.IV.VÏÏ.2, p. 149.
See in.XI.lI, p.723; m.XII.1.1, p.745; ni.Xin.1.2, p.757. 
^  Tadaslii, “Temperamenta (Moderation)”, p.296.
Grotius, DJB, III.X.III, p.718-19.
ibid., III.XI.II, p.723.
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all necessary force, he appeals to the individual conscience understood in terms of 
internal justice and co-extensive with the law of love.
Having spent most of De Jure Belli ac P ads  elaborating upon the just causes of 
war, Grotius then spends sixteen chapters of the third book renouncing almost all o f 
the sanctions previously permitted. He writes;
I must retrace my steps, and must deprive those who wage war of nearly all 
the privileges which I seem to grant, yet did not grant them. For when I first 
set out to explain this part of the Law of Nations I bore witness that many 
things are said to be TawfuF or ‘permissible’ for the reason that they are 
done with impunity, in part also because coactive tribunals lend to them 
their authority; things which, nevertheless, either deviate from the rule of 
right (whether this has its basis in law strictly so called, or in the admonition 
of other virtues), or at any rate may be omitted on higher grounds or with 
greater praise among men.
With regard to the destruction o f property, Grotius prohibits the despoiling of both 
sacred and consecrated things on the grounds that “these cannot be violated without 
contempt for human feeling.” "^^® However, Grotius’ greatest problem is with the 
right to kill others. In particular, his pronouncements about the right to kill are 
tempered by a particular regard for human life. Thus, referring to the law o f love, he 
argues that individuals ought not to be killed for the sake o f property;
ibid., III.X.I.1, p.716.
ibid., III.XII.VI, VII, p.751 & 753.
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... it may happen that those who wish by force to hinder the enforcement of 
a right may be killed, not intentionally but accidentally. But if this can be 
foreseen, we have shown elsewhere that we ought rather to surrender to 
forthering of the right, in accordance with the law of love. According to this 
law, particularly for Christians, the life o f a man ought to be of greater value 
than our property.
In a similar vein, Grotius argues in a later passage that “the killing of a man on 
account of transitory things, even if it is not at variance with justice in a strict sense, 
nevertheless is not in harmony with the law of love.” "^*^ Thus, killing must be done 
with humanity and in accordance with moral or internal justice, justitia interna. In 
practical terms, this entails sparing women, children and old men,^ "^  ^ priests, 
ministers and s c h o l a r s , f a r m e r s , m e r c h a n t s , a n d  prisoners of war. '^^  ^
Furthermore, Grotius argues that “[i]t is right to spare those who are guilty, if there 
number is very great”, thereby demonstrating the same clemency afforded 
individuals by God.^ "^  ^ Indeed, the concept o f clemency appears a number of times 
in De Jure Belli ac Pads, Grotius going so far as to suggest both that “the 
conquered should be treated with clemency” and that “[pjunishment may often be
ibid., III.II.VI, p.628. 
ibid., III.XI.II, p.723. 
ibid.. III.XI.IX, p.734. 
ibid., III.XI.X.2, p.737. 
ibid., III.XI.XI, p.737. 
ibid., III.XI.XII, p.737. 
ibid., III.XI.Xin, p.737. 
ibid., III.X3.XVII, p.742.
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remitted justly even to enemies who have deserved death.” "^^  ^ Such is the value of 
human life that Grotius believes it preferable to be captured and enslaved than to 
fight to the death. In this vein, slavery is considered a form of charity, a “lesser 
cruelty”, when proposed as an alternative to “the slaughter of unfortunate men.”^^ °
In accordance with his desire to preserve human life and limit the horrors of war, 
Grotius introduces the notion o f temperamenta, or moderation, and applies it to the 
conduct of war. In doing so, he devotes chapters of Book III o f De Jure Belli ac 
P ads  to arguments in favour of moderation in ‘laying waste and similar things’, 
in regard to captured p r o p e r t y , i n  regard to prisoners of war,^^^ in acquisition of 
sovereignty,^^^  ^and in case o f no pos t l iminy,Chapter  XT going to far as to argue 
that the “right of killing enemies, in just war, [ought] to be tempered with 
moderation and humanity.”^^  ^ As such, Grotius argues against the ‘unnecessary 
effusion of blood’;
...all engagements, which are of no use for obtaining a right or putting an 
end to a war, but have as their purpose a mere display o f strength, that is, as 
the Greeks say, ‘an exhibition o f strength rather than a combat against the 
enemy’, are incompatible both with the duty of a Christian and with
ibid., III.XV.XII, p.776; III.XI.VII, p.731.
^  ibid., m.VII.IX.1, p.696. 
ibid.. I1I.XIÏ, p.745. 
ibid., III.XIII, p.757. 
ibid., m.XTV, p.767.
^  yw., jn .xv, p. 770. 
ibid., III.XVI, p.778. 
ibid., III.XI, p.722.
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humanity itself. Consequently rulers, who must render account of the 
useless shedding o f blood to them in whose name they bear the sword, 
should strictly forbid such combats.^^^
As James Turner Johnson writes then, “both proportionality...and good wishes 
(deriving from charity and historically revealed in Christian thought and practice” 
limit the fully justified right o f self-defence.”^^  ^However, a pertinent caveat applies 
to the application of temperamenta and caritas that highlights the fundamental 
distinction between the highest tier of Grotian morality and the rest. Here Grotius 
maintains that “only Christians are bound by the latter restriction, while all peoples 
are bound by the f o r m e r . A s  Johnson explains, this is fundamentally due to the 
fact that Grotius thought that caritas formed part of “a higher morality accessible 
only through the gift o f divine g r a c e . H o w e v e r ,  as seen above, by equating it 
with internal justice and hence the individual conscience, Grotius nonetheless 
manages to argue that the law of love is an essential element of humanity that ought 
to be reflected in the functioning of human law.
Conclusion
The life and works of Hugo Grotius are marked by a number of significant tensions 
that, in many ways, have informed the very construction of his particular moral
ibid., III.XI.XIX, p.743-744.
^  James Turner Jolmson, “Grotius’ Use of History and Charily in tlie Modern Transformation of tlie 
Just War Idea”, Grotiana, Vol. IV, (1983), p. 29.
^  fW ., p.32.
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scheme. In the first instance, his work is marked by a tension between a self­
professed hatred of war and the recognition that its limitation requires, to some 
extent at least, an acceptance of the reality o f war. In a similar vein, Grotius is also 
torn between the attractiveness of the just war tradition, derived from a history of 
scholarship that he holds in high esteem, and his aversion to war at all. In large part, 
this tension is played out with his endorsement o f the just causes of war and 
subsequent calls to temperamenta that seek to limit even just wars. As made evident 
in the biographical discussion o f his life, Grotius’ work is also marked by the 
contending desire to identify a universal morality according to which all 
international relations can be regulated and his profound devotion to Christianity. 
Indeed, on a broader scale, although in attempting to achieve a universal legal 
system Grotius sought to overcome the problems inherent in the sectarianism of 
seventeenth century Europe, the fact remained that, though the power of the 
Catholic church was in decline, Christianity remained a dominant feature of 
European politics. In this then, Grotius is seen to play a delicate balancing act 
between the desire for universalism and respect for Christianity. Finally, and as 
seen in the final section o f this chapter, a tension is also apparent in Grotius’ work 
between his overwhelming desire to apply ‘strict’ law to the conduct of war and his 
equally strong aspiration for the promotion of the law o f love.
Although it does not satisfactorily resolve all, or even any of these tensions, the 
solution to Grotius’ contending beliefs and aspirations is found in his three-tiered 
moral scheme. Indeed, as demonstrated in this chapter, a multilayered system of
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morality is evident in Grotius’ work that, despite being based on a platform of 
secular and common principles is, in its highest form, ecclesiastically inspired and 
yet driven by a notion o f common humanity. Thus, at its most basic, irrefutable 
level, Grotian morality is a minimal, morality derived from the law of nature and 
which, at heart, implores individuals and states to refrain from injuring others or 
seizing their property. Mediating between these upper and lower tiers of morality 
are the precepts of the just war tradition which provide the essential vehicle for 
Grotius’ attempt to, by slightly devious means, actually induce a far higher morality 
in state conduct than that implored by the law of nature. Thus, Grotian morality is 
secular, yet remains true to the fondamental principles of Christianity, it abhors war, 
but provides a set of moral guidelines for its moderation nonetheless and, by 
appealing to a higher notion o f ‘humanity’, sets the law of love as a higher morality 
standing over and above law as strictly defined and applied to the conduct of war.
As will be seen in the following chapters of this thesis, it is this three-tiered moral 
scheme that has cemented Grotius’ longevity in International Relations and Legal 
scholarship and formed the ultimate foundations of the most prominent Grotian 
traditions of the twentieth century. In particular, as made evident in the following 
chapter, following the decline o f De Jure Belli ac P ads  at the hands o f Vattel’s Le 
Droit des Gens, James Kent and Henry Wheaton turned to Grotius on account of the 
manner in which his law of nations was infosed with an explicitly Christian 
morality. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Five, in the early twentieth century, 
writers such as Cornelius van Vollenhoven and J.L. Brierly, drew upon a notion of
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‘Grotian morality’ derived from the law of love and the law o f nature respectively. 
Most significant of all however, is the first formal incarnation of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ in the work of Hersch Lauterpacht that, despite rejecting the outwardly 
Christian foundations of the third layer of Grotius’ moral scheme, was explicitly 
conceived as a tradition of moral thought.
It has also been made particularly apparent in this chapter that those concepts 
deemed central to the Grotian traditions o f the twentieth century, in particular 
‘international society’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’, did not feature highly in 
Grotius’ actual works. Thus, although Grotius writes, with what Martin Wight 
terms a ‘fruitful imprecision’, o f a range o f ideas vaguely cognisant with an early 
notion o f international society, for example, magna ilia imiversitas (that universal 
society), mntua gentium inter se societas (mutual society o f nations), major ilia 
gentium societas (that greater society of nations) and humana societas (human 
society), none of these concepts bear a great deal of resemblance to the 
conceptualisation of ‘international society’ in the twentieth century.^^* As will be 
seen in the following chapters, the modem notion of international society with 
which Grotius has been erroneously associated only emerged in the scholarship of 
the nineteenth century that followed the Congress of Vienna.
Martin Wiglit, “Western Values in International Relations”, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays 
on the Theory o f World Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1966), p. 102.
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Furthermore, Grotius’ status as the ‘father o f humanitarian intervention’ seems, in a 
substantive sense at least, highly questionable. Considered slightly differently 
however, claims of Grotius’ paternity also imply that he was in some way the first 
writer to either understand the central principles o f the concept or, more stringently, 
conceive o f a distinct doctrine o f humanitarian intervention. Grotius’ position is 
similarly questionable on both these counts. As Terry Nardin points out, the concept 
of humanitarian intervention also appeared in a similarly minimal, yet discernible 
sense in the works of a range of writers prior to Grotius, including Francisco de 
Vitoria, Bartolomé de Las Casa, Luis Molina and Domingo de Soto.^^^ However, 
what these notions of humanitarian intervention lack that is critical to a modern 
conception of the practice, is an understanding of the sovereign state as the object of 
intervention. Thus, it was not until Christian von W olffs Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum o f 1747, discussed in the following chapter, that a notion 
of humanitarian intervention embedded in the modern notion of state sovereignty 
and the principle of non-intervention appeared.^*’^
Teriy Nardin, “The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention”, Ethics and International Affairs. 
Vol. 16, No.l, (2002), p.60-61. Indeed a distinct ‘humanitarian’ impulse is evident in Las Casas’ 
claim that “[a]ll who can do so are held by the natural and divine law to defend any and all persons 
from such injmies.” Bartolomé de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians: The Defense o f the Most 
Reverend Lord, Don Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, o f the Order o f Preachers, Late Bishop o f 
Chiapa, Against the Persecutors and Slanderers o f the Peoples o f the New World Discovered Across 
the Seas, trans. & ed. Stafford Poole, (DeKalb: Nortliem Illinois University Press, 1974), p.37.
Cluistian von Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, trans. Joseph H. Drake, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 257-258, p. 131-132.
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Finally, and o f immediate importance to the genesis of the first historical 
incarnations o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ that began to appear almost immediately after 
his death, contrary to his variable characterisation in contemporary International 
Relations scholarship, Grotius is, first and foremost, a natural law theorist. This 
does not imply that he did not also entertain a notion of a positive law o f nations in 
his works, but rather that the law of nature remained the dominant element of the 
law of nations. In this, Grotius’ allegiance to the central precepts of natural law is 
structurally similar to those o f Samuel Rachel and Richard Zouche, both of whose 
works are discussed in the following chapter and both of whom, despite 
promulgating an outwardly positivist approach to the law of nations, retained an 
element of natural law in their thinking. Thus, as will be seen in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis, it is Grotius’ theory of the law of nature, complete with its 
principles o f minimal morality, that not only constitute the basis of much 
seventeenth and eighteenth ‘Grotian’ scholarship, but have inspired elements of the 
twentieth century incarnations o f the ‘Grotian tradition’.
181
IV
The Early ^Grotians’ from Samuel Pufendorf 
to Henry Wheaton
Natural law no more dropped from the skies in the seventeenth century than 
did international law, neither did it spring from the ingenious brain o f a 
single human being. It is true that from this period both developed into a 
more independent conception, though the close relationship between natural 
law and international law cannot be denied even now.^
Although the first analytical incarnation of the ‘Grotian tradition’ did not appear in 
an explicitly articulated form until the works o f Hersch Lauterpacht in the 1940s, its 
intellectual antecedents are located at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
However, Grotius’ status in the history of international political and legal thought 
was certainly not always assured. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Grotius 
was generally regarded by European scholars as “old fashioned and out of date.”  ^
His grand treatise had been superseded by Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens as the leading 
authoritative text on the law of nations and Grotius himself had been relegated to 
the annals o f history as the founding father of the emergent ‘science o f international 
law’. Indeed, although the stunning success of De Jure Belli ac Pads  had seen it
 ^ Van der Molen quoted in Cliarles Edwards, Hugo Grotius The Miracle o f Holland: A Study in 
Political and Legal Thought, (Chicago; Nelson-Hall, 1981), p.24.
 ^Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 101.
“reprinted or translated fifty times between 1625 and 1758”, in the following 
hundred years it was only published tw ice/ With time, Grotius and his followers, 
Pufendorf and Vattel, would be branded as ‘sorry comforters’ by the highly 
influential Immanuel Kant and, with the rise to prominence of positivist legal 
theory, it would be said that their “philosophically or diplomatically calculated 
codes do not and cannot have the slightest legal force, since states as such are not 
subject to a common external constraint.” *^ Be that as it may, the nineteenth century 
remains the pivotal century during which the foundations of the Grotian traditions 
o f the twentieth century were laid. Indeed, by the end o f the nineteenth century, 
Grotius’ works were gaining popularity once more, paving the way for a massive 
resurgence o f Grotian scholarship that saw the solidification of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ in the early twentieth century.
Central to the revival of Grotius in international legal scholarship was the work of 
the American international lawyer, Hemy Wheaton (1785-1848). Wheaton’s 
Elements o f  International Law With a Sketch o f  the History o f  the Subject, first 
published in 1836 was the first international law treatise written in English and “at
 ^Mark Weston Janis. “American Versions of the International Law of Cliristendom; Kent, Wheaton 
and the Grotian Tradition”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol.XXXIX, (1992), p.43. See 
also J.G, Starke, “The Influence of Grotius Upon tlie Development of International Law in the 
Eighteenth Century” in Grotian Society Papers 1972: Studies in the History o f the Law of Nations, 
ed. C.H. Alexandrowicz, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 163.
 ^ Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Hmiiplirey, 
(Indianapolis; Hackett Publishing, 1983), p. 116.
183
once attract[ed] the attention o f the whole of Europe.”  ^ In 1845 he published a 
History o f the Law o f  Nations in Europe and America, from  the Earliest Times to 
the Treaty o f  Washington, 1842, a similarly popular work in international legal 
history/ In particular, three features of Wheaton’s works are of central importance 
to the development of ‘Grotian’ scholarship in the nineteenth century. As Edward 
Keene has spent much o f his time discussing, the first is the emergence of the claim 
that Grotius prefigured or even personally directed the substantive content of the 
Westphalian Peace Treaties. Here it is apparent that in an attempt to consolidate the 
history of international legal scholarship to date, international lawyers such as 
Wheaton and, in England, William Manning,^ fused two different accounts o f the 
emergence of modern international law, represented most prominently by the works 
of A.H.L. Heeren and G.F. von M aitens/ As will be seen in the remaining chapters 
of this thesis, in doing so, they initiated a myth “more potent than reality,”  ^ the 
pervasiveness of which has continued to inform contemporary Grotian scholarship. 
In particular, by associating Grotius with the Westphalian Treaties, the case for his 
later association with the concept of international society is strengthened, albeit on a 
false premise.
 ^ Lassa Oppenlieiin, International Law: A Treatise, 3"* ed. Ronald F. Roxburgh, (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. 114.
 ^Henry Wlieaton, History o f the Law o f Nations in Europe and America, from the Earliest Times to 
the Treaty o f Washington, 7S42 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1973).
’ William Manning, Commentaries on the Law o f Nations, (London: Sweet, 1839).
® Edward Keene, “The reception of Hugo Grotius in international relations theoiy”, Grotiana, 
Vol.20/21, (1999/2000), p. 142.
 ^C.G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and tlie ‘Grotian heritage’ in international law and international relations: 
the quartercentenary and its aftermath (circa 1980-90)”, Grotiana, Vol. 11, (1990), p.8.
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The second feature o f Wheaton’s work that is o f relevance to the development of 
the ‘Grotian tradition’ centers around the notion of ‘Grotian morality’ that appeared 
in his works and those o f James Kent. In particular, it highlights that while 
‘Grotian’ scholarship was undergoing a period of decline in Europe, the association 
of Grotius with Christian ethics in international law became central to American 
interpretations of the law of nations. Finally, the third important feature of 
Wheaton’s work is its three-fold division of the history o f international legal 
thought into the categories o f natural and positive law and, combining elements of 
each, ‘mixed’ law. Although this scheme originated in the eighteenth century, 
existing in an embryonic form in the work o f Emerich de Vattel, it was only with 
the first international legal textbooks of the nineteenth century that it became 
solidified in international legal thought. Thus, although the intermediary category 
standing between the dominant natural and positive legal traditions was labeled here 
as ‘mixed’, it is this pattern of thought that later became the analytical variant of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ that appears in Hersch Lauterpacht’s work.
However, this pattern o f categorisation is struck by a serious epistemological 
problem at the outset. Although Wheaton’s history of international law begins with 
the works of Hugo Grotius, the ‘founder’ o f the ‘science’ with which he is 
concerned, he seems uncertain as to whether Grotius ought to placed in the ‘natural
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law’ tradition alongside Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf/^ Indeed, in a 
similar manner, the natural law category of Oppenheim’s formulation includes 
Hobbes, Pufendorf and the French theorist and translator of Grotius’ and 
Pufendorf s major works, Jean Barbeyrac, while the ‘Grotians’ are said to include 
Christian von Wolff, Emerich de Vattel, Henry Wheaton and William Manning/^ 
However, as made clear in the previous chapter, Grotius was himself avowedly a 
natural law theorist and hence, according to this scheme, does not reside within the 
‘Grotian’ category. Similarly, and equally absurdly, as a member o f the ‘natural law 
tradition’, Grotius’ most self-conscious follower, Samuel Pufendorf, is not 
considered a ‘Grotian’. In light of what is constituted by an historical tradition, this 
exclusion is particularly problematic for, as is demonstrated in this chapter, 
Pufendorf clearly stands in a direct and self-conscious line o f transmission from 
Grotius.
This chapter consequently argues that, contraiy to the analytical constructions of the 
twentieth century that distinguish the Grotian and natural law traditions, in its early 
historical incarnations, those patterns o f thought that emanated from Grotius were 
explicitly traditions o f natural law. What is more, rather than existing as a singularly 
conceived tradition, a number of interweaving patterns of transmission can be 
discerned originating with Grotius and retaining an explicit association with him. 
The first section of this chapter therefore traces the development of Grotian
Henry Wlieaton, Elements o f International Law, ed. Jolm Grafton Wilson, (Oxford: Claiendon 
Press, 1936), I.I.2, p.3.
Oppenheim, p.l06.
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scholarship from Grotius to Pufendorf and on to Jean Barbeyrac and, in doing so, 
demonstrates that although Pufendorf explicitly derived his theory of the law of 
nature from Grotius, he sought to infrise it with a distinctly voluntarist moral 
system. In addition, this section also introduces the range of criticisms leveled at 
Pufendorf s work by Wilhelm Gottfried von Leibniz that exerted a significant 
influence on the later works of Christian von Wolff and Emerich de Vattel. The 
second section is consequently concerned with the works of Wolff and Vattel and it 
is here that we see the emergence o f concepts that are considered stereotypically 
‘Grotian’ in twentieth century scholarship. In particular, in Wolff we see the 
distinction between the ‘necessary’ and ‘voluntary’ law o f nations, later transposed 
to form the ‘natural’ and ‘positive’ law traditions and, the beginnings o f a notion of 
‘international society’ in the form of the civiias maxima. Finally, the third section 
discusses the three-fold contribution o f Henry Wheaton to the development of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ and, in particular, the resurgence of interest in ‘Grotian morality’ 
in nineteenth century American scholarship.
Samuel Pufendorf
Despite his categorisation within the bounds of the natural law tradition, Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-1694) stands in a self-consciously identified line of transmission 
from the works of Hugo Grotius, thereby rendering him a member o f an historically 
constituted ‘Grotian tradition’. In the first instance, this is established by reference
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to the praise Pufendorf affords Grotius in the preface to De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium in which he refers to himself as Grotius’ ‘Son’;
Indeed, it has been believed not unjustly that first place has thus far been 
held by Hugo Grotius, who was apparently the first to call his generation to 
the consideration o f that study [natural law], and was also so grounded in it, 
that in a large part of the field he has left all others nothing ftirther than the 
task of gleaning after him. But, however much we cherish the fame o f that 
man, so much so that we have been accorded the special designation o f his 
‘Son’, it must after all be acknowledged that he has entirely omitted not a 
few matters, some he has accorded but a passing touch, and introduced some 
other matters, which prove that after all he was only a man.
Thus, despite identifying himself as an intellectual descendant of Grotius, Pufendorf 
acknowledges the limitations of Grotius’ natural law theory. In particular, he is 
concerned with Grotius’ inability to satisfactorily reconcile the dual human instincts 
of self-preservation and sociability, his moral realism and, derived from this, his 
failure to include a strong notion of obligation in his theory of the law of nature.
However, Pufendorf s criticisms o f Grotius’ work poses him with somewhat of a 
dilemma; he simultaneously argues that modern natural law is voluntarist in nature 
and that Grotius was its founder. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
Grotius was not a voluntarist but a moral realist; that is, he argued that common 
morality is innate and as such, a range o f actions pertaining to it can be designated
Samuel Pufendoif, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, (liereafter DJN) trans. Ckules Heniy 
Oldfatlier and William Abbott Oldfatlier, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p.v-vi.
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as intrinsically moral or intrinsically immoral Pufendorf reconciles this anomaly by 
specifying the two particular senses in which Grotius can, despite his moral realism, 
be considered the founder o f modem natural law. First is the manner in which he 
strove to identify a universal morality that could not be subjected to the religious 
differences that had divided Europe. Secondly, and most importantly, Grotius is 
heralded for basing his minimal morality on two empirically verifiable conditions; 
the common ‘state of nature’ of humankind prior to the institution of civil society, 
and the primacy of self-love manifested in the instinctual desire for self- 
preservation.^^ On both of these points, Pufendorf sides with Grotius and argues 
that, contrary to Hobbes’ claim that the state of nature is the state of war o f all 
against all,^ "^  the state of nature is one of peace;
We conclude that from all this that the natural state of men, even when 
considered apart from commonwealths, is not one o f war, but o f peace; a 
peace founded on the following laws; A man shall not hami one who is not 
injuring him; he shall allow everyone to enjoy his own possessions; he shall 
faithfully perform whatever has been agreed upon; and he shall willingly 
advance the interests of others, so far as he is not bound by more pressing 
obligations.^^
James Tully, “Introduction” to Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty o f Man and Citizen (hereafter 
OHC) ed. James Tully, trans. Michael Silvertliome, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), p.xviii-xix.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J.G.A. Gaskin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), XIII.8, 
p.84; Pufendorf, DJN, II.n.5, p. 165.
DJN, II.II.9, p. 172-3.
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As such, Pufendorf bases his own theory o f the law o f nature on the two 
fundamental laws of Grotius’ minimal morality, the laws o f inoffensiveness and 
abstinence. However, as will be seen shortly, he combines them with a notion of 
obligation derived from Thomas Hobbes’ understanding o f law and his own variant 
of moral voluntarism.
Moral voluntarism
The starting point of Pufendorf s theory of the law of nature is the claim that 
humans are endowed with two faculties that set them apart from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, understanding [intellectus] and will.^^ As such, “[hjuman actions 
arise from the will.” ^^  However, as “the wills o f different men tend in different 
directions. ..there must have been some rule to which these wills might conform” in 
order to achieve ‘order and decency’. The rule Pufendorf cites, “is called law 
[ le x f  but unlike Grotius’ understanding of it, it is strictly a human imposition. 
Two points are therefore critical to the development of Pufendorf s natural law 
theory here. The first is the assertion that “human society is almost entirely a human 
artifact” constructed, not in a supernatural or innately determined manner, but 
through the choices and agreements that humans make with one another. Thus, the
11.4,9, P.17&19. 
^Ghid., 1.2.1, p.27.
ibid.
19 ;ibid., 1.2.3, p.27.
J.B. Sclmeewind, “Pufendorf s Place in tiie History of Etliics”, in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern 
Natural Law, ed. Knud Haakonssen, (Aldershot: Asligate, 1999), p.200.
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determination of morals according to which society is ordered is the result of human 
will, hence Pufendorf s moral voluntarism.
According to Pufendorf s theory, the formation of civil society is the result o f two 
innatefeatures of human nature, the impelling desire for self-preservation and the 
proclivity for sociability, and it is in his particular combination of these two 
elements that Pufendorf seeks to accommodate both the dominant views of Hobbes 
and Grotius. With both Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf maintains that “[i]n common 
with all living things which have a sense o f themselves, man holds nothing more 
dear than himself, he studies in every way to preserve himself, he strives to acquire 
what seems good to him and to repel what seems bad to him.”^' Furthermore, 
Pufendorf also notes the ‘immoral soul’ and ‘greater proneness to evil’ of 
humankind that accompanies the desire for self-preservation. However, on the other 
hand, he also argues that “[t]he saying: ‘It is not good for man to be alone’ is 
applicable not only to the state of matrimony but also to the association with other 
men in general.”^^  However, given the ‘depth of human depravity’ and the ease 
with which humans injure one another, “a society o f men cannot be constituted nor 
maintained in a peaceful and firm state without law.”^  Thus he writes that “since 
men cause so many injuries to each other even now, when law and punishment hang 
over them, what would the future hold, if there were no control over anything, if no
Pufendorf, OHC, 12.3., p.27. 
Pufendorf, DJN, II.I.8, p. 152-3. 
ibid.
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direction from within curbed the desires of man?” "^^ For Pufendorf therefore, the 
‘fundamental natural law’ is that “every man ought to do as much as can be to 
cultivate and preserve sociality.”^^
Cognisant with this argument, and in accordance with Grotius’ assertion that 
individuals and states are morally equivalent, Pufendorf concludes that the law of 
nations is the law of nature. In doing so, he refutes Grotius’ claim that the law of 
nations is, in some part, positive law derived from the customs of relations between 
states and endorses the collapsing of ju s  gentium into ju s  naturae evident in 
Hobbes’ work:
There is, finally, one more question to be considered here, namely whether 
there be a peculiar and positive law o f nations, distinct from natural law; for 
on this point scholars are not entirely agreed. It is held by many that the law 
of nature and the law of nations are one and the same thing, differing only in 
their external denomination. Hence Hobbes, De Cive... divides natural law 
‘into the natural law of men and the natural law of states, which is 
commonly called the law of nations. The injunctions of both’, he adds, ‘are 
the same; but because states, upon being constituted, take on the personal 
properties o f men, on being applied to whole states and nations or peoples, 
is called the law o f nations’. To this statement we also fully subscribe. Nor 
do we feel that there is any other voluntary or positive law o f nations which 
has the force of a law, properly so called, such as binds nations as if it 
proceeded from a superior.
Pufendorf, DJN, II.I.6, p. 149-50. 
Pufendoif, OHC, I.3.9., p.35. 
ibid., II.ni.23, p.226.
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Similarly, in Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis he writes;
..on the subject of the Law o f  Nations, which, in the eyes of some men, is 
nothing other than the law o f nature, in so far as different nations, not united 
with another by a supreme command, observe it, who must render one 
another the same duties in their fashion, as are prescribed for individuals by 
the law of nature. On this point there is no reason for our conducting any 
special discussion here, since what we recount on the subject of the law of 
nature and of the duties of individuals, can be readily applied to whole states 
and nations which have also coalesced into one moral person. Aside from 
this law, we are o f the opinion that there is no law of nations, at least none
27which can properly by designated by such a name.
Thus, the second important feature of Pufendorf s natural law theory is his 
conceptualisation of law. For Pufendorf, law [lex] is defined as “a decree by which 
a superior obliges one who is subject to him to conform his actions to the superior’s 
prescript [ p r a e s c r ip tu m ] This notion of law is derived from the works of 
Thomas Hobbes with whom Pufendorf sought to reconcile Grotius. Indeed, central 
to Hobbes’ natural law theory is his distinction between the terms ju s  and lex, right 
and law. Defining the latter term in De Cive, he writes that “LAW is a command o f  
that person (whether man or council) whose instruction is the reason fo r
Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo (Elements o f Universal 
Jurisprudence) (hereafter E/U), trans. WA. Oldfather, (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1931), I.XIII.24, 
p. 165.
^  fW ., 1.2.3, p.27.
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obedience. Distinguishing between right and law in Leviathan he similarly writes 
that;
RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forebear; Whereas LAW, 
determineth, and bindeth to one o f them; so that law and Right, differ a 
much, as Obligation and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent.^®
Thus, in accordance with Hobbes, a notion o f obligation, defined as “a bond o f right 
by which we are constrained by the necessity o f making some performance. ..a kind 
of bridle on our liberty”, is critical to Pufendorf s understanding of law. Critically, 
obligation requires a superior to prescribe certain actions and, for this reason, 
Pufendorf maintains that morality must be voluntarist. For, if it were not, God 
himself would be subject to the rule o f a superior being. As Schneewind points out, 
“[t]he argument that is central to Pufendorf s thought, and that indicates the real 
difference between his view and Grotius’ is that to set up “an external rule for the 
morality of human actions beyond the imposition of God” is to admit some external 
principle co-eternal with God, “which He Himself had to follow in the assignment 
of forms of t h i n g s . A s  no external rules o f morality can be said to exist it also 
stands to reason that “[mjoral distinctions result from acts of will, and not from
^ Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. & trans. Richard Tiick and Michael Silverthome, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univers% Press, 1998), XIV. 1, p. 154.
^  Hobbes, Leviathan, XIV.3, p.86. 
Pufendorf, OHC, I.2.3., p.27. 
Sclmeewind, p.203.
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anything e l se .Accord ing  to Pufendorf then, moral entities are distinct from 
natural entities and moral goodness is defined in terms o f acts in accordance with 
the law. Contrary to Grotius’ understanding, for Pufendorf natural goodness does 
not have any inherent morality but can only be understood as ‘moral’ when 
recognised by voluntary human laws.
However, as Jon Parkin notes, “without a convincing account of natural obligation”, 
Pufendorf s theory was particularly susceptible to claims o f Hobbesianism and 
‘moral relativism’ antithetical to the Grotian position.^"^ It was thus in defending 
himself against such claims that Pufendorf enlisted the work of his contemporary 
Richard Cumberland. Interestingly however, Cumberland was particularly critical 
of Pufendorf s voluntarist morality, supposing, with Grotius and Leibniz, that 
absolute moral principles can be discerned in the law of nature. Nonetheless, it is to 
Cumberland he turns in order to justify his reconciliation o f self-preservation and 
sociability and locate the concept of obligation in the law of nature. Thus, in doing 
so, Pufendorf tips the scales away from a Hobbesian position with the claim that;
Sociability is the ‘chief principle in the study of natural law derived from the 
obseivation o f the nature o f things and the desires of men. ’ It is an opinion 
held by Plato, Aristotle and especially the Stoics, as it is completely opposed 
to the Hobbesian doctrine o f self-preservation, which Cumberland joins me 
in attacking.
Jon Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England, (Woodbridge: The Boydel 
Press, 1999), p.207.
Pufendoif in Parkin, p.209.
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Furthermore, in Specimen controversarium, Pufendorf writes of Cumberland;
In my opinion, however, the Englishman, Richard Cumberland has most 
soundly refuted his [Hobbes’s] theories in his most learned and excellent 
book. De Legibus Naturae; and he has securely erected a counter-philosophy 
which agrees very closely with the views o f the Stoics. I, too, had planned to 
do both of these things. And I must admit that I was delighted to see this 
work published abroad in the same year (rather different form) but 
nonetheless agreeing with my philosophy and demolishing very many tenets 
of Hobbes which I had criticised. Nor is the work of either of us the less 
valuable, because each has particular merits o f its own in addition to those 
which they have in common.^®
Again, using Cumberland to defend himself against claims of Hobbesianism, 
Pufendorf writes that “[i]f anyone carefully compares with mine the work of 
Richard Cumberland... he will see practically all his criticisms of Hobbes had been 
made by me too, though whereas his declared purpose was to demolish Hobbes’s 
philosophy, I counted it as merely an ancillary task to refute his errors.”^^
More critical however, are the changes made to the manuscript o î De Jure Naturae 
et Gentium prior to the publication o f its second edition. Here, as Parkin notes, 
Pufendorf incorporates a notion o f obligation cognisant with Cumberland’s idea 
that the will o f God, and hence obligation to natural law, is evident in the nature of 
things. Thus, he writes, with the 1684 addition in italics;
^ Samuel Pufendorf, Specimen controversarium, 1.6, Parkin, 209.
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Since He has so formed the world and man that the latter cannot exist 
without leading a social life, and for this reason gave him a mind capable of 
grasping the ideas that lead to this end, and since He suggests these ideas to 
men's minds by the course o f  natural events as they come from  Him as the 
first Cause, and represent clearly their necessary relationship and truth, it is 
surely recognised that He also willed for man to regulate his actions by that 
native endowment which God himself appears to have given him in a 
special way above the beasts.^^
Thus, obligation is derived via nature from God who has “assigned to every act 
agreeable with His Law its regular and natural effect, which tends to the advantage 
of man...good things Richard Cumberland calls natural re w ard s .H o w e v e r , in 
accordance with his voluntarist stance, neither the ‘good things’ determined by God 
nor the obligations stemming from them are absolute or intrinsic in nature.
Bringing these ideas together, the stated aim of Pufendorf s De offico hominis et 
civis jiixta legem naturalem libri duo is to “expound to beginners the principal 
topics of natural law in a short, and, I hope, lucid compendium.” ®^ In doing so, 
Pufendorf believed that his “framework constitutes a new discipline o f natural 
law.”^^  Central to this new system is the demarcation of the boundaries separating 
natural from civil law and moral theology. As Pufendorf argues, there are three 
distinct disciplines, derived from “the common duties of man, particularly those
Pufendorf, DJN, 2.3.20, Parkin, p.211. 
yW., 2.3.21.
Pufendorf, OHQ p.6. 
ibid.
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which render him capable o f society [sociabilis] with other men;...the duties o f a 
man as a citizen living in a particular and definite state [civitas]; [and]...the duties 
of a Christian” ;"^^
The first is the discipline of natural law, which is common to all nations; the 
second is the discipline o f the civil law o f individual states, which has, or 
may have, as many forms as there are states into which the human race is 
divided; the third is called moral theology, and is distinct from the part of 
the theology which explains the articles of our faith.
Thus, “[i]n natural law a thing is affirmed as to be done because it is inferred by 
right reason to be essential to sociality [socialitas] among men.”'^ '* As will be seen 
in the following section, it is this demarcation of natural law that is particularly set 
upon by Leibniz in his “Opinion on the Principle of Pufendorf’.
Beyond Pufendorf - Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s ‘Opinion on the Principles o f Pufendorf 
remains perhaps the harshest set o f criticisms leveled at De Offtcis to date. Indeed, 
although he is rarely discussed with reference to the development of Grotian 
scholarship, Leibniz exerted a significant influence on its development. In
yw.. p.7.
y&yd.
y&yd.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’ (1706), in The Political 
Writings o f Leibniz, trans. & ed. Patrick Riley, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
pp.64-76.
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particular, despite chiding Pufendorf s ‘Grotian’ natural law theory, Leibniz also 
sought to achieve a reconciliation o f Grotius and Hobbes in his works. However, in 
doing so, Leibniz concurs with Grotius’ distinction between the law of nature and 
the voluntary law of nations, thereby refitting Pufendorf s claim that the law of 
nations is the law of nature. As will be seen shortly, this is o f particular importance 
with regard to Christian von W olffs theory of the law of nations.
Leibniz’s “Opinion on the Principles o f Pufendorf’ begins with the criticism that 
Pufendorf s De Officio Hominis et Civis “sutler[s] from no small weaknesses.”"*^ 
Rather sarcastically, he argues that “since the greater part of the thoughts 
expounded in the course o f the work are not consistent with the principles, and are 
not logically deduced from them, but rather are borrowed elsewhere, from good 
authors, nothing keeps this little book from containing many good things, and from 
serving usefully as a compendium of natural law for those who are satisfied with a 
superficial smattering (as are the majority of readers), without looking for sound 
learning.”"*^ Substantively however, it is Pufendorf s demarcation of natural law that 
most concerns Leibniz and, in particular, its division from moral philosophy. Thus, 
Leibniz argues that “[i]t should not be admitted, therefore, as our author urges, that 
that which remains hidden in the soul, and does not appear externally, is not 
pertinent to natural law.”"*^ At heart, this limitation is apparently derived from
Leibniz, “Opinion on tlie Principles of Pufendorf”, p.65, 
4^  ibid., p.68.
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Pufendorf s more flindamental failure to correctly establish the efficient cause of 
the law of nature. Thus Leibniz writes;
He, indeed, does not find it in the nature o f things and in the precepts of 
right reason which conform to it, which emanate from the divine 
understanding, but (what will appear to be strange and contradictory) in the 
command of a superior...If we admit this, no one will do his duty 
spontaneously; also, there will be no duty when there is no superior to 
compel its observance; nor will there be any duties for those who do not 
have a superior. And since, according to the author, duty and acts prescribed 
by justice coincide (because his whole natural jurisprudence is contained in 
the doctrine of duty), it follows that all law is prescribed by a superior. This 
paradox, brought out by Hobbes above all, who seemed to deny to the state 
of nature, that is [a condition] in which there are no superiors, all binding 
justice whatsoever (although even he is inconsistent), is a view to which I 
am astonished that anyone could have adhered."*^
In order to resolve this issue, Leibniz sides with Grotius’ claim that “there would be 
a natural obligation even on the hypothesis -  which is impossible -  that God does 
not exist, or if one but left the divine existence out of consideration.” ®^ This, he 
argues, is because “care for one’s own preservation and well-being certainly lays on 
men many requirements about taking care o f others, as even Hobbes perceives in 
part.” *^
4^  p.70.
ibid., p.71.
51 ibid.
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With this, Leibniz’s praise and adoration o f Hobbes, and in particular Grotius, 
whom he refers to as “that excellent man”^^  is revealed. Writing of Pufendorf s 
attempt to compose a comprehensive compendium of natural law, Leibniz writes;
The discernment and erudition of the incomparable Grotius, or the profound 
genius of Hobbes, would have been capable o f something like this, if  the 
former had not been distracted by many other concerns, and the latter had 
not lain down truly wicked principles, and adhered to them with too much 
fidelity.
In a letter to Thomas Hobbes written in 1670, Leibniz also writes;
I believe that I have read almost all your works, in part separately and in 
part in the collected edition, and I freely admit that I have profited from 
them as much as from few others in our century...I know no one who has 
philosophized more exactly, clearly, and elegantly than you, not even 
excepting that man of divine genius, Descartes himself.^"*
Heaping praise on both men, Leibniz sought to “reconcile the views of the radical 
Hobbes and the more traditional natural law theorist Hugo Grotius.”^^  In particular, 
as Gregory Brown notes, Leibniz specifically attempted “to reconcile the view of
Gottfried Willielm von Leibniz, "Eaesarinus Ffirstenerius (De Suprematu Principimi Germaniae) 
(1677), in The Political Writings o f Leibniz, p. 113.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “Opinion on tlie Principles of Pufendorf’, p.65-66.
4^ Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “Letter to Thomas Hobbes” (July 1670), in Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, ed. & trans. Leroy E. Loeniker, Vol. 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956),
p. 162 & 166.
Nicholas Jolley, “Introduction”, The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 14-15.
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Grotius that human society was founded upon a faculty o f sociability inherent in the 
nature o f man, and the view o f Hobbes that “all society... is either for gain, or for 
glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love o f ourselves.”” ®^ 
This reconciliation. Brown writes, “was based upon his notion o f “disinterested 
love” whereby he was able to “reconcile egoism with the possibility of altruism and 
to develop a theory of obligation which did not make obligation dependent...on 
threat of punishment or the command of a superior.”^^  Furthermore, in doing so, 
Leibniz also manages to achieve a partial reconciliation o f the relatively lofty law of 
love apparent in Grotius’ works with a more solid notion of obligation.
Leibniz’s notion of ‘disinterested love’ is fundamentally derived from his 
understanding of justice as “the charity o f the wise man, that is, as charity which 
follows the dictates o f wisdom.”^^  Wisdom, he argues, “is merely the science of 
happiness, or that science which teaches us to achieve happiness.”^^  Thus, in 
“Elements of Natural Law” Leibniz writes;
It is obvious that the happiness of mankind consists in two things -  to have 
the power, as far as is permitted, to do what it wills and to know what, from 
the nature o f things, ought to be willed. Of these, mankind has almost
^ Gregory Brown, “Leibniz’s moral philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, p.411.
7^ ibid.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus” (1693), in Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, p.690.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “On Wisdom”, in Philosophical Papers and Letters, p.697.
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achieved the former; as to the latter, it has failed in that it is particularly 
impotent with respect to itself^®
Combining a notion of duty with self-preservation he continues to argue that “as 
concerns our own good, it is universally admitted that what one does out of the 
necessity o f protecting his own security seems to be done justly” and, that “no one 
is willing to separate justice from prudence, for, as everyone agrees, justice is a 
definite virtue, but every virtue restrains the affections so that nothing can obstruct 
the dictates of right reason.” *^ Therefore, “it follows... that there can be no justice 
without prudence”, hence achieving the requisite synthesis.®^
Despite the undoubted influence of Leibniz on W olffs work however, to be 
discussed in the following section, the extent to which this particular work directed 
his thinking is questionable. In a letter written in 1714, Leibniz remarked that “Mr 
Wolff has agreed with some of my sentiments, but since he is very busy with 
teaching, especially mathematics, we have not had much communication 
concerning philosophy, he can hardly know more of my opinions than those which I 
have published.”^^  Although Pufendorf is mentioned in a number of Leibniz’s 
published works the only comprehensive treatment is to be found in his ‘Opinion on
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “Elements of Natural Law” (1670-71), in Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, p.203. 
ibid., p.208.
® Gottfr ied Wilhelm von Leibniz to Remond or Pieire de Montmort, July 1714, quoted in Charles A. 
Corr, “Christian Wolff and Leibniz”, Journal o f the History o f Ideas, Vol.36, No.2, (April-June 
1975), p.248.
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the Principles of Pufendoif’. As Riley notes, “originally written in the form of a 
letter [this work] became fairly well known in the early eighteenth century because 
Barbeyrac translated most of it and appended it to his translation o f Pufendorf s De 
Officio Hominis)"^"^ However, as noted above, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Wolff came into direct contact with this work.
Jean Barbeyrac
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) is best known for his French annotated translations of 
Pufendorf s De Jure Nattirae ei Gentium and De Officio Hominis et Civis, and 
Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pads. Although Barbeyrac’s reputation has “crystallized 
around his role as interpreter and annotator o f Pufendorf’, Tim Hochstrasser argues 
that he “provided an original contribution in his own right to the development of 
eighteenth-century natural-law theory that cannot be fully extrapolated from his 
edition of P u f e n d o r f . I n  particular, Barbeyrac sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
address Leibniz’s criticisms o f Pufendorf outlined in his Opinions o f the Principles 
o f Pufendorf m d  defend Pufendorf s alterations to Grotius’ natural law theory. In 
particular, siding with Pufendorf, he writes in his annotated translation of De Jure 
Belli ac Pads;
Patrick Riley, The Political Writings o f Leibniz, (Cambridge: Cambridge Universit}  ^Press, 1972). 
p.64.
^ Tim Hochstrasser, “Conscience and Reason: Tlie Natural Law Theory of Jean Baibeyrac”, The 
HistoricalJournal, Vol.36, (1993), p.290.
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The Author here means what he calls the Law o f  Nations which he distinguishes 
from the Law o f Natttre as making a separate class. But in this he is mistaken.^®
In large part however, the limited success of Barbeyrac’s defence of Pufendorf s 
natural law theory can be attributed to the extent to which he ended up concurring 
with Leibniz’s opinion. Thus, “[i]nstead of sweeping aside Leibniz’s objections to 
modern natural law with a declaration o f omnipotence of human reason in moral 
matters, Barbeyrac concedes Leibniz’s judgement that a natural law which takes 
man as its starting point must finish by deriving obligation from the will o f a 
superior, and the will o f God in par t icu la r . Indeed ,  his discussion of the ‘etiamsi 
daremus’ of Grotius concludes that “the Will o f GOD is the Source of all Duties. 
With this, his defence of Pufendorf is rendered critically weak.
However, in the context of the Grotian scholarship Barbeyrac’s significance 
concerns the controversial claim that Grotius was the ‘father of modern natural 
law’. In the preface to the French translation of De Jure Belli ac P ads  he writes;
One cannot refuse my Author the glory of being original in his class. It is 
the peculiar characteristic of this Treatise, the first of its kind, that it reduced
^ Jean Barbeyrac in Hugo Grotius, The Rights o f War and Peace in Three Books Wherein are 
Explained, the Law o f Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points relating to Government, to 
which are Added, All the Large Notes ofMrJ. Barbeyrac, (London: Iiinys & Manley, 1738), p.xiii.
ibid., p.306.
^ Barbeyrac, p.xix.
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to a System the most beautiful and useful o f the human sciences, and 
unfortunately the most neglected one.^^
Further extrapolating this point, Barbeyrac continues to add that it was Grotius who 
“introduced the methodic study of Natural Law” and was the first to attempt to 
systematise it/®
However, claims that Grotius was the ‘father of modern natural law’ have 
precipitated much controversy and debate in subsequent scholarship. As Anton- 
Hermann Chroust has written, “[s]ince Pufendorf it has become a totally 
unwarranted academic tradition to consider Hugo Grotius the true and unique 
‘Father o f Natural Law’.” *^ This trend, he argues, was instigated by Pufendorf s 
assertion that “it was Grotius who divorced Natural Law from theology (and 
religion) by grounding it solely in the “social nature” and natural reason of man”, 
thereby rendering it ‘modern’ In a similar fashion, A.P. D ’Entreves also attributes 
the emergence o f this claim to Pufendorf s praise o f Grotius as the “v/r 
incomparibilis who dared to go beyond what had been taught in the schools, and to 
draw the theory out of the darlmess in which it had lain for centuries. However, 
both Leonard Krieger and Charles Edwards attribute the claim not to Pufendorf
^ Barbeyrac quoted in James St Leger, The ‘etiamsi daremus' of Hugo Grotius: a study in the 
origins o f international law, (Rome: Herder, 1962), p.38.
7*^ Barbeyrac in St Leger, p.39.
7* Anton-Hermami Cliroust, 118, in Char les Edwards, The life and legal writings o f Hugo Grotius, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 10.
7^  A.P. D ’Entreves, p.50, m Edwards, p. 10.
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himself but to Barbeyrac’s translation o f Barbeyrac’s own theory o f the law of 
nature on his translation o f De Jure Naturae et Gentium. While Krieger notes the 
influence o f Barbeyrac’s own theory o f the law of nature on his translation of 
Pufendorf, Edwards goes so far as to say that “[a]n exhaustive examination of 
Pufendorf s political writings shows that in none of them does he state directly that 
Grotius was the ‘Father o f Natural Law’.” "^* However, this seems to be an 
excessively pedantic argument for, as discussed above, in translations other than 
Barbeyrac’s, Pufendorf writes that he is an intellectual ‘Son’ o f Grotius, following 
in a tradition of scholarship begun by him. O f further interest here is Barbeyrac’s 
own annotation of Prolegomena 11 o f De Jure Belli ac Pads, the passage in which 
the supposed ‘secularisation’ occurred. It reads:
This Assertion is to be admitted only in the following Sense: That the 
Maxims o f the Law o f Nature are not merely arbitrary Rules, but are 
founded on the very Nature of Things; on the very Constitution of Man, 
from which certain Relations result, between such and such Actions and the 
State of a reasonable and sociable Creature.^^
With this, even the extent to which Barbeyrac attributed the ‘secularisation’ of 
natural law to Grotius is brought into serious question.
To conclude therefore, Pufendoif is conventionally heralded as a pivotal figure of 
the natural law tradition o f the seventeenth century. As this section has
^'feonard Kiieger in Edwards, p. 13. 
7^  Barbeyrac, p.xix.
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demonstrated, this assertion is not, in and of itself, problematic. For, as seen above, 
Pufendorf explicitly sought to reconcile the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius 
and Thomas Hobbes and, in doing so, relied upon the works o f a number o f less 
prominent natural lawyers including Richard Cumberland and John Selden. 
However, what is problematic is the extension of the claim that, as a natural lawyer, 
Pufendorf was not a ‘Grotian’. Contrary to this, it is perfectly clear that an explicit 
and self-conscious path o f transmission can be discerned linking the works of 
Grotius and Pufendorf and, by extension, that Pufendorf can be viewed as the 
second generation in an historically constituted ‘Grotian’ tradition. What is critical 
here then, is that, despite the extent to which Pufendorf deviates from Grotius’ 
thought, the term ‘Grotian’ refers to a particular understanding of the law of nature 
instigated by Grotius and developed by subsequent wiiters. As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, this fits well with the historical character of Hugo Grotius. 
Furthermore, as will be seen in the following section o f this chapter, although it is 
combined with other thematic concerns, natural law thinking also underpins the 
path of transmission that is drawn between Grotius and Vattel.
Christian von Wolff
Despite the demonstrable influence of Leibniz’s works on both Christian von Wolff 
and Emerich de Vattel, with Wolff emerged a new form of Grotian scholarship that 
was not explicitly concerned with moral philosophy. The central tenets of Christian 
von W olffs Jus Gentium Méthode Scientifica Pertractatum are presented in its
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opening dedication to the ‘Most Excellent and Serene Master William Charles 
Henry Friso, Prince o f Orange and Nassau;
That eternal and unchangeable law, which nature herself has established, 
controls all the acts of individual men as well as those of nations also, by 
prescribing duties both toward themselves and toward each other. And just 
as it has united individual men to each other by the closest bond and has 
established among them a certain society, so that man is necessary to man, 
and nothing is more useful to man than man; so by no less close a bond has 
it united nations, and moulded them into a supreme state, so that nations is 
necessary to nations, and nothing is more useful to nation than nation.
In developing this argument, Wolff introduces two ideas that have been critical to 
the development of the ‘Grotian tradition’. The first concerns the relationship 
between the Jus naturae and the ju s  gentium and explicitly seeks to redress Grotius’ 
problematic understanding o f the voluntary law of nations while the second 
introduces the notion o f the civitas maxima or supreme state. However, as both 
these ideas are embedded in W olffs understanding of the law of nations derived 
from the law of nature, it is necessary to first introduce the central tenets of this 
relationship.
According to Wolff’s conception, the law of nature is the “science of that law which 
nations or people use in their relations with each other and the obligations
7® Cliristian von Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, trans. Joseph H. Drake, 
(Oxford; Clarendon, 1934), Dedication, p.3.
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corresponding t h e r e t o . A s  nations are fundamentally comprised of “a multitude 
o f men united into a state,” in its most basic sense, the law o f nations is “nothing 
except the law of nature applied to nations. However, in the absence o f a political 
superior, the nature o f obligation inferred by W olffs definition of the law of 
nations necessarily differs between individuals and states. For this reason, Wolff 
distinguishes between what he terms the ‘necessary law of nations’ and its 
‘voluntary’, ‘stipulative’ and ‘customary’ forms. Considered together, the 
voluntary, stipulative and customary laws of nations are fused in Vattel’s 
‘popularisation’ of W olffs work and, in modem international legal works are 
considered to be facets of the positive law of nations determined by customs, 
treaties and the tacit agieements of states. The necessary law of nations is however, 
“the law of nature applied to nations” and, in accordance with the ‘immutability of 
natural law’, is ‘absolutely immutable’ The necessary law of nations therefore 
“rules the acts of nations” by obligations which are themselves also necessary and 
immutable. Thus, Wolff writes;
Nature herself has established society among all nations and binds them to 
preserve society. For nature herself has established society among men and 
binds them to preserve it. Therefore, since obligation, as coming from the 
law of nature, is necessary and immutable, it cannot be changed for the 
reason that nations have united into a state.^®
77 ibid., Prolegomena 1, p.9.
7® ibid.. Prolegomena 2, p.9; Prolegomena 3, p.9 
7^  ibid.. Prolegomena, 4&5, p. 10. 
ibid.. Prolegomena 7, p. 11.
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In accordance with a fundamental understanding of the fundamental precepts of 
natural law then, Wolff establishes that a nation’s primary duty is that of self- 
preservation. In this vein, he establishes at the outset that “[e]very nation is bound 
to preserve itself.”^^  Following a similar format to Grotius’ presentation of the law 
of nature Wolff continues to argue that in light of the nation’s overwhelming 
impetus for self-preservation, it follows that “the law of nature gives to men the 
right to those things without which they could not perform their obligation, every 
nation has the right of those things without which it cannot preserve itself”^  In 
accordance with the duty of nations to self-preservation, Wolff also outlines that of 
averting “all danger of destruction”^^  and “the obligation to strive for power.
From this understanding of self-preservation Wolff further establishes what he 
terms the civitas maxima^ or supreme state, defined as the “state, into which nations 
are understood to have combined and of which they are members or citizens.”^^  It 
is, according to Wolff, a concept that “was not unknown to Grotius, nor was he 
ignorant of the fact that the law of nations was based on it.”^^  However, despite his 
admiration o f Grotius’ works, Wolff contends that Grotius’ understanding of the 
civitas maxima is flawed by his failure to take the distinction between the necessary
ibid, 1.31, p.22.
^ iW .. 1.32, p.23.
/W ., 1.33, p.23. 
fW., 1.70, p.42.
ibid., Prolegomena 10, p. 13.
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law o f nations and the voluntary law o f nations far enough. Thus, he argues, 
summing up the central points of his theory;
Since nature herself has united nations into a supreme state in the same 
manner as individuals have united into particular states, the manner also in 
which the voluntary law of nations ought to be fashioned out of natural law, 
is exactly the same as that by which civil laws in a state ought to be 
fashioned out of natural laws. For that reason the law of nations, which we 
call voluntary, is not, as Grotius thought, to be determined from the acts of 
nations, as though fi om their acts their general consent is to be assumed, but 
from the purpose of the supreme state which nature herself established, just 
as she established society among all men, so that nations are bound to agree 
to that law, and it is not left to their caprice as to whether they should prefer 
to agree or not.^
Nonetheless, within the civitas maxima “[ejvery nation owes to every other nation 
that which it owes for itself, in so far as the other does not have that in its own 
power, while the first nation without neglect of duty towards itself can perform this 
for the o t h e r . I n  particular, applying Leibniz’s philosophy of the role o f 
happiness in the purpose of the individual to the relations of nations, Wolff lists 
mutual love, consideration for the happiness of others, charity, contributing to the 
preservation and perfection o f others, contributing to barbarous and uncultivated 
nations, friendship, forbidding injury and the obligation to engage in commerce 
amongst the most prominent rights and duties owed to nations.
ibid, p.6.
^  /W., n.l56, p.84.
/W ., II. 156-187, p.84-97.
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Emerich de Vattel
The influence o f Leibniz and Wolff on the works of Emerich de Vattel is marked 
and, in many ways, Vattel’s optis magnum. Le Droit des Gens, on Principes de la 
Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains 
(The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and 
to the Affairs o f Nations and Sovereigns), can be seen as representing a more 
thorough fusion of these two writers’ ideas than was achieved by Wolff himself 
Indeed, Vattel’s first work, although rarely referred to today, was a Défense du 
système leibnitzien published in 1741. As Alfred de Lapradelle notes, it was 
Vattel’s “reading of Leibniz” that had, in the first instance, “determined his 
v o c a t i o n . T h u s ,  with Wolff, Vattel applies a Liebnizian philosophy of the 
purpose of the individual and the nation to preserve and protect itself and cultivate 
happiness in the relations of nations.
W olff s Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum is the starting point of 
Vattel’s most famous work and his later Questions de droit naturel ou observations 
sur le traité de la nature par M. Wolff. In justifying why he takes W olffs work as 
his starting point, Vattel provides a brief assessment of the treatment of the law of 
nations to date. In doing so, the first line of the preface to Le Droit des Gens states
^ Alfred de Lapradelle, “Emer de Vattel” in Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, 
appliqués à la Conduit, et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, The Law o f Nations or the 
Principles o f Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs o f Nations and of Sovereigns, 
trails. Charles G. Fenwick, (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1916), p.iv.
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that the “Law of Nations”, later defined as "^the science o f  the rights which exist 
between Nations or States, and o f  the obligations corresponding to these rights,
“a great important a subject as it is, has thus far not received the attention which it 
merits.”^^  In justifying this statement he outlines the progress made and failings of 
W olffs most prominent predecessors, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and Jean 
Barbeyrac. However, combining a Leibnizian view that “man should combine his 
powers with those of other men to promote the perfecting of all”^^  with W olffs 
distinction between the law of nature and the law of nations, Vattel refutes and 
adapts many of W olffs central points. As such, in light of this and the ‘dry’ 
scholastic nature o f W olff s Latin prose,^"  ^his expressed purpose in composing Le 
Droit des Gens is “to facilitate for a wider circle of readers a knowledge of the 
brilliant ideas” contained in W olffs work.^^
Following that pattern of argument evident in natural law thinking o f the time, 
Vattel maintains, with Wolff, that the “Law o f  Nations is in its origin merely the 
Lœ'V o f  Nature applied to Nations. Within the bounds of the necessary law of 
nature, Vattel posits the existence o f a “universal society of the human race,” 
instituted in response to the natural fact that, according to man’s nature, “he is not 
sufficient unto himself and necessarily stands in need of the assistance and
Vattel, Introduction, 3, p.3. 
^ ibid.. Preface, p.3a.
Lapradelle, p.vii 
^ ibid., p.viii 
Vattel, p. 7a.
^ /W , L6, p.4.
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intercourse of his fellows, whether to preserve his life or to perfect himself and live 
as befits a rational animal.”^^  Thus, incoiporating Leibniz’s notion of the purpose of 
society, Vattel writes that “[t]he end of the natural society established among men 
in general is that they should mutually assist one another to advance their own 
perfection and that of their condition.” ®^ From this Vattel derived what he considers 
to be the first general law o f nations; “that each Nation should contribute as far as it 
can to the happiness and advancement of other Nations However, in a statement 
reminiscent of Grotius’ conceptualisation o f the minimal obligations o f sociability 
in De Jure Praedae, Vattel adds the caveat that a nation’s “duties towards itself 
clearly prevail over its duties towards others.”^^ ° Therefore, the second general law 
of nations states that “[s]ince Nations are free and independent of one another as 
men are by nature...each Nation should be left to the peaceful enjoyment of that 
liberty which belongs to it by nature.”^^ ^
As such, the first two general laws of nations are fundamentally contradictory in 
nature, the first imploring states to contribute to the happiness of other states, and 
the second, in accordance with the more fundamental right to self-preservations, 
emphasising the right of states to be left to enjoy their liberty. In the first instance, 
Vattel seeks to resolve this contradiction by introducing the notion of perfect and 
imperfect rights. Perfect rights, he argues, “are those which carry with the right of
^Ubid., I.10-ll,p.5. 
ibid., 1.13, p.6. 
ibid., 1.14, p.6.
ibid., 1.15, p.6.
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compelling the fulfillment of the corresponding obligations” whereas imperfect 
rights, “can not so compel.” However, the problem is addressed in far more detail 
in the following two books of Le Droit des Gens, the first o f which considers a 
nation ‘by itself, while in the second nations are considered ‘in their relations with 
other nations.’
However, before launching into his discussion o f nations and their relations, Vattel 
also distinguishes between the voluntary, conventional and customary law of 
nations. He argues;
The necessary and the voluntary laws of nations are therefore both 
established by nature, but each in a different manner; the former, as a sacred 
law which nations and sovereigns are bound to respect and follow in all their 
actions; the latter, as a nile which the general welfare and safety oblige them 
to admit in their transactions with each other.
In particular, he is at pains to demonstrate that the voluntary law o f nations did not
emerge from a naturally occurring civitas maxima, but via the agreement of nations
on principles that are bound to advance society. Indeed, Vattel argues that the
‘fiction’ o f the civitas maxima is “neither reasonable nor well enough founded to
deduce there from the rules o f the Law of Nations at once universal in character,
and necessarily accepted by Sovereign states.” Rather, “[a]s a consequence of
that liberty and independence, it exclusively belongs to each nation to form its own
ibid., 1.17. p.7. 
ibid., p. XV. 
ibid., p.9a.
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judgement of what her conscience demands of her -  o f what she can and cannot do 
-  of what it is proper or improper for her to do: and of course it rests solely with her 
to examine and determine whether she can perform any office of humanity without 
neglecting the duty which she owes to herself” In accordance with his moral 
pluralism then, Vattel conceives of a distinctly different international society to 
Wolff.
In accordance with the emphasis on liberty and pluralism it affords, Vattel’s 
understanding o f international society is founded on the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty and the legal equality o f states. Thus he writes that “differences of 
religion”, for example, must be “absolutely foreign” to members of the international 
society o f sovereign states for, “[tjheir common safety requires that they should be 
capable of treating with each other, and of treating with security.”*®^ With this, as 
Andrew Hurrell notes, “Vattel is the first writer on international law to elucidate 
clearly the principle of sovereign equality, that all states possess equal rights -  or an 
equal capacity for rights.” °^^  Indeed, a Vattel famously writes; “A dwarf is as much 
a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful 
kingdom.” ®^^
ibid., p.lxi.
^^Ubid., II.XVI, p. 195.
107 Andrew Hurrell, “Vatlel: Pluralism and its Limits” in Classical Theories o f International 
Relations, ed. Ian Claik and Iver B. Neumann, (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), p.239.
Vattel, p.lxii.
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However, Vattel also recognises that, in a self-help system whereby the principle of 
self-preservation provides the overwhelming impetus for action, a ‘balance of 
power’ system provides the means according to which conflict may be avoided. It is 
in his explication o f the concept o f the balance of power that Vattel’s understanding 
of European international society is made apparent:
Europe forms a political system in which the Nations inhabiting this part of 
the world are bound together by their relations and various interests into a 
single body. It is no longer, as in former times, a confused heap of detached 
parts, each of which had but little concern for the lot of the others, and rarely 
troubled itself over what did not immediately affect it. The constant 
attention of sovereigns to all that goes on, the custom of resident ministers, 
the continual negotiations that take place, make of modern Europe a sort of 
Republic, whose members -  each independent, but all bound together by a 
common interest -  unite for the maintenance of order and the preservation 
o f liberty. This is what has given rise to the well-known principle o f the 
balance of power, by which is meant an arrangement of affairs so that no 
State shall be in a position to have absolute mastery and dominate over the 
others.
Despite his pluralism and emphasis on the self-preservation of the sovereign state, a 
residual moral impetus remains in VatteTs work -  although, as will be seen in the 
following chapters, his future critics certainly did not see it like that. Having 
established the general duty o f a nation to itself and the objects of good 
government, Vattel returns once more to the conflict apparent between the nation’s 
rights and duties that pertain to itself and those that pertain to other nations. In
109 ibid., m.m.47, p.251.
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addressing this problem, Vattel introduces the concept of the offices o f  humanity in 
the opening chapter of Book II, ‘Nations Considered in their Relation with Other 
Nations’. These offices o f  humanity, he writes, “consist in the fufilment of the duty 
of mutual assistance which men owe to one another because they are men, that is to 
say, because they are made to live together in society and are of necessity 
dependent upon one another’s aid for their preservation and happiness, and for the 
means of a livelihood conformable to their nature.” They are derived from the 
fact that by nature, humans “can not be sufficient unto [themselves], nor continue 
and develop [their] existence, not live happily without the assistance” of their 
fellow humans. However, it does not follow that the civil society that this 
necessitates exists among nations as W olffs conception o f the civitas maxima 
posits. As Vattel explains;
But as soon as a sufficient number [of individuals] have united under a 
government, they are able to provide for most of their needs, and they find 
the help of other political societies not so necessary to them as the State 
itself is to individuals.
But these individual societies have, it is true, strong motives for mutual 
communications and intercourse; they have even an obligation to this effect, 
since without good reason no man may refuse his assistance to another.^
In this vein, Vattel introduces the common duties of nations whilst maintaining, 
contrary to Wolff, that “it is enough that Nations conform to the demands made
ibid., II.I.2, p. 114. 
(W., 11.1.3, p.114. 
ibid., p.9a-10a.
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upon them by that natural and world-wide society established among all men.” ^^  ^
Thus, he maintains that “when the occasion arises, every Nation should give its aid 
to further the advancement of other Nations and save them from disaster and ruin, 
so far as it can do so without running too great a risk.” ^^ '^  However, this injunction 
to help others is a general obligation imposed by human society and consequently 
resides outside the concept o f the civitas maxima. In order to maintain the nation’s 
right to liberty and non-interference then, Vattel also specifies that a nation “has no 
right to force them to accept its offer o f help.” *^  ^ The contradictory nature of the 
two basic laws of nations is therefore resolved by establishing that “[a] Nation 
has...only an imperfect right to offices of humanity,” that is, although its right to 
ask for them is perfect, “it cannot force another Nation to perform them.” ^^  ^ With 
this then, Vattel retains an absolutely minimal notion o f moral obligation in his 
theory of the law of nations, privileging the rights of the sovereign state to self- 
preservation, liberty and advancement.
Vattel’s theory of the law o f nations marks one of the most significant turning 
points in both the history of international law and the Grotian scholarship. In the 
first instance, although Vattel retains the fundamental principles o f the law of nature 
as the foundations o f his law of nations, by favouring the authority o f the voluntary, 
or positive, law of nations he paved the way for legal positivism to really take hold
ibid., p. 10a. 
""/W ., n.1.4, p. 114. 
/W .. II.I.7, p. 115.
ill 10, p. 116.
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in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries/*^ Similarly, although Vattel 
does not achieve a complete separation o f law and morality, retaining a minimal 
moral sense with his offices o f humanity, his pluralist outlook views the possibility 
o f a universal moral order with immense scepticism. When considered alongside 
the central precepts of legal positivism, to be discussed in the following section, 
Vattel may be seen as facilitating the final divorce of law and morality that 
followed in international legal scholarship. For this reason, he is widely viewed 
amongst the ‘strict’ Grotians of the twentieth century, most prominently Cornelius 
van Vollenhoven, as a “perversion of the gospel.” Finally, as a post-Westphalian 
text, cognisant with the workings of the emergent modern sovereign states-system. 
Le Droit des Gens was widely considered to be more immediately applicable to the 
concerns of contemporary international relations. As a result, before long it 
superseded De Jure Belli ac P ads  as the premiere exposition o f the law o f nations 
to date.
Henry Wheaton
...Hugo Grotius, who was born in the latter part of the same centuiy, and 
flourished in the beginning o f the seventeenth. That age was peculiarly 
fruitful in great men, but produced no one more remarkable for genius and 
for variety o f talents and knowledge, or for the important influence his
Hurrell, p.234.
Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays 
on the Theory o f World Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1966), p. 106.
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labors exercised upon the subsequent opinions and conduct of mankind. 
Almost equally distinguished as a scholar and a man of business, he was at 
the same time an eloquent advocate, a scientific lawyer, classical historian, 
patriotic statesman, and learned theologian. His was one o f those powerful 
minds which have paid tribute o f their assent to the truth of Christianity.
Following the publication o f VatteFs Le Droit des Gens, the popularity of Grotius’ 
work suffered a sharp decline. Not only was Vattel’s treatise considered more 
applicable to the modern international states-system with its secular orientation and 
understanding o f the balance o f power but Grotius’ work had begun to seem 
obsolete. However, the rescue o f Grotius’ works was soon at hand and came as 
international law theorists in the newly formed United States of America sought to 
establish the inclusion of their recently independent republic in the ‘family of 
nations’ or ‘civilised world’. In returning to Grotius, Wheaton made three 
significant contributions to the development of the ‘Grotian tradition’. First, he, 
amongst others, facilitated the erroneous association o f Hugo Grotius with the 
Westphalian Peace Treaties that has continued to mark Grotian scholarship. 
Secondly, the precursor of the analytically constructed Grotian tradition, standing as 
an intermediary between the natural and positive law traditions, is also found in 
Wheaton’s schématisation o f the history of the law of nations. Finally, and most 
importantly, the works o f Kent and Wheaton herald the return o f ‘Grotian morality’ 
that had been superseded by state and power oriented concerns.
119 Henry Wlieaton, Elements o f  International Law, p.27.
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Grotius and the Peace o f  Westphalia
Despite his death in 1645, some three years prior to the settlements of Münster and 
Osnabrück, Grotius is still heralded as one of the primary architects of the peace. As 
made evident in Chapter Three however, rather than looking forward to the modern 
international society o f sovereign states formally instituted at Westphalia, Grotius’ 
conception of sovereignty sought to address antecedent questions relating to the 
legitimacy of the Dutch Revolt from Spanish rule in the sixteenth century. The most 
obvious reason for this incorrect association refers to the biographical history of 
Hugo Grotius himself and, in particular his employment as Queen Christina of 
Sweden’s ambassador in Paris from 1634 to 1645. Indeed, available evidence would 
seem to suggest that Grotius was involved, in a diplomatic capacity, in the 
negotiations between France, Sweden, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire that 
preceded the settlement of Osnabrück. However, what we also know of Grotius 
seems to indicate that he was a particularly poorly skilled diplomat who cared little 
for the profession. Indeed, what is clear is that, due to his apparent ineptitude, 
Grotius did not play nearly the crucial role ascribed to him as the Swedish 
ambassador in Paris. Rather, perhaps the most solid connection between Grotius
Hamilton Vreeland, “Hugo Grotius, Diplomatist”, American Journal o f International Law, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, (July 1917), p.582fF. Although Vreeland provides a detailed account of Grotius’ 
diplomatic engagements, liis work is almost exclusively based on the work of M. de Burigny, The 
life o f the truly eminent and learned Hugo Grotius, (London; no publisher named, 1754), that has 
been widely accused of gross inaccuracy. However, it remains apparent from this work and otliers, 
tliat Grotius was certahily involved in tliese negotiations.
See for example a letter Grotius wrote to liis brother saying tliat he would not care particularly if 
he lost his diplomatic position. Hugo Grotius to William de Groot, November 1641, quoted in R.W. 
Lee, “Grotius -  Tlie Last Phase, 1635-45”, TGS, Vol.31, (1946), p.208.
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and the Peace o f Westphalia, related to his association with Sweden, is to be found 
in the fact that King Gustavus Adolphus was “one of the warmest adherents of 
Grotius’ ideas” and carried a copy of De Jure Belli ac P ads  with him always.
While claims that Grotius somehow directed the contents of the Westphalian Peace 
Treaties are both historically and intellectually unfounded, the question remains as 
to how this association came about. In addressing this question, Edward Keene 
presents the plausible proposal that it was the result o f an intellectual dispute 
between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century treaty historians G.F. von 
Martens and A.H.L. Heeren.^^^ Following the Congress of Vienna, with its 
concerted effort to submit the actions o f independent sovereigns to the Law of 
Nations, what became known as the ‘Gottingen School’ emerged as the center of 
counter-revolutionary scholarship in Europe. Although the historiographer Leopold 
von Ranke is probably the ‘school’s’ most famous ‘member’, Heeren and Martens 
can also be attributed membership. In particular, although writers before him, such 
as Friedrich von Gentz, had discussed the idea of a states-system, Heeren 
particularly developed the idea o f a Siaaten-system: “the union of several 
contiguous states resembling each other in their manners, religion, and degree of 
social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests.
H.Ch.G.J. van der Mandere, “Grotius and International Society of To-day”, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 19, No.4, (November 1925), p.804.
Keene, “The reception of Hugo Grotius”, p. 146.
A.H.L. Heeren, A Manual o f the History o f the Political System of Europe and its Colonies, From 
its Formation at the Close o f the Fifteenth Century, To its Present Re-Establishment Upon the Fall 
o f Napoleon, Vol.l, tians. from die 5**‘ Gennan edition, (Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1834), p.vii-viii.
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According to Heeren, the most ‘essential property’ o f the European states-system 
was “its internal freedom; that is, the stability and mutual independence of its 
members,” thereby developing those principles that had previously appeared in 
Vattel’s treatise. However, in discussing the emergence of the Staatensystem, 
Heeren contends that, as the event marking the transition from a medieval to a 
modern European order, the Peace o f Westphalia ought to be considered its origin. 
Thus he writes that while it “settled neither all the important, not even all the 
contested relations...by settling the leading political maxims...the Peace of 
Westphalia became the foundation of the subsequent policy o f Europe.”’^  ^ By 
extension then, modern international law must also be conceived as having 
originated with Westphalia. However, Heeren’s proposition did not accord with that 
of the earlier Gottingen school treaty historian G.F. von Martens. Although he did 
not wholly dismiss the existence o f a natural law of nations, von Martens stands as 
one of the most influential figures in the development of legal positivism, the 
central precepts of which are discussed in the following section. In particular, his 
Summary o f the Law o f  Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs o f  the 
Modern Nations o f  E u r o p e maintains that “Grotius was the ‘father’ of the 
modern science o f studying international law through the historical analysis of 
treaties.
ibid., I., p.6. 
ibid., p. 161-162
127 G.F. von Martens, Summary o f the Law o f Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs o f the 
Modern Nations o f Europe, trans. William Cobbett, (Philadelpliia, 1795).
Keene, “Tlie reception of Hugo Grotius”, p. 146.
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Thus, when the international lawyers o f the early nineteenth century began to write 
the first comprehensive textbooks o f their subject, they were confronted with two 
contending histories of its emergence. As Keene argues then, “[rjather than abandon 
one or the other of these cherished doctrines, they reconciled them through the now- 
familiar thesis that Grotius’s theory had anticipated Westphalian practice.” The 
Peace of Westphalia, in Wheaton’s conception, formalized “the epoch o f the firm 
establishment of permanent legations, by which the pacific relations o f the 
European states have since been maintained. What is more, he writes, 
connecting Westphalia to Grotius, it also gave “a more practical character to the 
new science created by Grotius and improved by his successors.” Although “this 
doctrine rested on rather flimsy evidence,” it indeed appears to have been a 
decisive factor in the erroneous association o f Grotius with the Westphalian treaties.
By the late nineteenth century, international lawyers such as T.J. Lawrence were 
writing that the “leading principles” o f De Jure Belli ac P ads  were recognised in 
the Peace of Westphalia.”^^  ^ In the early twentieth century, Amos S. Hershey 
sought to demonstrate the practical application of what he termed Grotius’ “dogma”
Wheaton, History of the Law o f Nations, p.71-2.
ibid., p.72. Keene also writes tliat “William Manning, similarly argued tliat Grotius ‘had tlie 
happiness of being exactly adapted to tlie times in which he lived, for had he lived much earlier he 
would have found Europe unfitted for the reception of his doctrines; and his times required a mind 
like tliat of Grotius, tlie new relations of tlie European powers needing reference to settled principles 
for tlieir guidance’.” Keene, “Reception of Hugo Grotius”, p. 142; Manning, p.21.
ibid., Keene, p. 146.
T.J. Lawrence, The Principles o f International Law, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1911), p.31.
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of sovereignty during the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the Westphalian 
Peace Treaties. Continuing this tradition, Hedley Bull proposed, more recently, 
that “Grotius may be considered the intellectual father of the first general peace 
settlement of modern times, just as Richelieu, who like Grotius died before the 
Peace came about, may be said to have created the political conditions that made it 
p o s s i b l e . A s  such, herein lies a possible germ for Grotius’ later association with 
international society in the works of Bull and others.
However, the modern concept o f international society, discussed further in the 
following two chapters, did not itself emerge at the Peace of Westphalia but first 
appeared in the nineteenth century. In particular, the question o f how sovereign 
states would be expected to submit themselves to international law, as suggested by 
the Congress of Vienna of 1815, remained unanswered in contemporary 
scholarship. It was in this context that the slogan uhi societas ibi ju s  est ‘where 
there is society there is law’, came to the fore,^^^ thereby drawing the pre-modern 
relationship between the ju s  gentmm and societas gentium evident in Grotius’ 
works closer to the modern notion of the Staatensystem  promulgated by writers
Amos S. Hershey, “History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia”, American 
Journal o f International Law, Vol.6, No.l, (January 1912), pp.30-69.
Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in tlie Study of International Relations”, in Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Khisbmy and Adam Roberts, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.75.
Teny Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), p.28.
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such as Heeren and, before him, Friedrich von Gentz/^^ Considered together, this 
international legal idea and the political notion o f a states-system combined to form 
the modern concept o f ‘international society’.
The Three Traditions
In constructing their histories of the emergence of international law, writers such as 
Wheaton and, soon after him William Oke Manning, also brought together two 
different rival patterns of thought. The first is the natural law tradition discussed in 
the previous chapter and is ordinarily discussed in terms o f the works of Samuel 
Pufendoif. Contrary to natural law, in its most general form, positive law contends 
that the law o f nations is derived exclusively from the tacit agreements, conventions 
and treaties established between nations. However, as Terry Nardin points out, three 
main forms of positive law can be discerned in the histoiy of the law of nations. The 
first maintains that positive law, otherwise known as ‘law properly so-called’, “is a 
set of rules distinguishable from revealed divine law, from rational morality (natural 
law), and from the moral conventions of any actual society.” As Richard Zouche,
one of the foremost proponents of this understanding of positive law, writes;
Although, as Hedley Bull points out, tliese “two streams converged” in tlie writings of Emerich 
de Vattel, they only really came together with the writings of the nineteentli century international 
lawyers. Hedley Bull, “Society and Aiiaichy In International Relations”, in Diplomatic 
Investigations, p.39.
Terry Nardin, “Legal Positivism as a Tlieory of International Society”, in International Society: 
Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David R. Mapel and Teny Nardin, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p. 17.
228
Law between Nations is the law which is recognized in the community of 
different princes or peoples who hold sovereign power -  that is to say, the 
law which has been accepted among most nations by customs in harmony 
with reason, and that upon which single nations agi ee with one another, and 
which is observed by single nations at peace and by those at war/^^
As discussed previously, this law of nations has a two-fold meaning. “In the first 
place”, Zouche writes, “it is the common element in the law which peoples of single 
nations use among themselves” and thus equates to a common form of civil law. 
In the second sense however, “it is the law which is observed in common between 
princes or people o f different nations; since this law, as a jurist also says, nations 
are separated, kingdoms founded, commerce instituted, and lastly, wars 
introduced.” "^^  ^ Thus, not unlike Suarez’s distinction between the two forms of jus  
gentium, Zouche titles this latter form the ju s  inter gentes, what was known in 
Roman law as ju s  feciale. Thus, ju s  inter gentes “besides common customs”, 
includes “anything upon which single nations agree with other single nations, for 
example by compacts, conventions and treaties...since the solemn promise of a 
state establishes law, and whole people, no less than single persons, are bound by 
their own consent.” "^^^
Ricbard Zouche, luris et ludicii Fecialis, sive. Juris Inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de Eodem 
Explixatio (An Explication o f Fecial Law and Procedure or o f Law between Nations, and Questions 
concerning the Same: Wherein are set forth Matters regarding Peace and War between different 
Princes or Peoples, derived from the Most Eminent Historical Jurists), trans. J.L. Brierly, 
(Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1911), I.I., p.l. 
ibid., I I. 1, p.l. 
ibid.
p.2.
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Also a proponent of this variant o f the positive legal tradition, Samuel Rachel’s 
Dissertations on the Law o f  Nature and o f  Nations represents the most prominent 
refutation o f Pufendorf s claim that no positive ju s  gentium exists as distinct from 
the ju s  naturale. Thus, in Rachel’s ‘First Dissertation’, On the Law o f Nature, 
Rachel, like Grotius, adopts Aristotle’s division between natural and positive law.*"^  ^
Positive law, he writes, may also be termed ‘arbitrary law’ and comprises “all law 
of an arbitrary character, whether they are adopted as peculiarly suited to the needs 
of a given state, or of whatever other kind they may be.” "^^"^ Here applied to civil 
law, the distinction between natural and arbitrary, or positive law, also applies to 
the law of nations. As Rachel writes in O f the Law o f Nations;
Not only has Nature provided its own Law for men, whereby, as if by a 
world-wide chain, they are bound to  one another in virtue of being men, but 
mankind has itself also laid down various positive laws for its own 
guidance, not merely those by which in every State the government binds its 
subjects to itself or by which these bind themselves to one another, but also 
those which the human race, divided up as it is into independent peoples and 
different States, employs as a common bond of obligation; and peoples of 
different forms o f government and o f different size lie under the control of 
these rules, which depend for their efficacy upon mutual good faith.
Saiquel Rachel, On the Law o f  Nature in Dissertations on the Law o f Nature and of Nations, 
tians. John Pawley Bale, (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1916), I.II, p.2.
On the Law o f  Nations, ibid., II.I, p. 157,
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However, although he acknowledges the existence of both forms o f law, Rachel 
continues to argue that the central precepts of the law of nature are ill-suited to the 
law of nations. This, he supposes, is fundamentally due to the fact that, “the Law of 
Nations is founded on the agreement of Nations.” For, as he writes, “Law can not 
but be set up by Agreement.”
However, the second definition o f positive law that Nardin offers is far more 
restrictive in nature and contends that “authentic law is law declared or “posited” 
(Latin positum, decreed) by a superior but this-worldly authority, a sovereign 
lawmaker.” The most prominent proponent of this conceptualisation of positive 
law is undoubtedly John Austin. As H.L.A Hart writes, John Austin was a close 
associate and neighbour of Jeremy Bentham, the figure responsible for coining the 
term ‘international law’. A fellow utilitarian -  although self-avowedly less radical 
than Bentham -  Austin shared with him a number of precepts critical to his theory 
of jurisprudence. First is the notion o f command, that is “an expression of desire by 
a person who has the purpose, and some power, to inflict an evil in case the desire 
be disregarded.” Thus, Austin, writes that “[a] command...is a signification of 
desire... [that] is distinguished from other significations of desire by this peculiarity; 
that the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he
\A 6  -tibid, Il.n, p. 157. 
ibid
148 N{irdin, p. 18.
H.L.A. Hart,
Uses o f the Study ofJurisprudence, (London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954), p.x.
149  “Introduction” to Jolin Austin, The Province o f Jurisprudence Determined and the
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comply not with the desire.” *^  ^ As such, the recipient of a command is ‘bound’ or 
‘obliged’ to obey it and thus “[c]ommand and duty are...correlative terms.” The 
second precept of Austin’s theory of jurisprudence pertains to what he terms the 
“habit of obedience.” ^^  ^“Laws properly so-called”, Austin writes, “are commands” 
and can be divided into four types; divine laws, positive laws, positive morality and 
laws metaphorical or figurative. The subject matter of that area of legal theory 
with which he is concerned, jurispmdence, “is positive law; law, simply and strictly 
so called; or law set by political superiors to political inferiors.” In particular, 
Austin argued that in the absence o f a political superior in international society, 
international law is not positive law but rather a form of international morality. He 
writes that “the law obtaining between nations is not a positive law; for every 
positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of 
subjection to its a u t h o r . A u s t i n  also says the following of Grotius;
Grotius, Puffendorf, and the other writers of the so-called law of nations, 
have fallen into a similar confusion o f ideas: they have confounded positive 
international morality, or the rules which actually obtain among civilized 
nations in their mutual intercourse, with their own vague conceptions of 
international morality as it ought to be, with that indeterminable something
Austin, ibid.. I, p. 14. 
ibid.
Halt, p.x.
Austin, I,p.l. 
ibid., p.9.
Austin, VI,p.20l.
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which they conceive it would be, if it conformed to that indeterminate thing
they call the law of nature 156
Finally, the third notion of positive law Nardin discusses seeks to “defend 
international law against the view that law is an expression of sovereign will.” ^^  ^As 
will be seen in the following chapter, this task was undertaken most prominently by 
Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart who, despite following Austin to a great extent, 
omitted the requirement of a sovereign superior from their understandings of law, 
thereby enabling international law to be viewed as a weak form of law.
For Wheaton however, Cornelius van Bynkershoek stands as the representative of 
the positivist tradition with his law o f nations based on “reason and usage, (ex 
ratione et usiiff usage begin derived from “treaties and ordinances, (pacta et 
edicta)r^^^ Drawing the positive and natural law traditions together, in Wheaton’s 
estimation, is Christian von Wolff. Despite his later classification as a ‘Grotian’ 
however, Wheaton goes to some lengths to highlight the extent to which the 
relationship between the law of nature and the law of nations is distinct in Wolff 
and Grotius’ works. First, he argues, while Grotius locates the origins of the 
voluntary law o f nations in the positive agreements of states, thereby deriving a 
weak notion o f obligation from consent, Wolff believes the law of nations to be “a 
law which nature has imposed upon all mankind as a necessary consequence of
ibid, V, p. 187 
Nardin, p. 18.
158 Wheaton, Elements, I.I.6, p.8. Comeliiis van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo 
(On questions o f public law in two booksjjians. Tenney Frank, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
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their social union.” Secondly, and following from this, “Grotius confounds the 
voluntary law of nations with the customary law of nations.” Indeed, what 
distinguishes the voluntary law of nations from the customary law o f nations in 
Wolff is the notion o f universal obligation applicable to the voluntary and not 
necessarily to the customary. With this, Wheaton begins to establish a third 
tradition of international legal thought that, although derived from the works of 
Grotius, is distinct from the natural law tradition which he precipitated.
Following Wolff, Vattel modifies this understanding of the relationship between the 
law of nature and the law of nations, denying the existence o f a naturally instituted 
civitas maxima. Distinguishing instead between the necessary law of nations and its 
voluntary, conventional and customary forms, Vattel maintains that “the Law of 
Nations, in its origin, is nothing but the law o f  nature applied to natioi'is.'’'^ ^^  Thus, 
although describing an alternative natural law derivation o f the law of nations, 
Vattel too may be viewed in a similar vein as Wolff as combining Grotian natural 
law with positive elements.
The position of Grotius within this triumvirate is not made particularly clear in 
Wheaton’s work. Although Grotius is seen as inspiring the ‘mixed’ tradition of 
Wolff and Vattel, he is also discussed in terms of the naturalist tradition. Here, 
despite being generally portrayed in a positive light, Grotius is criticised for failing
ibid., I.I.8, p. 11. 
lW..I.I.9,p.l2.
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to locate the “origins of the Natural Law of Nations in the principle of utility.” As 
such, Wheaton settles with simply heralding Giotius the ‘founder’ of the ‘science’ 
of the law of nations, thereby doing away with the need to categorise him.^^  ^
Nonetheless, this same pattern of categorisation is evident in a range of 
international law treatises o f the nineteenth century from T.A. Walker and T.J. 
Lawrence to John Westlake. However, as will be seen in the following chapter, it 
was with the work of Lassa Oppenheim that the triumvirate found its most 
prominent expression and the ‘mixed’ category’s new title of ‘Grotian’ become 
conventionally accepted.
Grotian 'morality'
Despite the demise in popularity o f Grotius’ work in nineteenth centuiy European 
scholarship, it was during this era that a number of pivotal steps in the emergence 
and development of the ‘Grotian tradition’ occurred in America. In particular, the 
influence o f Grotius’ works in the early years of the American Republic is 
considerable. Not only were his concepts of divisible sovereignty and the 
acquisition o f unoccupied lands employed to justify the act of colonisation and the 
practices that went with it,^^  ^but, as both Bernard Bailyn and Philip A. Hamburger 
argue, the central precepts of his law o f nature featured in the drafting of the
ibid., LI.4, p.6. 
ibid., LL2, p.3.
Thomas Alfred Walker, A History o f the Law o f Nations, Vol.l, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1899); Lawrence, Principles o f  International Law, p.39; Jolm Westlake, The 
Collected Papers o f John Westlake on Public International Law, ed. L. Oppenlieim, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1914.
For a discussion of (his see Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society.
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American Constitution/^^ What is more, the leading political figures of the time 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and John Adams all 
highly endorsed and recommended the reading of Grotius’ works/^^ For example, 
in his “Proposals Relating to the Education o f Youth in Pennsylvania” Benjamin 
Franklin argued that in “Questions o f Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice” youth 
ought to be acquainted with the works of Grotius and Pufendorf in order to resolve 
d ispu tes /S imila r ly ,  a young Alexander Hamilton, then a student at King’s 
College New York, wrote in response to a letter from A.W. Farmer concerning the 
controversy between Great-Britain and her American colonies;
I shall, henceforth, begin to make some allowance for that enmity, you have 
discovered to the natural rights o f  mankind. For, though ignorance o f them 
in this enlightened age cannot be admitted, as a sufficient excuse for you; 
yet it ought, in some measure to extenuate your guilt. If you will follow my 
advice, there still may be hopes of your reformation. Apply yourself, 
without delay, to the study of the law of nature. I would recommend for 
your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui.
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Enlarged Edition, 
(Cambridge, MA; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), p.27,43, 150 & 205; Pliilip 
A. Hamburger, “Natural rights, natural law and American constitutions”, Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 102, No.4, (January 1993), pp.907-960.
Significantly, all tliese figures also appear in Martin Wight’s rationalist category alongside 
Grotius himself. See Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight 
and Brian Porter, (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 14.
Benjamm Franklin, “Proposals Relating to tlie Education of Youth in Pemisylvania” (1749) in 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol.3, January 1, 1745 tlu*ough Jime 30, 1750, ed. Leonard W. 
Labaree, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p.413-414.
Alexander Hamilton, “Farmer Refuted, &c” New York, February 23, 1775, in The Papers of 
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Indeed, the works of Grotius were consulted by such prominent figures on a range 
of issues, both scholastic and practical in nature. Thomas Jefferson drew on his 
works, along with those of Pufendorf and Wolff, in his public paper on the French 
Treaties, not to mention at numerous other places in his work.^^° Indeed, this 
particular discussion o f Grotius in Jefferson’s work was also picked up and 
commented upon by Alexander Hamilton as he sought to apply it to the question of 
obligation in the interpretation o f treaties. Similarly, Hamilton also draws on 
Grotius in a letter to George Washington regarding the right of passage^^^, while 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were engaged in a long-running debate over the 
translation o f certain Greek tracts in Grotius’ w o r k s .H o w e v e r ,  although these 
figures all contributed to the elevated profile o f Grotius in American scholarship 
and, in many instances, came to associate his works with questions of justice and 
morality, as in Franklin’s proposal, it was not until the works of James Kent and 
Henry Wheaton that a fully-fledged notion o f ‘Grotian morality’ emerged.
Thomas Jefferson, “Opinion on the French Treaties” April 28, 1793, in Writings, (New York; The 
Libnuy of America, 1984), p.428.
Alexander Hamilton, “Answer to Question 3d. proposed by tlie President of the UStates, April 
18* 1793 viz”, in The Papers o f Alexander Hamilton, Vol. XIV, February 1793-Jime 1793, p.380-2.
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, New York September 15'^ ', 1790, in The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton, Vol. VII, September 1790 -  January 1791, p.38-9.
The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and 
Abigail and John Adams, ed. Lester J. Capon, (Chapel Hill: University of Nortli Carolina Press. 
1959), p.365, 370-1 & 381.
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James Kent (1763-1847) is best known as the Chancellor of the State of New York, 
Professor of Law at Columbia University and the author o f the ‘first great American 
law treatise’, the four volume Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830)/^'^ 
Although not a work of international law, Kent’s Commentaries begins with a two 
hundred page exposition on the law o f nations that makes a two-fold contribution to 
the development of ‘Grotian’ scholarship and the later Grotian tradition. In the first 
instance, in Kent’s history o f the law o f nations we see the same tripartite division 
of international law into its constituent natural, positive and mixed (later ‘Grotian’) 
forms that emerged in the late, eighteenth century and continues to inform the 
Grotian tradition in the twentieth century. Endorsing the middle road, Kent writes;
The most useful and practical part o f the law of nations is, no doubt, 
instituted as positive law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement. But it 
would be improper to separate this law entirely from natural jurisprudence, 
and not to consider it as deriving much of its force, and dignity, and 
sanction, from the same principles o f right reason, and the same view of the 
nature and constitution o f man, from which the science o f morality is 
deduced.
Although elements included in his further exposition o f the ‘mixed’ form of 
international law are certainly cognisant with Grotius’ ideas, for example the claim 
that “[sjtates, or bodies politic, are to be considered as moral persons, having a 
public will, capable and free to do right and wrong, inasmuch as they are collections
Janis, p.38.
James Kent, Commentary on American Law, (New York, 1836), p.2.
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of individuals,” ’^^  the categoiy is at no time identified as ‘Grotian’. Rather, as will 
be seen, the term ‘Grotian’ is used to designate a form of ethics that combined 
Christian values of brotherly love and charity with the law o f nations.
In Kent’s Commentaries therefore, the term ‘Grotian’ is defined in direct 
association with the historical figure of Hugo Grotius despite diverging from 
Grotius’ ideas in one critical area. Heaping praise upon him, Kent views Grotius as 
a moral crusader, writing that he has “justly been considered as the father of the law 
of nations; and he arose like a splendid luminary dispelling darkness and confusion, 
and imparting light and security to the intercourse of nations.” As Mark Weston 
Janis argues, “Grotius was attractive to Kent...because Grotius recognized that 
there was an inevitable conflict between the awful reality o f war and the Christian 
ideal of universal love and brotherhood.”’ ’^’ Indeed, Kent describes the ‘Grotian 
ethic’ as standing “in favour of the natural law of morality” and arguing that 
“justice was o f perpetual obligation, and essential to the well being o f every society, 
and that the great commonwealth o f nations stood in need of law, and the 
observance of faith, and the practice o f justice.”
According to Kent, the “object of Grotius” was to correct the false doctrines o f war 
that he saw prevailing about him;
ibid
ibid, p. 15. 
Janis, p. 44. 
Kent, p. 15.
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...by showing a community o f sentiment among the wise and learned of all 
nations and ages in favour of the natural law of morality. He likewise 
undertook to show that justice was o f perpetual obligation, and essential to 
the well being of every society, and that the great commonwealth o f nations 
stood in need of law, and the observance of faith, and the practice of 
justice.
The sense o f ‘Grotian morality’ Kent promulgates is explained as follows:
We ought not, therefore, to separate the science of public law from that of 
ethics, not encourage the dangerous suggestion, that governments are not so 
strictly bound by the obligations of truth, justice, and humanity, in relation 
to other powers, as they are in the management of their own local concerns. 
States, or bodies politic, are to be considered as moral persons, having a 
public will, capable and free to do right and wrong, inasmuch as they are 
collections of individuals, each of whom carries with him into the service of 
the community the same binding law of morality and religion which ought 
to control his conduct in private life.
The law of nations is a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It 
consists o f general principles o f right and justice, equally suitable to the 
government of individuals in a state of natural equality, and to the relation 
and conduct of nations; o f a collection of usages and customs, the growth of 
civilization and commerce; and o f a code of conventional or positive law. In 
the absence of these latter regulations, the intercourse and conduct of 
nations are to be governed by principles fairly to be deduced from the rights 
and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation; and we have the 
authority of the lawyers o f antiquity, and o f some of the first masters in the
i/mL  p. 15.
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modem school of public law, for placing the moral obligation of nations and 
of individuals on similar grounds, and for considering individual and 
national morality as parts o f one and the same science/^’
Critically however, despite naming it ‘Grotian’, Kent does not consider this 
morality, or indeed international law that is derived from it, as universal. Rather, 
contrary to Grotius’ desire for universality, he argues that “the Christian nations o f 
Europe, and their descendants on this side o f the Atlantic, by the vast superiority of 
their attainments in arts, and science, and commerce, as well as in policy and 
government; and above all, the brighter light, the more certain truths, and the more 
definite sanction, which Christianity has communicated to the ethical jurisprudence 
of the ancients, have established a law of nations peculiar to themselves.” 
Together, he writes, these Christian nations of Europe and America form a 
Christian ‘community of nations’.
By arguing against the universality o f the law of nations and making Christian 
ethics one of its central components, Kent attempts to achieve the inclusion of the 
United States within what was known to be the ‘civilised world’. By doing so, he 
reasons that the new republic’s precarious sovereignty might be recognised by the 
nations of E u r o p e .F u r th e rm o re ,  as Janis argues, “Kent was employing 
Christianity generally and the Grotian ethic particularly to grapple with one of
ibid, p.2-3. 
ibid., p.3-4. 
Janis, p.49.
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international law’s most troublesome open questions, its efficacy.” Again, by 
describing the law o f nations in terms of Christianity, Kent was able to explain that 
the “positive substantive rules o f international law” are based upon “a moral 
procedural foundation. However, this response did not bring the debate to a 
close and when Henry Wheaton published his most famous work some years later it 
had intensified significantly.
When Henry Wheaton published his Elements o f  International Law in 1836, John 
Austin’s The Province o f  Jurispridence Determined was exerting a significant 
influence on the perceived efficacy of international law. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries however, Wheaton did not respond to Austin’s criticisms of 
international law by ‘sheltering’ “in the observation that the ‘sanction’ of 
international law is war or the State’s own protection o f its self-interest””’^  but 
agreed, to some extent at least, that international law was ‘positive morality’. As 
with Kent, Christianity is afforded a position o f primacy in Wheaton’s work and, as 
such, “the practical observance o f the rules of justice among states” was indicative 
of the existence and efficacy o f international law.’^^  In particular however, it is 
Hugo Grotius who is attributed with bringing about “a most salutary change in the 
practical intercourse of nations in favour of humanity and justice.” As Wheaton 
continues, this ‘salutory change’ has created within the “international intercourse of
1*^  Janis, p. 53.
1*^  WliQîAovL, Elements, p.iv. 
1** ibid., p.30.
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Europe, and the nations o f European descent...superior humanity, justice and 
liberality.” However, what is critical here is that this “humanity, justice and 
liberality” is indeed, ‘superior’ because it applies only to Europe and other civilized 
nations. Indeed, Wheaton goes so far as to limit the scope of his work to the 
“general principles which may fairly be considered to have received the assent of 
most civilized and Christian nations.” ’ ’^’ Thus, in a similar, although more strictly 
applied manner to Kent, Wheaton also maintains that the law o f nations is not truly 
universal but only applies to ‘civilised’ nations. He asserts that public international 
law “has always been, and still is, limited to the civilised and Christian people of 
Europe or to those of European origin.” ’^ ’ Making his point even more firmly he 
writes;
There is then, according to these writers, no universal, immutable law of 
nations binding upon the whole human race -  which all mankind in all ages 
and countries ancient and modern, savage and civilised, Christian and 
pagan, have recognised in theory or in practice, have professed to obey, or 
have in fact obeyed.
Thus, for Wheaton, to be ‘Grotian’ meant adhering to an understanding of the law 
of nations that was based on a form o f vague Christian ethics that promoted notions 
o f justice and humanity.
/6/d.
ibid., p.iii.
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Conclusion
In accordance with the very notion o f what is constituted by an ‘historical’ tradition, 
the ‘Grotian’ scholarship o f Pufendorf, W olff Vattel and, indeed Grotius himself, 
entertain a single vision o f what is meant by the term ‘Grotian’. Although not 
specified in such explicit terms, in the works of Grotius and his immediate 
successors, the term ‘Grotian’ pertains directly to the historical figure of Hugo 
Grotius. ‘Grotian’ ideas, although not necessarily absolutely cognisant with those of 
Grotius himself, retain an explicit connection to him and simply appear in an altered 
or developed form in these later works. Thus, although Pufendorf seeks to reconcile 
Grotius’ works with precepts o f Hobbesian natural law thus imbuing it with a sense 
of obligation, Wolff distinguishes firmly between the ‘necessary’ and ‘voluntary’ 
law o f nations, and Vattel further develops those ideas contained in Wolff, all self­
consciously viewed themselves as ‘following’ Grotius, or continuing his work in 
some way. However, with Vattel came the end of the historically constituted 
‘Grotian tradition’ and a singularly defined conception of the ‘Grotian’. From this 
time on, as an analytically constructed classification device, the term ‘Grotian’ 
assumed a wide variety of guises largely dictated by the purpose of schemes in 
which it is conceived.
Indeed, by the work of Henry Wheaton, the term ‘Grotian’ was already set to be 
dually defined. Although the ‘mixed’ category of Wheaton’s scheme was later to 
become an analytically conceived ‘Grotian’ category, from the outset there is little 
sense of the epistemological effects o f schematising international legal thought in
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this manner. Thus, the sense in which the ‘three traditions’ of international law are 
in fact ‘traditions’ is not considered. As will be seen in the following chapter, this 
pattern o f scholarship has been perpetuated in international legal thought, reaching 
the status of conventional wisdom by the twentieth century works of Lassa 
Oppenheim and Arthur Nussbaum. Indeed, it is only with the much later work of 
Hersch Lauterpacht that the implications of dividing the history of international law 
in this manner are considered. However, of equal or greater significance to the 
substantive contents o f the twentieth century Grotian traditions, in particular 
Lauterpacht’s seminal construction, is the emphasis on ‘Grotian morality’ evident in 
the works of Wheaton and Kent. As will be seen in the following chapter, by 
refocusing the attention of Grotian scholarship on Grotius’ understanding of 
morality, Wheaton and Kent foregrounded the more substantial revival o f Grotius’ 
works that began with the turn o f the twentieth century.
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V
The Emergence of the ^Grotian Tradition’ in Twentieth 
Century International Thought
In Europe, Grotius’s work was not esteemed in the latter part of the 
eighteenth and former part o f the nineteenth century, when “state 
sovereignty” was the watchword, and international law a garment which the 
nations tore and tlirew off whenever it suited their interests to do so. But its 
importance increased when the peace movement became stronger (1871), 
and when the Hague Peace Conferences and the League of Nations meetings 
came near.’
The ‘Grotian tradition of international law’ emerged in the 1940s at a time when the 
status of international law and, in particular, its ability to regulate the incidence and 
conduct of war, was in dire need o f revival. In the world of international relations, 
the preceding fifty years had seen two Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, the 
collapse of the balance of power system and subsequent outbreak of World War 
One, the formation and dissolution o f the League of Nations and, of course, the 
horrors of the Second World War. At the same time. International Relations 
witnessed its formal inception as a scholarly discipline, the emergence of idealism
’ Cornelius van Vollenlioven, “Grotius and tlie Study of Law”, American Journal o f International 
Law, Vol. 19, No.i, (1925), p.5.
in international thought and its succession by realism, complete with its sceptical 
appraisal o f the efficacy o f international law and the position of morality within it.
Thus, when Hersch Lauterpacht set about devising a set of fondamental principles 
central to the regulation o f war by law under the broad banner o f the ‘Grotian 
tradition o f international law’, he sought to “find a place for law in a dangerous 
time.”  ^However, the position of law, and indeed morality within it, was not simply 
made ‘dangerous’ by the tumultuous international political climate o f the time but, 
in intellectual terms, by the overwhelming predominance of realist thought in 
International Relations scholarship and legal positivism in international law. Indeed, 
although they are rarely referred to in International Relations scholarship, 
Lauterpacht wrote a number of papers addressing what he believed to be the 
fundamental problems o f realism, in particular that variant espoused by E.H. Carr.^ 
As will be seen, these writings provide us with a number o f important clues about 
Lauterpacht’s thinking during the period in which the ‘Grotian tradition’ was 
devised and, in particular, how he conceived the relationship between law and 
morality.
 ^Martti Koskennieini. The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations: The Rise and Fall o f International Law 1870- 
1960, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.355; Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian 
Tradition in International Law”, British Yearbook o f International Law. Vol.23, No.l, (1946), pp.l- 
53.
 ^ Hersch Lauterpacht, “On Realism, Especially in hitemational Relations”, in International Law 
Being the Collected Papers o f Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.2, The Law of Peace, 
Part I, hitemational Law in General, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.52-66; 
“Professor Carr on International Morality”, pp.67-92; E.H.Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919- 
1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations, ed. Michael Cox, (Hoimdmills: 
Palgmve, 2001).
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the resurgent 
interest in Grotius’ works that accompanied the Hague Conventions o f 1899 and 
1907, the formation o f the Grotius Society and the establishment of the League of 
Nations. In particular, the turpitude o f ‘Grotian morality’ is again stressed, this time 
by Cornelius van Vollenhoven whose attempt to rescue Grotius from the continued 
dominance o f Vattel signaled the re-entry of Grotius to mainstream International 
Relations scholarship. The second section discusses the contending 
conceptualisations o f the relationship between law and morality provided by the 
contending realist and idealist, and natural law and legal positivist perspectives. In 
doing so, it outlines the two most prominent intellectual debates in which 
Lauterpacht engaged in constructing the Grotian tradition o f international law. 
Finally, the third section then outlines the central precepts of Lauterpacht’s Grotian 
tradition. In doing so, it highlights the existence of two distinct understandings of 
the term ‘Grotian’ in Lauterpacht’s writings, neither o f which is self-consciously 
conceived in terms o f a well considered conceptualisation o f ‘tradition’ itself. The 
first is distinctly analytical in constitution and is derived from that mode of 
scholarship evident in the works o f Wheaton and Oppenheim in which the term 
‘Grotian’ simply refers to the intermediary category of international legal thought 
that stands between the natural and positive law traditions. However, this is 
juxtaposed with an alternative understanding of the term ‘Grotian’ that is derived 
explicitly from the works o f Hugo Grotius himself and is primarily concerned with 
the position of morality in international law. As will be seen in the following
2 4 8
chapter, that Lauteipacht entertained two visions o f what it means to be ‘Grotian’ is 
o f particular importance to its subsequent incarnations in the works of Martin Wight 
and Hedley Bull.
The * Grotian’ Revival
The late nineteenth century represents perhaps the lowest point in the development 
of the ‘Grotian tradition’. Indeed, while earlier in the century, American scholars 
such as Kent and Wheaton had returned once more to Grotius to justify the new 
republic’s inclusion in the ‘civilised world’, his status continued to decline in 
European scholarship. In particular, Grotius suffered forther irreparable damage at 
the hands o f the legal positivism o f writers such as W.E. Hall and Sir Robert 
Phillimore.'’ Furthermore, although the late nineteenth century saw the rise to 
prominence o f the modern concept of international society later associated with 
Grotius and, in particular, the slogan ubi societas ibi ins est, its central proponents 
showed little interest in Grotius himself. In Westlake’s estimation;
states form a society, the members of which claim from each other the 
obseiwance of certain lines o f conduct, capable of being expressed in general 
terms as rules, and hold themselves justified in mutually compelling such 
observance, by force if necessaiy; also that in such society the lines of 
conduct in question are observed with more or less regularity, either as the 
result o f compulsion or in accordance with the sentiments which would
4 William Edward Hall, A lYeatise on International Law, 4* ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895); 
Sir Robert Pliillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, (London: Butterwortlis, 1871).
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support compulsion in case of need. It is an old saying, nbi societas ibi ju s  
est; “where there is society there is law.”^
Contrary to conventional claims that place the emergence o f the society of states at 
the Peace of Westphalia, Westlake contends that international society originated 
prior to 1648.^ Thus, Westphalia is credited with the completion and consecration 
o f an already emergent international society. Extending this notion, Westlake 
further elucidates the relationship between states and individuals in international 
society;
The society of states, having European civilisation, or the international 
society, is the most comprehensive form of society among men, but it is 
among men that it exists. States are its immediate, men its ultimate 
members. The duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of the 
men who compose them.’
Thus, contrary to the ‘domestic analogy’ apparent in Grotius’ works, whereby states 
and individuals are considered morally equivalent via the imposition o f human 
characteristics upon the state, Westlake contends that individuals are the ultimate 
members o f international society purely because they are what comprise states. 
Furthermore, this international society is, in its original form, an explicitly 
European society and, as such, the international law to which Westlake refers is 
more accurately the public law o f Europe, Droit public de VEitrope. Thus,
 ^ Jolin Westlake, The Collected Papers o f  John Westlake on Public Internationa! Law, ed. L. 
Oppenheim, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1914), p.2.
® ibid., p.55.
’ ibid., p.78.
250
following its spread, international society is said to include all European states, all 
American states which, “on becoming independent, inherited the international law 
o f Europe” and, finally, “a few Christian states in other parts of the world, as the 
Hawaiian Islands, Liberia and the Orange Free S ta te .D esp i te  engaging a range of 
concepts also apparent in Grotius’ works and his later categorisation as a ‘Grotian’ 
for his fusion of natural and positive law, Westlake did not really discuss Grotius’ 
works or use the term ‘Grotian’ itself Indeed, although he exerted a significant 
influence on the writings o f Lauterpacht and Wight, Westlake inadvertently 
contributes to the marginalisation o f Grotius’ works in international legal 
scholarship by unceremoniously relegating him to the annals of history.
The revival o f Grotius’ popularity in the fields o f international relations and 
international law was heralded by the proceedings of the first Hague Convention 
held in 1899. Here, for the first time, Grotius came to be associated with the 
concept of international arbitration, although the connection is a spurious one 
derived from a single line o f the tome that is De Jure Belli ac Pads:
As in making peace, it scarcely ever happens that either party will 
acknowledge the injustice o f his cause, or o f his claims, such a construction 
must be given as will equalize the pretensions of each side.^
* ibid., p.81-2.
 ^Dorotliy V. Jones, Toward a Just World: The Critical Years in the Search for International Justice, 
(Chicago: University of Cliicago Press, 2002), p. 3.
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Although this fairly obscure line o f his work is referred to, little evidence exists to 
suggest that Grotius was anything more than a figure-head, a great classical theorist 
whose desire to limit the incidence and severity of war was particularly cogent to 
the aspirations of the delegates in attendance. Nonetheless, his association with the 
Hague Conventions was marked by a ceremony in his honour;
...the ceremony to place the wreath upon the tomb o f Grotius took place on 
the 4’*^ o f July, in the Nieuwe Kerk, in the city o f Delft. Representatives 
from the various delegations in the conferences were present. Outside, the 
winds raged and the rain beat furiously, as if nature were trying to remind 
the assemblage o f the storm and stress in which the life of the honoured 
dead was passed. Within, the great organ poured out its wonderous tones, 
and at eleven o’clock the ceremony began.’®
Thus, although the works o f Kent and Wheaton had kept ‘Grotian’ scholarship 
simmering in the background o f nineteenth century international legal scholarship, 
this marked the beginning of the revival o f Grotian scholarship in international 
relations and international law.
In the twenty years that followed, Grotius’ profile continued to rise. In 1901 AC. 
Campbell published a much needed English translation o f De Jure Belli ac P ads  
under the title of The Rights o f  War and Peace and, although it only appeared in 
1925, the Carnegie Endowment commissioned a further translation by Francis W.
Hamilton Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, The Father o f the Modern Science of International Law, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1917), p.239-40.
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Kelsey in 1910.”  Furthermore, despite the grave damage his outwardly positivist 
approach afforded Grotian scholarship, the publication of Lassa Oppenheim’s 
International Law: A Treatise with its discussion of the analytically conceived 
Grotian tradition similarly helped to raise its profile. However, the biggest boost to 
Grotian scholarship during this period was heralded by the establishment of the 
‘Grotius Society’ and the publication o f Cornelius van Vollenhoven’s The Three 
Stages in the Evolution o f  the Law o f  Nations in 1919.”
The Grotius Society
Had I consulted my feelings I would have laid the wreath on the tomb o f the 
illustrious dead in silence, for I despair o f finding words which can express 
the emotions called up in those who are privileged to stand upon this sacred 
spot. But it has been decided that such a course would not be right, and that 
as President of a Society specially formed to maintain the principles 
proclaimed by Hugo Grotius, I must seek the words to express the feelings 
of that Society to one o f the most famous citizens of Delfl. Hugo Grotius, 
Jurist -  Poet -  Theologian and Statesman. The man who, in the midst of all 
the horrors and barbarities of the Thirty Years’ War, asserted the rights of 
humanity and civilization.”
Hugo Grotius, The Rights o f War and Peace, tmns. A.C. Campbell, (Wasliington & London: M. 
Walter Dumie, 1901); De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, trails. Francis W. Kelsey with tlie 
Collaboration of Artliui E.R. Boak, Henry A. Saimders and others, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913). 
Prior to Campbell, William Wliewell had published a higlily unsatisfactory abridged translation of 
De Jure Belli ac Pads derived from the Barbeyrac edition. William Whewell, Grotius on the rights 
of war and peace, an abridged translation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1853).
Cornelius van Vollenlioven, The Three Stages in the Evolution o f the Law o f Nations, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1919).
Sir Graliam Bower, President of the Grotius Society, paying tribute at tlie tomb of Hugo Grotius, 
TGS, Vol.7, (1921), p.xxxix-xli.
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The ‘Grotius Society’ was established in 1914 in response to the outbreak of World 
War I. As the first vice-president o f the Society, the Regius Professor of Civil Law 
at the University of Oxford, Henry Goudy remarked in his opening introduction to 
the Society’s inaugural meeting in 1915, “[t]he object of founding the Society has 
been to afford an opportunity to those interested in International Law or discussing 
from a cosmopolitan point o f view the acts o f the belligerent and neutral States in 
the present war, and the problems to which it is almost daily giving birth.””  Further 
extrapolating its purpose, Goudy writes;
Its intention is to treat all international questions in an absolutely 
independent spirit, endeavouring to discover the truth whatever it may be, to 
discuss all the doctrines o f International Law, to examine them in the light 
of the present war, and to suggest reforms based on humanity and justice 
wherever possible. It is the welfare o f the commonwealth of nations, if one 
may use the expression, not o f any one nation or group o f nations, that the 
Society will seek to secure. For International Law, if it is to have any 
enduring authority, must be based on the fundamental principles of human 
rights and must give effect to the common welfare o f nations.”
The position of Hugo Grotius within the Grotius Society is a somewhat precarious 
one. The name the ‘Grotius Society’ was settled on as Grotius was thought to be the 
“admitted founder of public International Law...the first, as he justly claims for 
himself, to envisage and expound it as a system and base it on solid foundations.””
4^ Henry Goudy, “Introduction”, TGS, Vol.l, (1915), p.l. 
ibid
ibid., p. 1-2.
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As Goudy continues, “[tjhough much o f the “De Jure Belli ac Pacis” is now 
antiquated, and many o f its notions about natural law and ju s  gentium can no longer 
be accepted, that great work must ever be regarded as the matrix o f our science, and 
must be resorted to for the statement o f fundamental truths.””  However, as Goudy 
remarked in his introduction to the second edition of Transactions o f  the Grotius 
Society, ‘no attempt’ had been made “to estimate the character of Grotius’s writings 
nor the Grotian system as a whole” and, although the first o f these omissions 
received some degree of attention in subsequent volumes o f the journal, any attempt 
to discuss the ‘Grotian system’ as a whole is conspicuously absent from its 
publications.”  Thus, publications referring to Grotius were generally concerned 
with biographical details.”  In the main however, the Grotius Society publications 
were concerned with questions o f international law and paid relatively little 
attention to the namesake o f their association.
Although its focus shifted during its forty-five year existence, the subtitle of its 
journal, Transactions o f  the Grotius Society changing from Problems o f the War to
ibid., p.2.
Herny Goudy, “Introduction”, TGS, Vol.II, (1916), p.xvii.
G.N. Clarke, “Grotius’s East India Mission to England”, TGS, Vol.20, (1934), pp.45-84; Pieter 
Geyl, “Grotius”, TGS, Vol. 12, (1926), pp.81-97; W.S.M. Knight, “Grotius in England: His 
Opposition There to the Principles of the Mare Liberum” TGS, VoI.V, (1919), pp. 1-38; W.S.M. 
Knight, “Hugo Grotius: His Family and Ancestry”, TGS, Vol. VI, (1921), pp. 1-24; W.S.M. Knight, 
“The Infancy and Youth of Hugo Grotius”, TGS, Vol.VII, (1922), pp. 1-32; W.S.M. Knight, 
“Grotius’ Earliest Years as a Lawyer”, TGS, Vol.8, (1922), pp. 1-20; R.W. Lee, “The Family Life of 
Grotius”, TGS, Vol.20, (1934), pp. 11-24; R.W. Lee, “Grotius -  The Last Phase, 1635-45”, TGS, 
Vol.31 (1945), pp. 193-215; Jolm Macdomiell, “The Influence of Grotius”, TGS, Vol.5, (1920), 
pp.xvii-xx\^
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Problems o f  Peace and War in 1919’® and again to Problems o f  Public and Private 
International Law in 1946, the central driving force of the Society remained fairly 
constant. Thus, on the twenty-fifth anniversary o f its establishment, W.R. Bisschop 
argued in his retrospective address, “Grotius Society 1915-1940”;
The circumstances in that first year are not much different from those 
prevailing now. The same belligerents who then waged war against each 
other are again each others’ mortal enemies. . . The same manner o f warfare 
followed in those days is followed now, only to an intensified degree, and 
the same complaints o f violations of rules o f international law are raised in 
1940 as they were then and for the same reason.”
In light o f this, Bisschop reiterates the object of the Grotius Society that appears in 
Hemy Goudy’s speech above. Despite this general statement of purpose, the 
‘Grotius Society’ did not promote any specific perspective on the position of 
international law in international relations, but rather sought to facilitate dialogue 
and debate between a range o f views.
The Grotius Society boasted an illustrious membership during its period of 
operation. Amongst its founding members were T.J. Lawrence, whose works 
particularly influenced the later Grotian writings of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, 
and G.G. Phillimore whose ‘Pliillimore Committee’, appointed by British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George in 1917 to draft a proposal for the establishment of the 
League o f Nations, produced the ‘Cecil Draft’ which was taken to negotiations in
2° See Editorial Note, TGS, Vol. V, (1919), p.v.
W.R. Bisschop, “Grotius Society 1915-1940”, TGS, Vol.26, (1940), p.ix.
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Paris. In 1916, J.A. Hobson, author of Towards International Government became a 
member of the Society and was joined shortly after by Coleman Phillipson. In 1919, 
four particularly significant honourary memberships were granted to President 
Woodrow Wilson, mastermind o f the ‘Fourteen Points’ that heralded the foundation 
of the League o f Nations and facilitated the rise to prominence o f what became 
known as ‘idealist’ thought in international relations, the international lawyer 
responsible for many of the Carnegie Endowment’s publications in the history of 
international law, James Brown Scott, General Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of 
South Africa and author o f The League o f  Nations: A Practical Suggestion, and 
Senator Elihu Root. In subsequent years, membership was extended to James L. 
Brierly, Arnold D. McNair, Gilbert Murray, Hersch Lauterpacht, Ellery Stowell, 
David Davies, Alfred Zimmern, Wilfred Jenks, Georg Schwarzenberger, Cecil 
Hurst and B.C.J. Loder of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Elihu 
Lauterpacht. Two critical points are immediately apparent here. First is the wide 
range of views presented by these associates and second is the number of writers 
subsequently classified as ‘idealist’ within this lineup. As such, rather than 
attempting to form the multifarious ideas presented within the scope of the Grotius 
Society meetings and publications in a single coherent doctrine, more is to be 
gained from looking at its members both individually and within the wider 
international legal debates in which they themselves were engaged.
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Cornelius van Vollenhoven
Grotius’s Law o f Nations stands at the door, and it knocks. For three 
hundred years we have let it knock. Now it is getting too strong for us, we 
have not yet turned the key, but the bolts have been drawn.”
Although his nationality precluded van Vollenhoven from membership o f the 
Grotius Society, the society records indicate that he nevertheless attended a number 
of its meetings in an unofficial capacity. As the scholar who exerted the most 
significant impact on the revival of Grotian scholarship prior to Hersch Lauterpacht, 
it is not surprising that he was granted some sort of guest status. In 1918 van 
Vollenhoven published a short (98 pages) text in Dutch, the English title o f which 
reads The Three Stages in the Evolution o f  the Law o f  Nations, As P H . Kooijmans 
writes, the work was “an incredible success: it was twice reprinted in its Dutch 
version and was translated into French, German and English.””  The success o f this 
work is even more surprising when its contents are considered. The work essentially 
constitutes an attempt to restore the status of Hugo Grotius’ work in the face o f its 
demise at the hands o f Emerich de Vattel. As van Vollenhoven writes, indicating 
his preference for Grotius, “the Dutchman is called Hugh (Huig in Dutch), a bluff 
and sturdy name; the other is called Emeric: the name o f a balletmaster”, adding 
that the latter’s work constitutes a “misshapen conglomeration of hypocrisy and 
cynicism.””  It is a sentiment with which Lauterpacht broadly agrees, warning those
Cornelius van Vollenhoven, Three Stages in the Evolution o f the Law o f Nations, (The Hague; 
Martinus Hijhoff, 1919), p.98,
”  P H. Kooijmans, “How to Handle the Grotian Heritage: Grotius and van Vollenhoven”, 
Netherlands International Law Review, Vol.XXX, (1983), p.81.
4^ van Vollenlioven, Three Stages, p.26.
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“who look forward to a natural law revival of international law” that, “after all, 
natural law has produced not only Grotius but Vattel.”’^
As Kooijman notes, after the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, van 
Vollenhoven had become “an active crusader for the establishment of...an 
international police f o r c e , a n d  even went so far in his endeavour as to make “an 
emotional appeal” to the Dutch government to propose such a measure and, further 
to this, to initiate a Third Peace Conference to be held in 1915.”  When, in 1914, 
with the outbreak o f the First World War, plans for a third conference were made 
redundant, van Vollenhoven turned his attention to Grotius for inspiration. As he 
would write some years later o f De Jure Belli ac Pads, “No book on international 
law written since Grotius radiates so much love, inspires so much confidence and 
restfijlness to the soul as his book does.”’  ^He explains his attraction to Grotius as 
follows:
States should not be at liberty to do good or evil, but their actions should be 
judged by strict rules o f what is just and unjust; hostile engagements 
between states may no longer be a game of war, but a crime crying out for 
punishment; such is Grotius’ most earnest conviction. This is what his 
whole book, entitled: ‘on the rights o f war and peace’ aims at.”
Hersch Lauterpacht, “Kelsen’s Puie Science of Law”, in International Law Being the Collected 
Papers o f Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975), p.428.
Kooijmans, p.83.
^ van Vollenlioven, “Grotius and tlie Study of Law”, p.7.
^  van Vollenhoven, Three Stages, p. 15.
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From Grotius’ work then, van Vollenhoven derives what he terms “Grotius’ 
theorem” which consists of four doctrines/® First is the “doctrine of duties” which 
states that in matters o f justice, states and individuals are morally equivalent. 
Secondly, “Grotius advocated a worldwide mle of law” in an attempt to bring an 
end to the lawlessness he witnessed around him.^’ Thirdly, unlike the ‘Grotians’ of 
the nineteenth century such as James Kent and Henry Wheaton, Grotius did not 
conceive the law o f nations as only applicable to ‘civilised’ Christian or European 
states. Finally, in accordance with his notions o f caritas and temper amenta, 
“Grotius advocated the duty of altmism and charity among nations.””  Considered 
together then, van Vollenhoven’s “Grotian theorem” maintains that war is an 
instrument of punishment.^^ It is with this in mind then, that he casts President 
Woodrow Wilson as the foremost contemporary ‘Grotian’ for his following 
statement;
.. .our motive will not be revenge, or the victorious assertion of the physical 
might o f the nation, but only the vindication o f human right.. .Neutrality is 
no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved. We 
have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.^^
Cornelius van Vollenhoven, “Grotius and Geneva”, Bibliotheca Visseriana, Vol.6, No.l, (1926),
p.21.
Kooijmans, p.82. 
ibid.
4^ Woodrow Wilson quoted in “Grotius and Geneva”, p. 30.
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Combining Wilson’s vision with his own reading o f Grotius then, van 
Vollenhoven’s ‘three stages’ culminate with the formation of the League of Nations 
and establishment of a new world order which it was hoped to entail. Following the 
realisation of its establishment, van Vollenhoven again sought to draw a direct 
association between Grotius and the League of Nations, writing that “Grotius’s 
conception materially coincides with the platform of the American League to 
Enforce Peace (1915), the Covenant o f the League of Nations (1919) and, above all, 
the Geneva Protocol (October 2, 1924).”^^
However, van Vollenhoven’s use of Grotius has faced stringent criticism, most 
notably in Johanna Gudendijk’s “Van Vollenhoven’s ‘The Three Stages in the 
Evolution o f the Law o f Nations’. A case o f wishful thinking.” Here Gudendijk 
argues that “instead o f erecting on Grotius’ foundations a superstructure of his own 
he, instilled his own ideas into the existing argument and then presented the whole 
as Grotius’ work.”^^  Although, Gudendijk is correct in her observation here, it is a 
method to which van Vollenhoven freely admits. In particular, Kooijmans points 
out the opening tract of a lecture delivered at Columbia University in the mid-1920s 
entitled “Grotius and Geneva” makes this method explicit
The following pages do not purpose to deal with Hugo Grotius and his book 
of 1625 Gn the law o f war and peace’ in the light o f the past. They purpose 
to deal with them in the light of the present. When a book o f three centuries
van Vollenlioven, “Grotius and tlie Study of Law”, p. 3. 
Johanna Gudendijk quoted in Kooijmans, p.85.
37 Kooijmans, p.86.
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ago comes to the fore again in several countries, as by common consent, yet 
without any previous mutual understanding; when again it obtains a firm 
hold on the thoughts of mankind; and when, as was the case six years ago, 
[here van Vollenhoven was referring to a meeting of the Grotius Society in 
1920] it is predicted that its influence ‘may even grow’ -  it must carry some 
message for the world o f to-day. It is this message which solicits our interest 
and out [sic] attention.
Thus van Vollenhoven finds no fault in the wholesale and outwardly anachronistic 
supplanting o f Grotius’ ideas into the problems of the twentieth century. 
Significantly however, his doing so does not detract from the extent to which 
critical elements of Grotius’ conceptualisation of morality, including caritas and 
temperamenta, feature in his work.
Morality in International Relations and International Law
The revival of Grotian scholarship and foundation o f the ‘Grotian tradition of 
international iaw’ is also embedded in a range of questions surrounding the 
relationship between law and morality. In particular, the two long-standing 
questions, the first positivist in orientation and the second o f a normative 
configuration remained unresolved; what is the relationship between law and 
morality; and, what ought to be the relationship between law and morality? These 
two questions were addressed or dismissed in the context of two scholarly 
‘debates’, one in international legal scholarship and one in the corresponding field
van Vollenlioven, “Grotius and Geneva”, p.5, in Kooijmans, p.86 -  comments in brackets liis.
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of international relations. O f course, as will be seen shortly, a great degree of 
overlap exists between the two debates and as such, both feature highly in 
Lauterpacht’s formulation of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and other writings.
In international legal scholarship, as had been the case since the eighteenth century, 
views on the relationship between law and morality are polarised around the 
contending natural and positive legal traditions. As made apparent in the previous 
chapter, while natural law posits an embedded morality largely “independent o f the 
practices of actual communities,”^^  in its most common forms, positive law 
promotes the general, although not absolute repudiation of morality from the field 
of law.'^ Although in recent scholarship, writers such as John Finnis and Neil 
MacCormick have demonstrated that positive and natural law need not be viewed as 
dichotomous opponents, during the time in question, the battle lines were more 
firmly drawn."** Thus, on the positivist side stand the writings of Hans Kelsen and 
H.L.A. Hart, each explicitly derived from the works of John Austin, while the 
natural law tradition is represented most prominently in the works of J.L. Brierly.
Terry Nardin, “Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society”, in International Societ\>: 
Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p.27.
Frederick G. Whelan, “Legal Positivism and International Society”, m International Society: 
Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p.44.
Jolm Fhniis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Jolm 
Finnis, “The Truth in Legal Positivism”, in The Autonomy o f Law: Essays on Legal Positivism, ed. 
Robert P. George, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Neil MacCormick, “Natural Law and 
tlie Separation of Law and Morals” in The Autonomy o f Law; Robert P. George, “Natural Law and 
International Order” 'm International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, p. 54.
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Standing between opposing sides is Georg Schwarzenberger’s ‘Grotian’ tradition 
which argues that a limited relationship between law and morality both does and 
ought to exist, thereby functioning as an intermediary between the two."*^
In international relations scholarship, questions surrounding the relationship 
between law and morality have been conventionally framed in terms o f a so-called 
‘debate’ between realism and idealism known in disciplinary history as the ‘first 
great debate’. As Peter Wilson notes however, “[b]oth ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ are 
extremely elastic terms’’"*^ and as such, it makes little sense to discuss them in 
general. Thus, although they do not present identical points of view, on the ‘idealist 
side’ stand, most prominently. Lord Robert Cecil’s The Moral Basis o f  the League 
o f Nations, along with the writings of Gilbert Murray, David Davies, Arnold 
Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern and Norman Angell. What unites their disparate versions 
of ‘idealist’ thought is a fundamental belief in progress coupled with the claim that 
states have moral personalities and, by extension, moral rights and duties cognisant 
of those imposed upon individuals. On the ‘realist side’ stands Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
Moral Man and Immoral Society which argues that only individuals have a moral 
capacity and E.H. Carr’s more tempered approach to the limits of morality in 
international relations.
Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations 
and Post-War Planning, (London: Jonatlian Cape, 1941), p. 154.
Peter Wilson, “Introduction: The Twenty Years' Crisis and tlie Category of Tdealisin' in 
International Relations”, in Thinkers o f the Twenty Years ’ Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed, ed. 
David Long and Peter Wilson, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.6.
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However, Peter Wilson also contends that “the first great debate never actually 
occurred” as, “in the sense of a cohesive, and certainly self-conscious, school of 
thought, an ‘idealist’ or ‘utopian’ paradigm never actually existed.”"*"* ‘Idealism,’ he 
argues, was actually;
Carr’s clever device for discrediting a whole range of things he happened to 
disagree with. It is a realist category of abuse."*^
‘Idealism’ was, according to Wilson’s analysis constructed by drawing together an 
“exceedingly broad” range o f views and beliefs under a vague umbrella."*  ^
Nonetheless, a number of exchanges did take place between writers self­
consciously or subsequently classified as ‘realists’ or ‘idealists’. In particular, E.H. 
Cana’s criticisms o f Alfred Zimmern’s works are explicitly addressed by Norman 
Angell in his review of The Twenty Years’ Crisis. In this vein, and of particular 
relevance to the construction of the Grotian tradition o f international law, Hersch 
Lauterpacht also explicitly discusses the ninth chapter of The Twenty Years ’ Crisis 
entitled “Morality in International Politics” in his unpublished work, “Professor 
Carr on International Morality.” As David Davies once remarked, although there 
are certainly realists and idealists in existence, it is rare to “find a combination of
Peter Wilson, “The myth of tlie ‘First Great Debate’”, Review o f International Sliidies, Vol.24, 
Special Issue, (December 1998) p.l; see also, Lucian M. Ashwortli, Creating International Studies: 
Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition, (Aldershot; Ashgate, 1991), p.l; and, Duncan S.A. Bell, 
“Political Theory and the functions of intellectual history: a response to Eimnanuel Navon”, Review 
o f International Studies, Vol.29, (2003), p. 154. 
ibid.
ibid., p.9.
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the two in one person, the man imbued with broad sympathies who is also able to 
grasp the means by which his plans may be realised.”"*^ As will be seen shortly, this 
combination is most commonly termed the ‘Grotian tradition’ and emerged, in part, 
out of the debates that surrounded the two opposing points of view.
Natural Law and Positive Law
As Frederick G. Whelan argues, in the field o f political theory, Thomas Hobbes is 
credited with founding the doctrine of legal positivism."*^ Indeed, although he was 
followed shortly by the acknowledged founder of legal positivism in international 
law, Richard Zouche, Hobbes’ definition o f law as “ur command of. that person 
(whether man or council) whose instruction is the reason fo r  obedience, 
continues to influence positivist legal theory. In particular, the most important 
figure in the development of legal positivism, John Austin, can be shown to have 
derived his understanding of ‘law properly so called’ from Hobbes’ original 
definition.^**
Entertaining a more inclusive notion o f the positive law o f nations than that offered 
by Austin’s theory. Lassa Oppenheim defines law as “a  body o f  ndes fo r  human
David Davies, The Problem o f the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships, 
(London: Ernest Benn, 1930), p. 121-122.
Wlielan, p.36.
Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. & trans. Ricliaid Tuck and Michael Silvertliorne, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XIV. 1, p. 154.
John Austin, The Province o f Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses o f the Study of 
Jurisprudence, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954).
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conduct within which hy common consent o f  this community shall be enforced by 
external power. As such, three conditions are necessary for the existence of law; 
first, there must be a community; second, “a body o f rules for human conduct 
within that community”; and third, there must “be a common consent of that 
community that these rules shall be enforced by external p o w e r . B y  extension 
then, “the basis o f the Law of Nations is the common consent o f the member-States 
o f the Family o f Nations” and, as such, it has only two sources, express consent 
(treaties) and tacit consent ( c u s t o m ) . W i t h  this, Oppenheim introduces his 
distinctly positivist treatment o f international law. However, discounting the 
positivism of those prior to him, he writes;
From the seventies o f the nineteenth century the influence o f the downfall o f 
the theory of the Law of Nature becomes visible in the treatises on the Law 
of Nations, and therefore real ‘positivistic’ treatises make their appearance. 
For the Positivism of Zouche, Bynkershoek, Martens, Kliiber, Heffter, 
Phillimore, and Twiss was no real Positivism, since these authors recognised 
a natural Law of Nations, although they did not make much use o f it. Real 
Positivism must entirely avoid a natural Law of Nations. We know 
nowadays that a Law o f Nature does not exist. Just as the so-called natural 
philosophy had to give way to real natural science, so the Law of Nature had 
to give way to jurisprudence, or the philosophy of the positive law. Only a 
positive Law of Nations can be a branch of the science of law.
Oppenlieiin, p.6. 
ibid., p.7. 
ibid., p.20. 
^Ubid., p. 115-116.
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In accordance with his natural law focus, Hugo Grotius is granted a somewhat 
patronising treatment in Oppenheim’s history of the law o f nations. Oppenheim 
writes that “Grotius, as a child of his time, could not help starting from the Law of 
Nature, since his intention was to find such rules of a Law of Nations as were 
eternal, unchangeable, and independent of the special consent of the single 
States.”^^
However, following a more strictly conceived notion of positive law, the two “most 
prominent positivists” of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, 
reformulated Austin’s doctrine in order to conceive “international law as genuine 
(though defective) law.” *^’ According to Kelsen’s ‘pure theory o f law’, understood 
to be ‘pure’ “because it seeks to preclude from the cognition of positive law all 
elements foreign thereto”, l a w  is defined as “the specific technique of a coercive 
o r d e r . T h u s  Kelsen omits two elements of Austin’s understanding of law from 
his definition; the claim that a law is a ‘command’ and the requirement that the 
‘command’ is made by a ‘sovereign’. Austin’s assertion, he writes, is “incorrect, 
since not every command issued by someone superior in power is of a binding 
n a t u r e . T h u s ,  by removing the need for commands made by sovereigns, Kelsen 
entertains the possibility of international law existing as law, rather than simply as
ibid, p.lOl.
Whelan, p.37.
Hans Kelsen, “The Pure Theoiy of Law and Analytical Justice”, in What is Justice? Justice, Law 
and Politics in the Mirror of Science, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p.266.
Hans Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg, (Cambridge, Ma.: 
Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 20.
/W., p.3L
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positive international morality as in Austin’s theory. However, in a self-help 
international system, international law is conceived as ‘primitive law’ to be 
interpreted in a similar manner to the “institution of blood revenge (vendetta).
The relationship between law and morality in Kelsen’s theory is best understood in 
terms of his distinction between natural and positive law. The “idea of natural law”, 
he writes, “is one o f a natural order, it follows that its rules, directly as they flow 
from nature, God or reason, are as immediately evident as the rules o f logic and 
thus require no force for their realization.”*’* Positive law, on the other hand, is 
“essentially an order of coercion” and is associated with law in general, defined 
above. Contrasting the two then, Kelsen writes that “[ujnlike the rules of natural 
law,” the rules of positive law “are derived from the arbitrary will o f human 
author i ty .Pos i t ive  law consequently has little concern for principles of morality. 
As Kelsen writes;
The fundamental difference between law and morals is: law is a coercive 
order, that is, a normative order that attempts to bring about a certain 
behaviour by attaching to the opposite behaviour a socially organized 
coercive act; whereas morals is a social order without sanctions.^"*
60 -j.,.
61
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ibid., p.339.
Hans Kelsen, “Natuial Law and Legal Positivism”, in General Theory o f Law and State, p.392. 
ibid.
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory o f Law, trans. Max Knight, (Berkeley ; University of California Press, 
1967), p.62. See also Hersch Lauterpacht, “Kelsen’s Pure Science of Law”.
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Despite presenting a version of legal positivism that is, on the face of it, morally 
devoid, Kelsen and Hart do retain a minimal notion o f morality within their 
understandings of positive law. In particular. Hart concedes that “the development 
of law, at all times and places, has in fact been profoundly influenced both by 
conventional morality and ideals of particular groups, and also by forms of 
enlightened moral criticism urged by individuals, whose moral horizon has 
transcended the morality currently accepted.”**^ However, although a relationship 
between law and morality can be said to exist in this particular sense, it does not 
follow that laws necessarily “reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality.” *^’
By extension, legal positivists do not afford the concept of international society a 
great deal of attention, in some instances denying its very existence. As discussed in 
the previous chapter and as will be further elaborated in the following chapter, the 
modern concept of international society is derived, in part, from an understanding 
of international society and international law as mutually constitutive entities. As 
this specific notion of international society is founded on common moralities, 
customs and/or religious faith, it is necessarily at odds with positivist legal theory 
thus understood. As such, it is fair to conclude that the prominence of positive legal 
theory was, in an immediate sense, particularly detrimental to the development of 
the ‘Grotian tradition’. Not only did it deny the natural law underpinnings of 
international, law and severely restrict the relationship between law and morality,
65 H.L.A. Harl. The Concept of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 181.
66 •ibid.
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but it paid little attention to the concept of international society and even less to the 
figure of Hugo Grotius.^^
Contrary to the outwardly positivist stance o f Kelsen and, before him, Lassa 
Oppenheim, J.L. Brierly sought the revival o f natural law in international legal 
scholarship and with it, principles of natural morality that had appeared in Grotius’ 
works. Indeed, as Hersch Lauterpacht writes, Brierly “had no hesitation in pointing 
to the beneficent potentialities o f a revived law of nature as one of the main 
elements of the moral foundation o f international law -  for, on final analysis, he 
saw no other basis for it.”^^  Although he published a number of articles, addressing 
a wide range o f subjects pertinent to contemporary legal issues -  for example, 
whether there was a need for an international criminal court^^ - it was his inaugural 
lecture as the Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford in 
1924, “The Shortcomings o f International Law,” *^* and a book entitled The Law o f  
Nations: An Introduction to the International Law o f Peace, that have been most 
influential in subsequent scholarship.
Grotius is raeiitioned only once, in passing, in Kelsen’s General Theory o f Law and Stale, mid is 
reduced to a reference in an endnote in Hart’s The Concept of Lmr,
^ Hersch Lauterpacht, “Brierly’s Contribution to International Law”, m International Law Being the 
Collected Papers o f Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.2, (Cmnbridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p. 431.
J.L. Brierly, “Do We Need an International Criminal Court?”, British Yearbook of International 
Law, Vol.8, (1927), pp.81-88.
J.L. Brierly, “The Shortcomings of International Law”, British Yearbook o f International Law, 
Vol.5,(1924),pp.4-16.
J.L. Brierly, The Law o f Nations: An Introduction to the International Law o f Peace, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1942).
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The central argument of Brierly’s inaugural lecture contended that “international 
law lost the most faithful seed o f development that it has ever had when, far too 
early for the health of the system, though doubtless inevitably, its foundation in 
natural law was undermined.”^^  This ‘shortcoming’ Brierly attributes directly to the 
“triumph of the positive s c h o o l . I n  particular, he argues positivism undermines 
the efficacy o f international law by bringing into question its ability to enforce its 
mles. Indeed, contrary to the definition of law supplied by the extreme positivist 
legal theory of writers such as Kelsen, international law was seen to lack the 
coercive element necessary for its inclusion within the bounds of positive law. This, 
despite the existence of the distinctly positivist elements of treaties and customary 
law within its bounds. However, Brierly counters this criticism by arguing that 
although “it is true that the rules of international law are not always 
observed...neither are those o f municipal law.” "^* With this, he concludes that “it 
seems doubtful whether it would be safe to affirm that actual breaches of 
international law are much more frequent than those of municipal law.”^^  
Nonetheless, enforcement is acknowledged as one of the central shortcomings of 
international law.
Brierly, “Shortcomings”, p. 9.
ibid., p.5,
ibid.
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However, Brierly maintains that the most prominent shortcoming o f international 
law is the doctrinal dominance of legal positivism. Of particular concern is the hard 
distinction made between law and morals in most legal positivist theory and the 
extent to which it was thought to have permeated international law. In light of this 
limitation, Brierly therefore ascribed to the law of nature as the basis of 
international law and, with it, a notion o f ethics derived from its central precepts. 
He writes;
We are too often tempted to forget the link between law and morals is much 
more fundamental than the difference between them and that the ultimate 
basis of the obligation to obey the law can only be a moral one. The problem 
of the binding nature o f international law is only one aspect of the binding 
character of law in general, in the same way as the latter is no more than an 
aspect of the wider problem of obligation in general. And this is a problem 
of ethics.
Drawing a connection between natural law and morality then, Brierly argues that 
“the law of nature stands for the existence o f purpose in law, reminding us that law 
is not a meaningless set o f arbitrary principles to be mechanically applied by courts, 
but that it exists for certain ends, though these ends may have to be differently 
formulated in different times and p l a c e s . T h e s e  ‘ends’ are specifically directed 
towards the “sake of the individual in society”, rather than “a non-existent 
collective conscience” and thus ought to incorporate those fundamental moral
Brierly quoted in Lauterpacht, “Brierly’s Contribution”, p.434. 
Brierly, The Law o f Nations, p. 16.
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precepts outlined by the law o f nature/^ By thus arguing, Brierly advocates a 
“return to the Grotian conception o f the international community being not an 
association o f civitates, but a community of genus humanumf^^ Although it is not 
certain that Brierly used the term ‘Grotian’ himself, this perspective was widely 
understood to constitute a ‘Grotian’ conception of international society at the time. 
Nonetheless, Brierly was one of the last theorists to ascribe to the nineteenth 
century motto of ubi societas ibi his in international legal scholarship.
Following this line o f argument further, Brierly also argues against the idea that 
sovereigns are not subject to legal, and hence moral, obligations. He writes that 
“[t]he notion at the root o f “sovereignty” is superiority, which may be an 
appropriate notion when the internal life of the State is under analysis, but to which 
it is difficult to give a meaning when we are examining the relations of State to 
S t a t e . T w e n t y  years on he writes;
To say that the root of the evil is that states cling to their sovereignty and 
that therefore the line o f progress is to take this sovereignty away o f to 
reduce its range, does not cany the matter any further. That may be true: 
there is a sense in which it is certainly true, but all it does is to put a 
practical difficulty into a vague and abstract form which opens up endless 
opportunities for a warfare of words. Sovereignty is not a physical thing that 
a state can hand over in the way a solider hands in his kit when he is 
discharged; it is merely a word which has changed its meaning repeatedly in
Lauteipacht, “Brierly’s Contiibutioii”, p.435. 
ibid, p.436.
80 Brierly, “Shortcomings”, p. 12.
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the course of centuries o f usage, and which to-day has different meanings in 
different contexts and in the mouths of different people.^*
Thus, it is not sovereignty, as such, that is the limiting factor of international law, 
although is certainly plays a significant part, but the manner in which sovereignty 
and sovereigns are perceived. Indeed, recognising that the existence of sovereignty 
is a fact of the international system, Brierly is advocating a return to the natural law 
precept evident in Grotius’ works that states, despite their sovereignty, are entities 
with moral responsibilities and obligations indicated by law. Thus he concludes 
that;
To say that international law is a failure, if by a failure we mean that it has 
not succeeded in doing for states when they have asked o f it, is a mistake. 
For on the contrary it does what they ask it to do reasonably well on the 
whole. The real trouble is that they have not asked very much o f it.^^
A particular remedy Brierly proposes for the limited scope of international law is 
the institution of a real distinction between lawful and unlawful war, a distinction 
he attributes directly to Grotius.**  ^ According to Brierly’s reading, Grotius “saw 
clearly that international order is precarious unless that distinction can be 
established.”^^  However, to its subsequent detriment, “this distinction never became
J.L. Brierly, “Vital Interests and tlie Law”, British Yearbook o f International Law, Vol.21, (1944),
p.52.
82 ibid.
83 Brierly, The Law o f Nations, p.26.
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part o f actual international law.”^^  Indeed, “[i]t was not until the foundation o f the 
League o f Nations in 1919 that any real attempt was made... to embody in actual 
law the cardinal principle o f Grotius’s system.”^^
Finally, it is with Georg Schwarzenberger’s chapter “The Functions of International 
Morality” in Power Politics that an explicit notion of ‘Grotian morality’ appears 
once more. Here Schwarzenberger seeks to address the question o f whether or not 
moral influence can “permeate a society predominantly ruled by f o r c e . H i s  initial 
response supposes that if international law has a fimction in international society 
then “it is highly probable that morality is also not entirely alien from this sphere.” ®^ 
However, this brings him to a more serious problem: “in the relationship between 
the stars of international society, do there exist any rules identical or comparable 
with those moral norms applicable to the relations between individuals?”^^  Here, he 
writes, within the field o f international law, three approaches exist to the normative 
part of this question -  i.e. where ought morality lie in relation to international law. 
The first, ‘positivist’ approach “excludes international morality.” *^* As 
Schwarzenberger writes, “even if there were conclusive evidence in the practice of 
States of the reception o f morality into law,” proponents o f this perspective, “would
Schwarzenberger, p. 153.
ibid.
^ ibid., p. 154.
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shrink from accepting morality as a sine qua non of international law.” *^ “In 
diametrical contrast”, he writes, “a naturalist would either pin his faith to the 
superiority of natural over positive law or else equate them.”^^  Finally, standing 
between these two approaches is, predictably, the ‘Grotian tradition’, “the golden 
mean between these two extremes.”^^  Proponents of what Schwarzenberger calls 
the Grotian ‘school’ “examine customary law, treaties and the general principles of 
law as recognized by all civilized States and would search in the practice o f States 
for traces of an infiltration of morality into the system of international law and, 
accordingly, would either exclude or apply conceptions of international morality.” "^* 
As will be seen shortly, this notion o f ‘Grotian morality’ appears in a slightly 
altered form in Lauterpacht’s ‘Grotian Tradition of International Law’.
At the same time in International Relations scholarship questions o f law and 
morality were being played out in the context of a debate between realism and 
idealism. As will be seen however, although realism and legal positivism, and 
idealism and natural law are not absolutely synonymous, a number of points of 
contact can be identified between each pair.
ibid.
^  ibid.
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The ‘Idealists’
Idealism is, as Peter Wilson notes, a multifariously conceived term. It is often, 
although not always, used interchangeably with ‘utopianism’, as preferred by E.H. 
Carr or, less accurately, with liberalism .A lthough a number o f common concerns 
unite those writers subsequently classified as ‘idealists’ the parameters of 
idealism/utopianism were most explicitly defined by E.H. Carr in his attempt to 
discredit this pattern of thought. During the period with which Carr is concerned, 
President Woodrow Wilson emerged as “the world’s most influential statesman,” 
his arguments dominating the “new discipline of International Relations.”^^  Sharing 
Bentham’s faith in the liberal principles of “human reason, individual liberty, public 
opinion and social openness,”^^  Wilson and his fellow ‘idealists’ pursued peace and 
democracy, supposing conflict is not an inevitable feature of the international 
system, nor is it an inherent aspect of human nature. Highlighting these principles in 
his address to Congress asking for a declaration of war in April 1917, Wilson had 
argued:
Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in 
the life o f the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up 
amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a
Wilson. “Introduction”, p. 3-4.
^  Kniitsen, Torbjorn. A history of International Relations theory, 2"'* ed. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), p.214. 
ibid.
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concert of purpose and o f action as will henceforth ensure the observance of 
those principles.
More famously however, on 18 January 1918 Wilson set out his ‘Fourteen Points’ 
which proposed the establishment of the League of Nations;
A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
In addition to the formation of the ultimately unsuccessful League of Nations, after 
a significant amount of negotiation, Wilson’s ideas presented in the Fourteen Points 
were substantively included in the Versailles Peace Treaty that formally brought the 
First World War to an end. Upon this beginning, a range of other theorists further 
developed the fundamental ‘idealist’ principles that Wilson had proposed.
Foremost amongst those idealists involved in the foundation and establishment of 
the League o f Nations was Lord Robert Cecil (1864-1958). Indeed, Cecil is famed 
for what became known as the ‘Cecil Draft’, a document outlining the proposals of 
the Phillimore Committee appointed by Prime Minister Lloyd George, pertaining to 
the proposed structure and function o f the League of Nations. As Paul Rich notes.
^ Woodrow Wilson, “The World Must Be Made Safe for Democracy; The Fourteen Points”, From 
Address to Congress Asking for Declaration of War, April 2, 1917, in Classics of International 
Relations, 3'*^  edition, ed. Jolm A. Vasquez (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), p.36.
^ A.C. Wolwortli in Knulsen, p.206.
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not only was the Cecil Draft “taken to Paris and shown to Woodrow Wilson’s legal 
adviser David Hunter Miller along with General Jan Smuts’ 1918 pamphlet The 
League o f  Nations: A Practical Suggestion, ” but it went considerable way towards 
countering “Woodrow Wilson’s more ambitious [and impractical] ideas.”***** In 
1923, Cecil also published the manuscript of his Essex Hall lectures of 1923 
entitled The Moral Basis o f  the League o f  Nations, and in 1937 was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize.
Predictably, the central argument of Cecil’s work maintained that “the League of 
Nations must have a moral basis.”**** This, he reasoned, was due to the fact that the 
League stood for “peace as opposed to war, [and] for cooperation between nations 
as opposed to hostility,” concluding that “it does not seem possible for anyone, 
however prejudiced he may be, to doubt that there is a moral basis for such a 
movement as that.”***^ Although he doesn’t go into a great deal o f detail as to 
precisely what this moral basis entails, his refutation o f the range of criticisms 
leveled at the supposed ‘moral basis of the league of nations’ make it clear that he is 
specifically talking about Christian morality.***  ^ Indeed, the most concrete statement 
it is possible to locate in Cecil’s work is that which maintains that “the State is an
Paul Rich, “Alfred Zimmem’s Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations. International 
Education and the Commonwealth”, in Thinkers o f the Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 84.
Lord Robert Cecil, The Moral Basis o f  the League o f Nations, The Essex Hall Lecture, 1923, 
(London: The Lindsay Press, 1923), p.7.
/W ., p.7-8. 
ibid., p. 10.
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individual, a moral individual, and is subject as such to moral law”***"* and that 
moral principles include “the pursuit o f justice, honour, generosity, and mercy.” ***^ 
Although Gilbert Murray is slightly more forthcoming, focusing on love as a central 
“characteristic of the struggle for life,”***^ it is in the writings of Alfred Zimmern 
that the most clearly argued presentation of the relationship between law and 
morality in idealist thought is found.
In 1930, “with the strong support of Gilbert Murray”, Alfred Zimmern was 
“appointed Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford.”***^ 
Prior to his appointment he held the position of deputy director of the League of 
Nations International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation and had contributed to 
the proposals of the Cecil Draft. In 1945 he became the first secretary-general of 
UNESCO. Although he published a number o f significant works during his career, 
Zimmern’s most famous work. The League o f  Nations and the Rule o f Law 1918- 
1935 was published in 1936 and has been subsequently heralded the “most polished 
work of the ‘idealist’ writers.” ***^ As Paul Rich points out however, Zimmern’s was
ibid., p. 12. 
ibid., p. 15.
Gilbert Murray, “Peace and Strife as Elements in Life: Tlie Ideal of “Unliindered Activity””, in 
The Ordeal o f this Generation: The War, the League and the Future, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1929), p. 18.
Rich, p.80.
Alfred E. Zimmern, The League o f Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935, (London: Macmillan, 
1936); Hedley Bull, “Tlie Theoiy of International Politics, 1919-1969”, in International Theory: 
Critical Investigations, (Houiidsinill: Macmillan, 1995), p. 186.
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a ‘cautious idealism’ steeped in criticism of liberal institutionalist naivety.***  ^ In 
particular, Zimmern was especially critical o f J.A. Hobson’s support for world 
government. He writes;
What Mr. Hobson really desires is a World-Govemment, and I wish he had 
said so. Probably he did not do so because he thought the title sounded too 
chimerical. But in reality there is nothing inconceivable or intrinsically 
impossible in the establishment of a world-government. The real difficulty is 
to establish free world-government -  to ensure universal peace without the 
sacrifice of liberty.****
As Hobson’s ideal o f world government does not take into consideration the 
possible loss o f liberty it would entail, Zimmern concludes that it “and all other 
similar schemes fall to the ground.”*** Published in 1922, his less well known work 
Europe in Convalescence “anticipated some o f the arguments of The Twenty Years ’ 
Crisis by stressing how the ‘internationalist doctrines o f liberalism’ had been 
remoralized by ‘small, semi-religious coteries’ in Britain and the United States after 
a long period between 1871 and 1914 when they had been driven from the 
mainstream of European thought.”**^
'*^Rich, p.82-3.
Alfred E. Zimmern, “Nationality and Govenmient”, in Nationality and Government with other 
War-Time Essays, (London: Cliatlo & Windiis, 1918), p.39.
ibid., p.40.
” ^Rich, p. 83.
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In accordance with his criticisms o f Hobson’s work, Zimmern’s liberalism is based 
on “two fundamental articles of faith”;
The first is that right and wrong apply to public affairs. The second is that 
Justice and Liberty are the chief political goods, and Injustice and Servitude 
the chief political evils.
As will be seen, these two articles o f faith permeate Zimmern’s subsequent 
writings. As D.J. Markwell notes, four ideas are central to Zimmern’s ‘idealist’ 
thought. First is a belief in progress, and in particular the idea that education is an 
essential tool in the quest for peace.**"* Indeed, the primacy of education was 
particularly apparent in Zimmern’s inaugural lecture as the Montague Burton 
Professor at Oxford;
We find ourselves, through no fault of our own, in a world in which the 
barbarians, in the shape o f  the international economic forces which mould 
our existence, have assumed the mantle and have become accustomed to 
exercising it...O ur choice is between attempting to civilize the barbarians 
and abandoning our own city. It is between cooperation and exile from the 
world’s life; between internationalism and monasticism; between an effort at 
Hellenization, by whatever means may be at hand, or acquiescence in 
catastrophe and a return to the Dark Ages.**^
Zimmern, Nationaliy and Government, p.xvi.
D.J. Markwell, “Sir Alfred Zimmern revisited: fifty years on”. Review o f International Studies,
Vol. 12, (1986), p.284.
 ^ Zimmern quoted in Rich, p.86-7.
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As will be seen shortly however, the failure of Zimmern’s ‘education project’ to 
explain the failure of collective security following the beginning of the dissolution 
of the League of Nations was particularly set upon by E.H. Carr.
Secondly, contrary to the conventional realist position, Zimmern maintained that 
war was not an inherent feature o f the international system but rather that a “latent 
harmony of interests” could be identified as existing between states.**^ On this 
basis, and that of his third central idea, Zimmern posits the existence o f an 
international society. Thus, third is “an understanding o f the rule o f law and its 
dependence on international society.”**^  In particular, referring to the works of 
Gilbert Murray, Zimmern argues that the prevention o f war required, in part, the 
extension of international law. He writes;
One road lies through the development of what is known as International, 
but should more properly be called Inter-State Law, through the revival o f a 
former and broader foundation o f the Concert of Europe conceived by the 
Congress of Vienna just a hundred years ago -  itself a revival, on a secular 
basis, of the great medieval ideal of international Christendom, held together 
by Christian Law and Christian ideals. That ideal faded away for ever at the 
Reformation, which grouped Europe into independent sovereign States ruled
Markwell, p.284.
284
by men responsible to no one outside their own borders. It will never be 
revived on an ecclesiastical basis.
Thus, the final element of Zimmern’s thought is a notion o f international society, 
incorporating inter-state law and taking the form of a ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. 
It is here that a sense o f the relationship between law and morality in his thinking is 
most apparent. Characterising the central features of a Commonwealth, Zimmern 
writes;
A Commonwealth is an organisation designed with the ruling motive of love 
and brotherhood. It seeks to embody, not only in phraseology and 
constitutional doctrine, but in the actual conduct of public affairs, so far as 
the frailty and imperfection o f a man admit, the spirit and ideals of 
religion. *
Thus, although a new concert of Europe or commonwealth o f nations would 
necessarily be founded on secular principles it would, nonetheless, retain an 
ecclesiastically derived moral sense:
That problem is incapable o f solution till men have come to regard States as 
moral personalities with duties as well as rights: till all the leading States, 
tlii'ough the public opinion o f their free citizens, have come to regard their 
duty to humanity as prior to the safe-guarding of their selfish puiposes: and
118 Alfred E. Ziimnern, “German Culture and tlie British Commonwealtli” from “The War and 
Democracy” (published December 1914), 'm Nationality and Government, p.23.
Alfred E. Zimmeni, “Tluee Doctrines in Conflict”, in Nationality and Government, p.356.
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until there is a far closer agreement among the civilized peoples than seem 
possible to-day as to the principles which should underlie the ultimate 
organisation of the world on the basis o f morality and justice.
Thus, the ‘moral sense’ o f Zimmern’s understanding derives its central principles 
from the law o f nature.
However, when Reinhold Niebuhr accused the idealists of occasioning 
“considerable moral and political confusion” he was not far from the truth. 
Although a number o f specific principles emerge from the fog of idealist thought 
with some degree of clarity, for example those maintaining that states have moral 
personalities, and that international society and international law exist together in an 
intrinsic relationship to one another, precisely what this morality they purport to 
apply to states entails remains both vague and imprecise. Thus, although the term 
‘morality’ is bandied about as if to suggest that its meaning is fixed and devoid of 
all contention, it can only be understood by gleaning a hazy sense of what it might 
entail from a range of disparate works.
Although many writers categorised as ‘idealists’ are also simultaneously understood 
to be ‘Grotians’, the figure of Hugo Grotius and indeed, the term ‘Grotian’ itself, 
appears relatively infrequently in the idealist works mentioned above. What is
Zinunenr "Nationality and Government", p.60. 
Reinliold Niebuhr quoted in Knutsen, p.216.
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more, when Grotius’ works are mentioned, they are very often accompanied by 
downright bizarre interpretations, for example, David Davies’ absurd claim that 
“Grotius had little or no idea of the natural law o f States. Rather, for Davies, the 
term ‘Grotian’ indicates the acknowledgement of a relationship between municipal 
and international law whilst for Schwarzenberger, introduced above; it is a 
distinctly moral determination. As such, it appears that just as no one single 
understanding o f what the term ‘idealism’ entails, no single notion o f the ‘Grotian’ 
can be discerned within its porous bounds.
The Realist Challenge
Although the work of the radical American theologian Reinhold Neibuhr, Moral 
Man and Immoral Society, published in 1932,^^^ is widely characterised as the first 
sustained critique o f ‘idealist’ thought, in British international relations scholarship 
it was with E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis that ‘idealist’ thought ran into 
serious intellectual trouble. A former diplomat and Foreign Officer adviser, Carr 
was appointed to the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Relations at the 
University o f Wales, Aberystwyth in 1936. His appointment was much to the 
chagrin o f the founder o f the Wilson Chair, David Davies, a committed idealist who 
had expected the holder of the position “to lay down such rules and suggest such 
measures as may tend to diminish the evils o f war and finally to extinguish war 
between n a t i o n s . C a r r  certainly did not fit his ‘ideal’ profile and, as Tim Dunne
Davies, p. 162.
Reinliold Niebulu , Mora/Ma/7 and Immoral Society, (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1932). 
Ronald Roxburgh, “Preface” in Oppenlieim, International Law, p.v.
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writes, represented the ‘final nail’ in Davies’ idealist c o f f i n . I n d e e d ,  Carr’s 
inaugural lecture, “Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace”, delivered on October 
14, 1936, certainly raised Davies’ ire, along with that of his compatriot Gilbert 
Murray and the international legal scholar, Hersch Lauterpacht. In particular, Carr 
had argued specifically against Davies’ proposal for the establishment of an 
international police force to prevent the escalation of conflicts at their outset that 
formed the substantive argument of his 1930 text The Problem o f  the Twentieth
Century. 126
I do not believe [said Carr] the time is ripe...for the establishment of a 
super-national force to maintain order in the international community; and I 
believe that any scheme by which nations should bind themselves to go to 
war with other nations for the preservation of peace is not only 
impracticable, but retrograde.
In response to this, and Carr’s apparent insufficient commitment to the demands of
the Chair, Davies wrote some time later;
I wish to God I had never initiated this proposal. Almost since the inception 
of this department it has worked consistently against the programme I have 
spent most of my time and money advocating; namely, the development of 
the League with a real international authority. All the professors from
Tim Duime, Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School, (London: 
Macmillan, 1998), p.25.
Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century.
E.H. Carr quoted in Brian Porter, “David Davies and tlie Enforcement of Peace”, in Thinkers of
the Twenty Years’ Crisis, p.69.
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Zimmern onwards opposed these ideas, with the result that we have been 
landed in another...war.^^^
Despite Davies’ protestations, Carr went on to become perhaps the most influential 
figure in British international relations theory of the twentieth century.
With Carr, the ‘idealism’ o f theorists such as Zimmern, Angell and Davies became 
‘utopianism’ although, as Peter Wilson points out, it was more accurately a “realist 
category o f abuse” used to vilify “practically everyone who disagree[d]” with 
him.^^® As Lauterpacht argues in a paper delivered at the Carlyle Club in 1953, “On 
Realism, Especially in International Relations”, the use of the terms ‘realism’ and 
‘utopianism’ were value-laden from the outset. Realism, he argues, “is an assertion 
of victory even before the argument has started. It is an attempt to reduce the 
opponent at the very outset, to a lower intellectual status and to gain the confidence
of others.” ^^ * Indeed, as Carr writes;
The antithesis of utopia and reality can in some aspects be identified with 
the antithesis of Free Will and Determinism. The utopian is necessarily 
voluntarist: he believes in the possibility o f more or less radically rejecting 
reality, and substituting his utopia for it by an act of will. The realist
David Davies quoted in Porter, ibid, p.70.
Peter Wilson, “The myth of the ‘First Great Debate’”, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 24, 
Special Issue, (December 1998) p.l.
Lauterpacht, “Professor Carr on International Morality”, p.68.
131 Lauterpacht, “On Realism”, p. 53.
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analyses a predetermined course of development which he is powerless to 
change.
With this, Carr’s realist theory o f international relations was developed as an 
inevitable process to which human society is subject. Drawing heavily on 
Mannheim’s ‘sociology of knowledge’ and Marxist notions of interests and 
social re l a t io n s ,C a r r  argues that contrary to the assumptions of idealism, conflict 
over interests is inevitable in international society. More specifically, he argues that 
one of the central characteristics of the world is the scarcity o f those things 
necessaiy for life, and in particular a good life. Conflict is inevitable as the stronger 
‘haves’, in order to maintain their status and possession o f these goods in an 
anarchical international system, impose ‘ethical’ laws and rules upon the weaker 
‘have-nots’, who ignore these rules as they try to improve their situation. As 
such, the inevitability o f conflict was contrasted with the ‘utopian’ vision of 
harmony in the international sphere, instigating what came to be known as the ‘first 
great debate’.
Carr’s specific criticisms of the idealist vision of morality in international relations 
begins with the observation that writers such as Zimmern, Angell and Toynbee 
concentrated their interests “on the question of what morality ought ideally to be”
Carr. p.l2. 
see ibid, p. 15, 65. 
see ibid, p.62-67. 
ibid, p.42.
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rather than on the actual “moral behaviour of states except to pass hasty and 
sweeping condemnation on it in the light of this ideal morality.” Actual 
“international morality”, he argues, is not a Tofty ideal’ o f desirable behaviour but 
actually “/y the morality o f s t a t e s . H o w e v e r ,  the affirmed existence of the 
‘morality o f states’ does not infer that states have moral rights and duties cognisant 
of those of individuals. The fundamental reason Carr gives for this point of 
disjuncture is that states are not capable of displaying “love, hate, jealousy and 
other intimate emotions which play a large part in individual morality.” However, 
as hinted at above, Carr does not dismiss the existence of international morality 
altogether.
According to Carr’s realist/utopian division of international thought, “[tjheories of 
international morality tend to fall into two categories.” On the one hand are the 
realists who “hold that relations between states are governed solely by power and 
that morality plays no part in them”, whilst on the other are the ‘Utopians’ who 
maintain that “the same code of morality is applicable to individuals and to 
states.” By conceding the existence o f some form of international morality that 
does not align the moral rights and duties o f individuals and states, Carr stands 
somewhere between these two extremes. Thus, he argues that “the morality o f the
Carr, p. 135.
Carr, p. 138.
/W ., p. 139. 
ibid., p. 143. 
ibid., p. 140.
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State must be confined to that formal kind o f morality which can be codified in a set 
of rules and approximates to law, and that it cannot include such essentially 
personal qualities as altruism, generosity and compassion, whose obligations can 
never be precisely and rigidly defined.” As a result, morality comes to be defined 
in terms of the “good of the state.” Thus, “[hjarmony in the international order is 
achieved by [a] blend o f morality and power” in which “the role o f power is greater 
and morality less.” '^*'*
This, along with a range o f other aspects o f Carr’s work inspired very strong 
reactions, particularly from those whom he had singled out for criticism. For 
example, Norman Angell, “was particularly disturbed by Carr’s apparent ‘moral 
nihilism’ which led to a policy of ‘donothingism and over-caution 
Furthermore, although Zimmern agreed with some o f Carr’s more stringent 
criticisms of the naïve utopianism o f figures such as Woodrow Wilson, he argued 
that the teaching o f international relations “had to be done from some ethical 
standpoint and this could not be done ‘by running away from the notion of good 
because it is liable to misuse by the ignorant, the muddle-headed and the ill- 
intentioned or by refusing to admit that one foreign policy o f one nation or one 
political cause can be “better” than another.” However, of greatest relevance to
ibid, p. 143. 
ibid., p. 145-6. 
ibid, p. 150,151. 
Rich, p.88.
146 Zimmern quoted in Rich, ibid.
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the development of the Grotian tradition were those criticisms expressed by Hersch 
Lauterpacht.
Lauterpacht’s critique constitutes a two-pronged attack on the subject of realism in 
general and, in particular, what he views as Carr’s morally deficient version of it. 
He doesn’t mince words with either, writing that;
...realism is an inducement to facile and complacent thinking; that, as a 
method o f argument and discussion it may often be, in effect, open to the 
charge of being intellectually dishonest; that it is a convenient and much 
abused cloak for opportunism or worse; and that it has tended to treat with 
contempt long-range principle as a standard of human action and to deny the 
value of human will as an agency shaping the destiny o f men.^ "^ ^
In particular, Lauterpacht was especially concerned with both the extent to which 
realists magnify the apparent immorality o f states and the “double standard of 
morality” they proposed to apply to states and individuals. On the first of these 
issues, he writes that there “has been an almost fatalistic tendency to assume that 
modern States do habitually act in a manner offending against the generally 
accepted conceptions o f morality.” However, Lauterpacht questions the extent to 
which states actually act in contravention o f conventionally accepted principles o f 
morality, adding that although war certainly represents “an imperfection of 
international law and of international organization”, it does not indicate an
Lauterpacht, “On Realism”, p. 53.
ibid., p.60; Lauleipacht, “Professor Cair”, p.72.
Lauterpacht, “Professor Carr”, p.72.
293
imperfection o f international morality. On the second of these issues, the 
relationship between state and individual morality, Lauterpacht argues that realists 
cannot conceive of a level o f synonymy here because they are blinkered by a vision 
of the state as an immoral entity. Thus he writes that while Carr is right to point out 
that the “personification o f the State is one o f the central aspects of the problem of 
international morality”, he not correct “in assuming that the problem began with the 
personification of the State.”^^  ^ Indeed, by denying that “the same standards are 
applicable to the morality of States and individuals....Professor Carr’s general 
thesis -  although adroitly dissociated from that of the ‘realist’ -  amounts in fact to a 
denial o f international morality” in its claim that international morality can be 
simply equated with the good of the state. As will be seen shortly, it was with 
these issues in mind that Lauterpacht set about constructing the Grotian tradition o f 
international law.
Hersch Lauterpacht * Grotian Tradition^
Although Hersch Lauterpacht is not conventionally considered a major figure in the 
history o f International Relations, his influence upon its subsequent development, 
particularly in British scholarship, is significant. Not only did he address the central 
precepts of realist thought and engage E.H. Cair’s variant of it, but he was an active 
member of the League o f Nations Union, a member of the British War Crimes
ibid., p.72-3.
ib id , p.68.
’"2 ib id , p.77-78.
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Executive, in which capacity he attended the Nuremberg Trials and, o f course, the 
mastermind o f the ‘Grotian tradition of international law’. An orthodox Jew, fluent 
from a young age in Yiddish and Hebrew, Lauterpacht was born in 1897 in Lwôw, 
then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He completed his first doctoral 
dissertation on “The Mandate Under International Law” ^^  ^under the supervision of 
Hans Kelsen at the University o f Vienna who, noting his “extraordinary intellectual 
capacity,” wrote that Lauterpacht was one of his best students. In 1923 
Lauterpacht moved to London where he re-enrolled as a doctoral student at the 
London School o f Economics and produced his second thesis, “Private Law 
Sources and Analogies of International Law” under the guidance of his mentor, and 
later friend, Arnold McNair. As it is famously told, for much o f his academic life, 
Lauterpacht adorned the wall o f his study with three pictures, a photo each of 
Kelsen and McNair, and an engraving o f Hugo Grotius. Indeed, as will be seen, 
although Lauterpacht disagreed with Kelsen’s dismissal of natural law from the 
central precepts of international law, he “was impressed by the constructivist 
imagination at play in the Pure Theory o f Law.” ^^  ^His first published article was an 
assessment of the contribution of John Westlake to the development o f International 
Law entitled “Westlake and Modern Day International Law” ^^  ^ that sought to
Unfortunately the only copy of Lauterpacht’s diesis was kept in the arcliives of the University of 
Vienna wliich was bombed during the Second World War. As Lauterpacht did not keep a copy 
liimself it was lost forever.
Hans Kelsen and Lord McNair, “Tributes to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht”, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol.8, No.2, (1997), p.309.
Koskenniemi, p.356.
This article was first published in Economica, Vol.5, (1925), pp.307-325 but also appears in 
Collected Papers, Vol.2, pp.385-403.
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demonstrate, by reference to Westlake’s treatise that absolute adherence to one or 
the other of the leading legal doctrines o f the time, natural law and positivism, was 
not necessary. Rather, international law ought to be viewed as incorporating aspects 
of both legal traditions.
Shortly after the completion of his dissertation, Lauterpacht was employed as a 
lecturer at the London School of Economics before being appointed Reader in 
Public International Law at the University of London in 1932. In 1936 he was 
called to the Bar at Gray’s Inn and in 1938 became the Whewell Professor of 
International Law at Cambridge. Tragically, Lauterpacht’s entire family was killed 
in the early stages o f the Holocaust and, as Koskenniemi suggests, this pivotal event 
in his life may well have inspired the shift towards human rights in his later 
w o r k s . D u r i n g  his lifetime he published five major works in international law; 
Private Sources and Analogies o f  International Law (with Special Reference to 
International Arbitration) (1927), The Function o f  Law in the International 
Community (1933), Recognition in International Law (1947), International Law 
and Human Rights (1950) and The Development o f  International Law by the 
International Court (1958). Lauterpacht also served as the editor of the British 
Yearbook o f International Law and edited four editions of Oppenheim's
Koskenniemi. p.3 88.
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International Law. An edited collection o f his own papers was published in four 
volumes by his son Elihu Lauterpacht in the 1970s/^^
Lauterpacht defines international law as follows:
International Law is the body o f rules of conduct, enforceable by external 
sanction which confer rights and impose obligations primarily, although not 
exclusively, upon sovereign States and which owe their validity both to the 
consent of States as expressed in custom and treaties and to the fact of the 
existence of an international community of States and individuals. In that 
sense international law may be defined, more briefly (though perhaps less 
usefully), as the law of the international community.
Thus, Lauterpacht ascribes to the notion that international law is an element of 
international society. Refuting those who doubt the existence o f an international 
community or international society, he argues in an unpublished paper that “reality 
shows a picture o f the modern world as one o f common solidarity and community
For an oiitline of what is contained in tliese works see Wilfred Jenlcs, “Hersch Lauterpacht -  The 
Scholar as Prophet”, Yearbook o f  International Law, Vol.26, (1960), pp. 1-103.
For more biograpliical accounts of Lauterpacht see die European Journal o f International Law, 
Vol.8, No.2, (1997) which dedicated a section to him and includes die following articles; Ian 
Scobbie, “The Tlieorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judicial 
Function”, pp.264-298; Chaim Herzog, “Sir Hersch Lauteipacht: An Appraisal”, pp.299-300; Robert 
Jennings, “Hersch Lauteipacht: A Personal Recollection”, pp.301-304; Stephen M. Schwebel, 
“Hersch Lauterpacht: Fragments for a Portrait”, pp.305-308; as well as the tributes of Kelsen and 
McNair mentioned above and a version the chapter of Mai tti Koskenniemi s The Gentle Civilizer o f 
Nations dealing widi the life and works of Hersch Lauterpacht.
Hersch Lauterpacht, “Tlie Definition and Natine of International Law and its Place in 
Jurisprudence”, in Collected Papers, Vol.l, p.9.
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of interests in the field o f economic endeavour and of scientific pursuit o f 
humanitarian assistance -  a unity transcending the borders of the sovereign State in 
a manner which has led many to believe that the exclusive and self-sufficing 
sovereign State is a challenge to a higher and ever present reality, and that 
interdependence and not independence is the primary and fundamental fact with 
which we are inescapably confronted.”^^  ^ More publicly however, he presents a 
similar argument in a Royal Institute of International Affairs paper that;
This essential and manifold solidarity, coupled with the necessity of 
securing the rule o f law and the elimination o f war, constitutes a harmony o f 
interest which has a basis more real and tangible than the illusions o f the 
sentimentalist or the hypocrisy o f those satisfied with the existing status 
quoJ^ ^
For Lauterpacht, this solidarity was expressed in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, the “fundamental charter of the international society.” However, with its 
failure to fulfil its “principal objective” of collective security following the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s incursions in Abyssinia, Lauterpacht’s vision of 
the structure of international law was in serious trouble. Indeed, in what
Hersch Lauleipacht, “Sovereignly and Federation in International Law”, in International Law 
Being the Collected Papers o f  Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.3, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.6.
Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Reality of the Law of Nations”, in International Law Being the 
Collected Papers o f Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.2, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p.25.
Hersch Lauterpacht, “Japan and tlie Covenant”, p. 175.
Koskenniemi, p.353.
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Koskenniemi quite rightly calls an “uncharacteristic jump into informality and 
engagement”, Lauterpacht revealed his anxiety to his colleagues at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs with the following stream of questions;
But what have we to do in the meantime? Ought we to abandon the League 
and start afresh as soon as the obstacles disappear? Ought we to maintain it 
and to adapt it to the needs of a retrogressive period? Ought we to pursue the 
ideal of universality by reforming the League so as to make it acceptable for 
everyone? Ought we to admit that if peace cannot be achieved by collective 
effort, there are other good things that can be achieved through it?^^^
It appears that with this in mind, Lauterpacht dedicated much o f his subsequent 
writing to establishing the theoretical basis for a more resolute basis for the 
regulation of conflict by the instrument of international law within international 
society.
As Koskenneimi notes, it was to the nineteenth century and, in particular, the works 
of John Westlake, that Lauterpacht turned in this endeavour. As mentioned 
above, Lauterpacht had long held that Westlake’s dual vision o f international law 
could provide, not only a more stable basis for its functioning in the twentieth 
century but could also facilitate the resuscitation of the liberal rationalism that had 
marked such late nineteenth century legal scholarship. In this vein, Lauterpacht’s
ibid., p.353-354.
Hersch Lauterpacht, “The League of Nations”, in International Law Being the Collected Papers 
of Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol.3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
p.583.
Koskenniemi, p.355.
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project required not only the continued refutation of legal positivist principles and 
its sceptical appraisal o f the reality and efficacy of international law, but a critical 
assessment of the applicability of liberal ideals, derived from the law of nature, to 
modern international law. On the first of these challenges Lauterpacht was able to 
draw on a long history o f writing against the fundamental tenets of legal positivism. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, despite displaying both affection and almost 
overwhelming respect for his mentor Hans Kelsen, Lauterpacht did not adhere to 
the principles o f the Pure Theory o f  Law. Rather, his early works, Private Law 
Sources and Analogies o f  International Law and The Function o f  Law in the 
International Community argue that international law is no less a system of law than 
civil law. In doing so, he argues against the treatment of “fundamental questions of 
international law apart from the corresponding phenomena in other fields of law” 
that mark the legal positivist approach. With this, Kelsen and Hart’s arguments 
that international law is a ‘primitive’ form o f law are refuted. What is more, 
Lauterpacht also attacks positivism in more substantive terms, arguing that it fails to 
adhere to the universal principles o f science, namely, “logical consistency and 
correspondence with f a c t s . I n  particular, he questioned the positivist claim that 
states are the sole source of international law by arguing that the mere existence of 
law instituted by states is fundamentally based on the principle o f pacta sunt 
servanda, a norm not explicitly derived from the will o f states. By doing so, as
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function o f Law in the International Community, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1933), p.248.
Kelsen, General Theory, p. 103.
Koskennneimi, p.364; Function o f Law, pp.416-420. 
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Koskenniemi writes, Lauterpacht attacks “positivism on its own terrain of scientific 
factuality without having to resort to the moralizing rhetoric of naturalism or the 
formalism of the pure theory o f law.”^^  ^However, as will be seen shortly, although 
he conceived a fundamental place for it in international law he was not strictly a 
proponent of natural law either. Rather, he viewed himself as a “progressive” and 
promulgated limited range of liberal ideals.
The Grotian Tradition
‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ was published in 1946 following the 
tercentenary o f Grotius’ death in 1945. As Elihu Lauterpacht writes, his father 
considered this article “probably the most important that he ever wrote.”^^  ^ Indeed, 
this article represents the culmination of his thinking to date and has certainly 
exerted the greatest influence on the subject o f international relations. Lauterpacht’s 
motivations in composing this piece are made clear at the outset. In particular, he 
thinks it significant that, unlike the manner in which the tercentenary of publication 
o ïD e Jure Belli ac P ads  was celebrated in 1925, the three hundredth anniversary 
of his death had “passed almost unnoticed” in 1945.^ "^^  As Lauterpacht had made 
clear in a paper delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham 
House five years earlier, he considered the “decade preceding the Second World 
War as one of a period of retrogression.” However, even with the peace of 1945,
ibid., p.365.
Elihu Lauterpacht, editor’s note to “The Grotian Tradition”, p.307. 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ibid.
Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Reality of the Law of Nations”, p.25.
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this retrogression had not been satisfactorily addressed as international law 
remained “unable to impose its authority over the essentials o f the new international 
system.”^^  ^ Lauterpacht sought to contribute to the solution of this problem by 
proposing the solidification of international law via the reformulation of the 
‘Grotian tradition’.
Two distinct, yet inter-related variants of the ‘Grotian tradition’ are evident in 
Lauterpacht’s work and, although he does not include a discussion o f the concept of 
‘tradition’ itself within their explication, a number o f related ideas can be discerned 
from his other works. In a general sense, he implores his undergraduate students to 
“distrust labels” highlighting the manner in which titles attached to particular 
persons and sets of ideas bring with them an expectation of content. The second 
‘clue’ as to Lauterpacht’s understanding of tradition is found in his characterisation 
of the natural law tradition of which he writes; “[o]f course, it is not the old law of 
nature; it is rather the modern ‘natural law with changing contents’, ‘the sense of 
right’, ‘the social solidarity’, the ‘engineering’ law in terms of promoting the ends 
of the international society.” That Lauterpacht seems to equate natural law 
directly with tradition, understanding it to be the traditional approach to the subject 
of international law, would seem to indicate that his vision o f ‘tradition’ is a
Lauterpacht, “Grotian Tradition”, p.307. 
Lauterpacht, “On Realism”, p.65.
178 Hersch Lauteipacht, “Westlake and Present Day International Law”, in International Law Being 
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particularly fluid one in which traditions are capable of withstanding significant 
shifts in their contents.
The third indication of Lauterpacht’s understanding of the term ‘tradition’ is 
couched in the particular details o f the first notion of the ‘Grotian tradition’ he 
discusses. Here Lauterpacht simply employs the same ‘Grotian tradition’ that had 
previously appeared in a different form in the works of James Kent, Henry Wheaton 
and John Westlake, and with its current title in Lassa Oppenheim’s International 
Law. Thus, in a conventional sense, the ‘Grotian tradition’ simply stands as an 
intermediary pattern of thought between the contending natural and positive law 
traditions, achieving a “synthesis of natural law and State practice.” Grotius, 
Lauterpacht writes, is “impossible to classify... as belonging to any o f the accepted 
schools of thought” and, furthermore, cannot even be considered a ‘Grotian’. As 
will be seen shortly however, Lauterpacht directly contradicts this claim later with 
the assertion that Grotius viewed both consent and natural law as the dual 
foundations o f international law.^^® However, what is important here is the fact that 
with regard to this particular variant of the ‘Grotian tradition’, Lauterpacht 
understood the term ‘tradition’ in particularly vague and imprecise terms. Thus in 
his later work. Human Rights and International Law he writes;
When, in 1758, Vattel was calling his treatise Le Droit des Gens, ou
Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et atix affaires des
Lauterpacht, “Grotian Tradition”, p.311. 
p.329.
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Nations et des Souveraifis, he was giving expression to one of the salient 
features of modern international law. In this respect -  the recourse to natural 
law -  there was only a difference of emphasis between the so-called 
naturalists, Grotians, and positivists. The rigid distinction between these 
three schools o f thought was an afterthought of the positivist period in the 
twentieth centuiy -  a period which was but of short duration.’^^
As such, this variant o f the Grotian tradition is an analytical one retaining no 
necessary connection to Grotius. It is simply a classification device although, as 
made apparent in the discussion above, the bounds of its categories must not be 
seen as absolute. However, it is the second variant of the ‘Grotian tradition’ that is 
of greatest significance to its subsequent development. Many points of contact with 
the first -  can in many ways be seen as an attempt to argue simultaneously against 
realist and extreme idealist thought and both legal positivism and pure natural law, 
by interpreting Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac P ads  as the universal via media.
The Grotian Tradition II
The second variant of the ‘Grotian tradition’ evident in Lauterpacht’s work is 
derived directly from the works o f Hugo Grotius and has, as its central focus, the 
position of morality in international law. Although Lauterpacht’s reasons for 
choosing Grotius as the namesake o f his crusade are manifold including, for 
example, the assertion that he is “the acknowledged greatest exponent of the Law of
181 Lauleipacht, Human Rights and International Relations, (London; Steven & Sons, 1950), p. 115.
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Nations”/^^ it is his characterisation o f Grotius as a moral figurehead that is of 
greatest significance. Thus, he writes that De Jure Belli ac P ads  has about it “an 
atmosphere of strong conviction, o f reforming zeal, o f moral fervour” and that these 
qualities were “also typical o f Grotius himself.” Two pages on he continues that 
“[w]hat Grotius did was to endow international law with unprecedented dignity and 
authority by making it part not only o f a general system of jurisprudence but also of 
a universal moral code.” ^^ '^  Finally, the adulation concludes with the claim that De 
Jure Belli ac P ads  “satisfied the craving, in jurist and layman alike, for a moral 
content in the law.” ^^  ^ Thus, not only is the ‘Grotian tradition’ to be a moral 
tradition incorporating the principles o f “generosity, gratitude, pity [and] charity”, 
but they are thought to be derived explicitly from Grotius himself.
The first substantive section of Lauterpacht’s article is devoted to the 
characterisation of Hugo Grotius and an overview of his general theory of the law 
of nations. Brushing aside with “astonished impatience” claims that De Jure Belli 
ac P ads  is a “superficial, hasty, and pretentious production”, Lauterpacht continues 
his adoration of Grotius by arguing that it is “a dazzling exhibition of learning. 
Despite the continuous praise however, the work is not without serious problems. 
First Lauteipacht notes that Grotius’ understanding of the law o f nature is often 
vague and changeable remarking that “we are often at a loss as to the true meaning
ibid., p.308. 
ibid., p.361. 
/W .. p.363.
ibid., p.364. 
ibid., p.310.
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which he attaches” to it/^^ In large part, this observation is inspired by 
Lauterpacht’s desire to reconcile the apparent secularisation o f Grotius’ natural law 
with its distinctly ecclesiastical foundations. As it is clearly neither possible nor 
desirable to attempt to enforce an artificial coherence on Grotius’ thought, 
Lauterpacht makes the unsatisfactory conclusion that Grotius ‘oscillated’ between 
two conceptions of the law of nature, favouring the secular variant but “resort[ing] 
to God for assistance” when it did not provide him with the arguments he was 
searching for.^^  ^This reasoning seems to indicate an overwhelming lack of comfort 
in ascribing particular religious persuasions to intellectual scholars that would not 
be surprising given his family history and Zionist sentiments.
The second problem Lauterpacht finds with De Jure Belli ac P ads  is that it 
apparently abandons his original objective, “the humanization o f the conduct of 
war.”^^ However, Lauterpacht seems to equate ‘humanization’ with the complete 
‘obviation’ of war’s inhumane practices. Although he concedes that for Grotius to 
rule all war unjust would render his work meaningless in a world of continual 
conflict, Lauterpacht seeks the legal abolition o f the inhumanity o f war. In doing so, 
he implies that the principles o f humanity, charity and honour which accompanied 
Grotius’ call for temperamenta in war do not constitute a satisfactory ‘humanization 
o f the conduct of war’.^ ^^  In large part, this can also be attributed to his
ibid.. p.314. 
ibid., p.316. 
ibid., p.319. 
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unwillingness to consider the force of the Christian elements of Grotius’ writings. 
Thus he writes that the general in the field would likely not consider an impending 
battle the “proper occasion for exhibiting the virtues of Christian charity -  kindly 
and humane as they may have been as individuals.” Rather, contrary to Grotius’ 
firm belief that Christians ought to exhibit Christian morals at all times, particularly 
in the conduct of war, Lauterpacht is in favour of more strictly defined legal 
limitations on the conduct o f war. In particular, the most obvious problem with 
Grotius’ morality here of particular personal pertinence to Lauterpacht is that the 
call to Christian morality is not a universal one leaving members of other faiths 
outside the bounds of his higher morality. Nonetheless, despite his limitations, 
Grotius is “identified with the progression o f international law to a true system of 
law both in its legal and in its ethical conduct.”*^ ^
Eleven Principles
The Grotian tradition of Lauterpacht’s incarnation is comprised of eleven principle 
features:
the subjection o f the totality o f international relations to the rule of law; the 
acceptance o f the law o f nature as an independent source o f international 
law; the affirmation of the social nature o f man as the basis of the law of 
nature; the recognition o f the essential identity of States and individuals; the 
rejection of ‘reason o f State’; the distinction between just and unjust war;
191
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the doctrine of qualified neutrality; the binding force o f promises; the 
fundamental rights and freedoms o f the individual; the idea of peace; and 
the tradition of idealism and progress
The remainder of this section will discuss each of these in turn.
i) The subjection o f the totality o f  international relations to the rule o f law 
Lauterpacht deems the first element o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ as both the ‘central 
theme’ and ‘main characteristic’ of De Jure Belli ac Pacis.^^'^ By claiming that the 
‘totality’ o f international relations is subjected to the rule o f law, both Grotius and 
Lauterpacht fundamentally limit the rights o f states. In particular, a distinction is 
drawn between the just and unjust causes of war and, most importantly, an 
“absolute faculty o f action in self-preservation” is denied to states. As such, 
Lauterpacht picks up Grotius’ claim that even in pursuit of self-preservation, the 
actions of states are bound by the constraints of the law. Highlighting the existence 
of an identical argument in the work of John Westlake, who argues that “self- 
preservation... does not constitute a principle,” he writes, citing Westlake that self- 
preservation is;
a primitive instinct, and an absolute instinct so far as it has not been tamed 
by reason and law, but one great frmction of the law is to tame it...In
/W , p.363.
ibid., p.327. 
ibid., p.328.
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principle we may not hurt another or infringe his rights, even for our self- 
preservation, when he has not failed in any duty towards us/^^
What is more, contrary to contemporary interpretations of Grotius’ work that limit 
the bounds of his ‘universal’ law of nations to the Christian nations of Europe, 
Lauterpacht maintains that the ‘orbit’ of international law is not limited to the 
“States of Christian civilization” .^ ’^ Rather, Giotius explicitly maintains that treaties 
and agreements entered into between ‘civilised’ states and ‘infidels’ were equally 
binding as those amongst European states. With this Lauterpacht establishes the 
‘universality’ of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and hence the applicability o f law to the 
conduct o f states.
ii) The acceptance o f  the Law o f  Nature as an independent source o f  international 
law
The second element of the ‘Grotian tradition’ constitutes the reiteration o f 
Lauterpacht’s earlier claim that “[ijnternational law is much more than the will of 
States.” Grotius, Lauterpacht writes, “accepted as self-evident the proposition 
that the sovereign -  the State -  is bound by the law of Nations and the law of 
Nature.” What is most significant about the discussion of this element of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ is Lauteipacht’s argument that the law of nature supplied Grotius 
with a means o f “supplementing the voluntary Law of Nations...in the light of
Westlake quoted in Lauterpacht, ibid 
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ethics and reason.”’^^  With regard to the place of reason in the subsequent 
development of international law, Lauterpacht contends that this infusion of reason 
is evident even in the works o f staunch positivists such as W.E. Hall and Hans 
Kelsen. What is more, he argues again that despite attempts to remain wholly 
divorced from moral principles even Kelsen permits the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, evident in Grotius’ law of nations, to creep into his own w ork’^^  
Lauterpacht provides the following explanation for the inability o f international law 
to wholly divorce itself from principles o f morality originating within the common 
precepts of the law of nature:
The fact that while within the State it is not essential to give to the ideas of a 
higher law -  o f natural law -  a fiinction superior to that o f providing the 
inarticulate ethical premises underlying judicial decisions or, in the last 
resort, of the philosophical and political justification of the right of 
resistance, in the international society the position is radically different. 
There -  in a society deprived of normal legislative and judicial organs -  the 
function of natural law, whatever may be its form, must approximate more 
closely to that of a direct source of law.
These principles of natural law evident in the law of nations are also universally 
recognised and universally applicable. In affirming this position, Lauterpacht cites 
the judgement of Justice Story in La Jeune Eugénie, “one o f the most lucid and 
most uncompromising assertions of this aspect of the Grotian tradition”, when he
^  ibid.. p.330. 
fW., P.33L
^  ibid., p.331.
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that “[i]t may be unequivocally affirmed...that every doctrine, that may be fairly 
deduced by con ect reasoning from the rights and duties o f nations, and the nature of 
moral obligations, may theoretically be said to exist in the Law of Nations. 
Thus, although Lauterpacht concedes that natural law has rightly been charged with 
“vagueness and arbitrariness”, its moral force is preferable to the “arbitrariness and 
insolence of naked force.
Hi) The affirmation o f the social naittre o f  man as the basis o f  the law o f  nature 
As Lauterpacht highlights, questions surrounding the fundamental elements of 
human nature constitute “perhaps the problem...of political t h o u g h t . I n d e e d ,  
Grotius’ characterisation o f humans as “being intrinsically moved by a desire for 
social life, endowed with an ample measure o f goodness, altruism, and morality” 
has faced strong opposition, most notably from the likes of Thomas Hobbes.^°^ 
Siding with Grotius’ more optimistic view of human nature then, Lauterpacht can 
conceive of no other way to underpin a progressive approach to the development of 
international law. Again emphasising the salience of moral principles in De Jure 
Belli ac P ads here related to human nature, he highlights the frequency with which 
“the law of love, the law o f charity, o f Christian duty, of honour, o f goodness, and 
to the injunctions of divine law and the Gospel” are made, concluding that “the 
appeal to morality [is], without interfering with the legal character of the exposition,
p.332.
^  ibid, p.333.
311
a constant theme of the t r e a t i s e . T h i s  moral endowment and associated optimism 
regarding both human nature and the associated law of nations is, Lauterpacht 
supposes, one o f the fundamental reasons for the continued popularity o f the 
Grotian tradition in the international sphere. In this, he is certainly correct, for, as 
made clear in the previous chapter, the Grotian tradition has been most often 
resuscitated from the constant threat of intellectual exile when the need and/or 
desire has arisen for a moral approach to international law. Thus Lauterpacht 
concludes this section by writing that “much of the appeal and potentialities o f the 
Grotian tradition lies in the lesson which can be drawn from his conception o f the 
social nature and constitution o f man as a rational being in whom the element of 
moral obligation and foresight asserts itself triumphantly over unbridled selfishness 
and passion, both within the State and in the relations of States.”^^®
iv) The recognition o f  the essential identity o f  States and individuals 
The fourth element of the Grotian tradition maintains that the “conduct of nations 
and of rulers” is bound by the same “element of morality and rationality” ascribed 
to individuals above. This common moral identity is not derived from the notion 
that “States are like individuals” but is “due to the fact that States are composed o f  
individual human beings.”^^ ° This element is pervasive throughout Lauterpacht’s 
writings, a tract of his obituary stating;
Î6W., p.334. 
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His belief that the State exists for man and not man for the State, that the 
moral law applies in the same manner to public as to private conduct, that 
the use o f force for the protection of private interests is alien to, whereas the 
judicial process is an expression of the moral nature of man that right is 
ultimately the only might, and that the protection of human freedom and 
human dignity are the only legitimate purposes of law and government, was 
not an academic conviction but a consuming fire -  a fire which has 
consumed.^^ ^
This recognition o f the essential identity of states and individuals, although also 
derived explicitly from the works of Hugo Grotius is specifically drawn ftom John 
Westlake’s definition o f international society in which the “duties and the rights of 
States are only the duties and the rights of men who compose them.”^^  ^ In order to 
maintain that states are capable o f moral action cognisant of individuals’ rights and 
duties, Lauterpacht presents an argument reminiscent o f that used to refute E.H. 
Carr’s claim that groups are incapable o f morality, writing that “[t]he modern State 
is not a disorderly crowd given to uncontrollable eaiptions o f passion oblivious of 
moral scruples.
v) The rejection o f  'reason o f State '
The fifth characteristic o f the Grotian tradition represents a conglomeration of the 
previous four and maintains that, in accordance with the ‘subjection of the totality 
of international relations to the rule o f law’ and the moral personality o f states.
“Judge Lauterpacht”, British Yearbook o f International Law, Vol.25, (1959), p.x. 
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raison d ’état is not a justifiable cause o f war. This rejection o f the ‘reason o f State’ 
is necessary if Grotius and Lauterpacht are to avoiding creating a double-standard 
of morality, one pertaining to individuals and the other to states. Lauterpacht goes 
to some length in the discussion of this element to demonstrate that in rejecting the 
raison d ’état Grotius is refuting MachiavelU. What is more, he attributes the 
complete absence o f any reference to Machiavelli in Grotius’ works to a deliberate 
decision to ignore him. However, as extensive surveys o f Grotius’ works and notes 
reveal, no evidence exists to suggest that he had either read or even heard of 
Machiavelli. Nonetheless, the reasoning behind the rejection o f the reason of state 
still stands, maintaining that allowing it would necessarily deprive other states of 
their right to the “benefit of judicial determination of disputed legal rights.
vi) The distinction between just and unjust wars
As Lauterpacht notes, “Grotius did not invent” either the “denial o f the absolute 
right of war [or] his consistent differentiation between just and unjust wars” evident 
in his works.^^^ Rather they were concepts that originated in the Middle Ages and 
appeared in the works of Saint Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Giovanni da Legnano, 
Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco de Suarez. In fact, Lauterpacht concedes that 
“[i]n the elaboration o f the cause of just war Grotius made no obvious advance 
upon the already elaborate treatment o f the subject by his predecessors.”^^  ^
Nonetheless, it remains a central element of the Grotian tradition and one that is o f
Lauterpacht, “Tlie Grotian”, p.345. 
ibid.. p.347.
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particular pertinence to Lauterpacht’s assessment of contemporary international 
law. He explains that although almost immediately after the publication of De Jure 
Belli ac P ads  “[w]ar became the supreme right of sovereign States and the very 
hallmark of their sovereignty” thereby doing away with the need for a distinction 
between just and unjust wars, “law on the subject has now undergone a fundamental 
change.”^^  ^ In particular, “[w]ar has ceased to be a supreme prerogative of State” 
and as such, “[t]he Grotian distinction between just and unjust war is once more 
part of positive law.”^^ ^
vii) The doctrine o f qualified neutrality
The doctrine o f qualified neutrality stems directly from Grotius’ understanding of 
the distinction between just and unjust wars. The doctrine maintains that states are 
entitled to remain neutral in relation to States waging unjust wars. Thus, 
Lauterpacht quotes Grotius who writes that “[i]t is the duty o f those who keep out 
of war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause may be rendered 
more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who wages an unjust war may be 
hampered.”^^  ^Although this notion of qualified neutrality was rejected, along with 
the distinction between just and unjust wars, in the nineteenth century, Lauterpacht 
notes its return in the Covenant o f the League of Nations. He writes that by 
“permitting neutrality and in obliging the Members to resort to sanctions and other 
measures o f discrimination against the Covenant-breaking State” it incorporated the
ibid., p.349.
ibid., p.350.
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principle of qualified n eu tra lity .H o w ev er, “[u]nder the Charter of the United 
Nations neutrality is no longer an absolute right.”^^  ^ Rather, its members are 
“bound, if  called upon to do so by a valid decision of the Security Council, to resort 
to war against a State waging an aggressive, an unjust, war.”^^  ^In order to reconcile 
this with the position o f qualified neutrality in the Grotian tradition, Lauterpacht 
presents the rather weak argument that it is possible to “appreciate the legal and 
ethical merits o f this aspect of the Grotian tradition... without holding it applicable 
in international society.”^^ ^
viii) The binding force o f promises
The eighth element of the Giotian tradition is fairly straightforward and simply 
maintains that promises are binding and that obligations ought to be fulfilled in 
good faith. In accordance with the perceived universality o f Grotius’ work, this rule 
extends even to pirates, tyrants and infidels.^^'^ Without this notion, Lauterpacht 
explains, “the social contract is meaningless” and as such, “the obligation to keep 
promises is the principal tenet of the law of nature.”^^ ^
^  p.352.
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ix) The fim dam ental rights and fi^eedoms o f the individual
It is with the ninth element of the Grotian tradition that Lauterpacht runs into rather 
serious trouble. He writes that “[tjhere is one perplexing aspect of the work of 
Grotius which appears to be alien to the spirit of his teaching as outlined so far, and 
which calls for careful examination, namely, his attitude to the question o f the 
freedom of the individual in his relation to constituted authority.”^^  ^Amongst those 
apparently anomalous aspects of Grotius’ work are the justification o f slavery, 
rejection of the idea that sovereignty rests with the people, denial o f the right of 
resistance and designation as ‘unjust’ wars fought by oppressed people to 
reestablish their liberty.^^^ Rather than dismiss these aspects of Grotius’ work as 
inapplicable to the Grotian tradition, Lauterpacht seeks to explain and hence 
incorporate them by justifying Grotius’ illiberal stance. On the question of slavery, 
for example, he presents Grotius’ argument that as “reason prefers life to 
freedom...to yield to fate rather than to engage in a suicidal fight for liberty” is the 
preferable course o f a c tio n .F u rth e rm o re , Lauterpacht points out that the 
justification of the institution of slavery in Grotius’ work is buttressed throughout 
by a “spirit o f charity and mercy.”^^  ^ Thus, rather than concede that for all his 
liberal moral principles, Grotius retained a number of ideas that are antithetical to 
twentieth century ‘Grotian’ morality, Lauterpacht is at pains to enforce a form of
ibid, p.354. 
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conceptual coherence upon him. The reasons for this become apparent shortly 
thereafter.
As Koskenniemi notes, one of Lauterpacht’s over-riding desires throughout his 
career was to witness the establishment of an international society based on a 
fundamental respect for human rights.^^° What is more, these rights would ideally 
be ‘enforced’, thereby requiring a further doctrine o f humanitarian intervention. In 
this, Lauterpacht is faced with a particularly tricky problem. Although he recognises 
that if it is to be seen as a complete system of law the ‘Grotian tradition’ must 
include a doctrine o f humanitarian intervention, the only discussion of the doctrine 
in Grotius’ work occurs in the illiberal context described above. Thus, Lauterpacht 
is forced to provide a sanitised version of those less acceptable aspects of Grotius’ 
thinking in order to maintain the integrity of his larger project. In doing so he even 
goes so far as to suppose, not altogether accurately, that De Jure Belli ac P ads 
includes “the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian 
intervention.”^^ * However, as discussed in Chapter Three, Grotius certainly did not 
entertain a modern understanding o f humanitarian intervention. Rather the first 
‘authoritative statement’ of the principle is to be found in Christian von W olffs 
denial of its validity.
Koskenniemi, p.392, see Human Rights and International Law, p. 114-126. 
Lauterpacht, “Grotian Tradition”, p.357.
318
x) The idea o f peace
The tenth element of Lauterpacht’s Grotian tradition is as dubious as the ninth. Here 
again, Lauterpacht can be seen to outwardly interpret Grotius’ writings in terms of 
his own aspirations. Thus, the tenth element of the Grotian tradition is not, as 
Lauterpacht’s heading suggests, ‘the idea o f peace’, but is rather the stronger 
principle of pacificism. Although Lauterpacht concedes that Grotius “does not deny 
that war is a legal institution”, he derives an erroneous sense of pacificism from 
both Grotius’ attempt to ‘humanise’ the rules o f war and from his tangible hatred of 
war.^^^ This corresponds directly to Lauterpacht’s desire to see war outlawed that 
formed the central principle o f his proposal for the continuation of the League of 
Nations in 1942^^  ^ and again amounts to the prefiguring of Grotius’ ideas with 
twentieth centuiy concerns.
xi) The tradition o f idealism atid progress
Finally, and derived from the contention that a ‘pacifist strain’ can be identified 
running through Grotius’ work, is the final claim that the Grotian tradition “may not 
inappropriately be called the tradition of progress and idealism.”^^"* Thus 
Lauterpacht concludes his discussion o f the eleven elements of the Grotian tradition 
by listing the range of progressive ideas that can be attributed to Grotius, for
/6/dl, p.358.
Lauterpacht, “Undated Memorandum, 1942/43”, in Collected Papers, Vol.3, p.481.
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example, the legalization o f the extradition o f criminals and the theorisation of the 
practice o f diplomatic immunity.
‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ concludes, in part, by returning to one 
of the original aspects of its construction, the “intrusions of opportunism and 
realism.”^^  ^Thankfully, he notes, these intrusions “did not decisively influence the 
character o f De Jure Belli ac P ads’" but rather constitute a ‘perennial problem’ that 
has plagued Grotian scholarship ever since. He writes;
It has been exposed to the inducement to supply a rationalization of inferior 
and irrational practices; to confuse, in the name of realism, the function o f 
chronicling events with that o f a critical exposition o f rules of conduct 
worthy of the name of law; to furnish a philosophy o f the second best; and 
to represent the transient manifestations of immaturity and anarchy in 
international relations as resulting necessarily and permanently from the 
nature of States the mutual relations o f which, it is said, may be regulated by 
voluntary co-operation but not by a rule o f law imposed and enforced from 
above.
However, as the very last sentence of the article maintains;
It is a measure of the greatness o f the work of Grotius that all these 
questions should have found a place in his teaching and that he should have
ibid., p.359-60.
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answered them in a spirit upon the acceptance o f which depends the ultimate 
reality of the Law of Nations as a Taw properly so called’
Conclusion
Although the Grotian tradition of twentieth century international law owes its 
foundations and origins to the scholarship o f the seventeenth, eighteenth and, in 
particular, nineteenth centuries, it was with the works of Hersch Lauterpacht that 
the most comprehensively articulated incarnation of the Grotian tradition emerged. 
In particular, it is with Lauterpacht’s “Grotian Tradition in International Law” that 
the most thorough fusion of the analytical and historical Grotian traditions of 
previous scholarship is achieved. Here Lauterpacht entertains a dual understanding 
of what the term ‘Grotian’ means, deriving an analytical meaning from that pattern 
of thought that had previously appeared in the works of Lassa Oppenheim and 
stretches back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As will be seen 
in the following chapter, an identical notion of the ‘Grotian tradition’ as a vague 
analytical category appears in the work of Martin Wight, itself categorised under 
the broader banner of rationalist international thought. References to both 
Lauterpacht and Oppenheim in “The Balance of Power”, composed at around the 
same time as Wight’s lectures reveal that he was certainly familiar with their 
w o r k s . I n  an historical sense however, Lauterpacht draws on historical elements
^  365.
239 Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power”, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory o f  
International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1966), p. 172.
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of Grotius’ work that have appeared repeatedly throughout the development of the 
‘Grotian tradition’ but does not view them in terms of a path of historical 
transmission. Here, the ‘Grotian tradition’ is marked by the primacy of law, the 
social nature o f humankind and an appeal to morality, here secular in orientation.
As will also be seen in the following chapter, the fact that Lauterpacht entertained 
two distinct notions o f what the ‘Grotian tradition’ entails is o f particular 
significance to its further development. In particular, although Bull relies heavily on 
Lauterpacht’s ‘Giotian tradition’ in the formulation o f his own “Grotian conception 
of international society”, he does not maintain Lauterpacht’s distinction between his 
two notions of what it is to be ‘Grotian’. As a result, these two distinct sets of ideas 
are fused and thus facilitate the erroneous association of Hugo Grotius with 
concepts characteristic of the analytical variant of the tradition bearing his name.
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VI
The ^Grotian Tradition’ in the ^English School’ of 
International Relations
Trying to pick a path through the baroque thickets of Grotius’ work, where 
profound and potent principles lurk in the shade of forgotten arguments and 
obsolete examples like violets beneath overgrown gigantic rhododendrons, I 
find that he does not say what I thought he said. *
Although a range o f ‘Grotian’ traditions reside within the bounds of International 
Relations scholarship, a number of which will be mentioned in the course of this 
chapter, it is within the scholarship o f the so-called ‘English School’ that the most 
prominent and influential development of the ‘Grotian tradition’ has occurred. 
However, the very notion that there is, in fact, an ‘English School’ of international 
relations is a matter of .some contention in contemporary scholarship. In particular, 
questions abound as to whether or not the ‘school’ exists, who ought to be 
considered a ‘member’ of it and the extent to which it is centered around one or 
more conceptualisations of ‘international society’. In light of this, the first section 
of this chapter is concerned with precisely what defines the ‘English School’, taking 
account of the various manners in which it has been constmcted in contemporary 
histories o f the discipline.
* Martin Wight, “Hie origins of our states-system: geograpliical limits”, in Systems of States, ed, 
Hedley Bull, (London; Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 127.
The following two sections then discuss the development of the ‘Grotian tradition’ 
in the works of two of the most prominent members of the ‘English School’, Martin 
Wight and Hedley Bull, taking particular account o f the manner in which each 
employs the term ‘tradition’ in their construction of the ‘Grotian’ and other 
traditions. In doing so, it demonstrates two shifts that have been critical to the 
development of the ‘Grotian tradition’. First, although a weak notion of ‘Grotian 
morality’, somewhat akin to that which appeared in the work of Hersch 
Lauterpacht, can be discerned in Wight, this is almost entirely superseded by a 
broad notion of ‘international society’ in Bull. In particular, despite retaining a 
foundational connection to ‘Giotian’ scholarship concerned with the relationship 
between law and morality. Bull’s ‘Grotian tradition’ constituted a new formulation 
of what it means to be ‘Grotian’. Secondly, and of particular importance to the 
manner in which this ‘new’ ‘Grotian tradition’ is related to the historical figure of 
Hugo Grotius, a distinct shift in the type o f conceptualisation of tradition can be 
identified between Wight and Bull. Thus, while Wight employs a vague ‘analytical’ 
notion of tradition, Bull promulgates a more historically oriented understanding o f 
the term. When applied to the construction of the ‘Grotian tradition’, the 
transposition of the contents o f Wight’s analytical tradition to an actual historical 
one has, in large part, facilitated the conflation of Hugo Grotius with a range of 
twentieth century ideas. The final section o f this chapter goes beyond Bull to 
consider the application of the ‘Grotian tradition’ and, in particular, its association
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with the works o f Grotius, to works addressing the normative justification of 
humanitarian intervention.
The ^English SchooV 
The ‘English School’ is a title first coined by Roy E. Jones in 1981 to designate a 
group of scholars including the ‘odd combination’ of Charles Manning and Martin 
Wight, its “seminal thinkers”, along with Hedley Bull, Michael Donelan, F.S. 
Northedge and Robert Purnell.^ Centered around the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Jones supposed the group’s status as a ‘school’ was 
established by their “shared commitment to international relations conceived as a 
distinct, even autonomous subject”, common ‘professional task’, style and 
philosophical position and, most importantly, their understanding o f the “whole 
society of states as the peculiar matter of the study of international relations.”  ^
Significantly however, despite identifying the existence of an ‘English school’ of 
thought about international relations, Jones called for its closure. The English 
school was, in his view, a ‘static’, ‘sterile regime’, moving “inevitably from 
scholarship to scholasticism,” and hence did not warrant continuation."* To make 
matters worse, Jones also argued that its defining concept, ‘international society’.
 ^ Roy E. Jones, “The English school of international relations: a case for closure”. Review of  
International Studies, Vol.7, (1981), p.l.
 ^ ibid., p.l & 3. 
ibid., p. 12.
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conceived here as a fusion o f ‘society’ and ‘sovereignty’ was utterly ‘meaningless’, 
thereby attempting to add the final nail to the English school’s coffin.
Although Hidemi Suganami published an alternative account o f the English School 
two years later, including the writings of Charles Manning, Hedley Bull, F.S. 
Northedge and Alan James^ - he has since conceded that Hedley Bull’s response 
that Martin Wight also ought to be included is ‘fair’  ^ -  it was not until 1988 that, 
with the work of Sheila Grader, Jones’ article elicited a formal response.^ Rather 
than call for the closure of the so-called English school however. Grader maintained 
that “evidence for such a ‘school’ does not exist.”  ^ In particular, she argued that 
although there is “merit in the suggestion that the identities o f both the ‘English 
school’ and the ‘British school’ coalesce around the idea o f international society,” 
the question remains as to whether their proponents are “talking about the same 
t h ing .According  to Grader, the ‘international societies’ of the ‘English school’ 
were ‘distinct’, Manning’s being “metaphysical”, Bull’s “empirical and normative”,
 ^ Hidemi Suganami, “Tlie Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream 
International Relations”, V o l . 7 ,  (1983), pp.363-381.
 ^Hidemi Suganami, “British Institutionalists, or tlie Englisli School, 20 Years On”, International 
Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3, (September 2003), p.255.
’ For a discussion of the genesis of this piece and those of Suganami (1983) and Jones see, 
Suganami, ibid., p.253-255.
 ^ Sheila Grader, “The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation”. Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 14, No.l, January 1988, p.41.
 ^ibid.. p.38.
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and Northedge’s tending “towards discounting international society in favour of the 
international system of states.”***
A year later however, Peter Wilson argued, contrary to Grader, that “there are 
sound reasons why the identity o f the school does to a large extent coalesce around 
the concept of international society.”** Thus, Wilson argued, not only that the 
‘English school’ could be said to exist and that its central focus, the concept of 
international society was in fact meaningful, but that “[tjhere is no difference in the 
ontological status of the international society, as the concept is employed by 
Manning, Wight, Bull, James and more recent recruits to the school such as R.J. 
Vincent and James Mayall.” *^  With this, he reasserted the existence and focus of 
what has continued to be known as the ‘English school’.
In more recent scholarship, Tim Dunne has pointed to “an emerging consensus that 
the legitimate founders o f the English School are Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, 
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson,” although his account of its history focuses on 
Wight, Butterfield, Bull, Vincent and, in light of his overwhelming influence on 
British International Relations, E.H. Carr.*^ For Dunne, the English school’s 
emergence and development largely took place within the context of the British
ibid.
" Peter Wilson, “The English school of international relations: a reply to Grader”, Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 15, (1989), p.49. 
ibid., p.54.
Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School, (London: 
Macmillan, 1998), p.l5.
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Committee on the Theory of International Relations. Inspired by the American 
Rockefeller Committee formed in 1954,*"* the British Committee was instigated by 
Herbert Butterfield in 1958 with the aim o f extending “‘the frontiers o f thought’ 
about international politics.” *^  Its membership included, in addition to Butterfield 
himself, the historians, Desmond Williams, Michael Howard and Geoffrey Hudson, 
a philosopher and theologian, Donald Mackinnon, representatives of the Foreign 
Office and Treasury, Adam Watson and William Ar mstrong, and the international 
relations theorists Martin Wight and, later, Hedley Bull. Perhaps the most 
significant British international relations scholar to be excluded from the 
Committee was E.H. Carr, for fear that his profile might hijack its broader aims.*^
For Dunne, three ‘preliminary articles’ signify the identification of the ‘English 
school’ in the British Committee. Drawing on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
discussed in Chapter Two, the first entails “self-identification with a particular 
tradition o f enquiry” and is exhibited most prominently in the transmission o f ideas 
from Martin Wight to Hedley Bull and on to R.J. Vincent.*^ Indeed, as will be seen 
shortly, there is certainly a sense in which Bull self-consciously ‘followed’ Wight, 
and Vincent then ‘followed’ Bull although, with regard to the development o f the 
Grotian tradition, their points o f divergence are probably o f greater significance 
than their areas of congruence.
Led by Kennelli Thompson and Dean Rusk, die American Coimnittee included Reinhold Niebulir. 
Hans Morgentiiau, Arnold Wolfers, Paul Nitze, W.T.R. Fox and Kemiedi Waltz.
Butterfield quoted in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.91.
Dmme, ibid., p.93. 
ibid., p.6-7.
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The second ‘preliminary article’ according to which the English school is located in 
the British Committee entails a commitment to an interpretive approach to 
international relations scholarship and, although nominally attributed to Wight, 
centers around Bull’s “International Theory; The Case for a Classical Approach.” 
Indeed, with this article, Bull became engaged in a particularly acrimonious debate 
with J. David Singer that has been widely seen as constitutive of the ‘second great 
debate’ of International Relations, that between proponents of the contending 
‘scientist’ approaches that emerged in response to the behavioural revolution and 
the classical or ‘traditionalist’ approach to the study of politics. Of particular 
importance to the construction o f the Grotian tradition, in this article Bull argues 
that “by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy”, practitioners of the 
scientific approach “have deprived themselves o f the means of self-criticism, and in 
consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and 
brash.” In his equally venomous reply. Singer lashes out with the counterclaim 
that “[t]he first fantasy one encounters in this morose recitation is the assertion that 
the scientific approach is so intellectually puritanical that it eschews the use of 
wisdom, insight, intuition, and judgement. Nonesense!” *^  Nonetheless, in 
presenting this argument. Bull established the idea that “[f]or the English School,
Hedley Bull, “International Theory; The Case for a Classical Approach”, World Politics, Vol. 18, 
No.3, (April 1966), p.375.
J. David Singer, “Hie Incomplete Hieorist: Insiglit Witliout Evidence”, in Contending Approaches 
to International Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Klaus Knorr, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), p.65; See also Morton Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in 
International Relations” in tlie same volmne, pp.39-61.
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the most important questions in international relations were not amenable to 
empirical verification (as the would-be-scientists demanded).” *^*
Finally, and in accordance the second article, the third ‘definitive article’ o f the 
English School centers around the conceptualisation o f international theory as 
normative theory. Explaining precisely what ‘normative theory’ entails, Mervyn 
Frost writes that, in contrast to ‘positivist’ questions that ask what is done in a given 
situation, normative questions “require o f us that we make judgements about what 
ought to be done.” *^ In this vein, as will be seen shortly, each o f Wight’s ‘three 
traditions’ of international theory, “represents a distinctive moral” approach to the 
manner in which international society ought to be viewed and p r o c e e d . I n  a 
similar manner, Bull’s pluralist and solidarist conceptions o f international society, 
also discussed further in the third section of this chapter, may be viewed as 
embodying alternative ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ “accounts of the nature of the common 
values to which states adhere.
Despite constituting the most comprehensive intellectual history of the English 
school to date, Dunne’s account of its membership and focus has faced both 
criticism and opposition in contemporary scholarship. In particular, Dunne’s
^ Duniie, Inventing International Society, p.9.
Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p.2. See also Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: 
A Pragmatic Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
^ Dimne, Inventing International Society, p. 9.
^ ibid., p .ll.
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portrayal of Carr as a directing influence on Butteifield, Wight and Bull has been 
particularly contentious. Indeed, amongst a barrage of criticisms, Ian Hall has 
recently both pointed out that “Carr was not a member of the British Committee -  
he was refused an invitation at Butterfield’s instigation” and, argued that evidence 
of his specific influence on the proceedings of the British Committee is, at best, 
‘patchy’.^ "* However, as Dunne readily acknowledges Carr’s failure to be invited to 
join the British Committee, noting that “it is unlikely he would have been partial to 
the ‘gentleman’s club’ gestalt o f the Committee” even if an invitation were 
extended, the first o f these criticisms is slightly unfa i r .Ha l l  does however, make 
the reasonable suggestion that the inclusion of Carr is “motivated by a desire to 
show the ‘radical potentiality o f the Grotian or rationalist tradition’, and to link the 
school with the agenda of critical theorists such as Andrew Linklater who have 
invested much effort in his rehabilitation.”^^  As will be seen shortly, this 
‘radicalised’ version of the ‘English school’ drives both Nicholas Wheeler’s Saxdng 
Strangers: Htmanitarian Intervention in International Society and Dunne and 
Wheeler’s co-edited Human Rights in Global Politics.^^
In addition, Hall also questions the second ‘definitive article’ o f Dunne’s history, 
arguing that the “Committee, at least for the first decade o f its existence, was united
Ian Hall, “Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the English school?”. International 
Affairs, Vol.77, No.4, (October 2001), p.93 5 & 934.
Dunne, Inventing International Society, p.93. 
Hall, “Still the English patient?”, p.936.
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (eds,). Human Rights in 
Global Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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neither by political conviction nor by a devotion to a particular methodology.”^^  In 
particular, he writes that Herbert Butterfield advocated “coming to an understanding 
of the ‘right relationship’, as he called it, between positivistic social science and 
more traditional approaches”, arguing that this accommodation would be 
“preferable to the outright rejection o f ‘scientism’. T h u s ,  it was actually amongst 
those scholars that Roy Jones originally designated as the ‘English school’ centered 
around the LSE, that support for Wight and Bull’s approach was most apparent.
Drawing together these two areas of contention, Robert Jackson has presented an 
alternative account of the English school that both denies the validity of its recent 
‘radicalisation’ and focuses on a commitment to the ‘classical approach’. In 
Jackson’s account, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and R.J. Vincent are designated the 
central members of the ‘English school’ on account of the “exceptional unity of 
theme and purpose” evident in their works. In particular, Wight, Bull and Vincent 
are perceived to “share a remarkable degree o f common intellectual perspective and 
sensibility in trying to grasp the human dimensions and problems o f international 
relations” and, as such, “disclose a strong family resemblance,” *^ What 
distinguishes his ‘English school’ from Dunne’s in substantive terms is Jackson’s 
denial of the ‘radical potentiality’ o f scholarly enterprise. In particular, Jackson 
maintains, with Bull, that “scholars should be as disinterested as possible in order to
^ Hall, “Still tlie English patient?”, p.935.
^  /6/d.
Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f States, (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.60.
/6/d.
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carry out scholarship that is properly academic and is not a vehicle of their own 
personal values or political ideology.”^^  Amongst those who do not, in his view, 
adhere to this ‘detached’ approach are critical theorists who “are not content with 
discerning and elucidating international society as a distinctive historical 
arrangement of political life”, but are rather “seeking to change it if that is 
necessary to bring about a better life for the population of the p l a n e t . A s  Hall 
points out, Jackson’s claim to intellectual ‘agnosticism’ is “the essence of the 
position Jones attributed to the LSE ‘English School’ back in 1981,” but was then, 
as it is now, critically flawed.^"* In particular. Hall argues that both Wight and Bull 
were engaged in promulgating their views on practical politics, Bull via his 
involvement in a British special advisory group on arms control in the 1960s and 
Wight via his advocacy o f pacifism in the 1930s, and that Jackson’s Global 
Covenant is not itself a ‘disinterested’ work but one that seeks to affirm the ethical 
worth of certain norms and institutions.^^
As will be seen as this chapter progresses, it is within what Dunne conceives as the 
‘English school’ that the development of the Grotian tradition has primarily 
occurred. This is not to say that Jackson has not himself contributed to its 
development, but rather that the account of the English school’s history and 
development provided by Dunne is more useful in elucidating the central tenets of
ibid., p.8L 
ibid., p.82.
34 Hall, “Still tlie English patient?”, p.937. 
ibid.
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the most prominent mid- to late-twentieth century variants of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’. Most obviously, it was in the context of the British Committee that Wight 
and Bull’s most important contributions to the development o f the Grotian tradition, 
“Western Values in International Relations” and “The Grotian Conception of 
International Society”, were made and critiqued. Furthermore, regardless of 
whether or not Dunne’s three ‘definitive articles’ of the English school can be 
applied to its ‘members’ with absolute consistency, there is certainly a sense in 
which each of the three has played an integral role in the Grotian tradition’s 
development. In accordance with the first ‘definitive article’, the remainder of this 
chapter focuses on the works of Wight, Bull and Vincent as the most identifiable 
members of the tradition o f inquiry according to which the Grotian tradition was 
transmitted from one generation of scholars to the next. Drawing together the 
second and third definitive articles, and in accordance with its development in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the Grotian tradition is also shown to be both 
normatively grounded and morally oriented, focusing on the morality of 
international society as the centerpiece o f international relations theory.
Martin Wight
The explication of Martin Wight’s contribution to the development of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ is made particularly difficult by the relatively small number of works he 
published during his lifetime. Although, as Adam Roberts notes, Wight was 
“perhaps one of the most profound thinkers on international relations of his
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generation of British academics,”^^  his most relevant contribution to International 
Relations scholarship amounts to a single text. Power Politics, published in 1946, 
and a handful of essays and papers, three of which were published in the edited 
collection, Diplomatic Investigations: Essayas in the Theory o f  World Politics in 
1966.^^ The reason most commonly offered for this relative paucity of publications 
is that “[t]he perfectionist in him seems to have resisted publication when, as is 
always the case, there was still room for improvement Indeed, as Wight himself 
wrote in a letter to a friend as he was preparing a revised version of Power Politics 
in 1971;
I analyse with painful interest the perfectionism which seems to prevent me 
from being satisfied with anything. There is also that final act o f will power 
which will seize a number of endlessly worked, disjointed, disparate 
chapters, and fuse them together into a whole in a blaze o f creative 
integration.^^
^ Adam Roberts, "Foreword” in Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. 
Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p.xxiv.
Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1978); “Wliy Is There No International Theory?”, “The Balance of Power”, 
“Western Values in International Relations”, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (eds.). 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of World Politics, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1966). Although rarely referred to in contemporary international relations scholarsliip Wight 
also published, The Development o f the Legislative Council 1606-1945, ed. M. Perham, (London: 
Faber, 1946); The Gold Coast Legislative Council, ed. M. Perham, (London: Faber, 1947); and 
British Colonial Constitutions 1947, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
Roberts, “Foreword”, p.xxiv.
Martin Wight in Hedley Bull, “Introduction: Martin Wight and the study of international 
relations”, in Martin Wight, Systems o f States, ed. Hedley Bull, (London: Leicester Universitj  ^Press, 
1977), p. 15.
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With this in mind it is wholly unsurprising that Wight did not publish the 
incomplete and imperfect set of lecture notes that were published posthumously 
under the title o f International Theory: The Three Traditions and has unfortunately 
become conventionally viewed as his definitive work in much International 
Relations scholarship.
Both the Grotian tradition and the figure of Hugo Grotius first appeared in Wight’s 
work during the course of a lecture series first delivered in Chicago where Wight 
spent a year in the 1950s at the invitation o f Hans Morgenthau. Following his return 
to the London School o f Economics, the lectures evolved and gained notoriety both 
amongst students and within the academic community for bringing into ‘sharp 
focus’ what otherwise appeared to be the ‘chaotic’ world of international politics."^ ® 
However, as a lecture series delivered over a ten year period, it is not at all 
surprising that its contents both evolved and changed with the thought o f their 
presenter. As Michael Nicholson writes, “there is a lack o f coherence about his 
thought”, in part because of the oral tradition in which it was presented."^^ Similarly, 
discussing the oral tradition in general, E. Kedourie noted in the Fourth Martin 
Wight Memorial Lecture at the University o f Sussex in 1978 that “[w]hen it is 
contrasted with, say, a book, mere speech is thought to be something fleeting and 
evanescent, not to be compared with the tangibility, fixity, durability o f the written
Brian Porter, “Preface” to International Theory: The Three Traditions, p.vii.
Michael Nicholson, “The enigma of Maitm Wight”, Review o f International Studies, Vol.7, No. 1, 
(January 1981), p. 15.
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and the printed word.”^^  Indeed, this certainly seems to be the case with Wight, 
Brian Porter noting in his preface to International Theory: The Three Traditions 
that the terms realist, rationalist and revolutionist at some stage seemed to morph 
into the not exactly synonymous Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian traditions/^
Where possible therefore, those discussions of Grotius and the Grotian tradition 
either contained within the works published during Wight’s lifetime, or that accord 
well with such works, will be given precedence over those pieced together from his 
lecture notes and those of his students that constitute International Theoiy: The 
Three Traditions. In particular “Western Values in International Relations” is taken 
as the most sophisticated presentation o f the three traditions o f international theory 
published during Wight’s lifetime. Indeed, while Bull writes that “[s]ome of the 
material from these lectures later found its way into his single most important 
paper, ‘Western Values in International Relations’”,'*'^  Ian Hall maintains that 
“Western Values” represents a “distilled, compressed version of part of the 
lectures.”'*^ These points aside, it is also here, and in a paper presented to the British 
Committee in July 1971, entitled “The Origins of Our States-System: Geographical
E. Kedourie, “Religion and politics: Arnold Toynbee and Maitin Wight”, British Journal of 
International Studies, Vol.5, (1979), p.6.
Porter, “Preface”, p.viii.
Bull, “Martin Wight and tire Study of International Relations”, p. 7. Marthi Wight, “Western 
Values in International Relations” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory o f World 
Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp.88- 
131.
Ian Hall, “Challenge and Response: The Lasting Engagement of Arnold J. Toynbee and Martin 
WighT\ International Relations, Vol. 17, No.3, (September 2003),p.398.
Î
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Limits” that the most lucid and coherent discussions of both Grotius and the 
‘Grotian tradition’ are to be found/*’
Before moving on to discuss Wight’s treatment of Grotius and the Grotian tradition 
however, it is helpful to elucidate a number o f biographical features of Wight’s life 
that have undoubtedly influenced his works, the most prominent o f which is the 
central position of Christianity in his life. As Hedley Bull notes, in the 1930s, Wight 
adhered to a particular notion of Christian pacifism,'*^ even going to far as to 
register as a conscientious objector during the Second World War. Although his 
pacifism later ‘dropped away’,'*^  he remained, throughout his life “a fervent and 
rather traditionalist Anglican.”'*^ As Midgley suggests, Wight’s Anglicanism may 
perhaps have directed his preference for the works of Grotius, a pious and revered 
protestant, over those of the Roman Catholic who preceded him intellectually, 
Francisco de Suarez, in whose work Wight identifies a number of crucial elements 
of the rationalist and Grotian traditions.^® Wight’s faith was o f a particularly
Martin Wiglit, “Bie Origins of Our Stales-System; Geograpliical Limits” in Systems of States, ed. 
Hedley Bull, (London: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 110-125.
See Martin Wight, “Clirislian Pacifism” Theology. Vol. 33, (1936), pp. 12-21. As Scott M. Thomas 
notes, tlie aigument in “Christian Pacifism” is “based on the incarnation and on tlie perfectionist 
etliic of the Sermon on the Mount, wliich left no room for a double standard betw'een private life and 
public obligations.” Scott M. Thomas, “Faith, liistory and Martin Wight: tlie role of religion in the 
historical sociology of the English school of International Relations”, International Affairs, Vol.77, 
No.4, (October 2001), p.928.
Bull, “Martin Wight and tlie Study of International Relations”, p.5.
Hall, “Challenge and Response”, p.393.
E.B.F. Midgley, “Natural law and die ‘Anglo-Saxons’ -  some reflections in response to Hedley 
Bxi\V\ British Journal o f International Studies, Vol.5, (1979), p.268.
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pessimistic nature, shunning the notion of progress that had stood as a moral beacon 
for the Christian idealists o f the interwar period, and viewing humans not as “well- 
meaning people doing our best”, but rather less optimistically as “miserable sinners, 
living under judgement, with a heritage o f sin to expiate.” *^ Significantly, Wight 
maintained that Christianity had been ‘perverted’ by its willingness to adopt as its 
central doctrine the notion that ‘God is Love’. Arguing against Arnold Toynbee’s 
characterisation o f Christianity in this manner, Wight writes in “The Crux for an 
Historian Brought up in the Christian Tradition” that “[t]he central declaration of 
Christianity is not that God is something, but that God has done something in 
h i s t o r y . W h a t  is more, he continues to argue that “God’s love is not a mere 
benevolence: it is a love that is identical with Holiness and Justice.”^^  As such, 
Wight deviates significantly from the vague ‘Christian love’ doctrine around which 
much previous Grotian scholarship had been centered. Furthermore, and as will be 
seen shortly, Wight’s faith not only exerted a significant impact upon his own 
treatment of international relations but constituted a source o f great consternation 
for his intellectual progeny, Hedley Bull.
IMartin Wight quoted in Hedley Bull, “Martin Wight and tlie Study of International Relations”, 1
p. 12. I
Wight quoted in Kedourie, p. 11. Martin Wight, “The Ciux for an Historian Brought up m the |
Christian Tradition”, in Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. VII, (London: Cambridge |
University Press, 1954), pp.737-748. 1
ibid. 1
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Tradition
In constructing his famous triumvirate schématisation o f international theory, 
Martin Wight employed a particular notion o f ‘tradition’ as the primary means of 
classification. This specific understanding o f tradition can be gleaned from two 
main sources; first, his explicit, though brief, discussions of the concept itself; and 
secondly, from the application o f his theoretical understanding o f tradition to the 
particular traditions he constructs. Again, a range of inconsistencies appear in the 
presentation o f ‘tradition’ in International Theory: The Three Traditions, 
presumably due to the spontaneous and changing nature of oratory.
The theoretical notion o f tradition employed in the formulation o f the realist, 
rationalist and revolutionist traditions o f Wight’s construction is based on the 
premise that “political ideas do not change much” over time. '^* In explaining this 
claim, Wight quotes A.P. D ’Entrevès’ observation that;
Men have kept repeating the same slogan over and over again. The novelty 
is very often only a question of accent.
Similarly, Wight outwardly acknowledges the influence of Alexis de Tocqueville 
upon his categorisation o f international theory, stating in the conclusion to 
International Theory that his aim had “been to try to bear out Tocqueville’s 
point...that there is very little, if  anything, new in political theoiy, that the great
Wight, International Theory, p.5.
A.P. D’Entievès quoted in Wight, ibid.
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moral debates of the past are in essence our debates.” *^’ Indeed, the Tocqueville 
passage to which he refers reads;
It is unbelievable how many systems of morals and politics have been 
successively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to reappear a 
little later, always charming and suiprising the world as if they were new, 
and bearing witness, not to the fecundity o f the human spirit, but to the 
ignorance of men/^
As applied to the field o f international theory, Wight’s classification scheme is 
based on the corresponding claim that “[i]f one surveys the most illustrious writers 
who have treated of international theory since Machiavelli, and the principle ideas 
o f this field which have been in circulation, it is strikingly plain that they fall into 
three groups, and the ideas into three t r a d i t i o n s . T h e  three groups, or “inter­
related political conditions which comprise the subject-matter” of international 
relations are outlined as ‘international anarchy’, ‘diplomacy and commerce’, and 
the ‘concept of a society o f states, or family of nations,’ ®^ and correspond 
respectively to the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism.
Wight, ibid., p.268.
Alexis de Tocqueville in Wight, ibid., p.5.
Wight,/W.,p.7.
ibid. In “An anatomy of international tliought”, published posthumously, Wight titles tlie three 
elements international anarchy, habitual intercourse and moral solidarity. Martin Wiglit, “An 
anatomy of international thought”. Review o f International Studies, Vol.13, (1987), pp.221-227.
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The realist tradition, Wight argues, is comprised of “those who emphasise in 
international relations the element of anarchy, o f power-politics, and o f warfare,”®® 
and is generally equated with the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Revolutionists, 
on the other hand, are “those who believe so passionately in the moral unity of the 
society of states or international society, that they identify themselves with it, and 
therefore they both claim to speak in the name o f unity, and experience an 
overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim o f their international 
policies.”®* Standing between these two positions, the rationalist tradition of 
international theory focuses on instances of ‘international intercourse’ and in 
particular, patterns o f ‘diplomacy and commerce’ in international relations:®^
[t]he Rationalists are those who concentrate on, and believe in the value of, 
the element of international intercourse in a condition predominantly of 
international anarchy. They believe that man, although manifestly a sinful 
and bloodthirsty creature, is also rational.®^
As Jens Bartelson quite rightly points out, Wight’s notion o f ‘tradition’ is less 
concerned with the apparent passage through time of an idea or set of ideas, than 
with their apparent coherence within a given set o f parameters.®'* In this vein, Wight 
writes that if the three traditions o f international theory are viewed as ‘patterns o f
ibid.
ibid., p.8.
ibid., p. 13. Similar ideas are expressed in Martin W i^if s “An anatomy of international tliought”. 
Review o f International Studies, Vol. 13, (1987), pp.221-227.
Jens Bartelson, “Short circuits: society and tiudition in international relations tlieory”, Review of  
International Studies, Vol.22, (1996), p.347.
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thought’ then they are defined by “logical inter-relation”, whereby, in accordance 
with the “logical coherence o f the complex o f thought... acceptance o f one unit-idea 
is likely to entail logically most of the others.”®® However, in a fairly conventional 
sense, Wight also defines ‘traditions of thought’ being “embodied in and handed 
down by writers and statesmen.”®® Thus, although coherence of thought is 
privileged in Wight’s conceptualisation of ‘tradition’, the element of continuity 
remains.
That Wight intended his three traditions to be considered ‘patterns of thought’ is 
however, made clear in the characterisation of rationalism included in ‘Western 
Values in International Relations’ in which he writes that;
[tjhis pattern is persistent and recurrent. Sometimes eclipsed and distorted it 
has constantly reappeared and reasserted its authority, so that it may even 
seem something like a consensus o f Western diplomatic opinion.®^
In a similar vein, he also mentions that “there are other patterns of ideas in 
international history for which persistence, recurrence and coherence can be 
claimed,” thus emphasising the central importance of coherence to his 
schématisation of international theory.®^ The relative unimportance of continuity in 
Wight’s understanding o f tradition is particularly apparent with regard to the
Wight, “An anatomy”, p.226.
Wight, “Western Values”, p. 90-91. 
^ ibid,, p.91.
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different manners in which he constructs the realist, rationalist and revolutionist 
traditions. The rationalist tradition is characterised as originating “with the Greeks 
and especially the Stoics,” owing its ‘upkeep’ to the Catholic Church and following 
a path of transmission taking in the Jewish and Ai ab thinkers o f the Middle Ages 
and the “Protestants, humanists and Rationalists” of the modern world. Individual  
figures named in the evolution of the tradition include Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, 
Grotius, Hooker, Althusius, Locke, the Founding Fathers of the American Republic, 
Washington, Madison and Hamilton, Mill, Cobden, Mazzini, Tocqueville, 
Gladstone, Lincoln and Wilson, although this in no way represents an exhaustive 
roll-call.™ Similarly the realist tradition is characterised as being “as self-conscious 
and continuous” as the rationalist tradition and is said to begin with the work of 
Machiavelli and include the subsequent writings o f Bacon, Bodin, Spinoza, Hume, 
Frederick and Catherine, Bismarck, Treitschke, E.H. Carr, Morgenthau, Burnham, 
Kennan and Butterfield.^* Most critically, there is an explicit sense in which these 
contributors are characterised as having ‘continued the tradition’ that is realism.
When it comes to the construction of the revolutionist tradition however, the 
element of continuity is less critical to its ‘traditional’ status. As Wight writes, the 
“Revolutionist ancestry o f ideas and continuity o f thought is ambiguous or 
uncertain... [h]ere continuity is least important; there is rather a series of
International Theory, p. 14. 
ibid., p. 16.
ibid., p. 17.
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disconnected illustrations o f the same politico-philosophical truths.”™ The 
revolutionist tradition, unlike realism and rationalism, is consequently characterised 
as “less a stream than a series o f waves.”™ That the revolutionist tradition is 
nonetheless termed a ‘tradition’ in Wight’s assessment is testimony to the loose 
manner in which he understood the term. Indeed, the lectures upon which 
International Theory is based were explicitly presented as “an experiment in 
classification, in typology, and ... [an] exploration of continuity and recurrence, a 
study in the uniformity o f political thought.”™ Thus, while Wight’s traditions are 
marked by varying degrees o f intellectual continuity and coherence, they “are not 
straightjackets, but organizing frameworks used to group closely related and often 
independent ideas together.”™ As such, Wight leaves room within his theoretical 
treatment of the term ‘tradition’ for the “illogicalities and discontinuities” that 
inevitably appear in their practical construction.™
This loose conceptualisation of ‘tradition’ is also particularly evident in Wight’s 
discussion of the parameters o f the Rationalist tradition:
The Rationalist tradition is the broad middle road of European thinking. On 
one side o f it the ground slopes upwards towards the crags and precipices o f 
revolutionism, whether Christian or secular; on the other side it slopes down
ibid.. p. 12. 
ibid.
ibid., p.5.
David S. Yost, “Wight and tlie Tliree Traditions: political plnlosopliy and tlie tlieoty of 
international relations”. International Affairs, Vol.70, No.2, (April 1994), p.268.
Wight, “An anatomy”, p.226.
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towards the marshes and swamps of realism...It is a road on which I 
suppose all of use, in certain moods, feel we really belong and it is the road 
with the most conscious acknowledgement of continuity. On it can be seen 
the stout figure o f Thomas Aquinas, whom Acton called ‘the first Whig’; 
also Vitoria, the Neo-Scholastics who make the bridge between the 
medieval traditions o f natural law and modem international thought. Hugo 
Grotius is there, with his offspring and descendents among Grotian writers 
on international law, together with Hooker, Althusius and John Locke, and 
the Founding Fathers o f the American Republic, at least Washington, 
Madison and Hamilton, to say nothing of Jefferson.
It is a broad middle road, but just at this point it seems to become rather 
uncertainly wide; its edges are difficult to discern and the road itself seems 
sometimes disconcertingly narrow, Hamilton, for instance, seems to be on 
the road, but look again and he is to be found well away from it, on the turf 
over towards the marshes...; the above describes the general tradition of 
international thought here called Rationalist, and perhaps illustrates how the 
three traditions are not clear-cut pigeon holes, but can overlap.™
For Wight then, the three traditions o f international theory are broad, overlapping 
and vaguely demarcated categories according to which both individual theorists and 
their common ideas can be classified. This is not to say that he does not equally 
appreciate the inherent dangers of categorisation. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
addressing this very issue, Wight writes that;
...all o f this is merely classification and schematising. In all political and 
historical studies the purpose o f building pigeon-holes is to reassure oneself 
that the raw material does not fit into them. Classification becomes valuable.
International Theory, p. 14-15.
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in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks down. The greatest 
political writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers 
dividing two of the traditions and most of these writers transcend their own 
systems.
Thus, he writes that Hume’s political theory, for example, “as expounded in A 
Treatise on Human Nature and in the Essay on the Balance o f  Power is Realist yet 
it has affinities with the Rationalist tradition.”™ Nonetheless, this recognition o f the 
limitations of classification does little to ameliorate the impact of his use o f the term 
tradition. In particular, Wight’s inconsistent conceptualisation of ‘tradition’, at 
times approximating that o f Krygier discussed in Chapter Two and at others 
resembling something akin to a paradigm, has certainly contributed to the 
entanglement of historical and analytical variants of the Grotian tradition in 
subsequent scholarship to be discussed shortly.
Disentangling the ‘Three Traditions '
As the intermediary category of his triumvirate schématisation of international 
theory, Wight’s rationalist category is constructed via the simultaneous acceptance 
and repudiation of elements o f the realist and revolutionist traditions. Thus, one of 
its defining features is;
ibid., p.259.
p.260.
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its quality of a via media. This pattern of idea usually appears as the juste 
milieu between definable extremes, whether it is Grotius saying; ‘A remedy 
must be found for those who believe that in war nothing is lawful, and for 
those for whom all things are lawful in war’ or Halifax’s classic exposition 
of the balance o f power in The Character o f a Trimmer, or Gladstone’s 
conception o f  the European Concert seen as a middle way between the 
radical noninterventionism of Cobden and Bright and the Realpolitik o f 
Beaconsfield and Bismarck/®
Although the ‘definable extremes’ to which Wight refers are, in the broadest sense, 
those represented by the contending traditions o f realism and revolutionism, they 
are intermingled with the natural law and legal positivist categories ordinarily 
associated with international legal scholarship in “Western Values in International 
Relations.” This raises the important question of whether or not Wight’s scheme 
constitutes a new way of dividing international theory or simply amounted to the re­
labeling of the positivist, naturalist, Grotian triumvirate of international law, or the 
reconfiguration o f the ‘first great debate’ waged between realism and idealism in 
international relations.
In the first instance, Wight appears to provide a definitive answer to this question, 
arguing that while the “three old traditions or schools o f international law, the 
Grotians, naturalists and positivists, are relevant” to the realist, rationalist, 
revolutionist classification o f international theory, they “do not exactly
80 Wight, “Western Values”, p.91.
348
correspond.” *^ As such, and as will become apparent as this discussion continues, 
no neat and tidy set of relationships between these sets o f ideas can be discerned. 
The position of realism is relatively simple. The realism of Wight is the realism of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Carr. What is more, Wight maintains that legal positivists 
are inductive realists, thereby conceiving legal positivism as a subcategory of 
realism in a similar manner to the classification o f the Grotian tradition as a 
subcategory of rationalism.^^ This set of relationships thus accords well with 
Wight’s intention to derive three traditions of international thought that 
incorporated past thinking in both international legal and philosophical scholarship.
Revolutionism however, does not equate directly to either realism or idealism, or to 
natural or positive law. As Peter Wilson notes, o f Wight’s three categories it is 
revolutionism that “bears the closest resemblance to idealism” however, that they 
are not directly synonymous is made apparent by Wight’s classification of a range 
o f well-known idealists, including Norman Angell, Gilbert Murray and Alfred 
Zimmern, as rationalists.™ Indeed, in much of Wight’s work the revolutionist 
tradition seems to oscillate between idealism and Marxism and, as it does not 
incorporate a well established theory of international law, generally stands outside 
the positivist/naturalist/Gi'otian scheme.
International Theory, p.233. 
ibid., p.233.
^ Peter Wilson, “Introduction: The Twenty Years' Crisis and tlie Category of ‘Idealism* in 
International Relations”, in Thinkers o f the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, ed. 
David Long and Peter Wilson, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.5.
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Rationalism combines elements o f realism and revolutionism. As Wight argues, it 
‘dove-tails’ revolutionism in its idealism and shares a realist understanding of the 
anarchical nature of international relations, thereby implying that it stands between 
both realism and idealism, and the realist and revolutionist traditions.™ As 
mentioned above, although its acceptance o f the primacy of state sovereignty 
precludes it from being synonymous with idealism, the most prominent idealists of 
the inter-war period are all classified as rationalists. To further confuse matters, 
Wight maintains that Grotians, in the international legal sense of the term, are 
rationalists, although clearly the converse, that rationalists are Grotians, does not 
hold.™ Grotians, as conventionally defined, combine elements of natural and 
positive law, and maintain “that both are essential to the law of nations.”™ With 
reference to this discussion, Edward Keene writes that Wight “twisted himself into 
knots trying to explain how Grotians were similar to rationalists, while at the same 
time retaining a sense o f the differences between the two t r a d i t io n s .I n  light of 
his loose conceptualisation of the term tradition, these divisions are perfectly 
plausible. Rationalism stands as the intermediary between realism and 
revolutionism, whilst the Grotian tradition is a sub-category of rationalism and itself 
stands between the natural and positive law traditions. As the traditions all overlap 
at various junctures, the fact that revolutionism does not equate directly to idealism 
is immaterial.
Wight, International Theory, p. 162.
^ /W.. p. 14.
Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 34.
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Three central features of Wight’s scheme are therefore apparent here. First, in light 
of the porous boundaries separating the three traditions of realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism, a large amount of liberty is afforded the classification o f both 
theorists and their ideas. Thus, as mentioned above, both theorists and ideas may 
appear in more than one category, Wight conceding that the most important 
theorists generally ‘straddle the frontiers’ of two distinct traditions.Secondly, as 
the via media between a range of ‘definable extremes’, rationalism is a far more 
elastic term than realism or revolutionism. Indeed, its derivation as the repudiation 
of the two traditions between which it stands indicates that it is not an 
independently conceived and thus tightly bounded category, but one constituted by 
the conglomeration of the vaguely compatible elements of the other two. As such, it 
is reasonably employed as the via media between realism and idealism, realism and 
revolutionism, and legal positivism and natural law. What is important is not 
whether or not the extremes can be equated with one another, for clearly there are 
no absolutes in Wight’s scheme, but that the central characteristic of rationalism is 
its intermediary status. In particular, Wight seeks to justify rationalism’s 
intermediary position by arguing that “[t]he golden mean can be an overcautious 
and ignoble principle as a guide to action, but it may also be an index to the 
accumulated experience of a civilization which has valued disciplined scepticism 
and canonized prudence as a political virtue.”™
Wight, International Theory, p.260. 
Wight, “Western Values”, p.91.
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Finally, the relationship between these contending classification schemes is made 
slightly clearer in Wight’s diagrammatical representation o f the structure of 
international relations. Here, what Wight terms the ‘three stages of society and law’ 
are presented as three concentric circles. In the inner circle stand the state and 
municipal law, whilst in the outer circle Wight places natural law and mankind. 
Forming the intermediary circle between the two are international society and the 
law of nations. What is significant about this scheme is that natural law exists in a 
more broadly based sphere than the law o f nations, thereby exerting an influence 
upon it whilst not being synonymous with it. As Wight makes clear, it was only 
with the works of Francisco de Vitoria that the jtts  gentium and the ju s  naturae 
came to be confused, thereby creating the set o f convoluted relationships described 
above.
Rationalism
The most coherent and polished explanation o f the central precepts o f Wight’s 
rationalist tradition is found in ‘Western Values in International Relations’. It is also 
here that the partial fiision o f Lauterpacht’s two distinct understandings of the term 
‘Grotian’ is apparent. In elaborating upon the rationalist position, here deemed 
indicative of ‘western values’, Wight discusses its approach to four particular 
subjects; the nature of international society, the maintenance of order in 
international society, intervention and international morality. Thus, although a 
particular notion o f international society is central to his discussion and is deemed
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the definitive concept of the rationalist tradition in subsequent scholarship, it is 
simply one a number o f subjects with which he is concerned.
The first section o f Wight’s explication o f the rationalist tradition is therefore 
concerned with the nature o f international society and international law. Adopting 
elements of the international legal scheme discussed in the previous chapter, the 
rationalist tradition is viewed as the intermediary between legal positivism and 
cosmopolitanism. Thus, Wight writes that “by recognizing no international society 
except the society o f sovereign states, [legal positivism] denies the existence of an 
effective international society.” ®^ Although Wight distinguishes between the 
‘extreme’ and ‘general’ variants o f this approach in International Theory, legal 
positivism as thus portrayed accords well with a broadly conceived notion of 
realism.^* At the “opposite extreme” however, international society is conceived as 
“none other than the community of mankind” understood in terms of the civitas 
maxima^^ For proponents of this perspective, it is the notion of an international 
society comprised of states that is the ‘unreal thing’. The rationalist tradition then 
stands, characteristically, as the via media between these extremes:
Between the belief that the society of states is non-existent or at best a polite 
fiction, and the belief that it is the chrysalis for the community of mankind, 
lies a more complex conception of international society. It does not derogate 
from the moral claims o f states, conceding that they are, in Suarez’s phrase.
ibid., p.93.
Wight, International Theory, p.36. 
^ Wight, “Western Values”, p.93.
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communitates perfectae (exercising valid political authority); but it sees 
them as relatively, not absolutely perfect, and as parts o f a greater whole. It 
does not see international society as ready to supersede domestic society; 
but it notes that international society actually exercises restraints upon its 
members.
As Wight concedes, this concept of international society is “full o f qualifications 
and imprecision,” embodying the tension o f the opposites it reconciles and, in doing 
so, constituting a more accurate picture of international experience as it is.™ 
Drawing these opposites together then, rationalism posits international society as 
‘true society’, derived from the assumed innate sociability o f humankind and based 
on the mutual recognition o f international law as the institution best suited to 
maintaining order in what is otherwise an anarchical society. It is defined as;
the habitual intercourse o f independent communities, beginning in the 
Christendom of Western Europe and gradually extending throughout the 
world. It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance 
of the balance of power to preserve the independence of the member- 
communities; in the regular operations of international law, whose binding 
force is accepted over a wide though politically unimportant range of 
subjects; in economic, social and technical interdependence and the 
functional international institutions established latterly to regulate it.^ ®
ibid., p.95. 
ibid., p.95-6. 
ibid., p.96-7.
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Thus, on the one hand, the rationalist view o f international society includes the 
distinctly realist notions of the balance of power and primacy of independent state 
sovereignty, whilst on the other, it promotes the ‘binding force’ of international law.
Within Wight’s discussion o f the central precepts of international society, Grotius is 
noted for the ‘fruitful imprecision’ with which he describes an antecedent notion of 
international society in a manifold number of ways.™ However, what Grotius lacks 
in precision he well and truly makes up for in Wight’s opinion with his claim that 
both states and individuals are the members of his ambiguously conceived 
international society. Following this train of thought then, John Westlake’s 
‘Grotian’ definition of the international society of states is heralded as the definitive 
expression of this doctrine:
The society of states, having European civilization, or the international 
society, is the most comprehensive form of society among men, but it is 
among men that it exists. States are its immediate, men its ultimate 
members. The duties and rights o f states are only the duties and rights of the 
men who compose them.™
Thus, although Grotius is mentioned in the context of the rationalist theory of 
international society, he is not attributed with its inception or deemed its most 
important proponent.
^See p. 181.
Westlake quoted in Wight, “Western Values”, p. 102.
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It is in Wight’s discussion o f contending approaches to the maintenance o f order in 
international society that the term ‘Grotian’ first appears in his work. Again, the 
rationalist tradition is conceived as the via media between two extremes, this time 
the realist claim that “[i]f there is no international society, then. ..[t]here is no call to 
maintain order,” and the revolutionist vision o f the assimilation of the domestic and 
international realms.®^ If, however, international society does exist, its maintenance 
generally entails four postulates. First is the notion that “international society exists 
and survives by virtue of some core of common standards and common custom.”™ 
Second is the notion that “the tranquility o f international society and the freedom of 
its members require an even distribution o f power” somewhat akin to the balance of 
power system.*®® Third is the “right to self-defence and o f coercion”, whilst the 
final postulate maintains that these rights to self-defence and coercion must be 
undertaken collectively. Here Grotius emerges as the herald o f the cognate idea that 
for order to be maintained in international society, a “penal code for states [is] as 
indispensable as a penal code for citizens” is within domestic civil society.*®* This 
notion, Wight contends, found expression in the Covenant o f the League of Nations, 
the ‘Grotians’ discovering, with what he calls a “kind of messianic wonder, that the 
doctrines of the master had at last, after three hundred years, been embodied in the 
first written constitution of international society.”*®^
ibid., p. 102-3. 
^ fW ., p. 103.
ibid., p. 105.
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Herein lies a pertinent discussion o f the development of the relationship between 
law and morality in the ‘Grotian tradition’, starting with Grotius and extending to 
the twentieth century ‘Grotians’. As Wight notes, for Grotius, the “moral and legal 
order were the same” and were maintained by the instrument of punishment 
applicable to criminal states.*®  ^ However, he writes, “[ajfter Westphalia, the moral 
and legal order became increasingly identified with the balance of power, a 
development that the strict Grotians like the Dutch jurist Vollenhoven regard as a 
dilution, even a perversion of the gospel.”*®'* However, the Covenant of the League 
of Nations reformulates this point of contention by “combining the Grotian doctrine 
about the enforcement of law against a delinquent state with the system of the 
balance of power.”*®® This is apparent in the works of Brierly, Hancock, Salter and 
Zimmern, Wight thereby implying that they are at least quasi-Grotians. Strict 
Grotians however, obviously derived their ideas purely from Grotius himself.
This intermediary position is also evident in Wight’s discussion o f the contentious 
issue of inteivention in international society. Thus, standing “[bjetween the 
opposing positions of non-interventionism and interventionism,” represented by the 
legal positivist and cosmopolitan approaches respectively, is “a central doctrine of 
what might be called the moral interdependence of peoples.”*®® This doctrine 
maintains that although intervention is always unwelcome, it is occasionally
ibid., p. 106.
ibid., p. 107.
^^^ibid., p. 116.
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necessary in international relations because o f “the permanent instability of the 
balance of power and the permanent inequality in the moral development of its 
members.” *®^ As intervention necessarily “conflicts with the right of 
independence”, it ought to be viewed as the “exception rather than the rule.”*®^ At 
heart, this doctrine owes its foundations to the sense in which international society 
is conceived as being immediately constituted by states, but ultimately constituted 
by individuals. Grotius is named as a proponent of this doctrine with his claim that 
“in addition to the particular care o f their own state,” kings “are also burdened by a 
general responsibility for human society.” *®^ Although Wight is more cautious than 
Lauterpacht in his discussion o f the existence of a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention in Grotius’ work, he does acknowledge a limited form of the doctrine.
Finally, it is with the discussion o f international morality that the central tenets of 
realism and natural law are conceived in opposition to one another, thereby fusing 
the two debates that Lauterpacht addresses in his ‘Grotian tradition’. Thus, on the 
one hand, Wight conceived o f writers such as Kenneth Thompson, Hans 
Morgenthau and, of course, E.H. Carr, whose “kingdom of the fairies that seduces 
the intelligence of men is not the Roman Church but the League o f Nations... and 
the principal old wives who circulate its fables are President Wilson, Lord Cecil, 
Professors Toynbee and Zimmern and the Winston Churchill o f Arms and the
ibid., Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, II.XX.XL1V.1, p.508.
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Covenant. As discussed in the previous chapter and, as Kenneth Thompson 
writes, according to this realist perspective, states “tend to be repositories of their 
own morality.” *** At the opposite extreme lies the natural law tradition, the 
‘vitality’ o f which Wight commends on a number of occasions:
It might be thought enough to say o f the natural law ethic that it survives in 
an awareness o f the moral significance and the moral context of all political 
action. But the moral context is focused more precisely where the politically 
expedient and the morally permissible come into conflict.**^
It is in the via media between these two extremes that Wight contends the most 
prominent articulation of ‘western values’ is to be found. Here, as in “The Origins 
o f Our States-System: Geographical Limits”, Wight endorses a ‘double-standard’ 
of morality that provides a “permissible accommodation between moral necessity 
and practical demands.” **^  He justifies this intermediary position by arguing that;
it assumes that moral standards can be upheld without the heavens falling. 
And it assumes that the fabric of social and political life will be maintained, 
without accepting the doctrine that to preseive it any measures are 
permissible. For it assumes that the upholding of moral standards will in 
itself tend to strengthen the fabric o f political life.**'*
p. 121.
Kennetli Thompson in /ôM, p. 121.
Wight, fW., p. 124.
ibid., p. 128; Wight, “The origins of our states-system”, p. 125-8.
114 ibid., p. 130-131.
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However, this is not the only dual moral standard evident in Wight’s work. Indeed, 
in addition to the pattern o f concentric circles described above, Wight also depicts 
the states-system in Grotius as a double set of circles. In the outer circle stands the 
law o f nature, embracing all mankind and promoting the unity o f the human race.**® 
However, the inner circle is the corpus Christianorum, a unique circle “bound by 
the law of Christ.”**® Although a glimpse of Wight’s partiality to some form of 
Christian morality is evident here it, and indeed, all forms of morality discussed 
within his work, are not elaborated upon.
However, what is clear is that Wight discusses a notion of morality as a feature of 
the rationalist tradition that broadly equates to that which appeared in Lauterpacht’s 
‘Grotian tradition’. In particular, both the principles o f justice and charity that had 
previously appeared in Grotius’ works and the relationship between law and 
morality characteristic of the general development of the ‘Grotian tradition’ are 
discussed in general terms and with specific reference to Hugo Grotius himself.
Hedley Bull
Hedley Bull remains perhaps the most significant proponent of the Grotian tradition 
in twentieth century International Relations scholarship. An Australian by birth and
Wight, “The orighis of our states-system”, p. 125 & 128.
p. 128.
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character, Bull was, in Tim Dunne’s view, “a hybrid o f two political cultures.”  ^
On the one hand, he arrived at the University of Oxford to study for a B.Phil in 
Politics having graduated from the University o f Sydney with a Bachelor of Arts in 
1952, during a time when Australian political culture was marked by “a heightened 
sense of exceptionalism.” ^^  ^ Indeed, as will be seen shortly, this ingrained 
Australianism is particularly evident with Bull’s sceptical approach to questions of 
religion and morality. Although Bull made the pilgrimage to the United Kingdom 
that has become a typical part of Australian life, he only returned to Australia for a 
ten year Professorship o f International Relations in the Research School o f Pacific 
and Asian Studies at the Australian National University. Thus the remainder of his 
career was conducted in Britain.
As a junior academic at the London School o f Economics, Bull is known to have 
attended Martin Wight’s lectures in the mid-1950s. As Bull readily confesses, the 
lectures exerted a “profound impression” upon him, going so far as to write that 
“[ejver since that time I have felt in the shadow of Martin Wight’s thought -  
humbled by it, a constant borrower from it, always hoping to transcend it but never 
able to escape from it.” ^^ ° However, as will be seen shortly, Bull did far more than 
borrow Wight’s three traditions, he wholly appropriated them, solidifying their 
porous boundaries, imposing a new set of titles upon them and embellishing their
As Tim Duime notes, “Adam Watson described Bull as ‘a very dinkum Aussie’.” Inventing 
International Society, p. 137.
ibid.U 8
ibid.
120 Bull, “Martin Wight and tlie tlieoiy of international relations”, p.ix.
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contents. Thus, the vaguely defined realist, rationalist and revolutionist traditions of 
Wight’s thought became with Bull the less flexibly demarcated Hobbesian, Grotian 
and Kantian traditions. In Bull’s view, rationalism was Grotianism and Grotius was 
not only the progenitor of the ‘Grotian tradition’ but its herald, exemplar and its 
most eminent member. This new set of associations is most evident in the most 
important work in the transformation of the Grotian tradition, Bull’s “The Grotian 
Conception o f International Society.”
As a result o f his association with Wight, Bull became a member o f the British 
Committee on the Theory o f International Relations in 1961. “The Grotian 
Conception of International Society” was presented to the Committee in 1962 as an 
attempt to redress a gap in the Committee’s project, namely, the analysis of the role 
of law in international society. As will be seen shortly, it instigated both lively 
discussion and fierce criticism from members of the British Committee, garnering 
support from Herbert Butterfield and opposition from Wight. “The Grotian 
Conception” was followed in 1977 by Bull’s most famous work, The Anarchical 
Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics, a text that reiterates the central 
principles o f the “Grotian Conception” albeit in a slightly altered form. Continuing 
his interest in the concept of international society, together with Adam Watson, Bull 
edited The Expansion o f  International Society in 1984^^  ^ and, as Watson writes, 
intended to write a “companion volume” entitled The Revolt Against the West 
“which would show Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania as rejecting not only
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion o f International Society, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984).
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Euro/North American political, administrative and economic standards, but also the 
West’s cultural standards and practices.” However, the most important sea- 
change in Bull’s thought came with the Hagey Lectures delivered at the University 
of Waterloo in Ontario in 1984, published under the title of Justice in International 
R e l a t i o n s It is in this work, followed by his contribution to the co-edited volume 
Hugo Grotius and International Relations, “The Importance o f Hugo Grotius in the 
Study o f International Relations”, that Bull appears to move towards the ‘Grotian’ 
or solidarist position he had spent much of his career criticising as detrimental to 
the maintenance of international order. Unfortunately however. Bull died in 1985 
without revealing the fiill extent of this apparent change o f heart.
Tradition
Following Wight, Hedley Bull conceives the ‘Grotian tradition’ as standing 
between the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions, and as combining elements of the 
natural and positive law traditions. However, whereas Wight did not assume that 
the terms rationalist and Grotian were absolutely synonymous, the characterisation 
of the Grotian tradition as a sub-category o f the rationalist tradition is overlooked 
by Bull. Thus, in Bull we see the absolute equation o f rationalism with Grotianism, 
and the solidification o f the boundaries separating Wight’s three traditions:
Adam Watson, “Recollection of ray discussion with Hedley Bull about tlie place in tlie liistory of 
International Relations of the idea of the Anarcliical Society” (July 2002), 
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/watson-bull02.doc.
Hedley Bull, Justice in International Relations, Tlie Hagey Lectures, (Waterloo: University of 
Waterloo, 1984).
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Throughout the history of the modern states system there have been three 
competing traditions o f thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which 
views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist 
tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community 
of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views 
international politics as taking place within an international society.
Similarly, whereas Grotius stands as one of many members o f the Grotian tradition 
in Wight’s theory. Bull makes a far more direct association between the works of 
Grotius and the Grotian tradition. Given his conflation of the two entities then, it is 
somewhat ironic that Bull was amongst the first to hint, albeit unconsciously, that a 
meaningful distinction might be made between Grotius’ ideas and Grotian thought 
in contemporary International Relations. In ‘The Grotian Conception of 
International Society’, perhaps the seminal work in the broadly understood ‘Grotian 
tradition’ of International Relations, he writes;
The reason for giving it this name does not lie in the part which the writings 
o f Grotius have played in bringing about this twentieth centuiy doctrine, 
although this is by no means negligible; but simply in the measure of 
identity that exists between the one and the other. We shall have occasion to 
consider the differences as well as the resemblances between Grotius 
himself and the twentieth-century neo-Grotians; but the resemblances are 
remarkable enough to wairant our treatment of De Jure Belli ac P ads  as 
containing the classical presentation of the same view.^^^
BvM, Anarchical Society, p.23.
Bull, “Tlie Grotian Conception”, p.51.
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However, Bull’s attempt to draw a set of meaningful comparisons between Grotius’ 
works and the ideas o f the twentieth century neo-Grotians, as he terms them, is 
critically limited. In particular, Schmidt’s argument that the meaning of ‘classic 
texts’, such as Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pads, “is often already prefigured by 
reference to the tradition in which they are placed,” springs to mind. On an even 
more fundamental level however, Bull’s understanding of Grotius appears to be 
directed by the works o f Cornelius van Vollenhoven, Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch 
Lauterpacht, all o f whom were instrumental in the development of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ o f international law in the twentieth century, and whom Bull considered 
members of a wider ‘Grotian tradition’. Thus, Bull’s understanding o f Grotius as an 
intellectual entity separable from the ‘Grotian tradition’ (what he would call the 
neo-Grotians), is situated wholly within what he constitutes as the tradition itself. It 
is therefore not at all surprising that Bull is able to draw such ‘remarkable’ 
resemblances between the two sets of ideas.
Just fifteen pages on however, having established the degree of synonymy between 
Grotius and the Grotian tradition. Bull attempts once again to distinguish them, 
writing;
Brian C. Sclunidt, “The historiography of academic international relations”. Review of 
Internationa} Studies, Vol.20, (1994), p.359.
A. Claire Cutler makes a similar argument to Bull in “The ‘Grotian tradition’ in international 
relations”. Review o f International Studies, Vol.7 (1991), pp.41-65. However, like Bull, Cutler’s 
interpretation of Grotius lias been prefigured by her reliance on a number of writers who are 
members of tlie ‘Grotian tradition’.
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...the positions of Grotius and o f the twentieth century neo-Grotians are 
quite distinct. Grotius stands at the birth of international society and is 
rightly regarded as one o f its midwives. For him the terminology of a 
universal state is what is still normal, and the language of international 
relations can only be spoken with an effort. The neo-Grotians, however, 
have three more centuries o f the theoiy and practice o f international society 
behind them; their novelty lies not in moving away from the domestic model 
in international relations, but in moving back towards it.^^^
Benedict Kingsbury cites this passage as evidence of Bull’s ‘systematic rigour’, 
maintaining that it “caused him to distinguish sharply between the writings of 
Grotius and the tenets of a ‘Grotian t r a d i t i o n A s  will be seen shortly however, 
despite again attempting to theoretically dissect Grotius and the ‘Grotian tradition’. 
Bull’s subsequent discussions continue to conflate the two entities.
The transformation of Wight’s traditions into more solidly demarcated categories 
and the contingent reassociation of the Grotian tradition with the works of Hugo 
Grotius can in large part be attributed to the contending notions of tradition 
employed by Wight and Bull. With regard to the theoretical notion of tradition 
apparent in Wight’s three traditions of international theoiy. Bull writes that “Wight 
himself was the first to warn against the danger of reifying the concepts he had 
suggested.” Revealingly, he continues that “the Machiavellian, Grotian and
Bull, “Tlie Grotian Conception”, p.66.
Benedict Kingsbury, “Grotius, Law and Moral Scepticism: Theory and Practice in tlie Thought of 
Hedley Bull”, in Classical Theories o f International Relations, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, 
(Houndinills: Macmillan, 1996), p.42. 
ibid., p.xiii.
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Kantian traditions were merely paradigms,” and that “not even Machiavelli, for 
example, was in the strict sense a Machiavellian.” Thus, Bull seems to 
acknowledge Wight’s insistence that the “three traditions were only to be taken as 
paradigms”, and even then not “too s e r i o u s l y . B u l l ’s apparent understanding of 
the dangers inherent in the practice o f categorisation is also reflected in a number of 
other works published around the same time. Thus, in “The Theory o f International 
Politics 1919-1969” he argues that “[i]t is not possible to divide the theoretical 
works of the last half centuiy into neat categories or schools that are logically 
exhaustive and exclusive of one a n o th e r .S im i l a r l y ,  in putting his “case for a 
classical approach” he acknowledges that “[t]here are dangers in lumping them 
[proponents o f the scientific approach] all together, and it may be inevitable that 
criticisms directed at the whole o f the genre will be unfair to some parts of it.” ^^ '^  
However, the pivotal point in Bull’s thinking is revealed in his criticism of Wight’s 
view and the subsequent claim that “one has to take [the three traditions] seriously, 
or not at all.” ^^  ^ Indeed, this contention may be seen as being largely responsible for 
the solidification o f what Bull recognised had been in Wight’s view three vaguely 
defined traditions.
ibid.
ibid., p.xviii
133 Hedley Bull, “The Theoiy of International Politics 1919-1969”, in International Politics 1919- 
1969, ed. Brian Porter, (London; Oxford University Press, 1972), p.33.
Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The (Zase for a Classical Approach”, World Politics, 
VoLXVllI, No.3, (April 1966), p.363.
Bull, “Martin Wight”, p.xviii.
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On a more fundamental level however. Bull’s argument and contingent 
conceptualisation o f the Grotian tradition reveals the extent to which he viewed 
Wight’s analytical traditions as actual historical ones with solidly demarcated 
boundaries and an explicitly discernible path o f transmission. In particular, “Bull 
criticizes Wight for giving in to the temptation of coherence” with the following 
argument:
Much that has been said about International Relations in the past cannot be 
related significantly to these traditions at all. Wight was, I believe, too 
ambitious in attributing to the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the Kantians 
distinctive views not only about war, peace, diplomacy, inteiwention and 
other matters of International Relations but about human psychology, about 
irony and tragedy, about methodology and epistemology. There is a point at 
which the debate Wight is describing ceases to be one that has actually 
taken place, and becomes one that he has invented; at this point his work is 
not an exercise in the history o f ideas, so much as the exposition of an 
imaginary philosophical conversation.
However, Bull similarly ‘invents’ a Grotian tradition, only his pays more attention 
to the element of continuity than the element o f coherence. Thus, Bull, unable to 
resist the equal temptation o f locating “the origin o f the Grotian tradition in the 
works of Grotius himself’ constructs a singular pattern of thought transmitted 
from Grotius to the twentieth century. In doing so, the central precepts of this 
broader ‘Grotian tradition’ are demonstrated by reference to actual passages of
Baitelson, “Short circuits”, p.347. 
Bull, “Martin Wight”, p.xviii. 
Bartelson, “Short circuits”, p.347.
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Grotius’ most famous work. De Jure Belli ac Pads, thus firmly establishing the 
position of Grotius in the Grotian tradition.
The Grotian Conception
As its title suggests, “The Grotian Conception of International Society” pivots about 
the concept of international society. International society is defined in general terms 
as;
a group o f states, conscious o f common interests and common values, [who] 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set o f rules in their relations with one another, and share in the 
workings of common institutions. If  states today form an international 
society...this is because, recognising certain common interests and perhaps 
some common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in 
their dealings with one another, such as that they should respect one 
another’s claims to independence, that they should honour agreements into 
which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain limitations in 
exercising force against one another. At the same time they cooperate in the 
workings of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international 
law, the machinery o f diplomacy and general international organisation, and 
the customs and conventions of war.^^^
Bull entertains two understandings of the term ‘Grotian’ that are associated with 
this conception of international society. In a broad sense, the ‘Grotian tradition’ is 
defined by an acceptance o f the supposed existence of international society and is 
thought to be synonymous with the rationalist tradition of Wight’s conception.
Bull, Anarchical Society., p,13.
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However, in its narrow sense, the Grotian tradition is conceived as the solidarist 
variant o f the broader tradition and stands in opposition to the alternative ‘pluralist’ 
conception of international s o c i e t y I t  is this solidarist. form of the ‘Grotian 
tradition’, understood in contradistinction to pluralism, that is the central concern of 
“The Grotian Conception o f International Society.” However, before these 
contending approaches are discussed, it is necessary to back track a little in order to 
account for this division in the first place.
As Tim Dunne has noted on a number o f occasions, for Bull, international society 
“can only be understood in contradistinction to the idea of a states system. 
However, the states-system does not just stand in contradistinction to international 
society but exists as one of the two constituent components of its modern form. As 
such. Bull contends that while the existence o f an international society 
“presupposes an international system”, the converse does not apply. This notion 
o f an international states-system is explicitly derived from Heeren’s 
conceptualisation discussed in Chapter Four and is said to exist, in Bull’s terms 
“when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave -  at least in some 
measure -  as parts of a whole.” Thus, Bull reasons that without this degree of 
contact it is not possible for states to become “conscious o f common interests or
ibid., p.310.
Tim Dimne, “New tliinkiiig on international society”, British Journal o f Politics and Internationa! 
Relations, Vol. 3, No.2, (June 2001), p.226.
BwW, Anarchical Society, p. 13.
’ ibid., p.9. Heeren discussed on p. 12.
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values” essential to the existence o f international society. For Bull, as for his 
English school colleagues, the modern concept of international society is 
constituted by two sets of ideas, Heeren’s Staaten-system and the much earlier 
notion that the force of the ju s  gentium is located in the societas gentium.
In light of the dual strands of thought from which the concept of international 
society is derived, Bull also identifies within it an inherent tension between the 
concepts of order, that “pattern o f activity that sustains the elementary or primary 
goals of the society o f states,” and justice, variously defined. These goals include, 
“preservation of the system and society of states itself’, “maintaining the 
independence or external sovereignty of individual states”, “peace” and the 
“limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm, the keeping of promises 
and the stabilization of possession by rules of p r o p e r t y . J u s t i c e ,  on the other 
hand, “is a term which can ultimately be given only some kind of private or 
subjective definition” and comes in three forms; international or interstate justice, 
individual or human justice, and cosmopolitan or world justice. While Bull 
concedes that “justice, in any of its forms, is realizable only in a context of order”, 
he also argues that there is “an inherent tension between the order provided by the
p. 13. 
ibid., p.8. 
ibid., p. 16-18, 
ibid., p.75-82.
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system and society o f states, and the various aspirations for justice that arise in 
world politics.”
In response to this problem, “The Grotian Conception of International Society” 
dlptingujglies between the solidarist and pluralist approaches to the concept of 
international society, heralding Grotius and Oppenheim as each perspective’p 
tespectiyp prototypical representative. Recognising the multiple conceptions of 
justice that operate within the international system, pluralism “is a conception qf 
internattQpal society founded upon the observation o f the actual area o f agreement 
between states and informed by a sense of the limitations within which this situation 
rules m^y be usefully made rules of law.” In affording the maintenance o f order 
primacy in international affairs, pluralism contends that “international society ip 
composed, of states, and only states possess rights and duties in international 
law.” ^^® In doing so, it particularly endorses the maintenance of state sovereignly 
via respfpt for the principles o f non-inteivention and non-use of force. Thus, 
although individuals “may be regarded objects o f international law”, this is only 
the behppt of dqrpestic legislation and, as such, the individual recipients of rights 
and duties in international law cannot be conceived as “members of international 
society in their own right.”^^ ^
Bull, Grot%> Conception”, p.71-2.
ibid, p.68.
ibid
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Contrary to this, the ‘solidarist’ approach posits that the “members o f international 
society are ultimately not states but individuals.”*^  ^ International society is 
consequently “a society formed by states and sovereigns” whose position “is 
secondary to that of the universal community o f mankind” and it is from this that 
their legitimacy is derived. As such, solidarism maintains respect for the right of 
the states to sovereign integrity, but does not conceive this as an absolute right. 
Characterised as more convivial to the notion of justice in international society, 
solidarism’s “central assumption is that o f the solidarity, or potential solidarity, o f 
most states in the world in upholding the collective will o f the society of states 
against challenges to it.” *^ '* It consequently stands in direct opposition to the 
pluralist view that states “are capable o f agreeing only for certain minimum 
purposes which fall short o f the enforcement of the law.” *^  ^ Significantly, Bull 
contends that the second, narrow understanding of the term ‘Grotian’, defined as 
“the solidarist form, .o f the doctrine that there is a society of states.. .united Grotius 
and the twentieth century neo-Grotians, in opposition to the pluralist conception o f 
international society entertained by Vattel and later positivist writers.
In presenting the solidarist and pluralist approaches as a debate between Grotius 
and Oppenheim, Bull explicitly seeks to extend the debate instigated by Cornelius 
van Vollenhoven earlier in the century that sought to defend the solidarism of
BwW, Anarchical Society, p.230.
Bull, “The Grotian Conception”, p.52. 
Bull, Anarchical Society, p.310.
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Grotius against the pluralism o f Vattel. However, a number of problems are 
apparent with this endeavour at the outset. As hinted at above. Bull seems to 
suggest that the ideas of Grotius are commensurate with the central precepts of 
contemporary solidarism. In large part, this can be attributed to the overwhelming 
extent to which Bull relies on Lauterpacht’s interpretation of De Jure Belli ac 
Pads. By doing so, as Dunne writes;
. . .Bull infers that the ‘central Grotian assumption’ of solidarity is the central 
assumption of Grotius. Such a distortion flows easily from Bull’s attempt to 
read the tension between the power political order and the normative legal 
order in terms o f a dialogue between Oppenheim and Grotius. His 
instrumental approach to the history of ideas is evident in the discussion that 
followed; I had in mind’. Bull reflected, ‘to criticise the conception o f 
international relations embodied in the League and United Nations and to 
some extent in Western thinking about international relations’. I f  Bull’s 
target was the League o f Nations (and the internationalist views that 
underpinned it) then why take the labyrinthine route of associating it with 
the work of Grotius?*^^
Of course the reason why Bull chose to attack the League of Nations via the works 
of Grotius is most probably due to the manner in which its inventors and proponents 
were considered ‘Grotians’ in subsequent scholarship. However, by deriving his 
understanding of Grotius’ works purely from the interpretation of one of those he 
sought to criticise, the Grotius that Bull addresses is, at least in part, a figment of 
Lauterpacht’s imagination.
Bull, “The Grotian Conception”, p.51 & 52.
Inventing International Society, p. 101.
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Bull seeks to actively criticise the ‘solidarist’ or narrowly conceived Grotian 
position for two main reasons. First is the claim that solidarism has exerted “an 
influence positively detrimental to international order.” Thus, he argues that “by 
imposing upon international society a strain that it cannot bear”, namely the 
imposition of a supposed, though in actual fact false, solidarity of interests, “it has 
the effect of undermining those structures of the system which might otherwise be 
secure.”*^** Exactly what these systemic structures are is not specified in this 
context, although it can be assumed that they equate to those discussed above with 
relation to international order. In Bull’s view then, pluralism is more conducive to 
the maintenance o f order with its recognition that “the actual area o f agreement 
between states” is far more limited than solidarism supposes.*^*
Secondly, Bull is particularly sceptical o f the assertion that any form of common 
morality, implied by the central precepts o f the solidarist approach, can be 
identified in international relations. This scepticism is particularly displayed in his I
Icritique of E.B.F. Midgley’s The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory o f  =|
International Relations, which he describes as “dauntingly massive and j
impressively learned, if [an] avowedly dogmatic and profoundly reactionary
ibid., p.70. I
i
ibid., p.70-71. I1
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attempt to rehabilitate the Thomist philosophy o f natural iaw.” *^  ^In particular, Bull 
highlights what he believes to be the “majestic outlandishness” o f Midgley’s claim 
that the secularisation and later rejection of natural law constituted serious 
“crimes”. Revealing his outward discomfort with the avowedly Christian 
elements of Midgley’s work. Bull particularly criticises his “reliance on Christian 
revelation, his statement that the fundamental principles of his work are confirmed 
by the authority of the Church and his view that natural law cannot effectively be 
upheld today except by theists.” *^"* However, Bull’s most substantial criticism of 
Midgley’s work centers around his presentation of “moral issues in terms of 
“antinomies and paradoxes”.”*^  ^ In particular, he argues, contrary to Midgley, that 
moral questions can only be answered “by reference to moral rules whose validity 
we assume”, that is, according to rational a rg u m en t.H o w ev er, as Midgley’s 
impressive reply points out, rather that outwardly reject natural law in the manner 
which he purports to. Bull’s view “comprises a peculiar combination of scepticism 
about, and nostalgia for, the natural law.” *^ ^
Hedley Bull, “Natural law and international relations”, British Journal o f  International Studies, 
Vol.5, (1979), p. 171. Bull also similarly criticised Michael Donelan’s edited collection The Reason 
o f  States in die Time Literary Supplement in 1978. 
ibid., P.175& 178.
/W., p.181. 
ibid., p. 179.
/W., p. 180.
167 Midgley, p.262.
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Indeed, Bull also faced criticism on the moral front from his mentor Martin Wight 
who, in response to “The Grotian Conception o f International Society” reiterated 
the point that;
[t]he Grotian premise, explicit in both Grotius and his 20**’ century 
followers, is that war is an intolerable evil. H.B.’s alternative position is that 
wai* is a tolerable and necessary evil.*^^
Bull’s paper fared slightly better with Butterfield, eliciting the following response:
The real implication of Hedley Bull’s lucid paper then -  and I think it is a 
profound implication -  is that the Grotian conception o f international 
society gets in the way of a realistic view of the world situation. It leaves 
statesmen to think in terms o f punishing unjust enemies rather than in terms 
of setting up a viable balance or distribution of power. The Grotian system 
sets up nations to thinking about international morality in an epoch when 
international morality may not be sufficient by itself to guarantee peace and 
stability. The Grotian conception sets statesmen and scholars thinking about 
the justice o f the world order rather than the workability o f the world order. 
And Hedley Bull is surely right in thinking that we are in such an early stage 
in the evolution of world society that the most we can hope for now is 
workability.
However, the problems associated with Bull’s pluralism are also considerable. 
Considered in isolation, by rejecting moral universalism, Bull precludes the 
possibility of a moral basis to the pluralist conception of international society at all.
Wight quoted in Dunne, Inventing International Society’, p. 103. 
Butterfield quoted in Dumie, p. 103.
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In this vein, Rengger questions whether it is possible to find answers to moral 
questions;
unless there is, at least potentially, some standard outside the existing 
‘patterns of activity’ which could allow us to say that A rather than B under 
circumstances X is more appropriate? As a form of ethical judgement this 
surely slides imperceptibly into a rather curious rule utilitarianism with a 
sliding scale o f values; in principle nothing is forbidden, it depends on 
whatever the ‘consensus o f shared values’ happens to permit at any given 
time.*”^**
Bull’s pluralism is also particularly problematic when considered in relation to the 
Grotian tradition. By having two definitions of what it means to be ‘Grotian’, one of 
which is almost untenably broad. Bull is able to classify a wide range of theorists, 
including both Grotius and Oppenheim, as ‘Grotians’ in the sense that they both 
appear to endorse a notion o f international society. However, Oppenheim is not a 
good example of a broadly conceived ‘Grotian’ and narrowly conceived pluralist, 
most obviously because he was, in strictly international legal terms, not an 
analytical ‘Grotian’ but a legal positivist. In this vein, Vattel would have been a 
better representative o f the pluralist position although this would have rendered 
Bull’s work simply the converse of Van Vollenhoven’s piece. Furthermore, Vattel’s 
retention o f elements o f natural law would have caused Bull considerable 
difficulties. In large part, this may be seen as the direct result o f Bull’s
N.J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond 
International Relations theory, (London: Routledge, 2000), p.79.
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overwhelming desire to see the traditions of international law as directly 
commensurate with Wight’s three traditions.
By using Oppenheim here, pluralism is conceived as a broad Grotianism that 
includes an acceptance o f the existence o f international society but is infused with 
elements of legal positivism. In particular, it takes the state as the fundamental unit 
o f international society and eschews any notion of common morality. Rather, 
cognisant with the morality of realism and legal positivism, in Bull’s pluralism, the 
only acceptable form of morality is that of the individual, whether they be an 
individual human being within the state, or an individual state in international 
society. Joao Marques de Almeida attributes the legal positivist elements o f Bull’s 
pluralism to the influence o f H.L.A. Hart on his thought, arguing that “Bull adopts 
what could be called a ‘minimalist Haitian position’” by seeking to reduce 
“international law to a set of recognized and legitimate legal standards.”*^ * As such, 
Bull’s pluralist approach, despite being categorised under the banner of the broadly 
conceived ‘Grotian tradition’ does not retain either of the elements that have 
defined it historically, an acceptance o f the natural law foundations of international 
law and morality, and following from this, an acceptance of an inherent relationship 
between law and morality.
Joao Marques de Almeida, “Challenging Realism by Returning to Histoiy; The British 
Committee’s Contribution to International Relations 40 Years On”, International Relations, Vol. 17, 
No.3, (September 2003), p.292-293.
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The Importance o f Hugo Grotius
Despite the efforts with which Bull criticises the solidarist approach in Hie 
Anarchical Society and “The Grotian Conception of International Society”, a 
distinct shift towards this position can be discerned in his later works. Nicholas 
Wheeler and Tim Dunne attempt to reconcile this move by characterising Bull as 
harbouring a ‘pluralism of the intellect and solidarism of the wilT.*^^ In particular, 
they argue that “later Bull came to express increasing disillusionment with 
pluralism on the grounds that it could not provide for order among states and hence 
order among the wider society of humankind.” Evidence of this growing 
disillusionment first began to appear in the early 1980s and, in particular, in the 
Hagey Lectures of 1983. Here, despite his previous arguments against the solidarist 
approach. Bull discussed the notion of a “growing cosmopolitan awareness” 
according to which the West was able to “empathise with sections of humanity that 
are geographically or culturally distant from us.” *^"* Indeed, Bull’s ‘solidarist’ turn 
was in large part driven by an increasing concern for the welfare needs of the Third 
World. He writes;
For all this the Western countries today, and especially the United States, 
display an appalling lack of vision in their policies towards the South...No 
international order can endure in the future unless these states and people 
believe themselves to have a stake in its continuance. The issue that this
Nicholas J. Wiieeler and Timothy Dumie, “Hedley Bull’s pluralism of the intellect and solidarism 
of the will”. International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1, (1996), pp.91-107, 
ibid., p.96.
Bull quoted in ibid., p.99. Bull, Justice in International Relations, p. 12.
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raises for the Western powers is not mainly or even chiefly a moral 
one. ..We must take the Third World seriously primarily because of the vital 
interest we have in constructing an international order in which we 
ourselves will have a prospect of living in peace and security into the next 
century and beyond. This requires that we in the West should be ready to 
accommodate the demands o f Third World countries for a redistribution o f 
wealth and power in the international system.
What is particularly significant about this piece is that it indicates Bull’s recognition 
that in order to achieve order, states must pursue justice. As such, it stands in direct 
contradiction to the earlier claims o f “The Grotian Conception” that the pursuit of 
justice was positively detrimental to the achievement and maintenance of 
international order. However, Bull concedes that “[t]he cosmopolitan society which 
is implied and presupposed in our talk of human rights exists only as an ideal, and 
we court great dangers if we allow ourselves to proceed as if it were a political and 
social framework already in place,” thereby reining himself back in.
It is thus with “The Importance o f Hugo Grotius” that the most profound shift in 
Bull’s thinking is evident. Not only is Grotius bathed in an altogether more 
favourable light in this later work, but Bull also demonstrates a more sophisticated 
understanding of the history of ideas. Here, for the first time in Bull’s work, the 
historical figure of Hugo Grotius is afforded treatment alongside the ideas of the 
‘Grotian tradition’. Thus, although Bull discusses aspects of Grotius’ work in “The
Bull quoted in ibid., p. 101. Hedley Bull, “Bie iiiteniational aiiaichy in die 1980s”, Australian 
Outlook, Vol.37, No.3, December 1983, p. 128-9.
176 Bull, Justice in International Relations, p. 13.
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Grotian Conception”, it is only with this later article that any discussion of the 
historical circumstances surrounding Grotius’ life or the publication of De Jure 
Belli ac Pads  are included. This is not to suggest that all Bull has to say about 
Grotius is either useful or accurate, however. Like many o f his predecessors. Bull 
focuses unnecessarily on Grotius’ brief and unsuccessful diplomatic career, going 
so far as to suggest that he was the intellectual founder of the Peace of 
Westphalia.
However, Bull does make two important concessions in this work. First, he admits 
that “[b]y no means all that Grotius has to say seems to support what we have been 
calling a solidarist point o f view”, even going so far as to recognise that pluralist 
elements can be found in Grotius’ wor ks .Second l y ,  he also argues that “[i]t is 
absurd to read Grotius as if he were speaking to us directly about the problems of 
our own times”, thereby further dissociating Grotius from the twentieth century 
Grotian tradition o f his own construction.*^^ It is difficult to determine precisely 
what these significant shifts in Bull’s thinking mean, in large part because he passed 
away before having the opportunity to account for them in more detail. What is 
certain though, is that for the most part, the account of the Grotian tradition and 
discussion of the pluralist and solidarist approaches to the notion of international 
society in “The Grotian Conception of International Society” and The Anarchical 
Society, remain the most influential works in subsequent Grotian scholarship.
Bull, “Tlie Impoilance of Hugo Grotius”, p.75.
178 .ibid., p.89.
/W., p.91.
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Beyond Bull
Beyond the work of Hedley Bull, two distinct strands o f ‘Grotian’ scholarship can 
be discerned amongst theorists associated with the contemporary ‘English School’. 
On the one hand, drawing on the work o f Richard Falk, Jackson attempts to wrest 
the term ‘Grotian’ away from its purely solidarist association, writing that;
Richard Falk is an advocate of a solidarist conception o f international 
society in which the global community o f humankind has normative priority 
and the society of states is in conflict with it. By contrast, classical 
international society scholars view the states system as the only practical 
institution presently at hand by which the values and interests of humankind 
can be defended and advanced. According to that approach, Hugo Grotius is 
the theorist par excellence of international society.
Thus, for Jackson, reviving Falk’s notion o f the ‘Grotian moment’, the term 
‘Grotian’ is fundamentally marked by an increasingly conventional tension between 
pluralist and solidarist norms. On the other hand, theorists concerned with the 
normative justification o f humanitarian intervention have especially drawn upon the 
‘solidarist’ variant o f the ‘Grotian tradition’ and it is here that its most significant 
developments have occurred. However, standing between Bull and these 
contemporary theorists, is the work of R.J. Vincent.
Jackson, p. 379.
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R J . Vincent
Continuing the line of transmission that runs from Martin Wight to Hedley Bull, 
R J. Vincent became Bull’s protégé whilst writing his PhD at the Australian 
National University in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As will be seen shortly 
however, although much o f Vincent’s early work, including his PhD thesis, 
Nonintervention and International Order, is overtly influenced by Bull’s 
preoccupation with questions o f order in international society, his later work, in 
particular, Human Rights and International Society, certainly rejects Bull’s 
pluralism in favour of a solidarist approach to international society. What is clear, 
however, is that Vincent certainly adopted the three traditions from Wight and Bull, 
defining a ‘Grotian’ in a broad sense as one who rejects the “facile account o f the 
brutishness o f international politics given by realists.”*^* Explaining both his and 
Martin Wight’s reasons for considering Burke a ‘Grotian’, he outlines the central 
tenets of the Grotian tradition as follows:
...war cannot be abandoned since it is the means for the attainment of 
justice in international politics, but its rigours can be mitigated by the 
conventions of the international community; the nature of man is depressing 
to contemplate when abandoned to its vulgar propensities, but there is the 
chance of his nobility when civilized by political institutions and directed by 
enlightened leadership; and the imperial government o f less civilized 
societies was justified when it is conducted for their benefit. Law, order, and
R.J. Vincent, “Edmund Bmke and die tlieory of international relations”. Review o f International 
Studies, Vol. 10, No.3, (July 1984), p.206.
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the honouring o f obligations: this runs the course of Wight’s slogan for the 
Grotians.
Significantly, although Burke is considered both a Grotian and a solidarist in his 
work, Vincent concludes by remarking that he could be categorised, in different 
ways, in each of Wight’s three traditions, thereby “sweeping them all away.”*^ 
Unfortunately however, he does not go on to consider what the implications o f this 
might be for the three traditions in general.
Prior to this however, Vincent’s work was marked by a tangible emphasis on the 
concept of order. Nonintervention and Inteimational Order argues that “[i]f 
international society is accurately described as being split up into islands o f order, 
the distribution o f which is determined by the principle o f state sovereignty, then it 
is the fiinction o f the rule of nonintervention to draw attention to that distribution 
and require respect for Thus, “[t]he principle of nonintervention placed at the 
frontiers o f state sovereignty fulfils an analogous function to that of a “No 
Trespassing” sign standing at the perimeter of a piece o f property held under 
domestic law.” *^  ^ What is more, Grotius, along with Pufendorf and Hobbes, is 
considered the ‘precursor’ of the doctrine of nonintervention for, as Vincent 
reasons, “their writings furnished ideas without which the principle could not have
ibid., P.212&216.
R.J. Vincent, Noninten’ention and International Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974), p.330.
ibid., p.331.
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found expression in the form which it took in the works of Wolff and Vattel.” ^^  ^
Grotius’ contribution is particularly assured in this vein as “he conceived of 
international law as a law which existed between sovereign states:
International morality might then be impoverished by being the outcome of 
a decision to prefer the order established within the state, but the defence o f 
it rests on the assertion that any more ambitious doctrine that neglects the 
reality of a morally plural world is likely to undermine the international 
moral order rather than to protect and advance it. The unglamorous doctrine 
of non-intervention bears witness to the minimal unity of international 
society and retains such universal validity as it has (universal that is in 
international society) by the acknowledgement on the part o f state that most 
moral claims are to be made and met at a place other than in international 
society/
Thus, although Vincent still maintains here that world society “conceived as a 
moral framework” has “not yet taken a form concrete enough to uphold” the ‘noble 
ideas’ it has nurtured, he acknowledges the “idea that states do have duties in the 
area of human rights that has informed the traditional doctrine o f humanitarian 
intervention, so that if a state by its behaviour outrages the conscience of mankind it 
should not be entitled to invoke the principle of non-intervention.” ^^ ^
ibid., p.22.
/W.
R.J. Vincent, “Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order”, British Journal o f International 
Studies, Vol.4, No.l, (April 1978), p.28. 
p.31 &41.
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However, it is in Human Rights and International Relations that Vincent’s move to 
a minimal solidarist position is made complete. Here the principle of non­
intervention is explicitly presented as evidence of the minimal solidarity of 
international society, “not the absence o f morality but the recognition of its 
limits.” The ‘morality o f states’, Vincent argues, “flows from an ‘egg-box’ 
conception of international society” ;
Sovereign states are the eggs, the goodness within contained by a (fragile) 
shell. The box is international society, providing a compartment for each 
egg, and a (less fragile) wall between one and the next. The general function 
of international society is to separate and cushion, not to act.^^^
However, just two pages on he suggests two modifications to the ‘egg-box’, the first 
of which is relatively ‘modest’ and aims to make international society work better 
by “allowing counter-intervention to uphold the principle o f non-intervention, or 
assistance for successful secessionist movements practicing the principle o f self- 
determination.” ^^  ^However, the second, more ambitious modification “may presage 
structural change in world politics” and is, at heart, the doctrine o f humanitarian 
intervention “which obliges a response from outsiders if a state by its conduct 
outrages the conscience of mankind.”
R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 114. 
ibid., p. 123. 
ibid., p. 125.
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In doing so, Vincent inadvertently paved the way for the association of Hugo 
Grotius with the concept o f humanitarian intervention that emerged shortly after. It 
is important to note however, that although a number o f those theorists explicitly 
derive this association from Vincent, he did not wholly endorse it himself. In this 
vein, Vincent argues that “while it is possible to read into his work the basis o f a 
fully fledged principle o f non-intervention, and also a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention as an exception to it, it is anachronistic to take Grotius’ writings as 
indicating the arrival o f these ideas in international society.” Significantly, what 
he does concede is that “themes which arise from Grotius’ work.. .give shape to the 
contemporary discussion o f human rights and intervention.” Thus, these themes 
will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.
The Grotian Tradition and Humanitarian Intei^ention
In more recent scholarship, International Relations has witnessed the emergence of 
a subsidiary strand of the ‘Grotian tradition’ concerned explicitly with the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention. Emanating from the works of Bull and Vincent, this 
tributary of the ‘Grotian tradition’ seeks to theorise humanitarian intervention by 
reference to elements of the wider ‘Grotian tradition’, as constructed by 
Lauterpacht, Wight and Bull, interspersed with tracts of Grotius’ actual works. For 
example, both Oliver Ramsbotham’s ‘reconceptualisation’ of humanitarian
R.J. Vincent, “Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention”, in Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), p.242.
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intervention and Adam Roberts’ 'humanitarian war’ are explicitly derived tfom 
Vincent’s Nonintervention and International O r d e r On the other hand, Nicholas 
Wheeler’s Saving Strangers aims to build on Bull’s contribution by demonstrating 
the extent to which contending concepts within his work "generate competing 
approaches to the legitimacy o f humanitarian intervention.” By doing so, such 
theorists have unwittingly contributed to the peipetuation o f Bull’s convoluted 
branch of the ‘Grotian tradition’.
In particular, both Bull’s contending ‘pluralist’ and ‘solidarist’ approaches to 
international society and the firm distinction he makes between principles of order 
and justice from which they are derived, are especially applicable to the concept of 
humanitarian intervention. As Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris argue, 
illustrating the tension inherent within the concept of humanitarian intervention, 
"conflict between order and justice is revealed in its starkest form in those 
exceptional cases of human suffering that are triggered either by the breakdown of 
the state into anarchy and civil war, or by the genocidal practice of governments
Oliver Rainsbothain, “Humanitarian intervention 1990-5; a need to reconceptualize?”. Review o f  
International Studies, Vol.23, No.4, (October 1997), pp.445-468; Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian 
War: Militaiy Intervention and Human Rights”, International Affairs. Vol.69, No.3, (July 1993), 
pp.429-450; R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974).
Nicholas Wlieeler. Smnng Strangers: Humanitarian Inteivention in International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 12.
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and ethnic militias competing for control o f the state.”‘‘^  ^ Similarly, despite arguing 
that the line-up is somewhat too simplistic, Oliver Ramsbotham recognises that the 
question of humanitarian intervention “is often said to represent a conflict between 
concepts of sovereignty, order and non-intervention on the one hand, and human 
rights, justice and intervention on the o t h e r . W i t h  this, it is immediately apparent 
that even on a fairly superficial level. Bull’s scheme stands as a pervasive structure 
dictating and directing the theorisation o f other concepts in international relations.
Definitions of humanitarian intervention that begin from an understanding of 
international society generally take as their starting point a recognition of the 
primacy of the principle o f non-intervention to the maintenance of order in 
international r e l a t i o n s . I n  this vein, humanitarian intervention is usually defined 
as an exception to the rule o f non-intervention and is specified as the “use o f force 
by one state against another to protect the nations o f the latter from acts or 
omissions of their own government which shock the conscience o f m a n k i n d . I n  
accordance with the centrality o f the principle of non-intervention to the 
maintenance of order in the international states system however, debates 
surrounding the theorisation o f humanitarian intervention tend to pivot about the 
critical question o f whether or not the practice ought to be justified. In light o f the
Nicholas Wlieeler and Justin Morris, “Humanitariim Intervention and State Practice at tlve End of 
tlie Cold War”, in International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, ed. 
Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, (HoundsmiU: Macmillan, 1996), p. 135.
Ramsbotham, “Humanitarian intervention 1990-5”, p.446.
^  Bruce D. Jones, “‘Intervention without Borders’; Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990- 
9A''\ Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol.24, No.2, (Smnmer 1995). p.228. 
y W.
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contending conceptualisations o f international society and their contingent 
approaches to the supposed tension between order and justice within it, Bull’s 
distinction between pluralism and solidarism is particularly instructive here.
As Wheeler explains, adopting Bull’s schematization, “[pjluralist intemational- 
society theory defines humanitarian intervention as a violation of the cardinal rules 
of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use o f f o r c e . A t  heart, this failure to 
endorse the practice o f humanitarian intervention is derived from the reasoning that, 
as “agreement is not possible on universal principles o f human rights, any attempt 
to impose what must necessarily be a particularist value would disrupt order” in the 
international system.^^^ Extending this notion, and also revealing their reliance on 
Bull’s scheme, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse contend that although there is 
“enough commonality to generate rules o f association that are generally respected” 
in international relations, from a pluralist perspective, not enough commonality 
exists “to overcome local particularisms” that could potentially disrupt order. '^ '^  ^
Conversely, the solidarist approach acknowledges that states have a responsibility 
not only “to protect the security o f their own citizens, but also... [a] wider one of 
‘guardianship of human rights everywhere’. I n  this vein then, Saving Strangers 
proceeds by making the ‘solidarist’ claim that '"states that massively violate human
202 wqiGGler, Saving Strangers, p. 11.
^  Nicholas Wheeler, “Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society : Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol.21, No.3, (Winter 
1992), p.471.
Oliver Ramsbotliam and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: 
A Reconceptualization, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.31.
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 12.
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rights should forfeit their right to be tixated as legitimate sovereigns, thereby 
morally entitling other states to use force to stop the oppression.
As with the presentation o f their contending approaches to international society, so 
Oppenheim and Grotius are deemed illustrative of the pluralist and solidarist 
positions on humanitarian intervention. However, although Oppenheim certainly 
voiced reservations about the notion of humanitarian intervention, arguing, 
somewhat skeptically that “[n]o State will ever intervene in the affairs of another if 
it has not some important interest in doing so”, he did concede the possibility of 
justifying collective intervention.^^^ Thus, writing in 1919, he doubts that “there 
really is a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such interventions”, but 
acknowledges that “public opinion and the Powers are in favour of such 
interventions” and that, “it may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations will 
recognise the rule that interventions in the interest of humanity are admissible, 
provided they are exercised in the form of a collective intervention o f the 
Powers.”^ °^
Similarly, with the apparent ability of solidarism to justify the practice of 
humanitarian intervention, its representative, Hugo Grotius, has not only been 
reconnected to the concept but once again heralded the ‘father of humanitarian 
intervention’. Indeed, following this admittedly understandable trend, in seeking to
ibid., p. 12-13. Italics in text.
Oppenlieim, p.230, 229.
/W.. p.229.
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locate the historical origins o f the concept of humanitarian intervention, Wheeler 
writes that “lawyers date the origins o f the doctrine to the seventeenth-century 
Dutch international lawyer Hugo Grotius, who considered the rights of the 
sovereign could be limited by principles o f h u m a n i t y . S i m i l a r l y ,  despite 
recognising the possibility o f its earlier origins, Simon Chesterman writes that;
The classical origins of what became known as humanitarian intervention lie 
in the emergence o f a substantive doctrine o f the just war in the Middle 
Ages. This was developed in large part by the scholastics, but achieved its 
most comprehensive and widely publicised form in the work of the 
Protestant Hollander Hugo Grotius.
However, as revealed in Chapter Three, claims that Grotius ought to be considered 
the father of humanitarian intervention, although obviously derived from his 
position within the theoretical construction of the solidarist approach to 
international society, are ill-conceived. Although this is not immediately critical to 
the theorisation of humanitarian intervention itself -  although, its ramifications may 
well be -  it serves as a warning that something has gone seriously awry in the 
construction of the ‘international society approach’ to international relations.
^  Wheeler, Sending Strangers, p.45.
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2001), p.9.
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Conclusion
What the assertion that Grotius ought to be considered the ‘father of humanitarian 
intervention’ reveals is the extent to which the historical figure o f Hugo Grotius has 
been obscured in International Relations scholarship. As illustrated above, this has 
particularly been the case amongst theorists o f the ‘English School’ and their 
intellectual predecessors. For Hersch Lauterpacht and Martin Wight, the Grotian 
tradition was simply an intermediary categoiy of international legal scholarship that 
stood between the dominant natural and positive law traditions. According to 
Lauterpacht, in an analytical sense, Grotius was not a ‘Grotian’, however in Wight’s 
incarnation, Grotius is both a ‘Grotian’ and a ‘rationalist’, although he is not the 
only or most important member o f either o f these categories. Similarly, for Hedley 
Bull, Grotius is a ‘Grotian’ and a ‘rationalist’. However, in Bull the ‘Grotian 
tradition’ is not only synonymous with rationalism, as conceived by Wight, but also 
represents a subdivision o f the rationalist tradition alongside ‘pluralism’. However, 
in this vein, it is not logically clear why ‘pluralism’ is not also ‘Grotian’. In 
particular, given that Grotius’ work contains both ‘solidarist’ and ‘pluralist’ ideas, 
and the manner in which the pluralist category is constructed by fusing a broadly 
conceived notion o f the ‘Grotian’ with elements o f realist and legal positivist 
thought, this seems to suggest that Bull’s pluralist/solidarist division is, in fact, a 
false one. Next, in an attempt to pin some sort of definition to the ‘Gi'otian 
tradition’, contemporary theorists such as Robert Jackson, have simply asserted that 
Giotians are ‘international society theorists’ and, although Grotius is occasionally 
mentioned, his position within this ‘Grotian’ tradition is rarely considered. Finally,
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this ‘international society approach’, complete with its ‘solidarist’ and ‘pluralist’ 
variants, has been applied to the concept o f humanitarian intervention, leading to 
the re-emergence of the erroneous claim that Grotius was the ‘father of 
humanitarian intervention’.
However, what is particularly significant here is not simply the designation o f the 
‘Grotian tradition’ as a tradition of thought about international society, but the 
simultaneous invention of what might be called an ‘international society tradition’. 
In this vein. Bull depicts the development o f the concept o f international society as 
beginning in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the natural law 
writings o f thinkers such as Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili, Grotius and Pufendorf that 
emerged in réponse to the “social and moral vacuum left by the receding respublic 
Christiand\ continuing in a distinctly ‘European’ frame in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century writings o f Wolff, Vattel, Moser, Burke, von Martens, Gentz, 
Heeren and others, before emerging as the concept of ‘world international society’ 
in the twentieth century.^H ow ever, as discussed earlier in this and the previous 
chapter, ‘international society’ is a conceptual conglomerate, fundamentally 
constituted by the fusion o f two antecedent sets of ideas, those pertaining to the 
functioning of the ju s  gentium in the societas gentium and the existence of a 
Staaten-system whilst retaining elements of the civitas maxima and respublica 
Christiana.
Bull. The Anarchical Society, p.26-36, quote atp.26.
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In this sense, the histoiy o f the idea that is ‘international society’ may be considered 
a ‘scissors-and-paste’ a f f a i r / Ho we ve r ,  until the mid-twentieth century, Grotius 
was associated with only one piece o f the international society jigsaw. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, although Grotius includes a number o f concepts somewhat akin to 
notions of the societas gentium,, ‘international society’ is not coherently or 
consistently conceived in his works. With this in mind, it would make as much 
sense to herald Francisco de Suarez with his notion o f societas gentium, Richard 
Zouche on account o f his identification o f the Jus inter gentes or Christian von 
Wolff for his devotion to the civitas maxima, the ‘midwife’ o f international society, 
as Bull describes Grotius.
The ‘Grotian tradition’ o f Bull’s construction is similarly an exercise in ‘scissors- 
and-paste’ history, only here the cut-outs include elements o f both what it means to 
be ‘Grotian’ and what is constituted by a ‘tradition’. Bull’s Grotian tradition is 
therefore a collage, cut primarily from the scholarship o f Grotius, Lauterpacht, 
Oppenheim and Wight with little consideration of the fact that they are talking 
about distinctly different things. Pasted together, elements of these writers’ works 
are fused to form a new, largely unrecognisable picture of both Grotius and what it 
means to be ‘Grotian’.
Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem o f Order, p.77,
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VII
Conclusion: Hugo Grotius and the Grotian Tradition 
in International Relations
From the outset, this thesis has sought to address two specific sets of questions. In 
the first instance, it has sought to ascertain precisely what it means to be ‘Grotian’, 
both in relation to Hugo Grotius and as the term has been employed in subsequent 
scholarship. In doing so, it has considered three particular sets of texts. First, 
Chapter Three considered a range of Grotius’ works that are o f relevance to the 
study o f international relations. Thus, in addition to explicating the central themes 
o f De Jure Belli ac Pads, it also traced the development o f Gi otius’ thought in his 
earlier and less well known works. De Republica Emendanda, De Antiquitate 
Reipublicae Baiavicae, Commentarius in Theses XI, Mare Liberum and De Jure 
Praedae, The second set o f texts considered were those in which key elements of 
Grotius’ thought were later developed and includes the works of Samuel Pufendorf, 
Jean Barbeyrac, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Christian von Wolff, Emerich de 
Vattel, James Kent and Henry Wheaton. Together, this set of writers stand as the 
intellectual precursors o f the Grotian traditions o f the twentieth century. Finally, the 
third set of texts considered are those in which the formally constituted variants of 
the Grotian tradition emerged and have developed in twentieth century scholarship. 
This set of texts includes the works of Cornelius van Vollenhoven, J.L. Brierly, 
Lassa Oppenheim, Georg Schwarzenberger, Hersch Lauterpacht, Martin Wight,
Hedley Bull, R J. Vincent and, in contemporary scholarship, Tim Dunne, Robert 
Jackson, and Nicholas Wheeler.
The second set of questions with which this thesis has been concerned has sought to 
ascertain precisely what it means to designate a set of thinkers or ideas a ‘tradition’ 
and highlight some of the epistemological ramifications o f doing so. In the first 
instance, this line o f inquiry has been pursued in purely theoretical terms. Thus, 
Chapter Two considered how the term ‘tradition’ is best conceived and, in light of 
its historical implications, concluded that all traditions, like all forms o f history, are, 
in an Oakeshottian sense, invented. By applying a set o f methodological principles 
derived from Brian Schmidt’s ‘critical internal discursive’ approach to the analysis 
of traditions, the remainder o f the thesis proceeded by considering the sense in 
which the Grotian tradition, in its various forms, was itself invented. In doing so, it 
asked precisely what individual proponents o f the Grotian tradition have meant by 
its designation as a tradition and, by extension, how their particular understanding 
of what is constituted by a tradition has impacted the epistemological contents and 
membership of the Grotian tradition itself.
Considered together these two lines o f inquiry constitute an intellectual history of 
the Grotian tradition from Hugo Grotius to the contemporary writings o f the 
English School. Its central argument contends that the Grotian tradition is a 
tradition o f thought about law and morality, understood not as two separate entities, 
but in terms o f their relationship to one another. It is in essence, if not always in
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substance, derived from the synthesis o f law and morality evident in De Jure Belli 
ac Pads, although in subsequent scholarship it has assumed a wide variety of 
guises. By extension, this thesis therefore also argues that contrary to its 
contemporary conceptualisation, the Grotian tradition has not, historically speaking, 
been a tradition of thought about international society. Rather, this union coincided 
with the emergence o f more sophisticated conceptualisations o f international 
society in the writings o f Martin Wight and, in particular, Hedley Bull. However, 
this is not to suggest that events in the development of the concept of international 
society did not have an impact upon the evolution of the Grotian tradition, or that 
law and morality do not constitute an essential part of contemporary conceptions of 
international society. Rather, it simply serves to suggest that international society 
has not been the central focus o f either Grotian scholarship or the Grotian tradition 
for much of its existence.
The "Grotius problem ’
The explication of the central argument of this thesis has required a frmdamental 
reconceptualisation o f both the historical figure of Hugo Grotius and the contents of 
his works. This has been achieved in the first instance via a sustained engagement 
with a wide range o f Grotius’ works including, in addition to his ‘international 
legal’ works, those texts ordinarily categorised as works of history, jurisprudence 
and theology. What is more, in providing a more holistic treatment of Grotius than 
he is ordinarily afforded in International Relations scholarship, a concerted effort 
has been made not to prefigure the interpretation of his texts either by relying on the
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interpretations o f identified ‘Grotians’ or by attempting to categorise Grotius’ 
thought according to a set of retrospectively conceived intellectual traditions. As 
such, the consideration o f the intellectual, and for that matter, historical, political 
and personal, contexts in which Grotius wrote, has been limited to those he self­
consciously identifies as sources of inspiration.
Contraiy to his contemporary characterisation therefore, Grotius is presented not as 
the ‘father of international law’, ‘séculariser o f the law of nature’, ‘midwife of 
international society’, or even as a proponent of the doctrine o f humanitarian 
intervention, but in terms of what has been called ‘Grotian morality’. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, Grotian morality is a thiee-tiered moral scheme devised in 
response to a number o f personal and historical tensions with which Grotius was 
faced. It is constituted by three inteiweaving layers of morality derived from the 
law o f nature, the central precepts o f the just war tradition, and the Christian law of 
love. Although it was not until the twentieth century work of Hersch Lauterpacht 
that all three tiers o f Grotius’ scheme appeared together under the banner o f the 
‘Giotian tradition’, albeit in a secular form, Grotian scholarship was sustained in the 
interim by the continuing appeal o f its constituent parts.
In the first instance, Samuel Pufendorf drew upon Grotius’ work, presenting an 
even more forcefully argued case for the application of the law o f nature to the 
conduct o f nations than his intellectual ‘father’ had done, reorienting Grotius’ 
natural law theory in accordance with principles of moral voluntarism and
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attempting, unsatisfactorily, to resolve the problem of obligation inherent in it. 
Despite a period of relative moral downturn in the works of Wolff and Vattel, the 
early nineteenth century saw the revival o f an explicitly Christian Grotian morality 
at the hands o f James Kent and Henry Wheaton. Similarly, the early twentieth 
century saw the return o f Grotius’ works to mainstream international scholarship 
with Cornelius van Vollenhoven’s solid defence of Grotius’ works and appeal to the 
principle o f temperamenta and precepts o f the j m  caritas. At the same time, 
elements of Grotian natural law morality were evident in the ‘idealist’ international 
works of theorists such as J.L. Brierly, while Georg Schwarzenberger identified a 
Grotian tradition o f morality standing between those derived from the natural and 
positive legal traditions. However, Hersch Lauterpacht undoubtedly stands as the 
most important proponent o f Grotian morality since Hugo Grotius himself. Indeed, 
it is in Lauterpacht’s conceptualisation of the Grotian tradition of international law 
that all three tiers of Grotius’ moral scheme not only appear but are specifically 
directed towards the regulation o f state conduct. Finally, as indicated in the 
previous chapter, it is this form of the Grotian tradition that appears in the works of 
Martin Wight and is there categorised under the broader banner of the rationalist 
tradition.
Thus, although a direct pattern of transmission cannot be discerned linking Grotius 
through successive generations o f scholars to the twentieth century, it is clear that 
the Grotian moral tradition not only owes its origins to the seventeenth century 
thinker but retains at least a minimal responsibility to his ideas. However,
401
conceiving Grotius and the Grotian tradition in this manner is not possible without 
acknowledging that Grotius was not simply an international lawyer, politician, 
diplomat and historian, but a theologian and committed Christian. In this vein, a 
possible reason for the overwhelming neglect of the moral element o f Grotian 
scholarship in International Relations is the reticence with which Christian based 
morality is approached in contemporary scholarship. As Scott M. Thomas writes, 
scholars are often reluctant “to examine the personal beliefs, particularly the 
religious beliefs, o f scholars because it can cross uncomfortably the boundaries of 
private and public life.”  ^ This is all very well and good in those instances in which 
scholars have sought to draw a firm line o f demarcation dividing their private from 
their scholarly life. However, it is counterproductive in those instances in which 
they have not. Thus, to attempt to interpret Grotius’ works in isolation from the 
religious beliefs and theological ideas that permeate his writings is to risk 
fundamentally distorting the very nature of the man. As is evident thioughout his 
work, Grotius is as comfortable incorporating tracts of biblical exegesis in a so- 
called work of ‘international law’ such as De Jure Belli ac P ads  as he is discussing 
contending conceptualisations of sovereignty in those works later classified as 
‘theological’. Although the last outwardly Christian account of Grotian morality 
appeared in the early nineteenth century work of James Kent, elements o f Grotius’ 
Christian morality remained central to the Grotian tradition well into the twentieth 
century. Thus, although for understandable reasons Lauterpacht dropped the 
explicitly Christian element of this higher morality in his incarnation of the Grotian
 ^ Scott M. Thomas. “Faith, histoiy and Martin Wight: the role of religion in die liistorical sociology 
of the English school of International International Affairs, Vol.77, No.4, (2001), p.907.
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tradition, he too incorporated its fundamental principles. Similarly, although it is 
not afforded a great deal o f attention in his works, a sense o f the Christian morality 
of the Grotian tradition is also retained in Martin Wight’s thought. It is therefore not 
at all surprising that the point o f disjuncture at which the Grotian tradition was 
transformed from a tradition o f thought about morality to a tradition of thought 
about international society coincided with the contribution of Hedley Bull whose 
sceptical attitude towards Christianity is renowned.
However, the experience o f Grotius in the secular world o f International Relations 
is not unique. Foremost amongst twentieth century scholars whose theological ideas 
have been marginalised or flatly ignored is the radical theologian and realist 
international relations theorist Reinhold Niebuhr. For example, despite 
acknowledging that The Nature and Destiny o f  Man, a heavily theological piece, is 
Niebuhr’s most important work, it is dismissed as being “likely to be of interest 
only to those with a serious theological or philosophical bent” in Jack Donnelly’s 
work. Realism and International Relations f  Similarly, although Torbjorn Knutsen’s 
A History o f  International Relations Theory recognises that Niebuhr “provided the 
moral foundation for the new realist approach” that appeared in the 1930s, he does 
not consider its theological foundations.^ As such, despite being first and foremost a 
Christian theologian, Niebuhr is transformed into a wholly secular theorist who.
 ^ Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p.40.
 ^Torbjorii Knutsen, A history of International Relations theory, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997), p.241.
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alongside Hans Morgenthau, is considered one of the two ‘formulators’ of realist 
thought. Thus, like Grotius, Niebuhr has come to be characterised in terms o f an 
externally demarcated tradition o f thought within which there is little room for 
ecclesiastically derived thought.
The ‘traditions tradition ’
As suggested in the opening chapter of this thesis, the ‘Grotius problem’ is, in many 
respects, a symptom of the wider set o f problems associated with the ‘traditions 
tradition’ of International Relations. As introduced in Chapters One and Two, many 
of the problems associated with the invention of the Grotian tradition center around 
the conceptualisation o f the term tradition itself. Whether employed as a taxonomic 
device or to designate a self-consciously perpetuated pattern of transmission, the 
term ‘tradition’ brings with it a range o f historical and epistemological 
connotations. Whether intentionally or not, traditions infer an inherent connection 
to the past and, in most instances, make certain sets of assumptions about its 
origins. They demarcate who and what is ‘in’ and, in doing so, create linkages 
between both thinkers and their ideas.
As demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, the term ‘tradition’ has been used to 
varying effect in the invention o f the Grotian tradition. In particular, it could be 
argued that many of the problems associated with the convoluted and conceptually 
entangled contemporary Grotian tradition stem from Bull’s failure to understand the 
sense in which Wight used the term tradition itself; that, as Jens Bartelson points
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out, he transformed a set of traditions defined in terms of conceptual coherence to 
ones marked by continuity/ However, this seems slightly disingenuous. After all, 
Wight did himself seem to oscillate between viewing traditions as vague 
paradigmatic entities and conceiving them, more conventionally, as direct patterns 
of transmission. Similarly, following a long-standing tradition o f international legal 
scholarship that stretches back at least as far as Henry Wheaton, Hersch Lauterpacht 
includes in his work a ‘Grotian tradition’ that is simply a taxonomic category and 
that does not infer any notion of transmission.
Beyond apportioning blame for the current state of the Grotian tradition however, 
what is clear is that Brian Schmidt’s contention that International Relations has 
been marked by a “tendency to view an analytical tradition as an actual historical 
one” is borne out in this context.^ In particular, a distinct move from an analytically 
constituted Grotian tradition evident in the international legal scholarship of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to an historical tradition can be identified in 
the transmission of ideas from Wight to Bull. In particular, whereas the Grotian 
tradition was previously conceived as an intermediary category of thought, when 
associated with the concept of international society in Bull’s work, it becomes an 
historical tradition starting with Grotius, himself deemed to have ‘followed’ Vitoria, 
and extending to Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel and so on and so forth. What has resulted
Jens Bartelson, “Short circuits; society and tradition in international relations tlieoiy”. Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 22, (1996), p.347.
■ Brian C. Sclunidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p.25.
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is the entirely anachronistic characterisation of these and other writers who extend 
the path of transmission into the twentieth century as ‘Grotians’ as defined by Bull 
in terms of international society.
These findings also accord well with Schmidt and Gunnell’s criticisms of the ‘grand 
tradition’ of international relations theory on two separate fronts. As mentioned 
above, International Relations’ proclivity for the invention o f ‘grand traditions’ is 
played out with the construction of a single Grotian tradition extending from 
Grotius through almost four hundred years to the scholarship of Martin Wight and 
Hedley Bull. Secondly, and as hinted at in the conclusion of the previous chapter, 
the invention of the ‘international society tradition’ is similarly ‘grand’ in 
orientation. Here, as with the invention of the contemporary Grotian tradition, Hugo 
Grotius is appropriated as the great classical scholar from which an apparently 
grand tradition of thought is derived. However, what we have in both cases is an 
analytical tradition that groups together a range of thinkers who have contributed 
elements of a modem conceptual composite, such as ‘international society’ or 
‘Grotianism’, masquerading as an historical tradition.
As indicated in the opening chapter of this thesis, a number of specific problems are 
associated with the construction of traditions in this manner. In a methodological 
sense, the invention o f a grand ‘Grotian’ or ‘international society’ tradition, 
conceived in accordance with their contemporary conceptualisations will inevitably 
entail, at the very least, the implicit prefiguring of the works included. For example.
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as demonstrated in Chapter Three, in contemporary scholarship the designation of 
the Grotian tradition as a tradition concerned with the concepts o f international 
society and humanitarian intervention has lead to an entirely anachronistic reading 
of De Jure Belli ac Pads. On an ontological level, the placement of a thinker in a 
retrospectively conceived tradition o f thought limits or even precludes the 
possibility that they might be characterised in an alternative manner. As 
demonstrated above, by interpreting Grotius’ works in isolation from his 
contemporary characterisation it has been possible to derive an entirely different 
picture of the man and his works to that ordinarily presented in International 
Relations scholarship. Finally, the construction o f grand traditions as the means 
according to which present concepts are both explained and lent some sort of 
historically derived credence is fundamentally epistemologically limiting. In 
particular, the designation of the Grotian tradition as a tradition o f thought about 
international society left little room for the consideration o f Grotius’ moral scheme.
As Alastair Murray points out, a similar set o f problems has also beset the portrayal 
of the realist tradition in contemporary International Relations scholarship. 
According to Murray, realism is similarly a distinct twentieth century tradition, its 
most prominent proponents including E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann and Henry Kissinger. Although the title 
‘realism’ does not impute a necessary association to a great classical thinker, as the 
Grotian tradition automatically refers to Grotius, the realist tradition has attached 
itself to the writings o f both Machiavelli and Hobbes. Thus, in a similar manner to
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the construction o f a single Grotian tradition extending from Hugo Grotius to 
Hedley Bull and beyond, realism has suffered from continual attempts to “construct 
a ‘realist’ grand narrative in which historical figures with some affiliation to this 
mode of thought are lined up in a surreal identity parade of ‘the usual suspects’.”  ^
However, this grand narrative has rendered ‘realism’ “little more than an arbitrary 
anachronism, devoid o f any positive benefit,”  ^ thereby echoing the previous 
sentiments that question how meaningful a ‘Grotian’ grand narrative is. In order to 
overcome this problem, Murray suggests, with regard to the realist tradition, that the 
ideas of Machiavelli and Hobbes are “better conceived of as distinct traditions of 
thought in their own right,” the label ‘realist’ being reserved for its modern 
proponents.^ In a similar vein, this thesis has designated writers such as Pufendorf, 
Wolff and Vattel, not as ‘Grotians’ in a modem sense, but as precursors to the 
Grotian traditions of the twentieth century.
Of course, Murray’s work is not representative of the treatment of realism in 
mainstream International Relations scholarship but rather stands as a critique and 
reformulation o f the realist tradition. The opening sentence of Jack Donnelly’s 
Realism and International Relations is more representative and reads; “The 
tradition o f political realism -  realpolitik, power politics -  has a long history that is 
typically traced back to the great Greek historian Thucydides in the fifth century
 ^ Alastair J.H. Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics, 
(Edinburgh; Keele University Press, 1997), p.3.
 ^ ibid.
 ^ibid.
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B C /’^  Similarly, Martin Wight’s conceptualisation of realism accords well with its 
general treatment in International Relations scholarship:
[t]he Realist tradition in international theory is as familiar, virtually as self- 
conscious and as continuous as the Rationalist. At the beginning stands the 
astonishing figure o f Machiavelli, the first man (since the Greeks) to look at 
politics without ethical presuppositions. He was in a real sense the inventor 
o f Realism.
However, as Wight himself acknowledges, Machiavelli did not see himself as 
starting a particular strand o f thought called realism but was retrospectively 
identified as its originator. Similarly, although Hobbes, Bodin and Spinoza, 
amongst others, have been considered his ‘followers’, none of these thinkers self­
consciously thought of themselves as ‘realists’ or understood themselves to be 
continuing a pattern of transmission that originated with Machiavelli.
Implications fo r  International Relations
In order to overcome the plethora of problems surrounding the use of the term 
‘tradition’ in International Relations then, more thorough consideration o f precisely 
what it means to designate a set o f thinkers of ideas a tradition needs to be 
incorporated into contemporaiy scholarship. This does not mean simply identifying
 ^Donnelly, p.l.
Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter,
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 16.
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a range o f types of tradition employed in the discipline, as Tim Dunne, and 
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts have usefully done, but considering their 
historical and epistemological ramifications and answering a range of questions 
associated with them/^ What specific relationship between past and present does 
the designation o f something as a ‘tradition’ infer? What do we think the past 
actually is? Is interpretative authority deemed to reside in past or present elements 
of a tradition? Are traditions inherently ‘invented’ phenomena? Must a thinker self­
consciously declare membership o f an intellectual tradition to be considered part of 
one? Is the invention o f analytical traditions a legitimate scholarly device? What 
epistemological constraints do traditions confer upon sets of ideas?
Answering these questions ultimately requires engaging seriously in both that area 
of scholarship known as ‘the history of ideas’ and the philosophy of history that 
underpins it. However, ‘doing’ the history of ideas properly in International 
Relations requires a fundamental reconsideration of how we ‘do’ history in general 
in the discipline. It means engaging in debates about history, what it is and how we 
ought to go about doing it. It means asking serious philosophical questions about 
what it means to interpret a text or an historical event; for example, how does one 
go about reading an historical text? Is it accurate to interpret ‘great’ or ‘classic’ 
texts as addressing universal issues and universal audiences? Should a text be
Tim Dumie, “Mythology or methodology? Traditions in international tlieory”. Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 19, (1993), pp.305-318; Benedict Kingsbuiy and Adam Roberts, 
“Introduction: Grotian Tliought in International Relations”, in Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbuiy and Adam Roberts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), pp. 1-64.
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considered in isolation or should it be interpreted in terms of the context in which it 
was written? If  so, which contexts should the interpreter consider and how much 
interpretive weight do they carry? How does one reconcile the inevitable ‘filtering’ 
of the interpreter? More fundamentally, as indicated in Chapter Two, we need to 
decide on an individual basis what our response to the past/present paradox is. For, 
if ‘all knowledge is past knowledge’ rather than evidence of present thinking as 
suggested in this thesis, then the way we ‘do’ history will be distinctly different to 
the methods pursued here. This is not to suggest that everyone in the discipline 
ought to drop what they are doing immediately and start thinking about the history 
of ideas. Rather, it is merely to suggest that if the discipline as a whole is going to 
refer to these texts and continue to construct disciplinary histories accordingly, then 
someone needs to.
The call for serious engagement with the history of ideas has, in itself, two main 
implications. First, the inclusion o f studies such as this within the broad remit of 
International Relations requires a rethinking o f conventional categorisation schemes 
according to which the discipline is presented. In particular, the designation of 
works as either positivist or post-positivist is especially problematic as it does not 
provide room for this area o f study. Thus, although the history of ideas is plainly 
post-positivist in its general orientation, it cannot be equated with any o f the 
specific theoretical fiameworks that are categorised within its broader remit. As 
such, it is most often overlooked as a field of inquiry within International Relations 
or relegated to the realm o f Political Theory.
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Thus, the second and related implication of engaging seriously in the history of 
ideas in the discipline is that the reintegration of International Relations, Political 
Theory and International Law that has already begun to take place must continue to 
be reinforced. In particular, as many of the concepts deemed constitutive of 
contemporary International Relations owe their intellectual ancestry to scholarship 
that was not officially demarcated as ‘International Relations’, ‘Political Theoiy’ or 
‘International Law’, the barriers that demarcate these three ‘disciplines’ are not only 
artificial but epistemologically limiting. In this vein, it is also possible to argue in 
favour of the reintegration of theological thought with International Relations 
scholarship, although it is more than likely that this would be even less 
enthusiastically received than the integration suggested above.
However, this thesis stands as testimony to the extent to which the widely adhered 
to disciplinary boundaries that demarcate International Relations, International Law 
and Political Theory are, in fact, false ones. As made evident in Chapters Three and 
Four, for much of the four hundred years that have elapsed since Grotius’ time, no 
distinction existed between International Relations and International Law. For 
example, writers such as Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel and even Grotius himself, cannot 
possibly be considered either international relations theorists or international 
lawyers; plainly they are both. Even as late as the 1940s, amongst idealist thinkers 
in particular, little distinction was recognised between International Law and 
International Relations. In this vein, their premier project and intellectual focus, the
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League o f Nations, was simultaneously an institution of international relations and 
international law, and as such, its proponents straddled the dividing line between 
the two disciplines. Thus, as discussed in Chapter Five, it was not until the rise to 
prominence of both realist and positivist thought that an absolute demarcation of 
International Relations and International Law was achieved. However, in 
recognition of their historical and conceptual proximity, contemporary writers such 
as Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and Kenneth Abbott have identified a number of 
‘sites’ at which International Law and International Relations might be rejoined. 
Thus, the history of ideas in international thought stands alongside regime theory 
and the conceptualisation o f international society as a further possible site of 
reintegration.
Similarly, as discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, the commonly held 
distinction between Political Theory and International Law is also an artificial 
construction. As Stephen J. Toope points out, although they appear to reside in 
“almost hermetically sealed chambers” in contemporary scholarship, scholars of 
International Relations and International Law rely on the same “sources of 
inspiration” for their ideas; for example, the works of Plato, Grotius, Pufendorf and
Anne-Marie Slaughter Buiiey, “International Law and International Relations Tlieory: A Dual 
Agenda”, American Journal o f International Law, Vol.87, No. 2, (April 1993), pp.205-239; Kenneth 
Abbott, “International Relations Tlieory, International Law and the Regime: Governing Atrocities of 
International Conflicts”, American Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 93, No. 2, (April 1999), 
pp.361-379; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tuliunello and Stepan Wood, “International Law and 
International Relations Theoiy: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarsliip”, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol.92, No.3, (July 1998), pp.367-397.
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Kant/^ In particular, the accepted foundations o f modern international law are 
found, not in a distinct discipline titled ‘international law’, but in writings on the 
law of nature that could equally be considered works of political theory.
Perhaps the most important of all however, is the artificial demarcation of 
International Relations and Political Theory that marks contemporary scholarship. 
In part at least, this distinction has been facilitated by International Relations’ 
overwhelming desire to view itself as a distinct discipline. Thus, in accordance with 
the search for an individual identity. International Relations has promulgated a 
mythical story within which its origins are located in the early twentieth century and 
its development is traced through three, or perhaps even four successive ‘great 
debates’. Two main problems are associated with this. First, in the sense that is 
inferred by this conventional form of disciplinary history. International Relations 
only really emerged as a distinct scholarly discipline in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, 
although it had existed since 1919, it was almost twenty years before writers such as 
E.H. Carr began to think o f themselves as international relations theorists and 
compose their works accordingly. As mentioned above, prior to then, particularly 
with the works o f the ‘idealists’, the central concerns of international relations were 
not considered in isolation but intermingled with political and international legal 
thought. Secondly, by fixing the origins o f International Relations in this manner, 
the discipline denies itself much o f its history prior to then. Of course the study of
Stephen J. Toope, “Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law”, in The Role of Law 
in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael 
Byers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.9I.
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international relations did not begin in 1919 but had been pursued for hundreds, if  
not thousands of years in a range o f areas now understood as distinct disciplines, in 
particular, political theory. In implicit recognition of this, as mentioned in the 
opening chapter of this thesis, much o f the exercise o f compiling a ‘canon’ of 
International Relations classics has therefore entailed the pillaging of those works 
from the realm of political theory that address ‘international’ concerns. What this 
phenomenon indicates is not only the fact that a disciplinary distinction has not 
always been observed between International Relations and Political Theory but, in a 
more practical sense, that “there have been many periods in the past when a clear- 
cut distinction between the “international” and the “domestic” has not existed. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, this is certainly the case with regard to the works of 
Hugo Grotius.
Within the development of Grotian scholarship from Grotius to the twentieth 
century no reasonable distinction can be drawn between Political Theory, 
International Relations and International Law. As a tradition o f thought, the Grotian 
tradition spans all three disciplines, not by self-consciously incorporating elements 
of each ‘discipline’, but by refusing to acknowledge their distinction. Thus at the 
outset, although natural law theory is most commonly viewed as a facet of political 
thought, within the context of Grotian morality it is equally concerned with 
‘domestic’ matters of human nature and political community, and ‘international’
Cliris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger, “Introduction”, in International Relations in 
Political Theory: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 1.
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conflict between states. Similarly, as morally equivalent entities, the higher morality 
that is defined in terms o f temperamenta and the ju s  cariias is equally applicable to 
individuals and states in Grotius’ scheme. Finally, and in accordance with Grotius’ 
central aim, the limitation and regulation of war, the central elements o f Grotian 
morality are embodied in what is understood in contemporary scholarship to be 
perhaps the earliest form of modern international law.
By reorienting the Grotian tradition in this manner, that is, as a tradition o f moral 
thought that spans the (artificial) boundaries of International Relations, 
International Law and Political Theory, this thesis opens the way for it to contribute 
once more to debates about morality in international thought. Thus, rather than 
simply existing as a classification device, the Grotian tradition can be more 
profitably employed to address a range o f questions that are pertinent to 
contemporary International Relations. In particular, the reorientation of the Grotian 
tradition in this manner entails its dissociation from the concept of international 
society with which it has been commonly equated. This is not to suggest that there 
is anything inherently wrong with the idea of international society itself. On the 
contrary, although, like most ideas, a range of problems are associated with its 
conceptualisation, international society remains a useful and seductive one. 
However, the main point here is that despite its individual merits, international 
society was not amongst Grotius’ central concerns.
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Rather, where the works of Grotius and the Grotian tradition that followed can 
contribute to the theorisation o f international society is in their application to the 
range o f normative and moral questions that surround it. For example, a reoriented 
Grotian tradition could contribute to Tim Dunne’s ‘radicalisation’ o f the English 
School by providing a strong moral dimension, grounded in a set of core values, 
that is otherwise lacking from Bull’s conception o f international society. For writers 
such as Nicholas Wheeler who have, in recent years, grappled with the inherent 
tension between the rights o f the individual and the rights of the state that are 
brought to the fore by the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention, both 
Grotius’ works and the Grotian tradition could provide an alternative set of 
principles according to which questions about its morality can be approached: Is 
humanitarian intervention a morally justifiable exercise? What does this tell us 
about the relative moral standing of the individual and the state?
Furthermore, and of increasing pertinence in contemporary scholarship, a reoriented 
Grotian tradition is capable of contributing to debates surrounding whether or not 
the principles of the just war tradition provide a sufficient set o f guidelines for the 
regulation and limitation o f war. For example, is there a higher set of moral 
principles in existence that could indicate what constraints ought to be placed on the 
behaviour of combatants in both entering and conducting war? Indeed, in a time 
when notions of pre-emptive and punitive war are gaining increasing prominence 
on the global political agenda, questions o f restraint are becoming increasingly 
important. Furthermore, as the horrors and human costs of war become increasingly
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apparent to the global public, fundamental moral questions about how humans 
ought to treat one another, particularly in conflict situations are becoming 
increasingly pertinent. By focusing the Grotian tradition on these and other moral 
questions that continue to challenge the discipline, International Relations gains not 
only a powerful and long-standing tradition o f thought, but retains a notion o f what 
it means to be ‘Grotian’ that is both in essence and in substance true to the ideals 
and aspirations of Hugo Grotius.
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